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Thomas Burnet’s Telluris theoria sacra and its English translation the Theory of the earth, published in 
two volumes between 1681 and 1690, was one of the most widely-discussed and controversial 
philosophical and theological works of late-seventeenth-century England. In it, Burnet attempted to 
trace the earth’s history from the Creation, through the Deluge, Conflagration, and Millennium, to the 
final consummation. Despite its notoriety, a full, in-depth study of this work has yet to be produced in 
English. This thesis is a first step to providing such a study. The thesis is composed of six chapters. The 
first offers a detailed overview of the Theory’s two volumes and their historical context. Chapter two 
examines its philosophical, theological, scriptural, and antiquarian foundations. The third chapter 
looks at two early responses to the work, Burnet’s replies to these responses, and his hugely 
controversial supplement to the Theory, the Archaeologiae philosophicae, published in 1692. Chapter 
four examines the so-called “Burnet controversy”, a proliferation of writings which emerged following 
the publication of the Archaeologiae and which attacked the Theory and proposed alternative 
philosophical accounts of the earth’s history. The final two chapters explore the relationship between 
Burnet and two important Newtonians who were involved in the controversy, chapter five discussing 
William Whiston’s 1696 New theory of the earth and the sixth and final chapter analysing John Keill’s 
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The first volume of Telluris theoria sacra by Thomas Burnet appeared in 1681 in an edition of just 
twenty-five copies. In it, Burnet attempted to give a philosophical account of the earth’s history from 
the Creation to the Deluge. This fascinating and novel explication of earth and Sacred history quickly 
became well known among the reading public in England and an immensely popular English 
translation, the Theory of the earth, translated by Burnet himself at the request of King Charles II, 
appeared in 1684. By the early 1690s, a second volume dealing with the future Conflagration and 
Millennium had been added to the work. This, too, had been translated into English, and the Theory 
had acquired two supplementary works: a short essay appended to the first English edition of the 
second volume entitled A review of the theory of the earth and the hugely controversial Archaeologiae 
philosophicae. By the end of the century, the Theory was in its third English and second Latin edition. 
By now it had been subjected to numerous attacks, some of which had elicited responses from its 
author, and had inspired several imitations, new theories of the earth in which authors tried to supply 
what appeared to them to be insurmountable defects in the old one. In the meantime, Burnet had 
become Master of the Charterhouse school, had been appointed to and subsequently forced to resign 
from the positions of Chaplain-in-Ordinary and Clerk of the Closet to King William III, and had been 
considered but passed over for the Archbishopric of Canterbury. The Theory was now so notorious 
that its author could be referred to simply as “the Theorist”. 
 In contrast with his later notoriety, Burnet’s beginnings were rather humble. He was born in 
Croft-on-Tees in North Yorkshire around 1635 and educated at the free school in Northallerton. In 
1651, he entered Clare Hall, Cambridge as a pensioner. Here, though officially a student of William 
Owtram, he was heavily influenced by the Latitudinarian divine John Tillotson and the Cambridge 
Platonist Ralph Cudworth, and after receiving his BA, he followed Cudworth to Christ’s shortly after 
the latter became master of the College in 1654. Originally admitted as a pensioner, he became a 
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fellow in 1657, received his MA in 1658, and alongside Cambridge Platonist Henry More became 
prominent in teaching the new, Cartesian philosophy at the college. He left Cambridge in 1678 and 
relocated to London. Here, owing to Tillotson’s recommendation, he became personal tutor to the 
Earl of Ossory, grandson of the Duke of Ormond, in 1681, the latter helping him obtain the position of 
Master at the Charterhouse in 1685. As Master, he played a prominent role in the governors’ 
opposition to King James II’s attempt to appoint a Catholic pensioner at the school, a role for which 
he was rewarded after the Revolution of 1688-9 when, again under Tillotson’s influence, he was 
appointed Chaplain-in-Ordinary and Clerk of the Closet to King William III in 1689 and 1691. In the 
latter year, Tillotson had become Archbishop of Canterbury and Burnet looked like a likely successor. 
By the time of Tillotson’s death in 1694, however, his heterodox views on Scripture had been made 
clear in the Archaeologiae and he was passed over for the position. Shortly afterwards, he was forced 
to resign his positions at court and returned to the Charterhouse. Toward the end of the century, he 
published a third English edition of his Theory, three responses to John Locke’s Essay concerning 
human understanding (the only works published in his lifetime that were not related to the Theory), 
and a defence of the Theory against the Newtonian John Keill. His only published output in the 1700s 
was a third Latin edition of the Theory, published in 1702. He died in 1715 and was buried in the chapel 
of the Charterhouse.1 
 Burnet’s Theory was one of the most widely read and discussed philosophical and theological 
works of the late seventeenth century. As Dimitri Levitin has recently noted, “it is difficult to find a 
major natural philosopher who did not have at least a cursory interest”.2 Given its contemporary 
significance, it is no surprise that the work has attracted a great deal of attention from historians of 
science, philosophy, and religion. The historiography of Burnet and his theory is a familiar story. 
Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century geologists, the first to write the history of their science, 
                                                          
1 For these and other biographical details, see Heathcote (1759); Kelly (1970); Mandelbrote (2008). 
2 Levitin (2015), 189-90. 
3 
 
made Burnet the arch villain in their heroes-and-villains narratives. “Even Milton”, wrote Charles Lyell 
in 1830 when surveying the discipline’s history in the first volume of his Principles of geology, 
had scarcely ventured in his poem to indulge his imagination so freely in painting scenes of the Creation 
and Deluge, Paradise and Chaos, as this writer, who set forth pretensions to profound philosophy. He 
explained why the primeval earth enjoyed a perpetual spring before the flood! shewed how the crust 
of the globe was fissured by ‘the sun's rays’, so that it burst, and thus the diluvial waters were let loose 
from a supposed central abyss.3 
Archibald Geikie drew heavily on Lyell in his Founders of geology. Having paid little attention to the 
Theory in the first edition of 1897, he expanded his discussion of “[t]he grotesque speculations of 
Burnet” in the second edition of 1905.4 “Nowhere”, he wrote of the seventeenth century, “did 
speculation run so completely riot as in England with regard to theories of the origin and structure of 
our globe”. The locus classicus, he explained, was Burnet’s Theory, a work designed rather “to support 
orthodox religion” than further our understanding of the earth.5 
 Around the same time, the first discussions of the historical relationship between science and 
religion began to appear and early works by John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White 
pioneered the long since discredited “conflict thesis”, the image of a perennial struggle between the 
scientific and the religious worldviews.6 Interested predominantly in the purported conflict between 
science and Catholicism, Draper did not discuss Burnet. White, however, concerned with the supposed 
impediment to science presented by Christianity more generally, examined Burnet and other 
seventeenth-century theorists of the earth at length in his influential book of 1896, A history of the 
                                                          
3 Lyell (1830), 37-8. 
4 Geikie (1905), 61. Geikie mentions Burnet’s theory only briefly in the first edition – see Geikie (1897), 9-10. 
5 Geikie (1905), 66. For further discussion of Lyell’s, Geikie’s, and other earlier historians of geology’s treatment 
of Burnet, see Gould (1987), 23-4. For discussion of Geikie’s historiography, see Oldroyd (1980). 
6 Draper (1875 [1874]); White (1896 [1897]). For historiographical discussion of the conflict thesis and 
subsequent developments in the historiography of science and religion, see, e.g., Lindberg and Numbers (1986), 
1-10; Russell (2000); Wilson (2000); Weldon (2017).  
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warfare of science with theology in Christendom.7 “In th[e] second stage of the theological struggle 
with geology”, he assessed, “England was especially fruitful in champions of orthodoxy, first among 
whom may be named Thomas Burnet”. The first stage was the denial of the organic origin of fossils. 
The second, to which White refers here, is the belief in a universal Deluge. Burnet and his fellow 
diluvialists exemplify the impediment to progress that this belief presented, an impediment eventually 
overcome by the heroic efforts of Lyell.8 
 The picture of Burnet’s theory that emerges from Lyell, Geikie, and White, then, is of a purely 
speculative, unscientific account of the earth’s history that was motivated and constrained by an 
orthodox reading of Scripture and hindered rather than influenced the early development of the earth 
sciences. It is not until later in the twentieth century that historians began to look at the theory on its 
own terms and in its proper intellectual context. The first major work to do this was Katherine Brownell 
Collier’s 1934 book Cosmogonies of our fathers, an influential, comprehensive and highly informative 
study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of the earth which remains one of the best 
sources on the topic.9 This was followed the next decade by Don Cameron Allen’s 1949 classic work 
The legend of Noah, in which Burnet’s work is examined in the context of the history of ideas 
concerning the biblical Flood.10 Around the same time appeared papers by H.V.S. Ogden, E.G.R. Taylor, 
and Earnest Tuveson which examined Burnet respectively in relation to the history of aesthetics, 
geography, and literature.11 Later in the 1950s, Michael Macklem discussed the theory at length in 
relation to early-modern ideas about natural and moral law and appended an influential bibliography 
of works connected with Burnet in his 1958 book The anatomy of the world.12 The following year, 
Marjorie Nicolson expanded upon Ogden’s earlier work, including an extensive and highly illuminating 
                                                          
7 White (1897 [1896]), 206-30. 
8 White (1897 [1896]), 218-33. For further discussion of White’s treatment of Burnet, see Gould (1987), 24-6. 
9 Collier (1934), 68-134. 
10 Allen (1949), 92-112. 
11 Ogden (1947); Taylor (1948), 107-8; (1950); Tuveson (1950). 
12 Macklem (1958), 23-37, 97-9. Macklem’s bibliography has been drawn on by, among others, Kubrin (1968), 
150 [note 140], 209 [note 1]; Force (1983), 5; Cohn (1996), 150; Magruder (2000), 143-5. 
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treatment of Burnet’s theory and its role in the history of aesthetics in her important book Mountain 
gloom and mountain glory.13 And the following decade saw the appearance of one of the most 
significant and influential discussions of Burnet and theories of the earth in David Kubrin’s unpublished 
but widely-cited PhD thesis Providence and the mechanical philosophy, which examines Burnet and 
other theorists in relation to Newton and Newtonianism in seventeenth-century England.14 
 Since this time, Burnet and his theory have been discussed extensively in a variety of contexts. 
Paolo Rossi and more recently William Poole have produced works similar in certain respects to that 
of Collier, examining Burnet alongside other seventeenth-century theorists in relation to early-modern 
ideas about human history, chronology, and the origins of language.15 Norman Cohn, Michael Kempe, 
and others have added valuably to Allen’s discussion of Burnet in the context of ideas concerning the 
Flood and natural disasters.16 Robert Mayhew, Noah Heringman, Alexander Wragge-Morley, and 
William Barton have continued Nicolson’s exposition of the importance of Burnet’s theory and the 
seventeenth-century debate about the earth in the history of aesthetics.17 Burnet’s place in literary 
history has been elucidated further by Al Coppola, Gregory Lynall, and Kevin Killeen.18 Following 
Taylor, numerous historians of the earth sciences have discussed Burnet’s role in their early 
development, with Martin Rudwick, Roy Porter, Margarita Bowen, Stephen Jay Gould, Rhoda 
Rappaport, and numerous others thoroughly discrediting the early, whiggish assessments of Lyell and 
Geikie.19 And since Kubrin, Burnet has occupied an ever-prominent place in studies of Newton and 
                                                          
13 Nicolson (1959), 184-270. 
14 Kubrin (1968), 86-150. See also Kubrin (1967), 331-8, 345-6. 
15 Rossi (1984), 33ff; Poole (2010). 55ff. See also Poole (2008), 72-9. 
16 Cohn (1996), 47-61, 134-7; Kempe (2003), 153-7, 162-5. See also Goldgar (1982), 137-8; Pleins (2003), 74-5; 
Willmoth (2007), 26-7.  
17 Mayhew (2004), 46, 76-7, 83, 109, 256-7; Heringman (2004), 83-7; Wragge-Morley (2009); Barton (2017), 145-
50. 
18 Killeen (2007); Coppola (2010); Lynall (2012), 2, 13, 52-68. 
19 Rudwick (1976), 77-82; (2005), 134-5; (2014), 58-61; Porter (1977), 23-31, 62-90; Bowen (1981), 107-10; Gould 
(1987), 21-59; Rappaport (1997), 139-49. See also Dean (1981), 443-9; Ito (1988), 301-7; Gohau (1991), 46-56; 
Bowler (1992), 119-20; Willmoth (2007), 26-7; Eddy (2008), 164, 181; Young and Stearley (2008), 62-70; Dean 
(2009), 210-14; Lewis (2009), 113-4; Newcomb (2009), 121-2; Schweizer (2009), 96-7; Montgomery (2012), 64-
77; (2013), 11-12. 
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Newtonianism. This is largely due to his correspondence with Newton and the theory’s connection 
with that of Newton’s protégé and successor at Cambridge William Whiston, which, along with certain 
other connections, have been discussed in detail by James Force, Scott Mandelbrote, and others.20 
Burnet and his theory have also been examined in several other contexts. One of the most 
important of these is the history of Cartesianism and its development in England during the 
seventeenth century. The two most significant studies of Burnet’s use of Cartesian natural philosophy 
are papers by Jacques Roger and Peter Harrison, and his teaching of the Cartesian system at 
Cambridge has been discussed by John Gascoigne.21 Another important context in which Burnet, his 
theory, and related work have been explored in considerable depth is the history of antiquarianism, 
with Gascoigne, Luciano Malusa, and Dimitri Levitin offering extensive discussion of Burnet’s use of 
ancient texts in the Theory and Archaeologiae.22 The second volume of the Theory has been prominent 
in studies of seventeenth-century millenarianism and apocalyptic thought, the most in-depth 
discussions being those of Margaret Jacob and Wilfred Lockwood, Reiner Smolinski, and Arthur 
Williamson.23 Perhaps most importantly, Burnet and his theory have featured prominently in many 
important studies of the fascinatingly complex historical relationship between science and religion by 
such authors as Joseph Duncan, Barbara Shapiro, Peter Harrison, John Hedley Brooke, Kerry Magruder, 
Alexandra Walsham, and countless others which have come to replace the simplistic and highly 
                                                          
20 Force (1983), 4-6; (1985), 5-6, 32-62, 65, 192 [note 13]; (1990a), 47, 58; (1990b), 159-60 [notes 24-5]; (2001a), 
71-4. (2001b), 160-3, 169-70; (2004), 65-7, 70-1 [note 17], 78-9 [note 43]; Mandelbrote (1994). See also Austin 
(1970), 534, 538; Schaffer (1977), 19-21, 28-9; Gascoigne (1984), 9-11; Gascoigne (1989), 144-5; Gascoigne 
(1991), 180-6; Westfall (1987), 565-6; Hall (1992), 172-3; Harrison (1995), 539-40, 544-7; Smolinski (1999), 267-
73, 277-8, 280-1, 284-9; Snobelen (2004), 575-6; Friesen (2008), 40-7; Newman (2009), 41; Janiak (2012), 422-
6; Buchwald and Feingold (2013), 181-2, 237 [note 54]; Levitin (2013), 324-5; Iliffe (2017), 240-4; Kaplan (2018), 
460. 
21 Roger (1982); Gascoigne (1989), 65; Harrison (2000). See also Oldroyd (1974), 166; Force (1985), 34-8; Rogers 
(1985), 301; Gohau (1990), 47-8; Bowler (1992), 119-20; (2003), 32-4, 39; Vermij (1998), 153-66; Magruder 
(2006), 245-55; Poole (2010), 55-61; Henry (2013), 127. 
22 Gascoigne (1991), 180-6; Malusa (1993 [1981]), 330-70; Levitin (2015), 181-90. 
23 Jacob and Lockwood (1972); Smolinski (1999), 267-73, 277-8, 280-1, 284-9; Williamson (2008), 176-85. See 




misleading conflict thesis of Draper and White.24 Burnet and the theory are also frequently discussed 
in studies of the scientific revolution and seventeenth-century science more generally.25 
The image of Burnet and his theory that emerges from the above histories is very different 
from that presented by Lyell, Geikie, and White. The Burnet of this more recent historiography is 
someone who was closely engaged with the science and scholarship of his time and one of the first to 
teach the “new philosophy” at an English university. Far from being constrained by orthodox religion, 
his theory flatly contradicted the first three chapters of Genesis, and his frank admission of this and 
bold conclusion that Moses lied to the Jews about the Creation of the earth and the first humans 
because they were incapable of receiving the truth ultimately cost him his ecclesiastical career. His 
theory, moreover, though based in part on Scripture, was not an impediment to progress but on the 
contrary fostered considerable interest in the earth and its history and as such played an important 
role in the early development of the earth sciences. The picture I present of Burnet and his theory in 
this thesis is largely the same. The difference is that I endeavour to present it in greater depth and at 
greater length than has been done before in Anglophone scholarship. Burnet’s theory was one of the 
most notorious texts, one of the most notorious ideas, of late-seventeenth-century England, and yet 
no detailed, book-length study of it has been written in English.26 This thesis is a first step toward 
providing such a study. 
To elucidate more fully what the thesis is, it is important first to get clear about what it is not. 
The most important thing to note here is that it is not a biography. A comprehensive biography of 
Burnet is far beyond the scope of a PhD thesis. Biographical details are of course important and are 
                                                          
24 Duncan (1969). 171-2, 181-6; (1972), 271-7; Shapiro (1985), 54-6, 127, 159; Harrison (1990), 95. 104-5, 115-6, 
127; (1998), 135ff; (2001), 200-2; (2007), 123; (2011), 134-5; Brooke (1991), 9-14; Magruder (2008); (2009), 55-
63; Walsham (2012), 381-94. See also Schaffer (1977), 19-21, 28-9; Rudwick (1986), 305-7; Force (2001b), 160-
3, 169-70; Numbers (2002), 236-7; Thompson (2005), 143-53; Poole (2006), 46-7, 50-2, 56; Young and Stearley 
(2008), 62-70; Lewis (2009), 113-4; Schweizer (2009), 96-7; Gaukroger (2016), 570-3. 
25 See, e.g., Gaukroger (2006), 494, 504, 508; (2010), 34-9; Knight (2014), 117-9; Wootton (2015), 396, 467. 
26 The only full study of Burnet is Pasini (1981), which was written in Italian and has never been translated. 
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discussed at various points, but the thesis is not primarily concerned with the life of Burnet. Rather, it 
is a history of a theory, of an idea; of its historical context; its philosophical, theological, Scriptural, 
and antiquarian foundations; its development during the final two decades of the seventeenth 
century; and its reception among the reading public in early-modern England. Points about Burnet’s 
life are discussed only insofar as they help to elucidate these things. This is also the case with Burnet’s 
other works, that is, those besides the Theory and works directly related to it, nearly all of which were 
published posthumously. Discussion of these would be a vital component of a biography, yet they are 
attended to here only at certain points where they are able to shed light on the above issues 
concerning the theory. Burnet’s private correspondence, too, detailed discussion of which would be 
essential in a biography, is explored only to the extent that it illuminates the above topics. 
The aim of the thesis is to provide depth rather than breadth of analysis. To this end, I focus 
my attention mainly on primary sources. The central texts are of course the two volumes of the Theory. 
Also discussed at length are certain attacks on the theory and Burnet’s responses to them, the 
Archaeologiae, and William Whiston’s 1696 book A new theory of the earth, an attempt to provide an 
alternative theory to Burnet’s which, I shall argue, was heavily influenced by the original Theorist. 
There were many reactions to the theory and many published and unpublished responses to it, and 
while I pay some attention to a large number of them, it is impossible to discuss them all in depth. My 
principal focus, therefore, is limited to those texts which in my view were most closely connected with 
Burnet and with the theory itself, and these are Burnet’s writings on it, the responses to it with which 
he engaged directly, and the alternative theory in which his influence is most evident. Also due to 
space constraints, when discussing the public reaction to Burnet’s theory, I limit my attention almost 
entirely to England, where that reaction was most profound.27 
My historiographical approach in the thesis is primarily intellectual or philosophical. My main 
interest is in the theory as an idea and as a series of texts and in the various philosophical and 
                                                          
27 For discussion of the debate on the continent, see Rossi (1984), 69-106; Rappaport (1997), 139-72. 
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theological frameworks which informed its development and governed the reading public’s reaction 
to it. The most important frameworks in the development of Burnet’s theory are the philosophy and 
theology of the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians with whom he was closely associated and 
the Cartesian system of natural philosophy to which he was introduced by the former group. The 
reaction to the theory among the reading public in England was shaped in large measure by the 
Newtonian natural philosophy, which in the years following the publication of the Theory came to 
supersede the Cartesian framework on which the work was largely based. It is these four frameworks 
and ideas and the texts in which they are set down that provide the primary context of the thesis. This 
is not to say that I do not pay due attention also to social and cultural context. Ideas and texts are of 
course situated in society and culture, and so attention to these contexts is important for 
understanding them. Yet these contexts, much like biographical details about Burnet, are attended to 
in order to elucidate ideas and texts rather than as an end in themselves. Burnet would likely have 
approved of such an approach. As he wrote in the preface to his own work on the history of 
philosophy: 
THE State of Learning makes a considerable Part of the History of Mankind. Now in this History of 
Literature, there can be nothing more excellent or profitable than to explain the various Opinions of 
Philosophers, and what they professed in different Sciences: as for other Matters which frequently 
make up a literary History, such as the Lives of Philosophers, the Circumstances of their Births, and 
Funerals, their Praises, Travels, together with their good and bad Actions, and Particulars of the like 
Nature, they do indeed fill up and adorn the Subject; but are of lesser Moment when we are 
endeavouring to search out the Seeds and Progress of human Knowledge.28 
The thesis consists of six chapters. The first two are devoted primarily to the Theory. In chapter 
one, I give a detailed analysis of the work’s four books and their intellectual context. I begin by 
discussing Burnet’s theory of the Deluge in book one which he arrives at via an account of the Creation. 
                                                          
28 Burnet (1736a [1692]), i – italics omitted. 
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I then look at book two in which he gives an account of the antediluvian earth and Paradise before 
turning to the Theory’s second volume and examining his theories of the Conflagration and Millennium 
which are presented in books three and four respectively. The second chapter is concerned with the 
theory’s foundations. This chapter is framed around the three “guides” which Burnet used in 
formulating the theory: reason; Scripture; and antiquity. In this chapter I discuss what, for Burnet, 
each of these things consisted in and the different roles they played in constructing and supporting 
the theory. In chapter three, I first explore two early objections to the theory from the Bishop of 
Hereford Herbert Croft and the Rector of Worlington Erasmus Warren and Burnet’s responses to these 
critics and lengthy debate with the latter. I then turn my attention to Burnet’s controversial work of 
1692, the Archaeologiae philosophicae, examining the content of the work and its theological and 
antiquarian foundations and considering the extent to which it was shaped by the preceding debates 
with Croft and Warren. 
The final three chapters focus on the “Burnet controversy”: a series of reactions to the theory 
that arose out of its heterodox implications being exposed by Burnet in the Archaeologiae. In chapter 
four, I give an overview of the controversy. Here I depart from my narrow focus and adopt a broader-
brushed approach, the aim being to give the reader an impression of the extent and nature of the 
debate. I do, however, go into some detail on one unpublished response to the theory which I argue 
was most likely written by the Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed and Burnet’s reply to this work. I also 
discuss in some depth the rigorous application of the Theory’s second volume in the London clergyman 
Edward Waple’s analysis of the Book of Revelation. In the final two chapters, I focus on what I consider 
to be the most important works to come out of the controversy: that of Newtonians William Whiston 
and John Keill. Whiston is the subject of chapter five, in which I argue that his New theory of the earth 
is essentially a synthesis of Newtonian and Burnettian ideas concerning Scripture, theology, and the 
earth. I also discuss Whiston’s debate with Keill and its implications for late-seventeenth-century 
Newtonianism. In the final chapter, I turn my attention to Keill’s devastating attack on Burnet and the 
subsequent debate between them, considering what it was about Keill’s attack that was so damaging 
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to the theory, the conflict between Burnet’s resolute Cartesianism and Keill’s particular brand of 
Newtonianism, and the impact Keill’s work had on the controversy and on subsequent thinking about 
the earth and its history. 
Before proceeding to the first chapter I should say a brief word about editions of primary texts. 
Regarding the Theory itself, I cite mainly the first English editions of the two volumes, published in 
1684 and 1690. The English editions contain some material which is not present in the Latin text, but 
the reverse is rarely the case, and so we obtain a more complete view of Burnet’s thought from the 
English than from the Latin. Additionally, the English editions were much more widely read than the 
Latin, and so the public reaction to the theory which I shall be assessing was directed much more 
toward the former than the latter. Where there is material in the Latin texts which is not in the English 
and where there are significant differences between the Latin and English editions this is made clear 
and the former are cited and in certain places discussed in some depth. There are also some minor 
variations between different English editions. These, too, are discussed at various points where they 
are important. Regarding the Archaeologiae, I again cite the English edition, which was published in 
three parts during the eighteenth century – I am not aware of any significant differences between the 
Latin and English editions. The books by Croft, Warren, and Keill were all written in English, and I cite 
the first editions. Whiston’s New theory and his responses to Keill, too, were written in English. Here 
again I cite primarily the first editions, though I also discuss in detail certain important differences 
between the first and second editions of the work and their connection with Whiston’s debate with 







1. The Theory 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this first chapter is to acquaint the reader with Burnet’s theory of the earth and its 
historical context. The chapter consists of five main sections. In the first section, I give a brief overview 
of Burnet’s history of the earth from the Creation to the final consummation. In the remaining four 
sections, I discuss each of the four books of the Theory in turn, providing a summary of each book and 
discussing how the various details of the work relate to the intellectual context in which it was written. 
The overall context in which I want to situate the theory begins essentially with the Protestant 
Reformation during the previous century. Wanting to re-establish the Christian religion on the basis 
of scriptural rather than ecclesiastical authority, the Protestant reformers eschewed what they viewed 
as excessive allegorising of biblical texts by medieval exegetes in favour of a literal interpretation.1 It 
is important to note, as Peter Harrison emphasises, that this new Protestant literalism is to be 
understood in a broad sense as “determinacy of meaning”. For medieval exegetes, the texts of 
Scripture had multiple meanings. A single text had a variety of symbolic or allegorical senses. And 
these senses were applied dogmatically to Scripture by the Catholic Church. In contrast, for the 
Protestant reformers, biblical texts have a single, fixed meaning. And it is the task of the individual 
exegete rather than ecclesiastical authorities to determine what this meaning is.2 
 As Harrison has so perceptively observed, the new literalism that emerged at the Reformation 
had several profound effects on the development of early-modern natural philosophy and Christianity 
and on the relationship between them.3 Two such effects are especially important for our purposes. 
The first is that scriptural texts not obviously (i.e., literally) imparting moral or theological knowledge 
                                                          
1 Harrison (1998), 92-120.  
2 Harrison (1998), 111. 
3 Harrison (1998), 114-273. See also Harrison (2004), 68-80. Cf. van der Meer and Oosterhoff (2008). 
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became seen as providing factual – i.e., historical, geographical, philosophical, etc. – information. The 
Pentateuch in particular, the first five books of the Old Testament which were generally – though not 
universally – believed to have been written by Moses, became seen as communicating factual 
information about the first ages of the world and human existence – it is at this point that we begin 
to see the Pentateuch being described in new ways such as “the Mosaic history”. As a result of this 
new historicity, the Pentateuch and other biblical texts came to be read and assessed in essentially 
the same way as any other historical document as exegetes began to consider such things as the 
background of the author, the author’s intentions, the audience for which the text was written, and 
so forth. This was very different from the approach of medieval exegetes who assumed that the 
meanings of sacred texts transcended the human intentions of the author.4 
The second important effect of the Protestant literalism on early-modern natural philosophy 
and Christianity is that the natural sciences came increasingly to be employed in biblical exegesis; in 
uncovering the single, true meaning of texts and enhancing ones understanding of the texts, their 
authors, and the events and phenomena depicted in them. In the case of the Pentateuch, Moses was 
widely held to have possessed a detailed, philosophical knowledge of the events and places he 
described but to have accommodated his teachings to the limited capacities of his audience. By 
applying the natural sciences to his teachings, it was believed, one could come to understand what 
Moses actually knew and thought as well as what he explicitly taught.5 Closely related to this use of 
the natural sciences in biblical exegesis was the use of non-Christian texts. Moses’ and other sacred 
writers’ status as historians implied that “prophane” histories could now be used to aid our 
understanding of sacred history. To be sure, the latter, being divinely inspired, was more reliable than 
the former. But the shift in focus away from the transcendent truths of the medieval theologians 
                                                          
4 Harrison (1998), 121-6. 
5 Harrison (1998), 132-8. 
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toward the human authors of the reformers now meant that the difference between sacred and pagan 
texts was essentially one of degree rather than kind.6 
 As Harrison observes, this new historicity of Moses and the application of the natural sciences 
and “prophane” writings to biblical exegesis resulted in the appearance during the later-sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries of a large number of philosophical theories of the events described by Moses.7 
By the time of the first volume of Burnet’s Theory in 1681, then, there was already a venerable 
tradition of such theorising. Burnet’s account of the Creation, Deluge, and antediluvian earth, insofar 
as it embodied the Protestant literalism, the historicity of Moses, and the application of natural 
philosophy and pagan writings to scriptural exegesis, was very much a part of this tradition. As I will 
show in this chapter, however, these first two books of the Theory were as much a reaction to this 
tradition as they were a part of it. For Burnet, the direction that philosophical theorising about the 
Mosaic history had taken had led to conclusions which were inconsistent with the true sense of 
Scripture and were therefore conducive to irreligion. Additionally, these theories were in Burnet’s 
view contrary in various respects to our current understanding of the natural world and employed 
concepts which he viewed as unphilosophical and wanted to discard from natural inquiry. 
 The Protestant Reformation and the emerging biblical literalism also sets the stage for the 
second volume of Burnet’s Theory, which dealt with the Conflagration and Millennium. Although 
literal interpretations of prophecy had been common in the first and second centuries, they became 
challenged from the third century and officially renounced by the Church in the fifth. Most influential 
here was St Augustine’s interpretation of the Book of Revelation as an allegory describing spiritual 
struggles on earth and of the Millennium as a spiritual rather than physical reign of Christ which began 
at his birth and will continue until the end of the world. Augustine’s interpretation was accepted by 
                                                          
6 Harrison (1998), 124-6. 
7 Harrison (1998), 126-9, 138-60 
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the church and became official dogma at the Council of Ephesus in 431 where literal interpretations 
of prophecy were condemned as superstitious.8 
This interpretation of the prophecies went largely unchallenged until the Reformation when 
they came increasingly to be read as depicting contemporary struggles in Europe between conflicting 
Christian doctrines and as predicting a physical Kingdom of Christ on earth which was to follow from 
these struggles. This revival of a historicist reading of prophecy resulted in a period of significant 
political unrest both in England and on the continent as radical Protestants during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries attempted to overthrow what they believed were illegitimate governments in 
order to usher in the millennial Kingdom of Christ.9 In England, this millenarian-inspired civil discord 
largely ceased after the Restoration of King Charles II in 1660. As Warren Johnston has shown, 
millenarian thinking persisted but increasingly came to take less radical forms as moderate 
Protestants, reacting to the previous unrest, endeavoured to interpret prophecy in ways that would 
not be conducive to such radicalism. The historicist interpretation inherited from the Reformation was 
still predominant. But exegetes now wanted to interpret this history in ways that would not pose a 
threat to social order.10 As David Kubrin and Margaret Jacob and Wilfred Lockwood have argued, the 
second volume of Burnet’s Theory fits firmly into this tradition in that it was an attempt to provide a 
historicist interpretation of the Scripture prophecies, by way of a physical theory of the Conflagration 
and Millennium, which would not be conducive to – indeed, would actively discourage – civil discord.11 
1.2. A brief, sacred history of the earth 
In Burnet’s theory, the chaos from which the earth formed was a fluid mass of particles containing all 
the matter of the earth and its atmosphere. The particles descended toward the centre in order of 
their specific gravity, the densest descending first and compacting to form a spherical inner core. The 
                                                          
8 Williamson (2008), 9-13; Johnston (2011a), 2-3. 
9 Williamson (2008), 135-66; Johnston (2011a), 4-16. 
10 Johnston (2011a), 23ff. 
11 Kubrin, (1968), 100-4; Jacob and Lockwood (1972), 271. 
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remainder of the chaos then separated into an inner sphere of liquid and an outer sphere of air, both 
regions containing numerous particles of solid matter which were lighter than those at the centre and 
therefore descended more slowly. The liquid then separated again into two regions: an inner sphere 
containing denser, watery fluids; and an outer sphere composed of lighter, oily fluids. The earthy 
particles in the air then descended into the oil and accumulated and hardened to form a solid crust 
above the water (Figs.1-5).12 The earth’s water in the beginning, then, was entirely enclosed within 
the crust and there were no seas. And because the crust formed on a body of liquid, it must originally 
have taken the same shape as the surface of the liquid and so must necessarily have been entirely 
uniform, with no hills or mountains. Owing to the uniformity of the surface, the earth’s weight in the 
beginning was evenly distributed. Its axis, therefore, was at a right angle to the plane of the ecliptic 
rather than oblique as it is on the present earth.13 Finally, because the fluid body from which the earth 
formed rotated on its axis and a rotating body will recede from its centre of motion, the fluid at the 
equator endeavoured to recede from the centre but was prevented from doing so by the atmosphere 
and therefore moved toward the poles where it met with less resistance. As a result, the first earth 
took the form of a prolate spheroid, its circumference larger at the poles than at the equator.14 
                                                          
12 Burnet (1684), 51-60. 
13 Burnet (1684), 61-8. 
14 This argument appears in book two of the Latin edition of the Theory in Burnet’s discussion of the antediluvian 
earth’s hydrography – Burnet (1681), 186. In the English edition, he simply assumes this form of the antediluvian 
earth on the basis of ancient philosophers’ comparisons of the first earth with an egg (I shall discuss this doctrine 
of the “mundane egg” in the next chapter), omitting the above argument from his account of the antediluvian 
earth’s hydrography – Burnet (1684), 64-5, 227-8. In the third English edition, he adds an argument for this form 

















 The situation of the primitive earth’s axis meant that the sun shone directly and perpetually 
on the equator. This dehydrated the crust in this region, causing fissures to form. At the same time, 
the heat of the sun penetrated through the crust, volatising the waters of the abyss and exerting 
pressure on the weakened crust and eventually causing it to break apart. This dissolution of the crust 
was the cause of both the universal Deluge and the present form and situation of the earth. The 
descent of the fragments into the abyss agitated the waters such that they covered the earth for a 
period of time (i.e., the duration of the Deluge) before settling into their newly formed channels. These 
channels were formed by the fragments of crust coming to rest on the inner core and taking on a 
variety of postures with some parts in and some out of the water, thereby forming the present earth’s 
seas, continents, mountains, and other geological phenomena (Fig. 6). The newly formed inequalities 
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in the earth’s surface meant that its weight was no longer uniformly distributed, and the axis became 
oblique relative to the ecliptic.15 
 
                                                          




 In addition to leaving the earth terraqueous and mountainous, the dissolution of the crust 
made it hollow and cavernous. These vacuities serve as ventilation, rendering it vulnerable to 
destruction by fire.16 Prior to the Conflagration, a worldwide drought will dry the rivers, depriving the 
oceans of water and thus significantly reducing their size and removing the impediment they present 
to the spread of fire. The earth and its plant life will be desiccated and turned into fuel, their 
dehydration also releasing various combustible chemicals into the atmosphere. Fiery exhalations 
within the earth will enlarge its vacuities, providing further ventilation for the fire while also bringing 
about those earthquakes which are said in Scripture to precede the Conflagration.17 The immediate 
cause of the Conflagration will be a combination of three phenomena, each affecting a different 
section of the globe. The surface will be destroyed by a series of volcanic eruptions beginning in Italy 
– the volcanic centre of the Christian world and the seat of Antichrist (the Papacy) – and spreading 
throughout the earth. The interior parts will succumb to the combustion of various flammable solids, 
liquids, and gasses. And the atmosphere will be consumed by “fiery meteors”. (It is important to note 
here that Burnet uses the term “meteor” not in its modern sense but to refer to meteorological 
phenomena such as thunder, lightning, and other more mysterious “fiery exhalations” in the air.)18 
 Aside from the inner core, all the earth’s matter will be burned, reducing it to a second chaos 
from which a new earth will form. As in the first chaos, the matter will separate according to its specific 
gravity. It will divide first into two regions: an inner orb of the heaviest molten matter; and an outer 
sphere composed of flames, vapours, smoke, fumes, and ashes. The outer sphere will then separate, 
the heavier particles of solid matter descending first, followed by the liquid and then the lighter 
particles of earth. The latter will coalesce on the surface of the liquid and harden to form a solid crust. 
Like the first earth, then, though purer and more perfect due to the refining properties of fire, the new 
                                                          
16 Burnet (1990c), 54-5. 
17 Burnet (1990c), 65-9. 
18 Burnet (1990c), 43-6, 52-65, 74-90. 
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earth will be entirely smooth and uniform with no mountains or seas, and its weight once again being 
evenly distributed, its axis will again be perpendicular relative to the ecliptic.19 This new, paradisiacal 
earth will be home to the Kingdom of Christ during the Millennium, after which, when the righteous 
ascend to heaven, it will burn again, leave the vortex of the sun, and become a star.20 
1.3. Book one: The Deluge and Creation 
Published in Latin in 1681 and English in 1684, the first volume of the Theory consisted of books one 
and two which dealt with the Creation, antediluvian earth, and Deluge.21 Though in the above 
summary I have given the chronological order of the events themselves, it is important to note that it 
is not in this order that Burnet deals with them. Indeed, in the first volume he reverses the order 
significantly, addressing the Deluge in book one before discussing the antediluvian earth in book two. 
In the first book, moreover, he discusses the Deluge before the Creation. He then returns to the former 
after explicating the latter. What is important about this is that it highlights the extent to which this 
first book was intended as a theory primarily of the Deluge and only secondarily of the Creation. 
Burnet gives a detailed explanation of the Creation, but his principal reason for doing so is that an 
explanation of the Creation is necessary in his view for understanding the Deluge. Book one of the 
Theory, then, is essentially an account of the Deluge which is arrived at via an account of the Creation. 
Though the Creation is chronologically prior to the Deluge, in the Theory, both in terms of its place in 
the text and its importance, the Deluge has priority. 
 One thing that is immediately striking about Burnet’s account of the Deluge compared with 
earlier treatments is that there is almost no discussion of Noah’s ark. Previous theorists had grappled 
extensively with such issues as the dimensions and design of the ark, how it was built, how the animals 
were separated from one another, and so on. As Don Cameron Allen notes, such discussions were 
                                                          
19 Burnet (1990c), 129-41. 
20 Burnet (1990c), 142-224. 
21 Burnet (1681); (1684). 
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especially prevalent in the late Renaissance.22 Yet the logistics of the ark was still a going concern in 
Burnet’s time.23 As late as 1675, for example, the German Jesuit Priest Athanasius Kircher had 
dedicated almost the entire first book of his Arca Noë to such issues, providing extensive discussion 
and attractive illustrations of the ark, its construction, and its inhabitants before dealing with the 
Deluge itself in the subsequent two books.24 
Burnet, in contrast, bypasses such concerns entirely and launches immediately into what for 
him was the central question concerning the Deluge: its physical causes. He first calculates the 
quantity of water required to make a universal Deluge, computing that “at least eight Oceans” are 
required to submerge the entire earth up to the tops of the highest mountains – the depth of the 
Flood according to Genesis.25 Besides the oceans, the only significant stores of water on the present 
earth are the clouds and subterraneous waters. These, moreover, are the only sources to which Moses 
directs us in his narration of the Deluge, that is, the breaking open of the fountains of the abyss and 
forty days rain.26 The latter, he concludes quoting Marin Mersenne’s calculation of the Flood rains but 
omitting his conclusion that the inadequacy of ordinary rainfall underscores the miraculous nature of 
the event, “would supply little more than the hundredth part of the water required to make the 
Deluge”.27 As to Moses’ abyss, this was typically interpreted as referring either to the sea or 
subterraneous waters. Neither of these, however, could rise so as to encroach upon the land unless 
moved by some force. And even supposing such a force to be applied, in order to submerge the entire 
earth, other waters would be required to fill the space vacated by the rising waters.28 
                                                          
22 Allen (1949), 71-3. 
23 See, e.g., Cohn (1996), 41-2; Poole (2010), 45-54. 
24 Kircher (1975), 16-116. For analysis of Kircher’s discussion of the ark, see Pleins (2003), 73-4; Breidbach and 
Ghiselin (2006), 992-1001; Buonanno (2014), 97-119. On Kircher’s illustrations, see Godwin (1979), 25-33. 
25 Burnet (1684), 9-12 – quotation from 12. 
26 Burnet (1684), 12-13 – quotation from 13. 
27 Burnet (1684), 13-14 – quotation from 13. For Mersenne’s calculation and miraculous conclusion, see Poole 
(2010), 45-6. 
28 Burnet (1684), 14-15. 
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 What Burnet termed the “common explication of the Deluge” or “vulgar Deluge”, then, that 
is, the view that it was effected by a combination of rains and rising seas and/or subterraneous waters, 
makes the Deluge impossible, for there is insufficient water on the present earth for it to have been 
brought about by such means.29 Another “vulgar” notion was the idea of super-celestial waters, the 
“waters above the firmament” mentioned in Genesis which had been appealed to in order to supply 
the waters of the Flood. This Burnet dismisses merely as a relic of the old astronomy, the “firmament” 
having been understood as referring to the celestial sphere and the “waters above the firmament” to 
waters above this supposed sphere. Even supposing such waters to exist or to have existed at the 
Creation, it was unclear how they could be deployed in the Deluge. If the heavens were crystalline, 
then any waters placed above them could not pass through and descend upon the earth. If, on the 
other hand, the heavens are composed of air or ether, then water being heavier than these elements, 
it could not have remained above the heavens until the Deluge. There was also the problem of how 
these waters could have been removed after the Deluge, it being impossible for them to be raised 
again above the heavens and there being no place on earth to which they could have retired.30 The 
“vulgar Deluge”, then, was “impossible and unintelligible upon a double account”. Firstly, it required 
vastly more water than could be obtained. And secondly, even if the requisite water could be found, 
it could not be disposed of such that the earth could be made habitable again after the Deluge.31 
 Following the above confutation of the “vulgar Deluge”, Burnet turns his attention to two 
“Evasions” which had been used to overcome the difficulty of supplying and disposing of the water. 
The first was the notion that God miraculously created new water or transmuted air into water and 
then annihilated or transmuted it back after the Deluge.32 Miraculous interpretations such as these 
conflicted with Burnet’s maxim – to be discussed in subsequent chapters – that what can be explained 
                                                          
29 Burnet (1684), 15-17. 
30 Burnet (1684), 16-17. 
31 Burnet (1684), 17. 
32 Burnet (1684), 18-21 
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in terms of natural causes ought not to be attributed to miraculous intervention.33 Burnet’s stance on 
this issue was typical of Protestant thinkers. Catholics, on the other hand, were more willing to appeal 
to Miracles.34 Kircher, for example, had recently appealed to precisely the kind of miraculous 
transmutation to which Burnet was opposed.35 The Protestant literalism played an important role 
here, too. As Burnet pointed out, there is no mention in Moses’ narration of the Deluge of any such 
miraculous creations or transmutations. Moses gives two causes: the breaking open of the abyss and 
forty days rain. Any other purported causes were contrary to Scripture.36 
Miraculous creations and transmutations were also inconstant with current natural 
philosophy. According to the prevailing Cartesian physics, there was no empty space in which God 
could create new matter. In order to create new waters, therefore, he would have to destroy an equal 
amount of matter to obtain the necessary space. And to annihilate the waters after the Deluge, he 
would have to create as much new matter to fill the space.37 To Burnet, the thought of God subjecting 
himself to such toil was inconsistent with his wisdom. “[M]ethinks they make very bold with the 
Deity”, he writes of those who espouse such views, “when they make him do and undo, go forward 
and backwards by such countermarches and retractions, as we do not willingly impute to the wisdom 
of God Almighty”.38 The transmutation of air into water also ran into philosophical difficulties, for it 
was known that water is vastly heavier than air. “34 foot of water”, Burnet noted, is of the same weight 
as “a proportionable Cylinder of Air reaching to the top of the Atmosphere”. Hence, even if the entire 
atmosphere were transmuted, it would yield merely “eleven or twelve yards water about the Earth”, 
a quantity “very inconsiderable as to our eight Oceans”.39 
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The second “evasion” that Burnet discusses deserves special attention, for it was one of the 
key motivations – arguably the key motivation – for his producing a theory of the Deluge, and this has 
not been adequately appreciated in the historical literature. The “evasion” in question was the 
proposal that the Deluge was not universal.40 As Allen notes, doubts about the universality of the 
Deluge date back to ancient times. When confronted with the story of Noah, pagans argued against 
early Christians that the Deluge was merely a Hebrew version of one of their flood legends and “Noah” 
simply a Jewish pseudonym for one of their heroes or gods. Like their flood stories, the biblical Deluge 
was merely a local rainstorm rather than a universal inundation. Initially, the patristic writers fought 
back, pointing for example to what appeared to be the remains of marine animals on mountains as 
evidence of the Flood’s universal extent. But the issue became largely forgotten during the middle 
ages as theologians turned their attention away from the historical details of the Flood and toward its 
symbolic significance. It resurfaced, however, during the Renaissance as scholars attempted, as Allen 
puts it, “to turn the tables on the heathens” by asserting that pagan myths were essentially corrupted 
versions of biblical texts, that their flood myths were corruptions of the biblical Deluge, and that many 
of their heroes and Gods could hence be identified with Noah.41 
This Renaissance tradition of identifying pagan floods with the biblical Deluge was still very 
much in use in Burnet’s time and would play important roles in his theory. What had also become 
increasingly popular in the latter half of the seventeenth century, however, was the notion of a local 
Deluge. Now, however, it was being promulgated not by pagans in opposition to Christians but by 
Christians themselves. Crucially, the Protestant insistence on accounting for the Deluge in terms of 
natural processes combined with the difficulty of actually doing so had led several thinkers to conclude 
that the Flood was not universal. The most famous work to appear during the seventeenth century in 
which this was argued was the French Calvinist theologian and lawyer Isaac La Peyrère’s Prae-
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Adamitae, published in Latin in 1655 and translated into English the following year under the title Men 
before Adam. In this immensely controversial work, La Peyrère argued that God had created other 
humans long before he created Adam. Adam was merely the first Jew. The Pentateuch, moreover, was 
not a history of the world but a local, Jewish history, and was not written by Moses. Importantly for 
our purposes, at the Deluge, God did not wish to punish all humans but only the Jews, having been 
offended by their interbreeding with the Gentiles. Accordingly, the Deluge was not universal but 
confined to Palestine, where the Jews resided at the time.42 
Though published anonymously, La Peyrère’s views were well known among the reading 
public and his authorship of the work immediately obvious. In 1656, he was arrested, taken to Rome, 
and forced to recant and convert to Catholicism.43 It was not only the Catholics who took offence. The 
views in Prae-Adamitae were widely rejected and attacked among the Protestant community, too.44 
As Norman Cohn observes, however, the idea of a local Deluge was soon taken up by less radical 
thinkers.45 In 1659, the Dutch scholar Isaac Vossius, in a work which was ostensibly an attack on La 
Peyrère, nevertheless agreed that the Deluge was not universal. For Vossius, there were no “men 
before Adam”. Instead, he argued that at the time of the Deluge the earth was largely uninhabited. 
The nine generations from Adam to Noah had only dispersed to Mesopotamia and Syria, and so the 
Deluge was limited to these countries.46 A few years later, the German polymath Georg Kirchmaier 
argued similarly that the Deluge was confined to Asia, the only part of the earth that was inhabited at 
the time. What is especially interesting about Kirchmaier’s work is that he explicitly states that the 
impossibility of explaining a universal Deluge necessitates the conclusion that the Deluge was not 
universal. To counter the objection that a local Deluge is contrary to Scripture, he notes that the 
ancients often talked of local events in universal terms. He also points out that humans did not move 
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beyond Asia until the Dispersion at Babel, a postdiluvian event, and so the destruction of the human 
race did not require a universal inundation.47 
 By this time, the idea of a local Deluge had become adopted by moderate clergymen in 
England. Most notably, Edward Stillingfleet, the Latitudinarian Rector of Sutton in Bedfordshire, 
advanced the view in his Origines sacrae. First published in 1662, Stillingfleet’s book was immensely 
popular, appearing in five editions in under two decades.48 Addressing the Deluge in the final book, 
Stillingfleet was clearly well-versed in the recent literature on the topic. As was typical in discussions 
of the Deluge prior to Burnet’s Theory, Stillingfleet addressed two main concerns: first, the physical 
possibility of the Deluge itself; and second, the dimensions and capacity of the ark.49 He begins his 
discussion of the first issue by articulating precisely the same problem with which Burnet would begin 
his Theory two decades later, that is, finding sufficient water for the Deluge.50 His proposed solution, 
however, is essentially the same as that of Vossius and Kirchmaier. “I cannot see any urgent necessity 
from the Scriptures”, he writes, “that the Flood did spread itself all over the surface of the earth”.51 
 Stillingfleet of course does not go as far as La Peyrère. That all humans save for those on the 
ark perished in the Deluge, he stresses, “is most certain according to the Scriptures”.52 And clearly 
wanting to distance himself from that notorious heretic, he explicitly rejects the notion that the Deluge 
could have been restricted to “so small a country as Palestine…, as some have ridiculously imagined”.53 
Humans in general, not just the Jews, were corrupt. God’s wrath was directed at all humans. And the 
effects of the Deluge were universal. He introduces a subtle distinction, however, between 
universality with respect to the earth and a restricted sense of universality with respect to humans. 
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The Deluge, he argues, was universal in this latter sense, but not necessarily in the former.54 This 
distinction in Stillingfleet was clearly drawn from Vossius, who Stillingfleet cites elsewhere in his 
discussion and who had argued that “the Deluge still was universal because the destruction that fell 
on the entire then-inhabited world was universal”.55 It was beyond all doubt, Stillingfleet stressed 
echoing Vossius, “that the Flood was universal as to mankind, but from thence follows no necessity at 
all of asserting the universality of it as to Globe of the earth, unless it be sufficiently proved that the 
whole earth was peopled before the Flood: which I despair of ever seeing proved”.56 Following Vossius, 
he surmised that the human population of the earth could not have increased so as to spread to all 
areas of the globe in the relatively short period between Adam and Noah.57 
 A possible objection to a local Deluge which Stillingfleet anticipates and answers concerns the 
destruction of non-human animals. Scripture, he acknowledges, states that “all flesh died that moved 
upon the earth”.58 In answering this objection, Stillingfleet does not want to say that animals, like 
humans, had not yet dispersed throughout the earth. Indeed, that animals – but not humans – 
populated the entire globe was evident from their different mode of creation according to Scripture, 
for Moses teaches that they were produced by the water and earth whereas humans were created by 
God in a particular location.59 Instead, he answers that non-human animals were destroyed only “as 
far as the Flood extended”. The reason for this is that God’s punishment was for “the sin of man”, and 
the animals that were destroyed were so for man’s sake. In parts of the earth where there were 
animals but no humans, then, there was no necessity of their being destroyed.60 To the further 
anticipated rejoinder that if animals elsewhere were to survive there was no need for Noah to save 
the animals on the ark, Stillingfleet offers a similarly anthropocentric answer. The animals saved on 
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the ark were saved for the sake of humans. Had they not been saved in that part of the world where 
the human race was to be repopulated, there would have been no animals “for the use of men” for 
several generations.61 If, then, the entire continent of Asia was populated before the Deluge, “which 
is as much as we may in reason suppose”, and the Deluge confined to this continent, there would have 
been as much reason to save the animals in this region as there would if the Deluge was universal.62 
That the Deluge destroyed all human but not all animal life had many advantages. In the first 
place, it could solve the perplexities with which thinkers had grappled since the discovery of new 
species in America. Exegetes, Stillingfleet notes, had long struggled to explain how these creatures 
could have travelled to Noah in time for the Deluge and how they were transported back to their 
native countries after it. The supposition that animals were destroyed only in the area of the globe 
that was populated by humans removed such difficulties.63 It also helped solve the problems that had 
exercised thinkers for many decades as to the capacity of the ark. Supposing, that is, that only the 
animals of a single continent needed to be saved implied that the ark, given the dimensions that Moses 
relates in his history, was better able to accommodate them.64 
I have gone into some detail on Stillingfleet’s version of the local Deluge argument because, 
as Kerry Magruder has very plausibly noted, it was likely Burnet’s main target when discussing this 
particular “evasion”.65 As we shall see shortly, the content of his discussion certainly suggests that this 
was the case. At the very least, it was surely moderates like Stillingfleet whose espousal of such views 
exercised him most. Such ideas were only to be expected from radicals like La Peyrère. They become 
dangerous, however, when they become mainstream. Though merely a provincial rector at the time 
the Origines sacrae was first published, by the time of Burnet’s Theory Stillingfleet was Archdeacon of 
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London, Dean of St. Paul’s, and Chaplain-in-Ordinary to the King.66 The Origines, moreover, was in its 
fifth edition and had thus been widely read and disseminated.67 Vossius, too, now resident in England, 
was Canon of Windsor and a Fellow of the Royal Society.68 What had begun as a heathen attack on 
Christianity and was just two decades ago the opinion of a renowned heretic had, it seemed to Burnet, 
become acceptable to the ecclesiastical, political, and scientific establishment.  
 Against the notion of a local Deluge Burnet pits three main arguments. The first and most 
important since it attacked the main premise of Vossius, Kirchmaier, and Stillingfleet’s argument is his 
attempt to establish what Stillingfleet had two decades earlier “despair[ed] of ever seeing proved”, 
that is, that the entire earth was inhabited by humans at the time of the Deluge. Here Burnet appeals 
to the longevity of the antediluvians, a subject to which he would devote considerable attention in 
the second book of the Theory, in order to show that the earth’s population before the Deluge was 
more likely considerably larger than it is now. The antediluvians, he argues, lived around nine hundred 
years and therefore had many more offspring than the postdiluvians. Indeed, he notes rehearsing 
what was a commonly held opinion at the time, this longevity of the antediluvians was likely 
“providentially design’d” specifically for the “quicker multiplication and propagation of mankind”. 
Within sixteen hundred years, then, the lowest estimate of the period between the Creation and 
Deluge, the population was more likely so vast that the greater puzzle is how the earth could have 
accommodated it.69 He now attempts a calculation of the antediluvian population, arguing that if the 
first couple during the first century “left ten pair of Breeder, which is no hard supposition” and the 
population increased in quadruple proportion each century after that, then the number of humans on 
earth by the time of the Deluge would exceed ten billion, which is considerably larger than the current 
population. It was, therefore, “a very groundless and forc'd conceit to imagine, that Judaea only, and 
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some parts about it in Asia, were stor'd with people when the Deluge was brought upon the old 
World”.70 
 Burnet’s second argument was based on Scripture and clearly aimed at confuting Stillingfleet’s 
claim that there was no “urgent necessity from the Scriptures” for the universality of the Flood. Here, 
Burnet appeals to two texts, one from the Old and one from the New Testament. The first, 
unsurprisingly, is Genesis. Here, in chapter 6, verse 13 Moses calls the Deluge a destruction of the 
earth. In 7.19 he says that “[t]he waters exceedingly prevailed upon the Earth, and all the high Hills 
that were under the whole Heavens were covered”, “under the whole Heavens” clearly implying that 
the mountains around the entire globe were covered. After the Deluge in 9.1 God gives his blessing to 
Noah and his family to replenish the population of the earth. And in 9.11 he promises never again to 
destroy the earth with water.71 There was also the issue of God telling Noah to build an ark, for if the 
Deluge was local, he could simply have told him to take his family and the animals to some other part 
of the world.72 More important for Burnet, however, both here and elsewhere in the Theory, was his 
New Testament source: The Second Epistle of St. Peter. Here, the Apostle states explicitly that the old 
heavens and earth were destroyed at the Deluge and juxtaposes this with the destruction of the 
present heavens and earth at the Conflagration. This juxtaposition clearly implied that the destruction 
at the Conflagration will be of the same extent as that at the Deluge, and Conflagration is clearly a 
universal rather than local event.73 
 The third argument is based on non-Christian texts, a source on which Burnet draws heavily 
throughout the Theory and even more so in later work. He uses pagan antiquity here for two distinct 
purposes. The first is inherited from Renaissance writers who, as I noted above, had argued that 
various pagan flood stories were to be identified with the biblical Deluge. Here Burnet brings these 
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arguments to bear on the question of the universality of the Flood, arguing that this tradition, which 
is found in all ancient cultures, clearly indicates that there was a single Deluge which encompassed 
the entire globe. These cultures, moreover, all taught of “the restauration of mankind”, indicating that 
they believed the entire human race to have been destroyed.74 What is especially interesting here is 
that Burnet makes a point of discussing “the Chineses”.75 This was likely aimed at Vossius who, as Eric 
Jorink notes, had introduced Chinese antiquity into the debates about chronology and earth history 
and had appealed to Chinese sources in arguing for a local Deluge, claiming that their lack of any 
tradition concerning the flood indicates that the Deluge did not extend to that part of the world.76 
Against this, Burnet asserts – albeit, as was customary at the time, without any citation to support his 
claim – that the ancient Chinese did in fact have such a tradition.77 Burnet’s second use of Pagan 
antiquity in arguing against a local Deluge would resurface in various other contexts and was aimed at 
bolstering his interpretation of St. Peter. “All Antiquity”, he asserts, has taught of successive periods 
of the earth punctuated by universal destructions resulting from water and fire. The biblical Deluge 
was in his view “the first and leading instance of this kind”.78 
 As well as the above arguments concerning the antediluvian population, Scripture, and 
antiquity, Burnet noted also certain philosophical problems with the notion of a local Flood. One 
seemingly insuperable difficulty was that the water could not cover the mountains in just one part of 
the globe without dispersing into other areas, for the parts of fluids lack cohesion and so a fluid body 
will always conform to the convexity of the globe. “We cannot imagine”, he asserts conjuring up the 
kinds of fantastic images for which the Theory would achieve renown among literary scholars, “Hills 
and Mountains of water to have hung about Judaea, as if they were congeal’d, or a mass of water to 
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have stood upon the middle of the Earth like on great drop, or a trembling Jelly, and all the places 
about it dry and untouch’d”.79 
 I have dwelled for some time on this issue of the universality of the Deluge because, as I noted 
above, it seems to me one of the primary motivations for the first volume of Burnet’s Theory. Indeed, 
it is no overstatement to suggest that the entire first book of the Theory is essentially an extensive 
philosophical response to the increasingly popular and increasingly acceptable notion of a local Flood. 
At the beginning of his discussion of the issue, Burnet notes, as Kirchmaier had acknowledged, that 
this notion had resulted ultimately from the “straits they [i.e., authors discussing the Deluge] have 
been put to in all Ages, to find out water enough for Noah's Flood” and conjectures that “[t]he Authors 
that set up this opinion, were not themselves satisfied with it: but seeing insuperable difficulties in the 
old way [of explaining the Deluge], they are the more excusable in chusing, as they thought, of two 
evils the less”.80 He returns to this point toward the end of the discussion, alleging that proponents of 
this view “do not offer any positive argument for the proof of it, but depend only upon that negative 
argument, That an universal Deluge is a thing unintelligible” and proclaiming that the purpose of his 
theory is to remove this “stumbling-stone” by showing that such a Deluge is intelligible.81 His 
assessment of these authors is somewhat unfair. As we have seen, Vossius, Kirchmaier, Stillingfleet, 
and even the heretic La Peyrère had produced several positive arguments as well as the above 
negative one. Burnet was nevertheless correct to suggest that this apparent unintelligibility of a 
universal Deluge was the principal motivation for the view. Faced with the apparent choice between 
the Deluge being either local and intelligible or universal and wholly mysterious, they had chosen the 
former. By removing this apparent obstacle, Burnet hoped, he could show that such a choice need not 
be made. 
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 Having dealt at length with the universality of the Deluge, Burnet offers a few brief hints as to 
his own solution to the problem of supplying and disposing of the waters of the Flood before turning 
his attention to the Creation.82 Before explicating his theory of the earth’s formation, he first dedicates 
almost an entire chapter to proving that it had an origin at all.83 Here of course his target is Aristotle, 
the only ancient philosopher to have maintained that the earth and life on it have existed for eternity, 
and who, regrettably, “so great a part of the Christian world have made their Oracle or Idol”.84 He then 
rehearses a number of what were by this time standard arguments against this Aristotelian doctrine, 
appealing first to “Divine Authority” before advancing a series of arguments from “natural Reason” 
and devoting considerably more attention to the latter than to the former.85 On this note, it is 
interesting to compare Burnet’s work with other contemporary discussions of eternalism. Though his 
methods and arguments are similar, his attitude toward the issue is markedly different. Sir Matthew 
Hale, for example, in his 1678 book The primitive origination of mankind, had lamented that many will 
believe Scripture only insofar as it is corroborated by reason, and that this necessitated a philosophical 
refutation of eternalism.86 Burnet, in contrast, was a far more willing participant in the use of reason 
in religion. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, he stressed repeatedly throughout his career that 
Scripture must not be opposed to reason, and that where Scripture appears to be contrary to reason, 
one must reinterpret the former in light of the latter. 
Happily for Burnet, eternalism was as strongly confuted by reason as by Scripture. Both the 
earth and organic bodies, he noted for example, are composed of parts, that is, material corpuscles, 
and it is inconceivable for any compound mass to have existed from eternity without its parts having 
previously been in a simpler state. The earth’s mountains and higher regions more generally are 
evidently subsiding and eroding. Had the earth existed from eternity they would have long since 
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disappeared, leaving the entire surface submerged in water and uninhabitable. Human life, too, is 
manifestly a relatively recent creation. The world’s population is evidently increasing. If humans had 
existed from eternity, the earth would have long ago become overpopulated. The various mechanical 
arts, civil society, laws, letters, money and other aspects of modern human life are all relatively recent 
inventions. The sciences, too, are in an incomplete and imperfect state, and what progress has been 
made has been made very recently. Had humans existed from eternity, the mechanical and civil arts 
and the sciences would have been developed and perfected much earlier.87 
 Having dispatched with eternalism, Burnet turns to the Creation. That the earth formed from 
a chaos he takes as given, since all ancient authors both sacred and pagan who acknowledge that the 
earth had an origin – that is, all but Aristotle and his followers – agree that it formed from a chaos.88 
He now sets down the first of three “propositions” of his theory of the Deluge: 
That the Form of the Ante-diluvian Earth, or of the Earth that rise first from the Chaos, was different 
from the Form of the present Earth”.89 
At this point he wanted to establish merely that the antediluvian earth was different, not what the 
difference consisted in. This, he noted, had effectively been proved already, since it had been shown 
that the earth in its present form is not capable of a universal Deluge and hence that the antediluvian 
earth must necessarily have been different.90 He nevertheless offers further proof of the proposition 
from both Scripture and philosophy. First, he discusses at length a passage from St Peter’s Second 
Epistle in which, he alleges, the Apostle makes a distinction between the form of the antediluvian and 
postdiluvian worlds – I shall discuss this passage in depth in the next chapter.91 He then considers the 
nature of the chaos and what kind of body would form from it, defining the chaos as “a Fluid Mass, or 
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a Mass of all sorts of little parts or particles of matter, mixt together, and floating in confusion, one 
with another”, “the matter of the Earth and Heavens, without form or order; reduced into a fluid mass, 
wherein are all the materials and ingredients of all bodies, but mingled in confusion one with 
another”.92 He surmises that such a fluid mass will necessarily form itself into a uniform body with no 
inequalities. Additionally, all parts of the body will flow together into a continuous mass with no 
vacuities. The present earth, therefore, with its unequal surface and numerous cavities, cannot have 
formed immediately from the chaos.93 
 He next articulates his second Proposition: 
That the face of the Earth before the Deluge was smooth, regular, and uniform; without Mountains, and 
without a Sea.94 
This he proves by describing the formation of the earth from the chaos as detailed above and citing 
various passages of Scripture and other ancient writings which indicate that this is the correct account 
of both the formation and form of the primitive earth.95 As with the Deluge, there was by Burnet’s 
time a long tradition of philosophical theorising about the Creation. This, too, begins essentially at the 
Reformation when the idea that there is philosophical knowledge in Scripture begins to gain currency, 
though it should be noted that there are earlier examples. Nicolas of Lyra, for example, who in the 
fourteenth century argued for the priority of the literal sense of Scripture over the symbolic, mystical, 
and allegorical senses prioritised by his late-medieval contemporaries, attempted to apply the then-
prevailing Aristotelian philosophy to the biblical six-day Creation.96 Although Nicolas’s literalism was 
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censured by his contemporaries, it was taken up by the Protestant reformers, and from this period we 
begin to see an increasing number of similarly philosophical explications of the Creation.97 
By this time, the growing disenchantment with Aristotle, itself closely related to the 
Reformation, saw the emergence of rival systems of natural philosophy.98 Thus, increasingly, it was 
these systems rather than Aristotle’s that became applied to biblical exegesis. The first new system to 
challenge the authority of Aristotle and to be widely applied to scriptural interpretation was the 
chemical philosophy of Paracelsus, and in the first half of the seventeenth century several Paracelsians 
– for example, Jean Baptist van Helmont, Robert Fludd, and Jan Amos Comeneius – pitted various 
chemical interpretations of Moses against the “heathenish” philosophy of Aristotle.99 Such 
interpretations were still popular later in the century. Most notably, Isaac Newton, who was heavily 
engaged in alchemical work at the time of his correspondence with Burnet in 1680, suggested to 
Burnet various chemical processes which may explain the formation of mountains at the Creation and 
discussed chemical theories of the Creation in his notebooks. And as I shall discuss in chapter four, 
during the controversy surrounding the Theory in the 1690s, one of Burnet’s critics, Thomas Robinson, 
proposed an alternative theory of the Creation which was heavily influenced by these earlier chemical 
interpretations.100 
 By mid-century, however, the Paracelsian challenge to Aristotle was becoming eclipsed by the 
mechanical philosophy of René Descartes, and during the 1660s and 1670s interpretations of the 
Creation based on Cartesian cosmogony and physics began to emerge. An early attempt to reconcile 
Descartes and Moses appeared in The defence of the threefold cabbala, published in 1662 by Henry 
More, Burnet’s colleague at Christ’s and the foremost populariser of Cartesianism in England at the 
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time.101 This was followed shortly afterwards on the continent by similar works from Joannes 
Amerpoel, Géraud de Cordemoy, Christoph Wittich, and others.102 Burnet, with some qualification, 
belongs in this tradition of Cartesian biblical exegesis. Certainly he has nothing at all in common with 
the chemical philosophers and given his resolutely mechanistic worldview it is highly likely that he saw 
the chemical philosophy, with its “virtues”, “qualities”, “sympathies”, “antipathies”, and the like, as 
retaining all the explanatory deficiencies of the Aristotelian framework it was intended to replace. 
Physical processes, he would stress to a later critic, “must be Mechanical: There being no other Modes, 
or Powers of Matter… but what are Mechanical”.103 And as I shall discuss in detail in the next chapter, 
his account of the formation of the earth very closely mirrors that of Descartes. 
 The qualification mentioned above is important, however, for there is one very significant 
difference between Burnet’s account of the Creation and these earlier Cartesian glosses of Genesis. 
That is, it is not a gloss of Genesis. It is a theory of the Creation, but unlike these earlier accounts, it is 
not a theory of the Mosaic Creation, for whereas More, Amerpoel, and others go to great lengths to 
reconcile the stages of their Cartesian Creations with the six days of Genesis, Burnet makes no such 
attempt. His is a purely physical account of the formation of the earth, with no reference whatsoever 
to the Hexameron. In this respect, Burnet’s account of the earth’s formation is closer to that of 
Descartes than these other authors in that Descartes, too, makes no attempt to reconcile his account 
with Genesis. Burnet differs from Descartes, however, in that where Descartes presents his 
cosmogony as hypothetical or counterfactual, Burnet’s theory is intended as a true, historical account 
of the earth’s formation. Also unlike Descartes, he appeals to Scripture in support of his account. This, 
however, is done only after he has articulated his physical theory, and as we shall see in the next 
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chapter, the support is derived from texts other than Genesis, which he – privately at this point – 
believes does not give a true account of the formation of the earth. 
As I have noted above, Burnet’s account of the Creation was articulated primarily in order to 
give an account of the Deluge. Accordingly, then, after explicating the former, he turns his attention 
back to the latter, first introducing his theory of the dissolution of the crust and showing how his 
theory is supported by Scripture before explaining the cause of the dissolution, how the agitation of 
the waters produced a universal Deluge, and how the breaking and collapse of the crust resulted in 
the earth taking its present form and situation.104 He concludes the chapter by stating the third 
proposition: 
That the disruption of the Abysse, or dissolution of the primaeval Earth and its fall into the Abysse, was 
the cause of the universal Deluge, and of the destruction of the old World”.105 
His explanation of the Deluge is followed by a lengthy chapter designed to prove that his theory “is 
not an Idea only, but an account of what really came to pass in this Earth, and the true explication of 
Noah’s Flood”.106 To this end, he presents further in-depth analysis of Moses’ account of the Deluge 
and various other passages of Scripture, showing how these writings support his theory and how his 
theory illuminates aspects of these passages which are otherwise obscure – I shall discuss these points 
in detail in the next chapter.107 He also discusses again some pagan accounts of floods. Having as we 
have seen enlisted such accounts to argue for the universality of the Deluge, he now appeals to them 
in arguing for its causes by pointing to evidence that they were believed to have been brought about 
by a dissolution of the crust.108 After this chapter, he bolsters his theory further by showing how it 
explains various details of the Mosaic account before considering the state of the earth immediately 
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after the Flood and the role played by Providence in bringing about and governing the Deluge – also 
to be discussed in the next chapter.109 
 Having “deduc’d” his theory of the Deluge “by the intuition of causes”, that is, by reasoning 
from the nature of the chaos, Burnet proceeds over the last four chapters of the first book to prove 
his theory “from the Effects”, that is, from the present form of the earth.110 Here, he sets down his 
final proposition: 
That the present form and structure of the Earth, both as to the surface and as to the Interiour parts of 
it, so far as they are known and accessible to us, doth exactly answer to our Theory concerning the form 
and dissolution of the first Earth, and cannot be explain’d upon any other Hypothesis”.111 
He begins his discussion with a general description of the present earth which he characterises as a 
“great Ruine”, a “broken and confus’d heap” of continents, mountains, seas, caves and other 
geological phenomena “plac’d in no order to one another, nor with any correspondency or regularity 
of parts”, which is precisely what we would expect to find given his account of the crust’s 
dissolution.112 He then considers particular features of the earth individually, dedicating the remainder 
of the ninth chapter to underground cavities before turning in the tenth and eleventh to the channel 
of the sea and mountains, showing how each phenomenon is accounted for by his theory.113  
 In the final chapter of the first book, after making some further observations concerning the 
present form of the earth, he addresses and confutes some rival explanations for the formation of 
mountains.114 He then concludes the first book with some brief but intriguing considerations about 
the moon and other planets and the extent to which they are of a similar formation and structure to 
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the earth and therefore subject to the same fate. The mountains observed on the moon, he notes, 
indicate that it has undergone a deluge similar to the earth. Venus and Mars, too, from the “spots” 
observed on their surfaces, seem also to be terraqueous globes and thus to have suffered a deluge. 
Singling out Saturn and Jupiter for special consideration, he proposes that the ring of Saturn indicates 
that at its deluge the two polar regions of the crust disintegrated and collapsed into the abyss but the 
middle section remained intact and rose above the equator to form an “Arch” or “Bridge” around the 
planet. Turning finally to Jupiter, he argues that this planet is evidently in its antediluvian state, its 
“Fasciae” or “Belts” marking different “Zones” similar to those on the antediluvian earth – of which 
he gives an account in book two. Other planets, then, likely formed via the same process as ours and 
like the earth have either undergone or will undergo a universal Deluge caused by the same processes 
as that which occurred on the earth.115 This discussion of Saturn would become the subject of an 
interesting objection to the Theory which I shall discuss in chapter four. 
1.4. Book two: The antediluvian earth and Paradise 
Having ascertained certain key features of the antediluvian earth during his explication of the Deluge 
in book one, Burnet proceeds in book two to give a fuller account of this former world. He sets out a 
number of key questions in the first chapter: “what were the other properties of this World? how 
were the Heavens, how the Elements? what accommodation for humane life? why was it more proper 
to be the seat of Paradise than the present Earth?”.116 For Burnet, it was the latter question that was 
most central, the main purpose of this second book being as he put it “to give a just account of 
Paradise”.117 He notes that we know the main characteristics of Paradise from Scripture and other 
Christian writings. We also have knowledge from pagan accounts of the “Golden Age”, which was 
evidently contemporary with Paradise and the antediluvian earth and can thus reliably be identified 
with them. The aim of this second book was to use the theory to explain the causes of these 
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characteristics. The three principal differences between the antediluvian and present earth which had 
been established in the previous book and which were to be used to explain why the former was 
paradisiacal were: (a) its uniform surface and lack of seas; (b) its situation relative to the sun; and (c) 
its oval figure.118 Here, rather than reason from causes as he does in the earlier chapters of book one, 
he begins the second book by reasoning from effects, that is, from characteristics of the antediluvian 
earth of which we have knowledge from sacred and pagan history and from Jewish and Christian 
accounts of Paradise. The three principal characteristics are: (a) a perpetual spring; (b) the longevity 
of humans; and (c) the generation of (non-human) animals from the soil.119 
 These three characteristics of Paradise, he argues in the following chapter, do not, and cannot, 
obtain on the present earth. The position of the axis does not allow a perpetual spring on any part of 
the earth. The soil does not produce animals. And the kind of longevity that humans enjoyed in 
Paradise and the Golden Age is entirely alien to our world. Paradise, therefore, cannot have been on 
the present earth.120 Having shown this, he returns in the next chapter to those three features of the 
antediluvian earth which distinguish it from the present earth, viz., its uniform surface, the position of 
the axis, and its oval figure. Of these, the key factor for Burnet in explaining the three principal 
characteristics of Paradise was the position of the axis. From this feature followed immediately a 
perpetual spring, and from a perpetual spring followed the generation of animals and longevity.121 
Dealing first with the generation of animals, Burnet draws an analogy between seeds and eggs. These 
things being so similar, he argues, it is easy to conceive of the primitive soil, which was more fertile 
than the present, containing both the seeds of plants and animal eggs. For the fertilisation of eggs in 
the earth, he appeals to “an aethereal element in the male-geniture”. This “aethereal element”, he 
argues, given the purer atmosphere on the antediluvian earth, was also present in the air and fell on 
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the soil in dews, fertilising the eggs. The perpetual spring provided the constant, unchanging 
temperature necessary for incubation, thus preventing miscarriages.122 
 Following his explanation of the generation of animals, Burnet devotes a chapter to giving a 
detailed account of antediluvian longevity. This chapter is especially interesting and deserves some 
attention. The longevity of the antediluvians and the shortening of human life that followed the 
Deluge represented an interesting puzzle for seventeenth-century philosophers and theologians. 
Aside from the view that the antediluvians’ lives were measured in lunar rather than solar years, there 
were essentially three main kinds of explanation. The first was diet. It was widely believed that the 
antediluvians were vegetarian, and that the introduction of flesh into the human diet had shortened 
life. The second was Adam’s perfect medical knowledge, passed down to his progeny but lost after 
the Deluge. The third pointed to environmental differences between the antediluvian and postdiluvian 
earth resulting from climatic changes brought about at the Flood.123 A seventeenth-century project 
which was closely related to that of trying to discover the causes of antediluvian longevity was the 
effort to try and restore it. Those who believed that the antediluvians’ vegetarian diet contributed to 
their longevity held that such a diet would be conducive to longer life in the postdiluvian world. Those 
who attributed longevity to Adam’s medical knowledge believed that rediscovery of this knowledge 
would inevitably re-establish our former lifespan.124 The most famous seventeenth-century 
philosopher to have actively pursued this dream of restoring antediluvian longevity was René 
Descartes. He believed that a new system of medicine founded on his new mechanical philosophy 
could lengthen human life to that of Adam and Noah.125 
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For Burnet, antediluvian longevity and the postdiluvian shortening of human life were 
important for essentially two reasons. First, they were phenomena that any theory of the earth had 
to account for. Second, they were crucial evidence of (a) a significant difference between the 
antediluvian and present earth, (b) this change in the earth having occurred specifically at the Deluge, 
and (c) what this difference and this change consisted in. As Philip Almond has noted, Burnet’s account 
of antediluvian longevity is especially important in the context of seventeenth-century thinking on the 
topic in that he was the first to offer what may be considered a “scientific” account of the 
phenomenon in terms of environmental factors.126 The particular change in the earth to which he 
attributes the shortening of life is the change in the axis and consequent introduction of seasonal 
variation. The effects of this change in the body are explained in terms of Descartes’ mechanistic 
physiology. Burnet takes seriously the Cartesian notion that the body is a kind of machine. An 
important difference between the body and an artificial machine, he notes however, is that the former 
has the capacity to regenerate, to repair or replenish its own worn components. Were we to give this 
capacity to an artificial machine, even a complex machine analogous to the body, we would expect it 
to continue to function for a far longer period than the human lifespan. To illustrate this point, he 
introduces a thought experiment concerning a highly complex lamp whose workings are exactly 
analogous to Descartes’ account of nutrition in his Description of the human body. Such a lamp, he 
argues, if given this regenerative capacity, would continue to function far longer than the body.127 
Burnet offers this thought experiment not to explain the longevity of the antediluvians but 
rather to problematise the comparative brevity of life in his own time. It was this brevity rather than 
the antediluvians’ longevity that was a surprising phenomenon, and which was in need of explanation. 
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We naturally think of the antediluvians’ long lives, he observes, as mysterious, as something to be 
explained, but such longevity is precisely what we should expect given the composition of the body. 
We consider it unusual merely because we are accustomed to a short existence, and when something 
is familiar, we are apt to think that we know more about it than we do. In the case of our short lifespan, 
though, we know very little. Indeed, the shortness of life runs directly counter to our best physiological 
knowledge, and so is an especially puzzling phenomenon. The issue to be addressed, then, was not 
why the antediluvians live so long, but 
[w]hy the frame or Machine of an humane Body, or of another Animal, having that construction of parts 
and those faculties which it hath, lasts so short a time? And though it fall into no disease, nor have any 
unnatural accident, within the space of eighty years, more or less, fatally and inevitably decays, dies 
and perisheth?128 
 This question could not be answered in terms of our physiology alone, for our physiology 
implies that we should live far longer than we do. We must therefore look to external factors. It is here 
that Burnet appeals to the change in the earth’s axis and consequent seasonal variation, offering a 
detailed explanation of the effects of this change on the body in terms of a mechanistic physiology 
and physics. The main effect of seasonal variation on the body in his view is that which it has on the 
“Tone or Tonick disposition of the organs”. By this, he means their elastic or spring-like properties. 
Bodily organs, he argues, are essentially springs or configurations of springs. It is the decay of these 
springs that constitutes the main cause of the body’s degeneration. The main springs which, through 
their decay, bring on the decay of the rest of the body are those of the heart and stomach, for these 
are the principal springs by which the body is nourished, “the two Master-Springs in the Mechanism 
of an Animal”. In the stomach are small spring-like fibres which push the food into the intestines from 
which it travels to the liver and then through the veins to the heart. The heart has a spring-like action, 
                                                          
128 Burnet (1684), 203-6 – quotation from 203. 
47 
 
which, when opened by the rarefaction of the blood, forces blood out of the heart and into the arteries 
through which it circulates and nourishes the various parts of the body.129 
The key environmental factor which affects these organs for Burnet is the motion of small 
particles which pervade all bodies. On the antediluvian earth, this motion was calm and ordered. On 
the postdiluvian earth, however, due to our varying seasons, it is erratic and disorderly.130 The force 
of springs, he notes, results from particles exerting pressure on the depressed parts such that, when 
those parts are released, they return to their original posture as the pent-up particles are allowed 
freely to follow their natural course.131 The variable, non-uniform motion of these particles brought 
on by our intemperate seasons weakens the springs of the heart and stomach far more quickly than 
the uniform motion of these same particles on the antediluvian earth. This causes these organs to fail, 
that is, to lose their spring-like or elastic properties, thereby inhibiting their ability to nourish and 
maintain the body and bringing on its more general decay.132 
Burnet was clearly well-versed in contemporary discussions about antediluvian longevity. He 
engaged with all the major views on the topic, paying particular attention to the notion that the 
antediluvians’ lives were measured in lunar years, which he argued was untenable for several 
reasons.133 He also engaged with the related endeavour of restoring our former longevity, offering a 
decidedly pessimistic outlook which contrasts sharply with the optimism of Descartes and others. 
Crucially, the shortening of life being due to environmental factors put the prolongation of life beyond 
human capabilities. He does not disagree in principle that Descartes’s mechanistic physiology showed 
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that the body is theoretically capable of longer life. Indeed, in certain respects he is even more 
confident of this than Descartes. Descartes had argued that with better knowledge of the mechanism 
of the body we could potentially learn how to make it function for a longer period. Burnet went 
further. Adopting various details of Descartes’s physiology and taking seriously his conception of the 
body as a machine, he claimed that what we know about the body already implies that it should live 
longer than it does. In practice, however, because the accelerated decay of the body results from that 
intemperate motion of particles which is caused by the position of the earth’s axis, antediluvian 
longevity was not something that could be restored. Assessing “those Projectors of Immortality, or 
undertakers to make Men live to the Age of Methusalah, if they will use their methods and medicines”, 
he urged that “[t]here is but one method for this, To put the Sun into his old course, or the Earth into 
its first posture; there is no other secret to prolong life; Our Bodies will sympathize with the general 
course of Nature, nothing can guard us from it, no Elixir, no Specifick, no Philosopher's-stone”.134 
After his lengthy discussion of antediluvian longevity, Burnet turns his attention to the 
important issue of how the antediluvian earth was watered. This, he admits, was an especially 
perplexing problem given that he had enclosed the water within the crust and removed all the 
inequalities in the surface which facilitate the flow of rivers.135 To overcome these difficulties, he 
proposes a novel antediluvian hydrography. The heat of the sun, he argues, raised vapours from the 
earth at the equator – at first from the moist soil and then, as the crust became dehydrated and 
fissured, from the abyss. The vapours, following the path of least resistance, moved toward the polar 
regions where they were condensed by the cooler air and descended, forming reservoirs in the 
northern and southern hemispheres from which, owing to the earth’s oval figure, rivers flowed toward 
the equatorial region where they were either evaporated again or absorbed by the dry earth (Figs. 7-
8).136 
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Next, after some observations concerning the appearance of the rainbow after the Deluge, 
which he attributes to atmospheric changes brought about by the Flood, Burnet describes the 
different “Zones” of the antediluvian earth. In the centre was the torrid zone. Here, the sun shined 
directly at all times, rendering it both uninhabitable and unpassable. The torrid zone was flanked to 
the north and south by two temperate zones. This was the inhabited part of the earth and the part 
where the aforementioned rivers flowed. Finally, to the north and south of the temperate zones were 
two frigid zones. These, too, were uninhabitable. These zones gave the antediluvian earth if viewed 
from a distance an appearance similar to Jupiter, which is in its antediluvian state.137 
 After brief discussion of some further characteristics of the antediluvian earth and civil life 
before the Deluge, Burnet turns to the widely debated issue of the location of Paradise.138 Once again, 
as Harrison notes, the search for an earthly Paradise was ultimately a product of the Reformation. 
Medieval exegetes had largely – though not universally – adopted a spiritual interpretation of 
Paradise. And those who did adopt a historical, earthly Paradise were generally unconcerned with its 
location. In contrast, early-modern thinkers were at pains to determine the earthly location of 
Paradise. Here again, the Protestant literalism, the historicity of Moses, and the notion that Scripture 
contains philosophical knowledge played important roles. Crucially, following the Reformation, 
Moses’ description of Paradise came increasingly to be seen as imparting geographical information 
about its location on earth.139 By the end of the seventeenth century, the most popular view was that 
Paradise was located in Mesopotamia, an opinion that Burnet dismisses as “a conceit and invention 
of some Modern Authors, which hath been much encouraged of late, because it gave Men ease and 
rest as to further inquiries, in an argument they could not well manage”.140 
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Instead, as Joseph Duncan has illustrated and as is already apparent to some extent in the 
above discussion of the antediluvian earth, Burnet revives a notion, last promulgated by the Spanish 
Jesuit Juan de Pineda in 1620, that not just a single garden but the whole earth was paradisiacal prior 
to the Deluge, and that the expulsion from Paradise was not a change of location but a change in the 
state of the earth.141 Though he does not deny that there was a particular place on the antediluvian 
earth called “Eden” where our first parents lived, he emphasises that the characteristics of this place 
were essentially no different from the rest of the habitable part of the earth. He also wants to dismiss 
the idea that Paradise can be located on the present earth, which of course in his is view radically 
different from the antediluvian earth. Wherever God placed Adam and Eve cannot have been on the 
present earth, since the present earth lacks the key features which make the essential characteristics 
of Paradise possible. The most important characteristic here of course is the earth’s situation relative 
to the sun, and since the entire earth was in this situation, so too the entire inhabited zones of the 
earth, rather than merely a single garden, were necessarily paradisiacal.142 As to the location of Eden, 
then, there was no reason on the basis of the theory to prefer any particular location over any other.143 
Assessing the evidence provided by the Church Fathers and pagan accounts of paradisiacal worlds, it 
seemed probable that it was in the southern hemisphere, and so not in Mesopotamia. Wherever it 
was, though, its characteristics did not differ from the rest of the habitable earth. It was simply 
wherever God placed the first humans, its location depending “rather… upon the Divine pleasure… 
than upon Natural causes and differences”.144 
 Having given his account of the antediluvian earth and Paradise, Burnet next devotes a 
chapter to showing how his theory illuminates various ancient writings – I shall discuss this in the next 
                                                          
141 Duncan (1969), 182-6; (1972), 271-4. 
142 Burnet (1684), 250-62. 
143 Burnet (1684), 250-1. 
144 Burnet (1684), 251-62 – quotation from 262. 
52 
 
chapter.145 He then considers the peopling of America.146 This latter problem had been a much-
discussed topic for some time, and especially so since La Peyrère’s unorthodox solution that there 
were humans before Adam.147 Burnet’s solution, though more acceptable than La Peyrère’s, was 
nonetheless controversial. The people of America, he argues, originate from descendants of Adam 
who travelled west before the Deluge when there was no sea. Foreseeing that at the Deluge the crust 
would form two main continents, God saved a selection of humans in each part of the world. The 
people of America, then, are descendants of Adam, but not of Noah.148 Following his discussion of the 
peopling of America, Burnet deals with the potential objection that, had there been such a marked 
change in the earth at the Deluge, then there would exist some human records of this change, to which 
he responds by arguing that the vast majority of ancient learning is no longer extant and promising to 
deal with the issue more fully in a later work – which I shall discuss in chapter four.149 Finally, he 
concludes the book with two theological chapters on “the Author of Nature” and “Natural Providence” 
in which he addresses the existence of God and his role in the natural world – to be discussed in the 
next chapter.150 
1.5. Book three: The Conflagration 
That the Theory was to have a second volume was implied in the full title of the first: The theory of the 
earth: Containing an account of the original of the earth, and of all the general changes which it hath 
already undergone, or is to undergo till the consummation of all things. The two first books concerning 
the Deluge, and concerning Paradise. In case there were any lingering doubts, Burnet makes clear at 
the end of the second book that “[w]e are next to enter upon new Matter and new Thoughts, and not 
only so, but upon a Series of Things and Times to come, which is to make the Second Part of this 
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Theory”.151 The eagerly anticipated second volume did not surface until nearly a decade after the first, 
the Latin edition appearing in 1689 and the English in 1690.152 
The publication of the second volume, then, coincides almost exactly with the Revolution of 
1688-9, and as Jacob and Lockwood have observed, these developments are reflected in certain 
differences between the Latin and English editions. As Jacob and Lockwood explain, the Latin edition, 
though not published until after the Revolution, was written before it during the reign of King James 
II, a Catholic. At the time of writing, moreover, Burnet was involved in a dispute with the Crown over 
the appointment of a Catholic pensioner at the Charterhouse. As a result, the Latin edition contains 
passages expressing dissatisfaction with the political and religious order in England and the threat of 
Antichrist, which, as was common among Protestants at the time, Burnet identified with the Catholic 
Church. These passages and certain others (which I shall discuss below) which Burnet appears to have 
deemed inflammatory were removed from the English edition – which was dedicated to Queen Mary 
II – indicating his satisfaction with the Revolution Settlement and belief that the Catholic threat had 
been overcome.153 Jacob and Lockwood conclude from this that the Latin version is “much more 
obviously” a millenarian text than the English.154 As Johnston emphasises, however, it is important not 
to overstate the significance of these differences, as indeed Jacob seems to do in a later paper where 
she writes that this volume of the Theory, “if read in its original Latin text, is a millenarian 
document”.155 As Johnston stresses, Burnet’s millenarian beliefs are still very much present in the 
English version. The overall aims and argument of the work are the same and are typical of millenarian 
thinking among Anglicans in the late-seventeenth century. “The argument of Burnet’s Anglican 
millenarianism”, writes Johnston, “did not dissipate simply because its tone had moderated”.156 
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As I noted in the introduction, the late-seventeenth-century Anglican millenarianism that 
Burnet’s work typifies has its roots essentially in the Restoration of King Charles II in 1660. Following 
the Restoration, after some unsuccessful attempts to depose the King in the early 1660s, the threat 
from radical millenarian groups waned and a different kind of millenarian thinking emerged as 
moderates reacted to the radicalism of the Civil War and Interregnum.157 As Johnston explains, there 
were at this time essentially three kinds of interpretation of prophecy: preterist, futurist, and 
historicist.158 Preterism was pioneered by the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius and adopted and developed 
in England by the Anglican clergyman Henry Hammond and the Presbyterian minister Richard Baxter. 
Preterists held that the prophecies in Scripture had all been fulfilled and that the Millennium had 
occurred in the past. On the opposite side of the coin, futurists believed that none of the prophecies 
had been fulfilled, placing their fulfilment and the Millennium far in the future.159 Historicists of course 
maintained that some of prophecies had been fulfilled and that the millennium was not far off. 
Preterists and futurists were motivated essentially by a desire to avoid the political consequences that 
had resulted from historicist interpretations. Hammond and Baxter, troubled by the religious divisions 
in England, argued that the Millennium began at the conversion of the Romans under Constantine in 
the early fourth century and ended a thousand years later. The enemies of the Church depicted in 
Revelation represented earlier, pagan emperors and other early antagonists toward Christianity rather 
than contemporary opponents of Protestantism – both eschewed the identification of Antichrist with 
the Papacy.160 Futurists sought likewise to counter the political threat of historicism. The Salisbury 
theologian Richard Hayter, for example, urged that the civil wars had been brought about by a 
misinterpretation of Revelation and endeavoured to remedy the situation by projecting the fulfilment 
of prophecies into the future and limiting the events to Asia.161 
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Despite the apparent threat it posed, however, historicism remained the dominant mode of 
interpreting prophecy, and rather than resorting to preterism or futurism, exegetes sought instead to 
maintain a historicist interpretation while at the same time avoiding advocating – or being perceived 
to advocate – radicalism.162 This was the project in which Burnet was ultimately engaged in this second 
volume of his Theory. He wanted to maintain that some but not all of the prophecies have been 
fulfilled, that Antichrist is to be identified with the Catholic Church, that the Conflagration and 
Millennium are not far in the future, and that the millennial Kingdom of Christ is to be a physical 
Kingdom on earth, while at the same time providing an interpretation which could not be used as a 
pretext for political violence. This project was likely inherited in large part from More, who maintained 
a historicist interpretation of biblical prophecies while at the same time condemning those 
“enthusiasts” who had used them as a pretext for political violence and arguing at length that the 
Millennium will not be brought about via such means.163 
More influential on Burnet, however, as William Poole observes, was the apocalyptic vision of 
Joseph Glanvill, a Latitudinarian clergyman and FRS who himself was friendly with and heavily 
influenced by the Cambridge Platonists.164 Glanvill addressed the Conflagration and Millennium in two 
short chapters at the end of his Lux orientalis, a work dealing primarily with the pre-existence of the 
soul. Published shortly after the Restoration, Glanvill’s model of the Conflagration and Millennium, 
like Burnet’s account of the Creation and Deluge, drew heavily on Cartesian physics and cosmogony. 
At the Conflagration, Glanvill held, the earth’s central fire will break out and engulf the surface. The 
righteous, upon the return of Christ, will ascend to heaven. The burning earth will turn into a comet 
and travel through space until it reaches another vortex. Here it will cool, and the vapours and ashes 
will descend and revitalise the surface, thereby transforming it into a second Paradise where the 
Kingdom of Christ will reign until the final consummation, which will result – possibly – from the 
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extinction of the sun (that is, the star at the centre of this other vortex).165 For Burnet, Glanvill’s theory 
served perfectly the purpose of maintaining a historicist reading of prophecy while at the same time 
providing no motive for political discord, for on this view, the Millennium will obtain on earth, but not 
on the present earth, thus negating any pretensions of radicals to be ushering in the Kingdom of Christ 
through violent uprisings. Burnet, as we shall see, disagrees with Glanvill on several details, but he 
substantially adopts his general model of the Apocalypse. 
 Turning now to the content of Burnet’s second volume, then, whereas in the first volume he 
discusses the events in non-chronological order, explaining the Deluge via an account of the Creation 
in book one and then going back in time to discuss the antediluvian earth in book two, in the second 
volume, he discusses the events chronologically, dealing with the Conflagration in book three and 
turning to the formation of the new earth, the Millennium, and the final consummation in book four. 
At the beginning of book three, following a brief introductory chapter, he sets out at the beginning of 
the second chapter two initial principles of his theory of the Conflagration. First, the end of the world 
of which he is to give an account is only the end of the sublunary world, that is, the earth and its 
atmosphere. It does not extend to the universe in general or any other part of it. Second, only the 
form of the earth will be destroyed at the Conflagration, not its matter, for fire does not annihilate 
matter but only changes its form.166 
The aim of chapters two and three was to establish, firstly, that the earth will be destroyed, 
and secondly, that it will be destroyed by fire. To establish these things, he turns first to the ancient 
pagan philosophers and theologians. Various sects of ancient philosophers, he observes, the Stoics for 
example, as well as the Atomists and Ionians, maintained some notion of the dissolution – and 
restoration – of the earth. Ancient theologians, too, in their various myths and poems, expressed 
similar ideas. The majority of the ancients, then, apart from Aristotle and his followers, held that the 
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earth is perishable. And although they are less unanimous on this point than on the formation of the 
earth from a chaos, there were two important factors which needed to be appreciated. First was an 
ambiguity in the term “world”. In ancient writings, this term is used to refer to both the earth and 
universe. Thus, where the ancients claim that the world is immortal, they may plausibly be referring 
to the universe, thereby allowing the earth to perish. Second was the distinction mentioned above 
between form and matter. When the ancients say that the world will not perish, if this does pertain to 
the earth, it may refer only to its matter, thus allowing its form to perish. The destruction of the earth, 
then, was consistent with all ancient learning apart from that of the Peripatetics.167 In keeping with 
his principle – to be discussed in the next chapter – of only accepting the testimony of the ancients if 
it is corroborated by Scripture, he turns now to the latter, quoting several Old and New Testament 
prophecies which confirm that the earth is to be subject to both a dissolution and restoration.168 
 Having determined that the earth will be destroyed, he turns next to consider the manner of 
its destruction. Beginning again with a survey of the ancients, he notes first that the Romans widely 
believed that the earth will be destroyed by fire. The Romans evidently took this notion from the 
Greeks, and especially the Stoics, who in turn learned it from various more ancient Eastern peoples 
such as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, and Chaldeans. Northern and western cultures, too, such 
as the Celts and Scythians, held this view.169 Once again, in keeping with his methodological principles, 
ancient learning had to be corroborated by Scripture and natural reason. The latter being dealt with 
at length in the rest of the book, he turns now to the former. As with the destruction of the earth 
more generally, its destruction specifically by fire was well supported by both the Old Testament 
Prophets and New Testament Apostles. That these two sets of sacred writers taught of the 
Conflagration at such different times and yet are in perfect agreement, moreover, clearly attests to 
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their having a common, divine source. That the earth will be destroyed by fire, then, was confirmed 
by virtually all ancient learning, and this learning was corroborated by the word of God.170 
 Having ascertained both that the earth will be destroyed and that it will be destroyed by fire, 
Burnet devotes the next two chapters to the question of when the Conflagration will take place. He 
argues first that the time of the Conflagration cannot be predicted by considering natural causes. As 
he was to illustrate in subsequent chapters, natural causes – aided as we shall see by the ministry of 
angels – were sufficient to bring about the Conflagration. However, the various natural processes 
which will cause the Conflagration must be synchronised at the appropriate time by a divine – or 
angelic – power. Thus, on the basis of these causes alone, we cannot calculate when they will conspire 
in bringing about the Conflagration.171 Textual sources were equally unpropitious. As well as casting 
doubt on various calculations from Christian and Jewish writers, Burnet argues that the prophecies 
give us no indication at present as to the time of the Conflagration. The seven Seals, Trumpets, and 
Vials are “rather Historical Prophecies than Chronological”. They are signs of events leading up to the 
Apocalypse, but they do not tell us the times at which they are to occur. Others “may be call’d 
Chronological”, such as the reign of Antichrist and the preaching of the Witnesses, but we do not know 
when they began and so cannot determine when they will conclude.172 Ultimately in Burnet’s view the 
ability to predict the time of the Conflagration depends on the fulfilment of more prophecies. By 
examining them such that we can reliably apprehend their fulfilment, we will be able to use them to 
predict the time of the Conflagration. What is required at present, then, is 
a judicious examination of these points: and according as we gather up the Prophecies of the 
Apocalypse, in a successive completion, we see how by degrees we draw nearer and nearer to the 
conclusion of all. But till some of these enlightning Prophecies be accomplish'd, we are as a Man that 
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awakes in the Night, all is dark about him, and he knows not how far the Night is spent: but if he watch 
till the light appears, the first glimpses of that will resolve his doubts.173 
On this subject, it is important to note a significant difference between the Latin and English 
editions of the Theory. Although the argument in the two chapters discussed above is essentially the 
same in both versions, there are, as Jacob and Lockwood point out, two passages elsewhere in the 
Latin text in which Burnet conjectures about the time of the Conflagration and which indicate that he 
believed it will occur in around two hundred years. These have been removed from the English 
version.174 It is also noteworthy that in chapter five of the English text Burnet makes the point that we 
cannot determine the time of the Conflagration from prophecy slightly more forcefully than he does 
in the Latin version. In the final paragraph, for example, he stresses again the difficulty of calculating 
the time of the Conflagration from Prophecy and the dangers of attempting such calculations. He also 
notes the importance of prophecy being obscure as to such matters. “In a word”, he writes,  
Tho the sum and general contents of a Prophecy be very intelligible, yet the application of it to Time 
and Persons may be very lubricous. There must be obscurity in a Prophecy, as well as shadow in a 
Picture. All its lines must not stand in a full light. For if Prophecies were open and bare-fac'd as to all 
their parts and circumstances, they would check and obstruct the course of humane affairs; and hinder, 
if it was possible, their own accomplishment. Modesty and Sobriety are in all things commendable, but 
in nothing more than in the explication of these Sacred Mysteries; and we have seen so many miscarry 
by a too close and particular application of them, that we ought to dread the Rock about which we see 
so many shipwrecks.175 
He concludes the chapter by noting again that, when more of the prophecies have been fulfilled, we 
will be better able to make the calculation: “But the Scenes will change fast towards the Evening of 
this long day, and when the Sun is near setting, they will more easily compute how far he hath to 
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run”.176 This paragraph is an entirely new addition in the English version which did not appear in the 
Latin text. 
 These differences are significant and highly interesting insofar as they highlight Burnet’s 
increased reticence to speculate about the time of the Conflagration after the Revolution compared 
with the period before it. They do not, however, in my view, justify Jacob and Lockwood’s contention 
that the Latin edition is significantly more millenarian than the English. Firstly, it is important to 
emphasise, as I have noted above, that the overall argument of this chapter – that we cannot 
determine the time of the Conflagration from prophecy – is the same in both texts.177 Indeed, the title 
of the chapter in the English edition, “Concerning Prophecies that determine the end of the World; Of 
what order soever, Prophane or Sacred: Jewish or Christian. That no certain judgment can be made 
from any of them, at what distance we are now from the Conflagration”, is a straightforward 
translation of the Latin.178 That he makes certain loose conjectures about the time of the Conflagration 
elsewhere in the Latin text but does not do so in the English, then, does not alter the fact that, when 
addressing the issue at length in this chapter, he came to the same conclusion in both versions. It is 
important also to note that in the English text he still exhibits the same historicist millenarian belief 
that the Conflagration is near, even if he no longer gives an indication of how near. Immediately 
following the above passage on the fulfilment of further prophecies, for example, he urges that 
[w]e must have a little patience, and, I think, but a little; still eyeing those Prophecies… till by their 
accomplishment, the day dawn, and the Clouds begin to change their colour. Then we shall be able to 
make a near guess, when the Sun of righteousness will arise.179 
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Secondly, an unwillingness to speculate about the time of the Conflagration was not at all 
uncommon in seventeenth-century millenarian thinking. Indeed, such agnosticism was well supported 
by Scripture. In his 1627 work An apologie of the power and providence of God in the government of 
the world, for example, George Hakewill wove together passages from Matthew 24.37-9, Peter 2.3.10, 
and Thessalonians 1.5.2-3 in which it is stated that we will know nothing of the time of the 
Conflagration until the event is upon us.180 And shortly after the publication of Burnet’s second volume 
in 1692 and 1693, the naturalist John Ray in his Miscellaneous discourses and Three physico-
theological discourses added testimony from Matthew 24.36 and Acts 1.17 to the same effect and, 
echoing Burnet’s warning “that we ought to dread the Rock about which we see so many shipwrecks”, 
listed several failed predictions concerning the time of the Conflagration which, he asserted, 
demonstrate how “ungroundedly and erroneously” such calculations are made.181 
 After dealing with the time of the Conflagration, Burnet turns at last to its causes. Here, he 
observes, the ancients are of little use, for they do not give causes in their accounts of the burning of 
the earth. The vast majority of modern authors were unhelpful too, for they typically ascribed the 
Conflagration purely to supernatural causes, something Burnet, in keeping with his maxim of 
appealing to miracles only when there is no adequate natural explanation, was unwilling to do.182 Here 
it is important to note that Burnet is motivated by similar concerns as in his theory of the Deluge. 
Crucially, he wants to make a universal Conflagration intelligible, that is, explicable in terms of natural 
processes, in order to show that allegorical and partial interpretations of the Conflagration are 
unwarranted. Here, though, the threat of such interpretations was political as well as religious, for 
such readings of the Conflagration had been used as a pretext for political violence. Most notably, the 
work of Cambridge academician Joseph Mede, who argued that there would be a partial Conflagration 
confined only to Italy prior to the Millennium and then a universal Conflagration after it, had been 
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appropriated by radical millenarians earlier in the century.183 By showing that the Conflagration was 
to be a literal and universal dissolution of the earth, Burnet aimed to demonstrate that the Millennium 
will not take place on the present earth and that those radicals who sought to institute the Kingdom 
of Christ on the present earth through violent means had no scriptural basis for doing so. 
Burnet’s discussion of the causes of the Conflagration closely mirrors his treatment of the 
Deluge. As with the latter where the principal problem was the difficulty of finding sufficient water to 
cover the entire surface of the earth, the key problem in this case was “the difficulty of setting the 
Earth on fire”.184 That is to say, there are various apparently insurmountable obstacles to the burning 
of the earth. The primary impediments, he notes, are: (a) the vast quantity of water; (b) the numerous 
rocky mountain ranges; (c) the various soils and clays in the earth which seem rather to quell than to 
fuel fire; and (d) the extreme cold at the poles. These phenomena, it seemed to many, will inevitably 
impede the spread of fire, rendering it impossible for the earth to be consumed in its entirety.185 
Having presented these impediments, he then briefly explains how they will be overcome at the 
conflagration. The amount of water on the earth will be greatly diminished by droughts. The 
mountains will be disintegrated during the Conflagration by earthquakes, enabling them to burn. Soils 
and clays will be altered by heat, turning them into fuel. And the earth’s axis will return to its original 
position, making the polar regions warmer and more pervious to fire.186 
Although, as Burnet noted, most who believed in a literal, universal Conflagration held that it 
would occur via purely miraculous means, some, as we have seen above in the case of Glanvill, sought 
to account for it in terms of natural causes. The two theories with which Burnet was familiar were: (a) 
Glanvill’s Cartesian-inspired notion of the central fire breaking out, a view that had also been argued 
around the same time by the Cambridge Platonist George Rust; and (b) More’s also Cartesian-inspired 
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theory, presented in his 1660 work An explanation of the grand mystery of Godliness, that the earth 
is moving closer to the sun and will eventually be engulfed by its heat.187 Addressing the latter view, 
Burnet first notes that if we compare the calculations of the distance between the earth and sun in 
ancient and modern astronomers it appears that, if the distance is changing at all, then the earth is 
rather receding from than approaching nearer to the sun, since the moderns’ calculations of the 
distance are greater than those of the ancients. More importantly, though, if the earth is moving closer 
to the sun, then the time of its orbit and consequently the length of the year would be becoming 
shorter, and there is no evidence that this is the case. The idea of the central fire breaking out seemed 
equally implausible. Though he acknowledges that such a fire very likely exists, its breaking out and 
engulfing the earth was highly improbable. Fire being the lightest, most volatile substance, the earth’s 
central fire must necessarily be enclosed within an incredibly thick and strong shell which will prevent 
it from consuming the earth.188 
Having confuted the above theories, he devotes the next chapter to the issue of the extent of 
the Conflagration. Reiterating his earlier point that the Conflagration will be confined to the sublunary 
world and will “have nothing to do with the Stars and superior Heavens”, he argues that the upper 
limits of the fire will be the top of earth’s atmosphere. As to its inner limits, he claims that the fire will 
burn the entire exterior region of the earth to the depth of the ocean, thus destroying all but the inner 
core.189 He then explicates the three causes of the Conflagration detailed above before discussing in 
more depth the dehydration of the earth’s matter and plant life which will take place prior to the 
event.190 After this, he considers to what extent miraculous causes will be involved in the 
Conflagration, arguing that the natural processes will be assisted and directed by the ministry of angels 
but ruling out any direct intervention from God – I shall return to this issue in the next chapter.191 
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Next, he discusses in detail the diminishing of the oceans by droughts prior to the Conflagration and 
the disintegration of mountains during it.192 He then devotes a chapter to explaining the beginning of 
the Conflagration in Italy and the complete dissolution of the earth that will result.193 
That the Conflagration will begin in Italy was of course very important. The identification of 
Antichrist with the Catholic Church had been the prevailing view among Protestant millenarians since 
the Reformation.194 Thessalonians, the Book of Daniel, and the Book of Revelation, Burnet observed, 
all indicate that the Conflagration will commence at the seat of Antichrist, “that Antichrist, and the 
Seat of Antichrist, will be consumed with Fire, at the coming of our Saviour”. It was thus “very 
reasonable and decorous, that the Grand Traitor and Head of the Apostasie should be made the first 
example of the divine vengeance” and therefore highly convenient that the Papacy was situated in 
the volcanic centre of the Christian world, that as he puts it, 
[n]ature hath sav'd us the pains of kindling a fire in those parts of the Earth, for, since the memory of 
man, there have always been subterraneous fires in Italy. And the Romans did not preserve their Vestal 
fire with more constancy, than Nature hath done her fiery Mountains in some part or other of that 
Territory.195 
After having dealt fully with all the physical causes and characteristics of the Conflagration, 
Burnet uses his theory to explain the various natural phenomena which, according to Scripture, will 
precede or accompany the event. These were: (a) earthquakes and the falling of mountains; (b) violent 
seas; (c) obscuring of the sun and moon; and (d) irregular motions of the heavens and falling stars.196 
Earthquakes and the falling of mountains he had explained already as resulting from droughts 
enlarging vacuities in the earth and releasing subterraneous gasses.197 The commotion of the sea 
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would also result from earthquakes and also from eruptions of volcanoes in the ocean.198 The sun and 
moon would be obscured by fumes and vapours emitted by volcanoes, a phenomenon which had 
frequently been observed prior to eruptions.199 The unusual motion of the heavens would result partly 
from the shaking of the earth by earthquakes, partly from the shift in the earth’s axis, and partly from 
the irregular movements of the earth perturbing those of the moon and other planets.200 Finally, the 
“falling stars” were a combination of the aforementioned “fiery meteors” in the air and comets in the 
heavens.201 He then concludes book three with a chapter on the coming of Christ and then a final 
chapter discussing who will burn and who will be spared at the Conflagration.202 
1.6. Book four: The Millennium 
In the opening chapter of the fourth and final book, Burnet addresses the notion that the earth will 
be annihilated at the Conflagration, a view which had been advanced earlier in the century by 
Hakewill.203 Against this view, he first adduces a philosophical argument from the conservation of 
matter. As he had stressed at the beginning of the previous book, Fire does not annihilate matter. 
Hence, if a complete annihilation of the earth were God’s design, fire would have no effect 
whatsoever, for “smoak and ashes are at as great a distance from Nothing, as the bodies themselves 
out of which they are made”.204 Following this, and ignoring Hakewill’s arguments to the contrary, he 
argues that the idea of the earth being reduced to nothing at the Conflagration is inconsistent with 
scripture, for both the Old and New Testament prophets make frequent references to a new heavens 
and earth which are to follow the Conflagration. Allegorical interpretations of the new heavens and 
earth were also problematic, for if the new heavens and earth are to be understood allegorically, then 
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the Conflagration, too, must be allegorical, for if the new heavens and earth are the same as the 
present, then the latter cannot have been destroyed. And to interpret the Conflagration allegorically 
was to contradict both Scripture and all ancient learning, which teach of a literal burning of the 
earth.205 He then returns to philosophy, invoking the impossibility of a vacuum, something that would 
necessarily be created by the matter of the earth being annihilated.206 
In the subsequent chapter, he gives his account of the formation and structure of the new 
earth.207 He follows his description with evidence from Scripture which supports his account and which 
I shall discuss in the next chapter.208 The remaining chapters of the fourth book deal with the 
Millennium and Kingdom of Christ – terms which Burnet uses interchangeably. Mirroring his theory of 
the Deluge in book one, he bookmarks his theory of the Millennium with a series of “propositions”, 
the first being: 
That after the Conflagration of this World, there will be New Heavens and a New Earth; and that Earth 
will be inhabited.209 
That a new earth will follow the Conflagration was supported by Scripture, antiquity, and the Church 
Fathers. The new earth, he continues, must necessarily be inhabited, for God does nothing in vain and 
so would not create a new world only to leave it unpopulated.210 As to who will inhabit this new earth, 
he argues on the basis of various passages of Scripture – to be discussed in the next chapter – that this 
will be the Martyred Saints, who will be resurrected and will reign on earth with Christ for a thousand 
years until the final consummation.211 He then gives further proof from the primitive Church Fathers 
from the Apostles to the Nicene Council, the vast majority of whom adhered to the literal sense of the 
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millennial Kingdom of Christ on earth, noting as I have discussed above that the doctrine of the 
Millennium was suppressed during the middle ages and revived at the Reformation.212 Following this, 
he states his second proposition: 
That there is a Millennial State, or a Future Kingdom of Christ and his Saints, Prophesied of and 
Promised, in the Old and New Testament; and receiv’d by the primitive Church as a Christian and 
Catholick Doctrine.213 
Over the next two chapters, he addresses the issue of whether the Millennium will take place 
on the present or future earth.214 This, as I have noted, is the central issue at stake in this second 
volume of the Theory, and the principal aim of the work is to establish the latter position. The final 
proposition of Burnet’s theory of the Millennium, then, which he states at the beginning of the eighth 
chapter, is by far the most important: 
That the Blessed Millennium (properly so called) according as it is describ’d in Scripture, cannot 
obtain on the present Earth, nor under the present constitution of Nature and Providence; but 
is to be celebrated in the New Heavens and New Earth, after the Conflagration.215 
This proposition he states at the beginning of the eighth chapter, having dealt with “[t]he truth of the 
Millennium, according to Characters taken from Scripture” and “some mistakes concerning it” in the 
seventh. It was these mistakes that in Burnet’s view had led to the belief that the Millennium will 
obtain on the present earth. The eighth chapter is dedicated to refuting this view. Here, the 
parenthesised “properly so called” in the above proposition is important, for in this chapter, again 
mirroring the first book and his assault on the “vulgar Deluge”, he makes a distinction between the 
true Millennium and the “vulgar Millennium”, a characterisation of the view that the Kingdom of Christ 
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will reign on the earth in its present state which for Burnet serves important rhetorical purposes. 
Against this “vulgar Millennium”, he advances a lengthy series of arguments. The resurrected Saints 
are said to live free of illness and death, something which is impossible in the present state of nature 
but will inevitably obtain on the new paradisiacal earth. St Peter states clearly that the righteous will 
inhabit a new earth. St John, too, claims that the Martyrs will inhabit the New Jerusalem, and situates 
the city on the new earth. Before the Kingdom of Christ can reign, the Antichrist must be destroyed, 
and this does not happen until the Conflagration. These and several other points taken together, he 
argues, clearly prove that the Millennium cannot take place on the present earth.216 
 As Kubrin has observed, it is in this chapter that Burnet’s political motivations become clear, 
for here he makes a number of observations as to why the doctrine of the Millennium became 
suppressed in the middle ages.217 Ultimately, he argues, the Church Fathers who adhered to a literal 
interpretation of the Kingdom of Christ on earth placed this Kingdom not on the present earth but on 
the new earth following the Conflagration.218 Later exegetes, however, by neglecting this important 
point, 
brought that doctrine [of the Millennium] into discredit and decay. For when they plac'd the Kingdom 
of the Saints upon this Earth, it became more capable of being abus'd, by fanatical spirits, to the 
disturbance of the World, and the invasion of the rights of the Magistrate, Civil or Ecclesiastical, under 
that notion of Saints. And made them also dream of sensual pleasures, such as they see in this life: Or 
at least gave an occasion and opportunity to those, that had a mind to make the doctrine odious, of 
charging it with these consequences. All these abuses are cut off, and these scandals prevented, by 
placing the Millennium aright. Namely, not in this present Life, or on this present Earth, but in the New 
Creation, where Peace and Righteousness will dwell.219 
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Here of course Burnet is discussing developments in the early Church, but he is keenly aware of their 
relevance to his own century. He makes this explicit shortly afterwards at the end of his Review of the 
theory of the earth, an essay appended to the English edition of this volume of the Theory which I shall 
discuss in detail in chapter three. “We might now put an end to this Review”, he writes, 
but it may be expected possibly that we should say something concerning the Millennium: which we 
have, contrary to the general Sentiment of the Modern Millenaries, plac'd in the Future Earth. Our 
Opinion hath this advantage above others, that, all fanatical pretensions to power and empire in this 
World, are, by these means, blown away, as chaff before the wind. Princes need not fear to be 
dethron'd, to make way to the Saints: nor Governments unhing'd, that They may rule the World with a 
rod of Iron. These are the effects of a wild Enthusiasm; seeing the very state which they aim at, is not 
to be upon this Earth.220 
Turning back to the Theory, the penultimate chapter is dedicated to the question of how the 
resurrected Saints will occupy their time during the Millennium, their primary occupations according 
to Burnet being philosophical inquiry and the contemplation of and devotion to God.221 In the final 
chapter, after answering some objections to his view, he directs his attention to the end of the 
Millennium. He first offers a possible explanation of the doctrine of “Gog and Magog”, who are said 
in the Book of Revelation to be led by Satan to rise up and attack the Saints in their city at the end of 
the Millennium. The nations of Gog and Magog, Burnet suggests, are a second race of humans 
“generated from the Slime of the Ground, and the Heat of the Sun” in the same way animals were 
before the Deluge. These humans, “increasing and multiplying after the Manner of Men, by carnal 
Propagation”, will grow numerous during the Millennium and, when Satan is freed, will be led by him 
in an attack on the Saints but will be consumed by “Fire and Lightning from Heaven”.222 
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Finally, he considers the question of what will happen to the earth after the Millennium when 
the Saints have ascended to heaven. There is nothing explicit on this in Scripture, he observes. And 
the ancient philosophers have said little about it, too. The Stoics and earlier Greeks, however, taught 
of a “final Resolution of all things into Fire”, and like their doctrine of the Conflagration, they seem to 
have derived this notion from ancient Eastern learning.223 This final “Dissolution of the Earth into Fire”, 
he notes, may be understood in two ways: the earth being “dissolv’d into a loose Flame”, and its 
matter dissipated throughout space; or it being “dissolv’d into a fix’d Flame, such as the Sun is, or a 
fix’d Star”.224  He adopts the latter view, arguing that if the planets were once fixed stars, which he 
believes to be the case, then their returning to their original state “seems to be according to the 
Methods of Providence, which loves to recover what was lost or decay’d, after certain Periods”.225 He 
stresses, however, following Glanvill who was similarly noncommittal about his proposal of the 
expiration of the sun, that these observations on the doctrine of Gog and Magog and the final 
consummation are merely conjectures.226 
1.7. Conclusion 
Burnet’s theory was very much a product of its time. Its literalist approach to Scripture, treatment of 
sacred texts as historical documents, and use of natural philosophy and pagan writings in biblical 
exegesis are typical of post-Reformation Christianity. Burnet’s anti-Aristotelianism, adoption of the 
Cartesian philosophy, and attention to such issues as the longevity of the antediluvians and 
prolongation of human life, the earthly location of Paradise, and the peopling of America all embody 
significant currents in seventeenth-century thought. His anti-radical, historicist account of the 
Apocalypse, moreover, was a paradigm example of post-Restoration moderate Anglican 
millenarianism. In important respects, however, he was resisting as many of these currents as he was 
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being carried by. He reacted strongly to the increasingly popular and acceptable notion of a local 
Deluge. His pessimism about the prolongation of life ran directly counter to the general optimism of 
the time. His insistence on Eden being located in the southern hemisphere contradicted the general 
agreement that it was in Mesopotamia. Most significantly, his account of the Creation, which, unlike 
Descartes, he presented as a true, historical account, but unlike More and others did not attempt to 
reconcile with the six days of Genesis, was quite radical and contrary to contemporary sensibilities. So 
too was his picture of the antediluvian earth as radically different from the present, of Paradise as the 
whole earth, of it being lost at the Deluge rather than the Fall, and of the Americans not being 
descended from Noah. As we shall see in later chapters, these and other points of the theory would 
become highly controversial. And Burnet’s elaboration on them in later work would only serve to 
further expose their heterodox implications, thus rendering them even more radical than they 











2. Reason, Scripture, and antiquity 
 
2.1. Introduction 
At the beginning of book one of the Theory, Burnet set out what were to be his three guides in 
constructing his history of the earth: reason, Scripture, and antiquity. These guides are explicitly 
prioritised in this order. “This Theory being chiefly Philosophical”, he writes, “Reason is to be our first 
Guide; and where that falls short, or any other just occasion offers it self, we may receive further light 
and confirmation from the Sacred Writings”. Both these sources of evidence, he emphasises, “are to 
be lookt upon as of Divine Original”, for as Scripture is divinely inspired, so too are our faculties created 
by God. 1 The writings of ancient philosophers, divines, historians, poets, and the like, in which we find 
information about past ages of the earth, may also be useful. But being the work of mere human 
rather than divine or divinely-inspired authors, they are ultimately less reliable than reason and 
Scripture and are of lesser consequence and should be appealed to only to the extent that they are 
corroborated by these more reliable sources. We cannot “depend wholly upon their credit, nor assert 
any thing upon the authority of the Ancients which is not first prov'd by Natural Reason, or warranted 
by Scripture”.2 
 The “Divine Original” of both reason and Scripture was for Burnet a central guiding principle, 
both in his Theory and elsewhere. This principle had been promulgated in the late sixteenth century 
by Richard Hooker and in the early seventeenth by William Chillingworth and the Great Tew Circle and 
was taken up later in the century by the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians.3 Burnet almost 
certainly imbibed it from these latter two groups, with whom he was closely associated during his 
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earlier years at Cambridge and later life in London.4 A consequence of this principle that was especially 
important in Burnet’s work was the impossibility of reason and Scripture being in conflict with one 
another. “He that made the Scripture made also our Faculties”, he writes at the beginning of the 
Theory, “and twere a reflection upon the Divine Veracity, for the one or the other to be false when 
rightly us'd. We must therefore be careful and tender of opposing these to one another, because that 
is, in effect, to oppose God to himself”.5 The truths of reason and the truths of Scripture both being 
divine, we must not interpret Scripture in a way that contradicts reason and philosophy, “lest Time, 
which brings all things to light, should discover that to be evidently false which we had made Scripture 
to assert”.6 In matters concerning the natural world, therefore, our interpretation of Scripture must 
yield to our philosophical knowledge. If our natural knowledge appears to contradict Scripture, we 
must reinterpret the latter in light of the former.7 Reason, then, was to be the arbiter of biblical 
interpretation, and so in a “chiefly Philosophical” theory of the earth, reason must necessarily take 
precedence over Scripture. This is not to say of course that Scripture does not play a major role in 
Burnet’s theory. As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the most important motivations for 
constructing the theory was to vindicate certain tenets of Scripture such as the universality of the 
Deluge and the millennial Kingdom of Christ on earth. And as we shall see here, passages of Scripture 
are frequently appealed in support of parts of the theory and also play significant foundational roles. 
Ancient texts, too, both Pagan and Judeo-Christian, play important confirmatory roles. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate what Burnet’s three “guides” – reason, Scripture, 
and antiquity – essentially consisted in and what roles they played in the theory. I shall devote the 
larger share of the chapter to the first of these, since this was in Burnet’s view the most important of 
his three guides and is the most complex and interesting of the three. The most significant facets of 
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“reason” in Burnet’s theory, I argue, are his use of Cartesian philosophy and his rational theology. I 
shall devote the first two sections – by far the longest of the chapter – to these things. In the two 
remaining – shorter – sections, I discuss Burnet’s other two guides, section three focussing on 
Scripture and section four on antiquity. 
2.2. Reason part one: Burnet’s Cartesianism 
When Burnet entered Cambridge in the 1650s, the university had become known for its interest in the 
Cartesian philosophy.8 This was due in large part to the popularising efforts of the Cambridge 
Platonists, in particular Henry More, with whom Burnet would become colleagues at Christ’s.9 
Burnet’s Cartesianism is in some ways similar to the “modified Cartesianism”, as Sarah Hutton refers 
to it, of the Cambridge Platonists from whom he inherited it.10 Like the Platonists, for instance, he 
eschewed Descartes’ rejection of final causes and theological voluntarism. In important respects, 
however, his philosophy is much closer than the Platonists’ to that of Descartes himself. Unlike More, 
who rejected Descartes’ identification of matter and extension and principle of a plenum, positing an 
“immaterial extension” in which material extension is contained, Burnet adopts the Cartesian 
definition of body and employs it at several points in his theory. His physics also differs markedly from 
the Platonists’ in being wholly mechanical. He does not posit any immaterial principle governing the 
physical world as we find in More’s “spirit of nature” or “hylarchic principle” and Cudworth’s “plastic 
nature”.11 He takes care to distinguish his mechanistic physics from Epicureanism. Yet he does this not 
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by invoking any immaterial principle but by speaking in terms of material corpuscles set in motion and 
governed by God as we find in Descartes and other mechanical philosophers of the period.12 
 The most obvious and widely discussed aspect of Burnet’s Cartesianism is his use of Descartes’ 
cosmogony.13 In order to understand Burnet’s application of it, we must first briefly outline this 
cosmogony as it appears in Descartes. Descartes’ first fully developed version of his cosmogony 
appeared in 1644 in his Principles of philosophy, though he had written essentially the same 
cosmogony over a decade earlier in his Treatise on light, part of an unfinished work which he began 
in 1629 and abandoned upon hearing of Galileo’s condemnation in 1633.14 The Treatise on light was 
published posthumously under the title Le monde in 1664.15 Both texts, then, would have been 
available to Burnet, and given his extensive use of Descartes’ philosophy in the Theory and the fact 
that he is known to have taught Cartesian philosophy at Cambridge, it is highly likely that he was 
familiar with both.16 Since it is the most fully developed version, I shall focus on the Principles.17 
In the Principles, the universe in the beginning was composed of particles of a single type of 
matter grouped together in large conglomerations: vortices. The particles rotated on their axes, 
causing small pieces of matter to be shaved off. These small particles constitute the first element: 
small, fast moving particles which appear luminous. The larger, rounded particles constitute the 
second element, which moves slower and appears transparent. The particles of the first element 
                                                          
12 Burnet (1684), 289-95. For discussion of the notion of material corpuscles governed by God among 
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lectures in natural philosophy from Dr. Thomas Burnet… who taught the Cartesian philosophy” – quoted in 
Gascoigne (1989), 65. 
17 For the cosmogonical chapters in the Treatise of Light, see Descartes (1998 [1664]) 21-53. For discussion, see 
Gaukroger (1995) 237-57; (1998), xvi-xxi; (2002) 13-18; Wilson (2008), 98-9. 
76 
 
coalesced together in the centre of their vortices, forming stars. The particles of the second element 
were pushed outwards, forming the heavens.18 On the surface of stars, particles of the first element 
become pushed toward the axis of the vortex and attach to one another, forming a third element 
which appears opaque. These particles join together and form sunspots which grow larger and 
eventually cover the surface.19 Once a star is covered, the pressure the matter of the first element 
exerted on the vortex which prevented it being consumed by neighbouring vortices is contained within 
the crust, and the vortex, along with the star, is consumed by one or more of the adjacent vortices. 
Depending on its solidity, the star now becomes either a comet travelling between vortices, a planet 
orbiting the star at the centre of the vortex, or a satellite orbiting a planet.20  
Before reaching its point of equilibrium in the sun’s vortex, the earth consisted of three 
concentric spheres: a fiery central core composed of particles of the first element; a solid shell of the 
third element; and an outer orb composed of a disordered combination of the second and third 
elements. After reaching its point of equilibrium, this outer orb divided into two, three, four, and five 
concentric sections. First, it split into an earthy inner orb surrounded by a gaseous sphere. Following 
this, a section of liquid formed in between these two orbs. A further earthy shell then formed on the 
surface of the liquid. Finally, another gaseous layer formed between the latter earthy section and the 
liquid beneath.21 The outermost sphere had numerous pores. When it formed, the sphere was in 
contact with the liquid and so the pores were filled with liquid particles. Once the gaseous section 
formed, the sphere was no longer in contact with the liquid, and so its pores were no longer filled with 
liquid particles and the empty spaces became pervaded by particles of the second element. The 
impetus of the particles widened the pores, causing fissures to form and the crust to break. The 
fragments descended into the gaseous and liquid sections beneath, coming to rest at various angles 
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on the inner core, causing the gaseous and liquid sections to merge and forming the earth’s 
mountains, seas, and other geological features.22 
 Clearly Burnet’s account of the Creation and Deluge was heavily indebted to Descartes. In the 
Theory, however, this debt is barely acknowledged. Burnet only discusses Descartes briefly in relation 
to the formation and dissolution of the crust, noting that “[a]n eminent Philosopher of this Age, 
Monsieur des Cartes, hath made use of the like Hypothesis to explain the irregular form of the present 
Earth” but criticising Descartes for not recognising the separation of the fluid into water and oil, which 
he believed was necessary for the crust’s formation.23 William Poole suggests that Burnet deliberately 
“understated his debt to Descartes” in an – ultimately unsuccessful – attempt to avoid the controversy 
associated with Cartesian doctrines.24 This is plausible. Indeed, by the time of the Theory’s publication, 
Cartesianism had become widely viewed as atheistic.25 It was on these grounds that More, once its 
most vocal proponent, had become one of its fiercest opponents.26 And there was much concern 
about the spread of Cartesianism in English universities for the same reason.27 It is important to 
remember, however, that the Theory contains very few references to any contemporary authors, and 
so Burnet’s minimal citing of Descartes is perhaps better explained by a more general unwillingness 
to acknowledge the influence of his contemporaries rather than any concerted effort to obscure the 
obvious influence of Descartes.28 
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 Despite the clear influence of the Cartesian cosmogony, there appear on the face of it to be 
important differences between the formation of the earth in Descartes and Burnet. Two closely 
related and apparently significant ones which have been noted respectively by Jacques Roger and 
Peter Harrison are that Descartes’ earth formed from a star and Burnet’s from a chaos and that 
Descartes’ earth has fire at the centre whereas Burnet’s seems to have a solid core.29 Roger also notes 
that the elements in Descartes’ cosmogony are his three kinds of corpuscle, whereas Burnet speaks in 
terms of common elements: earth, air, water, and oil.30 These differences are certainly apparent in 
Burnet’s description of the formation of the earth in book one. Here the matter of the chaos, which 
Burnet characterises in terms of the common elements mentioned above, descends in order of its 
density, and Burnet states explicitly that “the first change” in the chaos is “that the heaviest and 
grossest parts would sink down towards the middle of it”, which seems to imply that the heaviest 
matter is at the centre and to preclude the possibility of the earth having fire at the centre.31 Shortly 
afterwards, however, things become less clear when he alludes to the ancient doctrine of the 
“mundane egg”, for here he discusses the possibility of the earth having a central fire, “which though 
very reasonable, we had no occasion to take notice of in our Theory of the Chaos”.32 And when he 
returns to this doctrine in book two, he claims that his account of the earth’s Creation in the previous 
book is able to solve the “Riddle of the Mundane Egg”, for “[w]e have show'd there, that the figure of 
it when finisht, was Oval, and the inward form of it was a frame of four Regions encompassing one 
another, where that of Fire lay in the middle like the Yolk and a shell of Earth inclos'd them all”.33 
 Burnet returns to the subject in the second volume of the Theory when discussing Rust’s and 
Glanvill’s theory of it engulfing the earth at the Conflagration. Here too he states that 
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I am very well satisfied it is no imaginary thing. All Antiquity hath preserv'd some sacred Monument of 
it. The Vestal fire of the Romans, which was so religiously attended: The Prytoneia of the Greeks were 
to the same purpose, and dedicated to Vesta: and the Pyretheia of the Persians, where fire was kept 
continually by the Magi. These all, in my opinion, had the same origine and the same signification. And 
tho' I do not know any particular observation, that does directly prove or demonstrate that there is 
such a mass of fire in the middle of the Earth; yet the best accounts we have of the generation of a 
Planet, do suppose it; and 'tis agreeable to the whole Oeconomy of Nature; as a fire in the heart, which 
gives life to her motions and productions.34 
As I have discussed in the previous chapter, he rejects Rust’s and Glanvill’s theory. He nevertheless 
allows that as the sun dries the earth and widens its pores the heat from the central fire “may have a 
freer efflux, and diffuse it self in greater abundance every way; so as to affect even these exteriour 
Regions of the Earth, so far as to make them still more catching and more combustible”.35 
It is worth drawing attention also to his note in the above quotation that “the best accounts 
we have of the generation of a Planet, do suppose” a central fire. This strongly suggests that he has in 
mind the Cartesian theory of planets forming from dead stars. That he does have this theory in mind 
is intimated in the preface to book four. Here he suggests that in theorising about the earth, “(which 
I hope to conduct into a Fix’d star, before I have done with it), we give an instance of what may be in 
other Planets”. The theory begins with the chaos,  
because that was a known principle, and we were not willing to amuse the Reader with too many 
strange Stories: as that, I am sure, would have been thought one, TO HAVE brought this Earth from a 
Fix'd Star, and then carried it up again into the same Sphere. Which yet I believe, is the true circle of 
Natural Providence.36 
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Later in the book, he conjectures that “what was before the Chaos, was but, in my opinion, the first 
remove from a Fixt Star”.37 Both this and the above quotation from the preface indicate that he thinks 
the formation of the earth from a star and its formation from a chaos are compatible. And as we 
observed in the previous chapter, at the end of book four, after relating his conjecture about the earth 
turning into a star at the final consummation, he states that 
if Planets were once fixt Stars, as I believe they were; their revolution to the same state again, in a great 
Circle of Time, seems to be according to the methods of Providence; which loves to recover what was 
lost or decay'd, after certain periods.38 
He returns to these points again in 1692 in the Archaeologiae. “It is probable”, he writes, 
that the Planets were formerly fixed Stars, and that the Earth it self ought to be numbred in the same 
Rank. It will be no easy Matter for you to solve the Originals of the Planets by any other Hypothesis; at 
least, not if they have Fire in their Center, which it is very probable they have.39 
Here he also follows Descartes in citing sunspots as evidence that stars become crusted over and 
transformed into opaque bodies and arguing that comets, too, are former stars which, “not as yet 
composed to rest…, wander up and down through the various Regions of the Heavens”.40 
Yet in the first volume of the Theory, he had portrayed a creation from a chaos which resulted 
in solid matter coalescing in the centre. This seemed an unlikely scenario if the earth was a former 
star. It also appeared to preclude the possibility of the earth having a central fire. This apparent 
inconsistency in Burnet’s Theory was noted in 1690 by Erasmus Warren, who pointed out that Burnet’s 
model of the Creation seemed to rule out the earth having a central fire. If the chaos contained fire, 
he argued, then the fire would either have consumed or been quenched by other elements. And as 
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Burnet himself had claimed, the chaos would separate according to its density. The densest matter, 
therefore, would subside first, forming a solid core.41 This ostensible ambiguity as to the composition 
of the earth’s core and its origins is also reflected in historical studies of Burnet’s theory. Roger, 
Harrison, Gabriel Gohau, and Rhoda Rappaport, for example, interpret Burnet as departing from the 
Cartesian cosmogony in positing a solid rather than fiery core.42 Poole and Paolo Rossi, on the other 
hand, construe him as following Descartes in placing fire at the centre.43 Roger contrasts Burnet’s 
formation of the earth from a chaos with the Cartesian view that it formed from a dead star, whereas 
James Force and Peter Bowler present him as having adopted Descartes’ account of the stellar origin 
of planets.44 
Burnet’s position on these issues becomes slightly clearer in his reply to Warren, for here he 
refers to the extent of the chaos as being only “from the bottom of the Abyss, upwards to the Moon”, 
stressing that he did not affirm anything concerning the composition of the core.45 This, too, implies 
that he thinks the formation of the earth from a star and its having a central fire is compatible with its 
forming from a chaos. Things becomes clearer still if we examine the formation of the new earth 
following the Conflagration in book four of the Theory. At this point in Burnet’s history, the fire has 
destroyed the present earth from the top of the atmosphere to the bottom of the ocean. The central 
core, however, remains intact, and the chaotic matter descends to form a new globe around it.46 
Burnet only gives a very brief account of the separation of this second chaos, since “it is so much the 
same with that of the First; which is set down fully and distinctly in the Fifth Chapter of the first Book 
of this Theory. Nature here repeats the same work, and in the same method”. He now informs us that 
the first chaos, like the second, had the same central core, and that “in forming the first Earth” he 
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“suppos'd the Chaos or confus'd Mass to reach down to the Center… only for the ease of our 
imagination; that so the whole Mass might appear more simple and uniform”. The outer mass of 
chaotic matter only and not the central core was “the true Chaos, whose parts, when they came to a 
separation, made the several Elements, and the form of an habitable Earth betwixt the Air and 
Water”.47 
Burnet’s tacit commitment to the earth having a central fire and having formed from a star 
can now be reconciled much more easily with his account of the Creation. He believes that the chaos 
surrounded a central core; that this core, along with the chaos, was likely a former star; and that, 
because it was probably a former star, the earth very plausibly has fire at the centre. The apparent 
difference between Descartes and Burnet, then, that Descartes’ earth formed from a star and Burnet’s 
from a chaos, which Roger argues is “significant”, is far less significant than Roger supposes, for it is 
not the case that Burnet believes the earth to have formed from a chaos rather than from a former 
star, but that it formed from both a chaos and a former star, or rather, from a chaos which derived 
from a former star.48 As to Harrison’s claim that Burnet’s theory differed from Descartes’ in placing 
earth rather than fire at the centre, although this appears to be the case in Burnet’s initial exposition 
of the Creation and is not strictly ruled out insofar as he does not commit fully to a central fire, it seems 
unlikely to have been his view, for as we have seen, he confesses in book four to having simplified his 
account of the Creation for illustrative purposes and notes in several places in the Theory and also in 
the Archaeologiae that he believes on a number of grounds that the earth very likely has a central fire. 
The foregoing interpretation of Burnet on the formation of the earth enables us to connect it 
more clearly with a specific phase of Descartes’ cosmogony. It also illuminates an important difference 
between Burnet’s theory of the earth and previous applications of the Cartesian cosmogony to 
Scripture. More, for example, had interpreted the biblical chaos as corresponding to the initial state 
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of the universe in Descartes’ cosmogony, the point at which the universe consisted merely of bare 
particles and which Descartes had characterised in the Principles as an orderly conglomeration of 
particles and in the Treatise on light as a chaos.49 In contrast, Burnet’s interpretation of the biblical 
chaos pertains very explicitly to the earth and not the wider universe.50 In terms of Descartes’ 
cosmogony, then, Burnet’s chaos corresponds to the state of the earth after it reaches its point of 
equilibrium in the sun’s vortex. And because Burnet, like Descartes, supposes the earth to have formed 
around a central core which (probably, in the case of Burnet) has fire at the centre, Burnet’s chaos 
corresponds only to the outermost of Descartes’ three concentric spheres, the inner two spheres 
being the core around which earth’s surface forms. This outer sphere in Descartes is composed of a 
disordered combination of particles of the second and third elements not unlike Burnet’s chaos. And 
in both authors, this chaotic outer sphere divides into concentric sections of earth, air, and fluid. 
That Burnet’s chaos corresponds specifically to this phase of Descartes’ cosmogony also 
explains why Burnet refers to common elements rather than material corpuscles. In the part of his 
cosmogony which is relevant to the formation and structure of the earth, which is what Burnet is 
interested in, Descartes, too, refers to common elements. That Burnet begins with these elements, 
then, is not indicative of any significant difference in the two authors’ physics as Roger seems to 
imply.51 Indeed, elsewhere in the Theory, Burnet makes clear that he, like Descartes, subscribes to a 
corpuscular theory of matter.52 Rather, the point in the earth’s history where Burnet’s theory begins 
corresponds to a point in Descartes’ cosmogony where his three kinds of material corpuscle are, at 
least as far as Burnet is concerned, no longer relevant for the purpose of explaining the formation and 
form of the primitive earth. 
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There are of course still important differences in the physical details of the earth’s formation 
in the two theories. The causes which separate the elements are more complex in Descartes than in 
Burnet. The composition and arrangement of the sections is also slightly different. Descartes has an 
extra section of air between the fluid and the crust. Burnet’s fluid divides into sections of water and 
oil, which as we have seen he criticises Descartes for omitting from his cosmogony. Nevertheless, 
Burnet’s view of the Creation, when considered in light of what he says elsewhere in the Theory and 
in the Archaeologiae about the earth being a former star and most likely having fire at its centre and 
his admission to having simplified his original account of the earth’s formation for illustrative 
purposes, corresponds more closely to the formation of the earth in Descartes’ cosmogony than Roger 
and Harrison suggest. That his theory of the Deluge and the form of the postdiluvian earth is derived 
from Descartes is so obvious as to require little comment. The two authors explain the breaking of the 
crust in different terms, Descartes in terms of microscopic processes involving the impetus of particles 
in the crust and Burnet in terms of macroscopic phenomena – the heat of the sun drying out the crust 
and agitating the water. Nevertheless, Burnet explicitly cites Descartes’ explanation of the form of the 
present earth and clearly saw in his cosmogony a physical explanation of Moses’ “breaking open of 
the fountains of the abyss”. By adding the somewhat implausible supposition that the dissolution of 
the crust would agitate the waters such that they would cover the surface of the earth for an entire 
year, he arrived at his theory of the Deluge. 
Other ostensible differences between Descartes’ cosmogony and Burnet’s theory of the earth 
pertain more to foundational issues than to physical details. These, too, have been discussed in some 
depth by Roger and Harrison. Roger argues firstly that Descartes’ cosmogony was aimed ultimately 
not at understanding the formation of the universe but at understanding its structure. We can better 
understand the structure of something, he thought, if we consider how it might have come into being 
through natural processes. In his cosmogony, then, he constructed a hypothetical (in the Treatise on 
light) or counterfactual (in the Principles) account of how the universe (or one exactly like it) might 
have been created through natural processes in order to elucidate the structure of the actual universe. 
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Secondly, Roger argues, Descartes’ cosmogony was atemporal. Although he presents the processes as 
occurring over time, time in his cosmogony is not historical time but theoretical time. The entire 
process can be reduced to an instant.53 Those like More, Amerpoel, and Burnet who sought to 
reconcile the Cartesian cosmogony with Genesis, Roger contends, misinterpreted Descartes. They 
read him as having “written a kind of scientific commentary to the biblical account of the creation of 
the world”.54 The influence of Cartesian cosmogony on the theory of the earth genre, then, resulted 
not from “its genuine nature, but, on the contrary, thanks to a kind of brilliant misinterpretation. From 
a logical model, the theory of the earth evolved to a reconstructed history”.55 This “distortion of the 
Cartesian model”, Roger argues, “is perfectly exemplified by Burnet’s Telluris theoria sacra”.56 
Responding to Roger, Harrison acknowledges that the distinction between the atemporality 
of Descartes’ cosmogony and the historicity of Burnet’s theory is an important one but argues that 
the difference between the two authors on this count is less significant than Roger suggests, observing 
for instance that in his private correspondence Descartes claimed that his cosmogony could be 
reconciled with Genesis and even toyed with the idea of effecting such a reconciliation himself. The 
application of Cartesian cosmogony to biblical exegesis, he argues therefore, “did not do great 
violence to the original intention of Descartes”, and the difference between them is “not so much a 
fundamental difference of orientation, but rather a difference of emphasis”.57 Harrison also takes 
issue with Roger’s construal of Burnet and other theorists as having misinterpreted Descartes by 
reading his cosmogony as a philosophical commentary on Genesis. For the theorists, Harrison argues, 
“Cartesian philosophy did not present a parallel creation narrative, but rather a means of interpreting 
Moses philosophically”. The central comparison for such authors, moreover, was not between 
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Descartes and Moses but between Descartes and Aristotle, the key question being whether the 
Cartesian philosophy could illuminate Scripture more effectively than the Aristotelian.58 
This latter point is certainly correct and is worth underscoring. Burnet did not simply 
misinterpret Descartes and attempt to reconcile his misreading of Descartes with Scripture. Rather, 
he applied the Cartesian cosmogony – along with other aspects of the Cartesian system – to 
constructing a philosophical account of earth and sacred history. The theory is not a simple 
reconciliation. Burnet takes parts of Descartes’ system that are useful for his purpose but discards 
those which are not. His use of Descartes is determined by two things: (a) the scope of his theory; and 
(b) whether the Cartesian philosophy can account for the phenomenon under investigation. Burnet’s 
theory traces the history of the earth, not the wider universe, which he thinks is much older. As a 
result, everything prior to the formation of the earth in Descartes’ cosmogony is irrelevant. But it is 
not so much that “[i]n this way, Cartesian general cosmogony becomes merely a theory of the earth” 
as Roger characterises things, but rather that those aspects of Descartes’ cosmogony that are not 
relevant to the history of the earth are simply not considered.59 Additionally, where Burnet sees the 
Cartesian cosmogony as wanting, as not serving his purpose, he introduces new hypotheses. When, 
for example, he thinks Descartes has not adequately accounted for the formation of the crust, he 
brings in his separation of the fluid into water and oil to fill the deficit. Interpreted in this way as 
applying Cartesian cosmogony to rather than reconciling it with Scripture, it becomes apparent that 
Burnet did not read Descartes as a “scientific commentary” on biblical history as Roger suggests but 
rather, as Harrison interprets things, as a purely philosophical theory that could be used – in part – to 
construct a philosophical account of the history of the earth and Scripture. 
The historicity of Burnet’s theory compared with Descartes’ cosmogony, whether a radical 
difference of orientation as in Roger or a less radical difference of emphasis as in Harrison, is 
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nevertheless important, and gives rise to some quite fundamental differences between the two 
authors. One important difference is epistemological or evidentiary. Descartes’ cosmogony is derived 
largely a priori from axioms about matter and motion and assumptions about how God arranged 
matter in the beginning. Burnet’s theory, by contrast, is largely empirical. In the first book, his account 
of the Deluge is arrived at both by reasoning from causes to effects and from effects – the present 
earth’s geological phenomena – to causes. The second book is dedicated mainly to learning about the 
antediluvian earth by reasoning in the latter way from the effects, that is, the longevity of humans, 
the generation of animals from the soil, and a perpetual spring, which we know about from Scripture 
and other ancient texts, to their cause, which for Burnet consists principally in the perpendicularity of 
the earth’s axis which was established in book one. Book three is based on Scripture and other ancient 
texts combined with physical evidence of the earth’s combustibility. And in book four, after reasoning 
from the second chaos to the form of the new earth, Burnet’s account of the Millennium is drawn 
principally from Scripture and the early Church Fathers. It is important to note also, as Roger points 
out, that even in the first book where Burnet appears to reason a priori from cause to effect, this 
reasoning has an empirical basis in that it is drawn from Scripture and other ancient sources which, in 
Burnet’s view, tell us (a) that the earth formed from a chaos and (b) what the nature of the chaos was. 
This, Roger observes, “is clearly a shift from the Cartesian model and its most typical features, from a 
distinctly deductive science to a more empirical and historical type of knowledge”.60 
As Harrison notes, the historicity and empirical basis of Burnet’s theory plays an important 
role in determining its scope, which of course is clearly very different from that of Descartes’ 
cosmogony.61 On the face of it, the scope of Burnet’s theory appears to be determined predominantly 
by Scripture, and in an important sense it is. The theory begins at the Creation and ends at the final 
consummation. But the scope of the theory is not determined by Scripture merely for Scripture’s sake. 
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Rather, the adherence to the biblical timeframe is parasitic on more fundamental evidentiary 
concerns. We have evidence from Scripture of the earth’s history. We have no evidence of the history 
of the wider universe. So while it could form part of Descartes’ ahistorical model, it has no place in a 
history. That is, it is outside the domain of history because there is no historical evidence of it. We do, 
however, have evidence of the earth’s future. So this, for Burnet, falls within the domain of history, 
whereas it has no place in Descartes’ model, which is concerned solely with the generation of the 
universe and earth. 
The historicity and empirical nature of Burnet’s theory also extend it in other directions which 
are different from those of the Cartesian cosmogony. Most notably, it includes human as well as earth 
history. For Burnet, as for most seventeenth-century thinkers, earth and human history were coeval 
with one another. Thus, a history of the earth was naturally also a history of humanity. Human history 
could also yield important insights into earth history. The longevity of the biblical Patriarchs and the 
postdiluvian shortening of the human lifespan constituted crucial evidence of environmental changes 
brought about at the Deluge.62 That people migrated to America indicated that the earth had no ocean 
in the beginning.63 Yet human history for Burnet is not useful merely for the insights it provides into 
earth history but is also an end in itself. In book two, for example, he devotes considerable attention 
to civil life on the antediluvian earth in addition to its physical features.64 In book four, he is concerned 
not merely with the formation and physical make-up of the new earth but with who will inhabit it and 
how they will spend their time during the Millennium.65 
One final important and quite fundamental difference to which I want to draw attention 
between Burnet’s theory and both Cartesian cosmogony and Cartesian philosophy more generally is 
Burnet’s use of final cause theorising. This is not discussed by either Roger or Harrison or, at least to 
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my knowledge, any other historians. Indeed, Harrison even suggests at one point that along with the 
Copernican hypothesis and the corpuscular philosophy, “the Cartesian assertion of the futility of the 
search for final causes” was one of the “common features of the theories of the earth” which troubled 
seventeenth-century thinkers.66 Here Harrison cites Burnet’s argument that mountains are relics of 
the Flood and devoid of any evidence of design and John Ray’s teleological defence of mountains 
against Burnet in his Miscellaneous discourses.67 But it seems here that Burnet is not so much asserting 
“the futility of the search for final causes” as engaging in just such a search himself. In the mountains 
and other geological features of the present globe he finds no evidence of final causes and concludes 
that the earth was not designed by God in its present state. But it is not a Cartesian rejection of the 
search for final causes that leads him to this conclusion. On the contrary, it is a search for final causes, 
which as far as Burnet is concerned had failed to turn up any evidence of design in the present earth.68 
Not all of Burnet’s searches for final causes were unsuccessful, however. Indeed, in book two 
he devotes an entire chapter to arguing for the existence of God and against Epicureanism almost 
solely on the basis of final causes, of which he finds abundant evidence in the laws of nature and in 
human and animal bodies.69 Here Burnet follows his Cambridge Platonist mentors Cudworth and 
More, for whom, as Harrison has noted elsewhere, one of the central problems with the Cartesian 
system was that the rejection of final causes deprives us of such arguments from design.70 To be sure, 
on the subject of mountains and other features of the present earth, Burnet’s critics accused him of 
having given inadequate consideration to final causes.71 But inadequate consideration is very different 
from no consideration. And although he would make some recognisably Cartesian observations about 
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the limits of final cause theorising when responding to one of these critics (I shall discuss this in the 
final chapter), even here he does not join Descartes in rejecting such theorising altogether.72 
2.3. Reason part two: Burnet’s rational theology 
Burnet’s theology is essentially the same as that of the Cambridge Platonists and the younger 
generation of Latitudinarians with whom he was closely associated both during his time at Cambridge 
and in his later years in London. “Latitudinarian” or “latitude man” was originally a pejorative term 
invented during the Restoration by High Churchmen to describe a group of divines who had conformed 
to the Interregnum Church and had justified doing so on the grounds that they had only compromised 
on inessential doctrines while remaining true to the fundamentals of the Christian faith.73 The term 
was intended to connote broadness, flexibility, and inclusivity in matters of doctrine, liturgy, and 
creed. As Glanvill, himself a prominent Latitudinarian, sympathetically summed it up, the 
Latitudinarians were 
a sort of men, whose Antipathy to the Fanatical Genius of the Age was quickly noted, and no sooner 
known than branded with Nick-names very odious, as the Custom then was, and preach't against with 
the usual Vehemence and Fierceness. One of the most Common names given them was Latitudinarian 
from a word that signifies compass or largeness, because of their opposition to the narrow stingy 
Temper then called Orthodoxness.74 
The list of names associated with Latitudinarianism varies significantly across historical studies. The 
divines listed as the most prominent Latitudinarians in Martin Griffin’s classic study of the topic are 
Gilbert Burnet, John Wilkins, John Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet, Simon Patrick, Thomas Tenison, 
William Lloyd, Joseph Glanvill, and Edward Fowler. To these Griffin adds a number of less prominent 
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Latitudinarians. 75 Other authors have applied the term to a broader set of seventeenth-century 
thinkers.76 The Latitudinarians were mostly educated in Cambridge but left the university to seek 
preferment in London, the vast majority of them taking up positions in the Church.77 Widely regarded 
as heterodox during the Restoration, their fortunes changed following the Revolution of 1688-9 when 
a number of them, being the most vocal supporters of the Revolution among the clergy and having 
presented concerted opposition to James II’s Catholicising policies, were promoted to Bishoprics.78 
During the Restoration, the term “Latitudinarian” was applied both to this younger generation 
and to the Cambridge Platonists. As the century progressed, it became increasingly applied exclusively 
to the former group.79 This variation in application is reflected in historical studies, with some 
historians characterising the Platonists as Latitudinarians and some wishing to distinguish between 
the two groups.80 Burnet, too, is sometimes presented as a Latitudinarian. Johannes van den Berg, for 
example, refers to “Thomas Burnet, master of the Charterhouse” as “a prominent Latitudinarian”.81 
John Gascoigne characterises the Theory as “the most thoroughgoing attempt by a Cambridge 
Latitudinarian to demonstrate the conformity of Scripture with the ‘new philosophy’”.82 And Richard 
Olsen describes it as “characteristic of seventeenth-century Latitudinarian natural theology”.83 David 
Sytsma is more circumspect, suggesting that, along with Patrick, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and Glanvill, 
the “author of the controversial Telluris theoria sacra… probably also belonged to these second-
generation Latitudinarians” – Wilkins and the Cambridge Platonists constituting the first generation.84 
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Scott Mandelbrote, on the other hand, suggests that the portrayal of Burnet as “a latitudinarian 
divine” is merely a result of confusion between his ideas and those of “his more famous namesake”, 
Gilbert.85 And several important treatments of seventeenth-century Latitudinarianism – including a 
number of studies of seventeenth-century Latitudinarianism and science – do not mention him.86 
Mandelbrote is certainly correct to suggest that Burnet is often confused with Gilbert Burnet, 
and indeed, he cites several examples of such confusion.87 Notwithstanding this, however, the 
characterisation of Burnet as a Latitudinarian is not entirely without warrant. As well as championing 
several core Latitudinarian principles, Burnet was close with Tillotson, under whom he studied at Clare 
Hall during the 1650s.88 During the 1680s, he, like those divines who are more widely considered 
Latitudinarians, opposed King James II, becoming involved in a dispute with the Crown over James’ 
appointment of a Catholic Pensioner at the Charterhouse.89 And following the Revolution, he partook 
in the Latitudinarians’ fortunes, being appointed Chaplain-in-Ordinary to King William III in 1689 and 
succeeding Tillotson as Clerk of the Closet when the latter was made Archbishop of Canterbury in 
1691. It should be noted, however, that Burnet’s preferments resulted principally from Tillotson’s 
patronage and that when Tillotson died in 1694 Burnet’s prospects for further advancement came to 
an abrupt end, suggesting that the other Latitudinarians, who by now were heavily influential in the 
Church, had less truck with his heterodox ideas – he had by now of course published the hugely 
controversial Archaeologiae.90 
The minutiae of who was and was not a Latitudinarian are of course beyond the scope of this 
thesis. What is important for our purposes is that the Latitudinarians and Cambridge Platonists held 
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several important theological commitments in common, and various of these are prominent in 
Burnet’s work. The tenets of Latitudinarianism and Cambridge Platonism that are important for our 
purposes are: (a) an advocacy of the use of reason in religion; (b) an insistence on the compatibility of 
reason and religion; (c) an enthusiasm for the “new science” and for the application of natural 
philosophy for apologetic purposes; (d) an emphasis on the fundamentals of Christianity over 
inessential doctrines; (e) an emphasis on God’s goodness and wisdom over his will and power; and (f) 
an anti-voluntarist conception of God.91 These things play several important and closely-interrelated 
roles in Burnet’s theory. The use of reason in religion and the application of natural philosophy for 
apologetic purposes were of course precisely what Burnet was engaged in. He wanted to make biblical 
events explicable in terms of natural causes in order, among other things, to vindicate sacred history 
and to show that reason and philosophy are consistent with Scripture. 
The essential compatibility of reason and Scripture also played important – and somewhat 
contradictory – foundational roles in Burnet’s theory. On the one hand, it implied that reason and 
philosophy cannot contradict Scripture. This placed constraints on the theory insofar as it had to be 
consonant with certain core tenets of biblical history. The Deluge, for example, had to be universal. 
The Conflagration must destroy only the form of the earth in order that a new earth may arise from 
its matter. On the other hand, however, it implied that Scripture cannot contradict reason and 
philosophy. And this enabled Burnet to construct a rational theory of the earth which was to a large 
extent free from constraints imposed by Scripture. As I noted in the introduction, for Burnet, the 
necessary agreement between reason and Scripture entailed that a correct use of reason cannot 
contradict Scripture. This meant that truths arrived at through reason and philosophy which may 
appear to contradict Scripture do not in fact contradict Scripture. In such cases, rather, Scripture has 
been misinterpreted, and must be reinterpreted to conform with reason and philosophy. The core 
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guiding principle in conducting such reinterpretations for Burnet is derived ultimately from the above 
emphasis on the fundamentals of Christianity over inessential doctrines. Interpretations of Scripture 
must not contradict these fundamentals. And interpretations which do contradict the fundamentals 
cannot be correct, and the relevant passages must be reinterpreted to conform to them. 
We shall see in the next chapter how the foregoing principles would be carried to their logical 
– and, many would believe, heretical – conclusion in Burnet’s Archaeologiae. For now, I want to focus 
on the Cambridge Platonists’ and Latitudinarians’ emphasis on God’s wisdom and goodness and their 
anti-voluntarism. Again, these two things are very closely related. The anti-voluntarist conception of 
God which the Platonists and Latitudinarians almost invariably adopted was first articulated in the 
early modern period by Richard Hooker in the first book of his Of the lawes of ecclesiastical politie, 
published in 1594. An emphasis on God’s wisdom and goodness implied for Hooker that God cannot 
act in a way that is contrary to these attributes. His will is governed by them. He has imposed a law 
upon himself, a “Law where-by his wisdome hath stinted the effects of his power in such sort, that it 
doth not worke infinitely”. This law does not contradict God’s will and power, for he freely chose to 
impose it on himself. He has voluntarily subordinated his will and power to his wisdom and goodness.92 
This anti-voluntarist conception of God was pitted in the late sixteenth century by Hooker and during 
the mid-to-late seventeenth by the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians against the Calvinist 
voluntarism that had been dominant since the Reformation.93 It was taken up during the latter period 
by Burnet and plays a crucial role in his theory. 
Burnet most likely imbibed his anti-voluntarism primarily from Cudworth and Tillotson, the 
respective Cambridge Platonist and Latitudinarian with whom he was most closely associated during 
his formative years at Clare Hall. Of all the Cambridge Platonists, writes Hutton, Cudworth provided 
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“the most systematic statement of their anti-voluntarism”.94 The Latitudinarians’ anti-voluntarism was 
heavily influenced by Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists and is communicated liberally 
throughout Tillotson’s various sermons on the nature of God.95 “[t]he Soveraignty of God”, he writes 
in one, “doth by no means set him above the Eternal Laws of Goodness, and Truth, and 
Righteousness”.96 And in another: 
we cannot, from the soveraignty of God, infer a right to do any thing that is unsuitable to the 
Perfection of his Nature; and consequently…, it would be little less than a horrid and dreadful 
Blasphemy, to say that God can, out of his Soveraign Will and Pleasure, do any thing that 
contradicts the Nature of God, and the essential Perfections of the Deity; or to imagin that the 
Pleasure and Will of the Holy, and Just, and Good God is not always regulated and determined 
by the essential and indispensable Laws of Goodness, and Holiness, and Righteousness.97 
The implications of this anti-voluntarism for Burnet’s theory, however, are most clearly 
prefigured in the work of Glanvill, the Latitudinarian who was closest, both intellectually and socially, 
to the Cambridge Platonists.98 Glanvill’s influence on Burnet has been noted by Poole. Poole, however, 
has focussed on Glanvill’s influence in Burnet’s use of Cartesian cosmogony and in his model of the 
apocalypse.99 What I want to draw attention to here is his influence on Burnet’s view of natural 
providence. On this issue, Glanvill’s and Burnet’s views are so similar that it is impossible not to 
conclude that Burnet was heavily influenced by him, despite his customary lack of acknowledgement. 
As with his assessment of Burnet’s scant citing of Descartes, Poole has argued that Burnet does not 
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cite Glanvill in the first volume of the Theory because the book on which he primarily draws, Glanvill’s 
Lux orientalis, was concerned principally with the pre-existence of souls, a controversial doctrine with 
which Burnet was wise not to associate himself.100 This seems implausible, however, and as in the case 
of Descartes, Burnet’s lack of any explicit reference to Glanvill is more likely merely symptomatic of 
his general unwillingness to acknowledge contemporary sources. Poole himself acknowledges that 
Burnet would later admit to believing in the pre-existence of souls in the second volume of the 
Theory.101 Here, though, Burnet does not merely admit to believing the doctrine but produces 
arguments for it which are clearly drawn from Glanvill and yet does not cite him here either.102  
Turning now to Glanvill’s anti-voluntarism, as Jackson Cope has observed, Glanvill’s anti-
voluntarist conception of God effectively barred him from intervening directly in the world. God, for 
Glanvill, is bound by his nature to work through “second causes”, and God’s providence is therefore 
primarily natural providence.103 Glanvill’s statement of this is so similar to Burnet’s that it warrants 
quoting at length. “There is an exact Geometrical justice”, he writes in the Lux orientalis, 
that runs through the universe, and is interwoven in the contexture of things. This is a result of that 
wise and Almighty Goodness that praesides over all things. For this Justice is but the distributing to 
every thing according to the requirements of its nature. And that benign wisdom that contrived and 
framed the natures of all beings, doubtlesse so provided that they should be suitably furnisht with all 
things proper for their respective conditions. And that this Nemesis should be twisted into the very 
natural coustitutions of things themselves, is methinks very reasonable; since questionlesse, Almighty 
wisdom could so perfectly have formed his works at first, as that all things that he saw were regular, 
just, and for the good of the universe, should have been brought about by those stated Laws, which we 
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call nature; without an ordinary engagement of absolute power to effect them. And it seems to me to 
be very becomming the wise Authour of all things so to have made them in the beginning, as that by 
their own internal spring and wheels, they should orderly bring about what ever he intended them for, 
without his often immediate interposal. For this looks like a more magnificient apprehension of the 
Divine power and Praeexistence, since it supposeth him from everlasting ages to have foreseen all future 
occurrences, & so wonderfully to have seen and constituted the great machina of the world that the 
infinite variety of motions therein, should effect nothing but what in his eternal wisdom he had 
concluded fit and decorous: But as for that which was so, it should as certainly be compast by the Laws 
he appointed long ago, as if his omnipotence were at work every moment.104 
God’s direct intervention, then, for Glanvill, is contrary to his wisdom: 
to engage gods absolute and extraordinary power, in all events and occurrences of things, is meseems 
to think meanly of his wisdome; As if he had made the world so, as that it should need omnipotence 
every now & then to mend it, or to bring about those his destinations, which by a shorter way he could 
have effected, by his instrument, Nature.105 
In the Lux orientalis, this insistence on natural over extraordinary providence becomes, as it would in 
Burnet’s Theory, an important methodological principle in explaining such things as the embodiment 
of souls. These, for Glanvill, must be explicated in terms of natural rather than miraculous causes, for 
as God’s nature binds him to work through natural law rather than direct intervention, so too, when 
theorising about these processes, we must do so in terms of the former rather than the latter.106 
Burnet’s similar emphasis on God’s wisdom over his will and a similar anti-voluntarist 
conception of God give rise in the Theory to a view of providence which strongly echoes that of Glanvill 
and which underpins the entire work. For Burnet, as for Glanvill, the wisdom of God effectively 
prevents him from intervening directly in the natural world, for where other, subordinate means of 
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bringing about his will are available, it is contrary to his wisdom, and therefore contrary to his essential 
nature, to intervene directly rather than employ these means. “Wisdom”, writes Burnet in book three, 
“consists in the conduct and subordination of several causes to bring our purposes to effect”, and 
“what is dispatched by an immediate Supreme Power, leaves no room for the exercise of Wisdom”.107 
The principal instruments of the divine will in Burnet’s view, those most consonant with God’s wisdom, 
are natural causes. God’s providence, therefore, is, as for Glanvill, predominantly natural providence. 
Natural providence consists in “[t]he Form or Course of Universal Nature, as actuated by the Divine 
Power: with all the Changes, Periods, and Vicissitudes that attend it, according to the method and 
establishment made at first, by the Author of it”.108 In other words, the laws of nature, contrived by 
God in the beginning. Where God’s will can be effected via natural law, then, it is contrary to his 
wisdom to employ a higher power. As in Glanvill, this rule to which God is bound by his essential nature 
becomes for Burnet an important methodological principle in constructing his theory. God does not 
intervene in nature where natural causes are sufficient. Neither, then, should we appeal to a 
miraculous power where natural causes are sufficient to explain a given phenomenon, for 
if we would have a fair view and right apprehensions of Natural Providence, we must not cut the chains 
of it too short, by having recourse, without necessity, either to the First Cause, in explaining the Origins 
of things: or to Miracles, in explaining particular effects. This, I say, breaks the chains of Natural 
Providence, when it is done without necessity, that is, when things are otherwise intelligible from 
Second Causes… The Course of Nature is truly the Will of God; and, as I may so say, his first Will; from 
which we are not to recede, but upon clear evidence and necessity. And as in matter of Religion, we 
are to follow the known reveal'd Will of God, and not to trust to every impulse or motion of Enthusiasm, 
as coming from the Divine Spirit, unless there be evident marks that it is Supernatural, and cannot come 
from our own; So neither are we, without necessity, to quit the known and ordinary Will and Power of 
God establisht in the course of Nature, and fly to Supernatural Causes, or his extraordinary Will; for this 
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is a kind of Enthusiasm or Fanaticism, as well as the other: And no doubt that great prodigality and 
waste of Miracles which some make, is no way to the honour of God or Religion.109 
This methodological principle, grounded in an anti-voluntarist conception of God inherited 
from Burnet’s Cambridge Platonist and Latitudinarian contemporaries, is adhered to throughout the 
Theory, and the Creation, Deluge, Conflagration, and formation of the new heavens and earth 
explained predominantly – though not entirely, as I shall discuss shortly – in terms of natural causes. 
Burnet was evidently aware that in explaining biblical events in such terms he ran the risk of being 
perceived as having written providence out of sacred history and was anxious to avoid his readers 
coming to this conclusion. To this end, he stresses throughout the work that interpreting biblical 
events naturalistically does not thereby render them non-providential, for it was God who, in his 
infinite wisdom, contrived a series of natural causes which would bring the events about. That they 
would be effected in this manner is to be considered a more compelling mark of divine providence 
than his intervening directly in the world, since the ordinary course of nature affords greater evidence 
of his wisdom than does his direct intervention. The course of nature, Burnet emphasises, is not 
less Providential, because constant and regular; on the contrary, such a disposition or establishment of 
second causes, as will in the best order, and for a long succession, produce the most regular effects, 
assisted only with the ordinary concourse of the first cause, is a greater argument of wisdom and 
contrivance, than such a disposition of causes as will not in so good an order, or for so long a time 
produce regular effects, without an extraordinary concourse and interposition of the First cause.110 
Introducing a familiar seventeenth-century analogy, he adds that “[w]e think him a better Artist that 
makes a Clock that strikes regularly at every hour from the Springs and Wheels which he puts in the 
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work, than he that hath so made his Clock that he must put his finger to it every hour to make it 
strike”.111 
 Likely anticipating the objections that were to be raised against it, Burnet was especially keen 
to emphasise the providential nature of his account of the Deluge. On the face of it, Burnet’s anti-
voluntarist interpretation of the Deluge appeared difficult to square with the event being brought 
about as a punishment for human sin, something which seemed to imply a voluntaristic act of God. To 
overcome this difficulty, Burnet posits a divine synchronicity between the “natural”, “material”, or 
“corporeal” world on the one hand and the “human”, “moral”, or “intellectual” world on the other. 
God, having foreseen human sin, contrived the physical world in the beginning such that the earth’s 
crust would break and cause a universal inundation at precisely the moment of maximal human 
sinfulness. Understood in this way, the Deluge becomes not merely a punishment for human sin but 
also a remarkable instance of God’s wisdom and prescience, far more consistent with his nature than 
the voluntarist picture of his observing sin and intervening in the world in order to punish it. Applying 
the above clock-maker analogy to the Deluge, Burnet observes that 
if one should contrive a piece of Clock-work so that it should beat all the hours, and make all its motions 
regularly for such a time, and that time being come, upon a signal given, or a Spring toucht, it should of 
its own accord fall all to pieces; would not this be look'd upon as a piece of greater Art, than if the 
Workman came at that time prefixt, and with a great Hammer beat it into pieces?112 
“I use these comparisons”, he continues, 
to convince us, that it is no detraction from Divine Providence, that the course of Nature is exact and 
regular, and that even in its greatest changes and revolutions it should still conspire and be prepar'd to 
answer the ends and purposes of the Divine Will in reference to the Moral World. This seems to me to 
be the great Art of Divine Providence, so to adjust the two Worlds, Humane and Natural, Material and 
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Intellectual, as seeing thorough the possibilities and futuritions of each, according to the first state and 
circumstances he puts them under, they should all along correspond and fit one another, and especially 
in their great Crises and Periods.113 
God, then, does not punish or reward humankind merely according to his will, but, in accordance with 
his wisdom, synchronises earth and human history such that they corresponded perfectly with one 
another. And since in both 
there are certain Periods, Fulnesses of Time, and fixt Seasons, either for some great Catastrophe, or 
some great Instauration, 'Tis Providence that makes a due harmony or Synchronism betwixt these two, 
and measures out the concurrent fates of both Worlds, so as Nature may be always a faithful minister 
of the Divine Pleasure, whether for rewards or punishments, according as the state of Mankind may 
require.114 
Despite his emphasis on natural over extraordinary providence, Burnet does not want to rule 
out miracles altogether, for while he emphasises God’s wisdom over his will, he does not want the 
latter “so to be bound up to second causes, as never to use, upon occasion, an extraordinary influence 
or direction”.115 Indeed, he sees an outright denial of miracles as more problematic than having too 
ready appeal to them, “for to deny all Miracles, is in effect to deny all reveal'd Religion”. He wants, 
then, to allow some miraculous intervention, “so as neither to make the Divine Power too mean and 
cheap, nor the Power of Nature illimited and all-sufficient”.116 He also maintains that miracles were 
involved in the Creation and Deluge, and that they will play a role in the Conflagration. The specific 
role of miracles in Burnet’s account of the formation and dissolution of the earth is somewhat vague, 
and I shall return to it shortly as the much clearer picture he gives of another miraculous element of 
the Deluge and of the miracles involved in the Conflagration will help to shed light on it. This other 
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miraculous element of the Deluge pertains to the protection of the ark. The violence of the waters, 
Burnet suggests, necessitated “an extraordinary and miraculous Providence” to prevent the ark from 
being destroyed. To this end, he proposes that it was protected by angels, a scenario he famously 




                                                          





Like the protection of the ark, the role of miracles in the Conflagration consists in the ministry 
of angels. Here, though, their role is very different in that they are involved in actually bringing the 
event about. What is especially interesting about Burnet’s discussion of the miracles involved in the 
Conflagration is that he distinguishes between two kinds of miracle: (a) “God's immediate 
Omnipotency”, and (b) “the Ministry of Angels”. Both are to be considered miraculous, because both 
proceed from divine or supernatural rather than natural causes. Yet the distinction between them is 
important, more important even than that between the natural and the miraculous, because the 
difference between an angelic and an omnipotent power is far greater than that between the natural 
and the angelic. Here Burnet introduces a new component of his anti-voluntarism: where God can 
bring about his will via the ministry of angels, he will not intervene directly in the world. Here again, 
this rule by which God himself is bound proceeds from his wisdom, to which it is contrary for him to 
employ an omnipotent power where a merely angelic power is sufficient.118 
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Assessing the powers of angels, Burnet argues in the first place that they are endowed with a 
perfect understanding of nature. They are able, therefore, to intervene in the natural world in ways 
that are not only above our capacities but beyond our imagination. Additionally, where our souls can 
control only the motions of “spirits” within our bodies, theirs can manipulate external nature.119 Thus, 
their dominion and power over the natural world far exceeds ours, and hence nature is much more 
subject to their control than to our own. “From these considerations”, he observes, “it is reasonable 
to conclude, that the generality of miracles may be and are perform'd by Angels; It being less decorous 
to employ a Sovereign power, where a subaltern is sufficient”. From these observations, which again 
are grounded in an emphasis on God’s wisdom and a resulting anti-voluntarist conception of God, 
Burnet derives a second methodological principle which is exactly analogous to the first: just as we 
are not to appeal to miracles where natural causes are sufficient to explain a given phenomenon, so 
too, we are not to appeal to God’s direct intervention where the ministry of angels is sufficient. “[T]he 
reason in both Rules”, emphasises Burnet, “is the same, namely, because it argues a defect of Wisdom 
in all Oeconomies to employ more and greater means than are sufficient”.120 
Burnet now applies this rule to the Conflagration. Drawing on a range of biblical illustrations 
of the propensities and capacities of angels, he notes in the first place that the notion of “Destroying 
Angels” as “Executioners of the Divine Justice and Vengeance” is well precedented in Scripture, there 
being frequent instances in sacred history of God’s judgement being dispensed by an angelic hand. 
There was thus nothing “new or strange” in their being instruments of God’s wrath in his last great 
judgement upon the earth.121 As to their capacity to intervene in nature, it was evident that angels 
can order and coordinate the various natural causes that are to bring the Conflagration about; they 
can increase the amount of fire or “fiery materials” in the earth; intensify the power of the sun; adjust 
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the temperature of flames; alter the composition of physical bodies so as the make them more 
combustible. It was thus both “reasonable” and “sufficient” to suppose that the Conflagration would 
be brought about primarily via natural causes, but that these causes would be augmented by the 
ministry of angels.122 God’s direct intervention could be ruled out, since he will not intervene in nature 
where the ministry of angels is sufficient. As with his above defence of natural causes, Burnet was 
keen to emphasise the providential nature of angelic causes and does so once again in markedly anti-
voluntarist terms. It is no “diminution of Providence”, he writes, “to put things into the hands of 
Angels”. On the contrary, “‘[t]is the true rule and method of it; For to employ an Almighty power where 
it is not necessary, is to debase it, and give it a task fit for lower Beings”.123 
Turning now to the miracles involved in the formation and dissolution of the earth, this as I 
have noted is rather vague in the first volume of the Theory. Following his explication of the earth’s 
formation from a chaos, Burnet notes that “we have propos'd the Natural Causes of it, and I do not 
know wherein our Explication is false or defective” yet immediately afterwards describes the structure 
of the primitive earth as “so marvellous, that it ought rather to be consider'd as a particular effect of 
the Divine Art, than as the work of Nature”. He then quotes a number of biblical passages and other 
ancient writings which indicate that other, non-physical powers were involved in this “piece of Divine 
Geometry or Architecture” – the “Word of God” or “Spirit of God” in Scripture and “Mens or Amor” in 
the ancients – but does not discuss what these powers may have consisted in.124 Later in the book 
when discussing the Deluge, he relates that as “there was an extraordinary Providence in the 
formation or composition of the first Earth, so I believe there was also in the dissolution of it”, yet says 
nothing about what this extraordinary providence consisted in in either case.125 
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Things become slightly clearer if we look at his two responses to Warren. Warren had objected 
to Burnet’s account of the Creation on the grounds that the formation of the earth according to 
Burnet’s principles would take far longer than the six days allotted by Moses.126 Responding to Warren, 
Burnet argued that the formation of the earth may be understood either in terms of ordinary or 
extraordinary providence. If the former, then it would obviously take much longer than six days. If the 
latter, then the process may be expedited so as to occur in a shorter timeframe.127 This, however, is 
clearly not his actual position. To begin with, he explicitly states that the argument is merely a possible 
“general Answer” to the objection.128 We know, moreover, that he thinks the Creation did take longer 
than six days, and that the Mosaic six-day Creation is not to be understood literally. He stated this in 
1680/1 in his correspondence with Isaac Newton and made his first public statement of it in the Review 
of the theory of the earth which was published the same year as this first reply to Warren.129 This 
position is intimated toward the end of the latter, too, for here he expresses his intention to produce 
an account of the six-day Creation, and declares that this account “might have spar'd much of the 
Excepter's [Warren’s] pains”, since his objections are grounded largely in a “Vulgar” reading of Moses, 
with which the theory is obviously inconsistent – “a Child that had read the first Chapters of Genesis”, 
he notes derisively, “might have observ'd this, as well as the Excepter”.130 He returns to this point in 
his second reply. Here, though, he is much more explicit, stating that “the Theorist hath no where 
asserted, that Moses's Cosmopoeia… is to be literally understood; and therefore what is urg'd against 
him from the letter of that Cosmopoeia, is improperly urg'd and without ground”.131 
Burnet’s notion of the speeding up of the earth’s formation, then, is not his view of the role 
of extraordinary providence in the Creation. His actual view of this and of the extraordinary providence 
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involved in the Deluge becomes apparent in his second reply to Warren. In his first reply, Burnet had 
made certain appeals to extraordinary providence when answering Warren’s objections.132 In his 
subsequent reply to Burnet, Warren took exception to this, and to Burnet’s earlier appeals to 
extraordinary providence in the Theory. Firstly, he argued, Burnet was violating his own principles, for 
he had insisted on explaining the Creation and Deluge in terms of natural causes but had appealed to 
extraordinary providence in the Theory and was now appealing to it to deal with objections. Secondly, 
by appealing to extraordinary providence, Burnet had rendered his theory superfluous. One of the key 
motivations for the theory was to explain the Deluge without appealing to a miraculous creation and 
annihilation of water. By appealing to miracles himself, he had thereby rendered his theory no better 
than the traditional, miraculous interpretation of the event.133 “To what purpose”, asks Warren, “did 
he [Burnet] invent a Theory, and write a Treatise with design to shut out one Extraordinary Providence, 
the creating of new Waters to make the Deluge; when in this Treatise, and to uphold that Theory, he 
is constrain'd to let in thus many?”.134 
It is in his response to these points that Burnet’s view of the miracles involved in the Creation 
and Deluge becomes clearer, for here Burnet rebukes Warren for being “so injudicious… as to 
confound all extraordinary Providence with the Acts of Omnipotency”. It is such acts, he explains, and 
not miracles more generally, that he did not allow in his theory. “The Creation and Annihilation of 
waters… is an act of pure Omnipotency”. This, therefore, “[t]he Theorist did not admit of at the Deluge: 
and if this be his fault, as it is frequently objected to him he perseveres in it still”.135 Here, as in his 
discussion of the Conflagration, he contrasts such “Acts of Omnipotency” with the ministry of angels: 
“as for acts of Angelical power”, he writes, 
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“he [the Theorist] does every where acknowledge them in the great Revolutions… of the natural World. 
If the Excepter [Warren] would make the Divine Omnipotency as cheap as the ministery of Angels, and 
have recourse as freely and as frequently to that, as to this: If he would make all extraordinary 
Providence the same, and all miracles, and set all at the pitch of Infinite power, this may be an effect of 
his ignorance or inadvertency, but is no way imputable to the Theorist.136 
Burnet’s appeals to miracles, then, are to lesser miracles, those which can be effected by the ministry 
of angels and which do not require God’s direct omnipotence. Thus, he did not violate his principles 
or render his theory superfluous as Warren had claimed, for Warren’s argument proceeded from an 
erroneous conflation of these two very distinct kinds of miracle. 
From the foregoing argument against Warren, his above assertion “that the generality of 
miracles may be and are perform'd by Angels”, the prodigious power over nature with which he 
believed angels to be endowed, and his clear antipathy with the idea of God intervening directly in 
the world, it seems highly likely that the miracles Burnet envisaged as being involved in the formation 
and dissolution of the earth at the Creation and Deluge, like those involved in the Conflagration, 
consisted in the ministry of angels. If this is correct, then Burnet’s anti-voluntarism dictates not only 
his view of ordinary providence, but also his conception of extraordinary providence. God’s direct 
intervention is theoretically possible, but in most cases God, in accordance with his wisdom, performs 
miracles not directly but via the medium of angels. This conception of extraordinary providence also 
appears to have been inherited in large part from Glanvill. Though Glanvill insists that God works via 
natural causes and does not intervene in the world and that we should endeavour to explain things in 
terms of natural processes rather than extraordinary providence, he maintains also that on occasions 
where natural providence falls short, and where a phenomenon cannot be explained in terms of 
natural processes, “we may have recourse to the Arbitrary managements of those invisible Ministers 
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of Equity and Justice, which without doubt the world is plentifully stored with”. Here, again like Burnet, 
he points to scriptural evidence of angelic interventions in the world in support of his contention.137 
Burnet’s conception of miracles is interesting to consider in relation to seventeenth-century 
English thinking about miracles more generally. At this time, the subject of miracles was being widely 
discussed by both theologians and philosophers. Here again, Harrison has some illuminating and highly 
relevant work. Harrison recognises two very distinct conceptions of miracles adopted by English 
philosophers and theologians from the middle decades to the end of the century. The first, held by 
earlier thinkers such as Stillingfleet, Robert Boyle, Thomas Sprat, and others, was essentially a 
modified version of a view developed by St. Thomas Aquinas during the middle ages. For Aquinas, 
miracles were events which could not be explained in terms of the powers of the objects involved in 
them. During the seventeenth century, this Aristotelian notion of objects possessing intrinsic powers 
became rejected in favour of inert matter governed laws of nature, and the Thomist definition of 
miracles became reconceptualised in these terms. From this reconceptualization emerges the familiar 
conception of miracles as violations of laws of nature which was famously attacked by David Hume 
during the following century. For the above thinkers, miracles were essentially violations of the laws 
of nature resulting from the direct action of God. The ordinary course of nature is caused ultimately 
by God, but not directly. Rather, it results from “second causes”, laws contrived by God in the 
beginning. Miracles, however, are direct interventions from God, in which these laws are violated.138 
 A very different conception of miracles, Harrison observes, emerged during the latter part of 
the century. This definition was derived ultimately from St. Augustine and was adopted by Newton 
and several of his followers. For Augustine, all of nature is essentially miraculous, and what we 
ordinarily refer to as miracles are to be understood not in terms of any essential difference between 
them and the ordinary course of nature but in terms of their effects on observers. They are events 
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which are unusual, and therefore appear contrary to nature. Yet they are not in fact contrary to nature, 
but rather to our knowledge of nature. For Newton and Newtonians such as Richard Bentley, Samuel 
Clarke, and William Whiston, attraction and gravitation result from the continual, direct action of God. 
Since God for these thinkers is continually intervening directly in nature, miracles cannot be 
distinguished for the ordinary course of nature on the basis of God’s direct intervention. The 
Newtonians therefore revived the Augustinian definition, reconceptualising it in seventeenth-century 
terms of laws of nature. Miracles for Newton and the Newtonians are events which are unusual. They 
appear to be violations of the laws of nature, yet this appearance is not due to their intrinsic nature 
but to our limited understanding of the world. Miracles, like other natural phenomena, are governed 
by the laws of nature, but we lack the requisite understanding of those laws to explain them. As 
Harrison observes, the crucial difference between these two definitions of miracles is that on the 
modified Thomist definition miracles are objectively and ontologically distinct from the laws of nature, 
whereas on the Augustinian-cum-Newtonian definition the distinction is subjective and epistemic. 
Miracles on the latter view are miracles only from our limited perspective. They can, therefore, at 
least potentially, be explained in terms of natural processes.139 
It is interesting to consider where Burnet’s conception of miracles stands in relation to these 
two seventeenth-century definitions. Harrison suggests that Burnet’s conception of miracles was 
similar to that of the Newtonians and discusses Burnet’s theory alongside the Newtonians’ 
endeavours to explain biblical miracles in terms of natural processes.140 This is somewhat misleading. 
Harrison is right to suggest that Burnet’s treatment of biblical events traditionally conceived as 
miracles is similar to that of the Newtonians in that he, like them, thinks these events can be 
understood in naturalistic terms. Burnet’s definition of miracles, however, is very different from that 
of the Newtonians. Miracles for Burnet are not merely subjectively and epistemically but objectively 
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and ontologically distinct from the laws of nature. They result either from (a) God’s direct intervention 
(which Burnet effectively, though not theoretically, rules out) or (b) the ministry of angels. These are 
divine or supernatural causes, and as such, they are ontologically distinct from natural causes. Burnet 
of course subscribes to a Cartesian, mechanistic physics. Thus, neither God nor angels are continually 
intervening in nature. So their intervention, should it occur, is wholly distinct from the laws of nature. 
As to the biblical events which Burnet and the Newtonians sought to explain naturalistically, there is 
a very important distinction here, too. For the Newtonians, as Harrison notes and as I shall explore in 
more depth in chapter five when I discuss Whiston, unusual events in Scripture which can be explained 
in terms of natural causes are still in some sense miraculous.141 For Burnet, on the other hand, biblical 
events, to the extent that they can be explained in naturalistic terms, are not miracles. They are only 
miraculous insofar as they involve either direct intervention from God or the ministry of angels. 
 In the foregoing respects, Burnet’s conception of miracles is closer to the Thomist definition 
than the Augustinian. For Burnet, as for Boyle, Stillingfleet and others, the miraculous is ontologically 
distinct from the natural. Miracles are something other than the laws of nature. In certain other 
respects, however, Burnet differs significantly from these authors, too. As I have noted above, those 
who adopted the modified Thomist definition conceptualised miracles primarily in terms of violations 
of laws of nature resulting from God’s direct intervention in the world. There are two crucial 
differences between this view and Burnet’s. The first difference is obvious. Burnet, at least in most 
cases, does not think God intervenes directly in the natural world, for in almost every conceivable 
case, this is not necessary and would therefore be contrary to his wisdom. Miracles for Burnet, then, 
are in virtually all cases not interventions from God but from angels carrying out God’s instructions. 
The second difference is rather more subtle. Miracles for Burnet, while being angelic interventions 
which alter the course of nature, are not straightforwardly violations of the laws of nature. Rather, the 
picture we get from his account of miraculous intervention in the Conflagration – the only detailed 
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picture he gives of extraordinary providence – is of angels working in concert with the laws of nature, 
organising and coordinating natural processes, transmuting matter, manipulating causes and 
effects.142 Burnet’s “Angels of Wrath”, Poole astutely observes, “no longer strike us as supernatural 
beings effecting incomprehensible miracles”, but rather “as superior versions of human chemists”.143 
 One final point I want briefly to discuss before moving onto Burnet’s use of Scripture is how 
his commitment to natural over miraculous causes has been characterised by historians. This 
commitment is typically framed as an essentially Cartesian principle. Martin Rudwick, for example, 
argues that Burnet sought physical explanations for the Deluge and other events which could “satisfy 
the text of Scripture and other ancient records…, and at the same time be framed within the Cartesian 
philosophy of nature, which permitted explanation only in terms of matter and motion”.144 Poole 
claims that Burnet’s promotion of “a model of general providence (‘the laws of nature’) that would 
limit the need for the philosopher to appeal to special providence (‘miracles’)… was a Cartesian move, 
as Descartes too had insisted on the necessity for God’s general providence as the caretaker and 
conserver of Creation’s regular movements”.145 Harrison notes that the aspect of Cartesianism to 
which critics of Burnet and other theorists objected was not the use of Cartesian cosmogony but “the 
Cartesian mode of explanation”, that is, the attempt “to describe all the features of the world in terms 
of secondary causes”.146 
It is true of course that Descartes had insisted on general rather than extraordinary providence 
in his cosmogony. “God will never perform a miracle in the new world”, he wrote in the Treatise on 
light.147 And Harrison is certainly correct to say that Burnet’s and other theorists’ commitment to 
natural causes was seen by their contemporaries as essentially Cartesian. It is important to emphasise, 
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however, that the foundations of Burnet’s commitment to ordinary providence were much more 
theological than philosophical. They were rooted, as I have argued, in an anti-voluntarist conception 
of God inherited from the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians, something quite un-Cartesian – 
Cudworth, for example, had objected strenuously to Descartes’ theological voluntarism.148 It was this 
anti-voluntarism rather than Cartesianism that underpinned Burnet’s commitment to natural over 
extraordinary providence. And as we have seen, it also placed strict limits on the latter. God does not 
intervene directly in the world in Burnet’s theory not because Burnet is committed to a Cartesian style 
of explanation but because he sees God as being bound by the law of his essential nature to employ 
natural – or where that fails, angelic – causes. 
2.4. Scripture 
As will become clear in later chapters, the first volume of the Theory would attract far more attention 
than the second. As a result, Burnet would become seen primarily as a “world-maker” or “flood-
maker” – two pejorative terms coined during the 1690s by critics of Burnet and other theorists – and 
the Theory viewed principally as a philosophical commentary on Genesis, and in particular on chapters 
6-9, the Mosaic narrative of the Deluge.149 Kerry Magruder has argued that this characterisation of 
Burnet as primarily a diluvial apologist is something of a distortion in that the most central biblical text 
in the Theory is not Genesis but St Peter’s Second Epistle.150 This is certainly correct. As we shall see, 
it is indeed St Peter and not Genesis that plays the most pervasive role in the Theory as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to understate the significance of Genesis 6-9 in the first book, for in 
this part of the Theory it is this text that plays the more foundational role. 
 There were essentially three core tenets of the Mosaic narrative that Burnet wanted to 
vindicate, and which underpin his theory of the Deluge. The first concerned the extent of the event. 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, the Deluge for Burnet had to be universal, for as well as the various 
other problems with the increasingly popular notion of a local Deluge, Moses explicitly states that the 
Deluge was universal.151 The second concerned the event’s causes. Moses mentions only two causes: 
the breaking open of the “Fountains of the great Abysse” and the forty days rain. That Moses gives 
these and only these causes precluded in Burnet’s view the possibility of any other causes such as a 
miraculous creation of water or a miraculous transmutation of other elements into water.152 The third 
concerned the nature of the event. Two things are important here. First, the onset and abatement of 
the Deluge in Moses’ narration are gradual. The water increases and decreases by degrees.153 This, 
too, ruled out any sudden creations, annihilations, or transmutations.154 Second, and this was more 
controversial, the Mosaic history as Burnet interprets it does not present the Deluge as a standing 
pool of water as was traditionally believed but as a violent sea.155 On this point, he cites chapter 8, 
verse 3 of the Hebrew text in which it is stated that the waters of the Deluge decreased by “going and 
returning” or “going and coming”, which indicates a violent motion and gradual settling of the waters 
into the channels that had been created by the dissolution of the crust.156 This was further supported 
by Psalm 104.6-8: “the waters… go up by the mountains; they go down by the valleys unto the place 
which thou hast founded for them”.157 
 Burnet’s account of the Deluge for the most part corresponded closely with Genesis 6-9. There 
were, however, two noteworthy divergences which would prove controversial. The first of these 
concerned the causes of the event. Although Burnet purported to have remained close to the text in 
maintaining that the only two causes are those stated by Moses, the timing and relative significance 
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of these two causes in the theory represented a significant departure from the Mosaic account. In 
Genesis 7.11-12, Moses appears to make the onset of the forty days rain occur at the same time as 
the breaking open of the abyss: “the same day were all the fountains of the great deep broken up, and 
the windows of heaven were opened. And the rain was upon the earth forty days and forty nights”.158 
He also seems to give the breaking open of the fountains and the rain equal roles in the Deluge. In 
Burnet, on the other hand, the rain precedes the dissolution of the crust. And having calculated that 
forty days rain would supply only an insignificant proportion of the water required, he relegates it to 
a merely preparatory or subsidiary role. It softens the ground and weakens the crust, fills the pores of 
the crust such that the waters of the abyss become more volatised and exert greater pressure on it, 
and buoys up the ark to protect it in its descent into the abyss. It does not, however, constitute a 
significant proportion of the Flood waters as seems to be the case in the Mosaic account.159 
 The second notable divergence from the Mosaic narrative was rather more controversial. This 
divergence is not apparent in Burnet’s discussion of the Deluge in book one but is revealed in book 
two where he considers the peopling of America. Here, as I noted in the previous chapter, Burnet 
argued that the population of America are not Noah’s descendants. Rather, their ancestors are 
descendants of Adam who migrated west prior to the Deluge. God, in another remarkable instance of 
his wisdom and prescience, foresaw that the broken crust would form two main continents and saved 
a selection of humans and animals in each hemisphere. Although the Deluge itself was universal, then, 
Moses’ narration of it pertains only to Europe, Asia, and Africa. This Burnet saw as an elegant solution 
to the problem of the peopling of America, something which had perplexed scholars since the 
Renaissance and had given rise in his own time to such heretical notions as Isaac La Peyrère’s pre-
Adamite hypothesis.160 Though nowhere near as controversial as La Peyrère’s, Burnet’s solution did 
nevertheless imply a significant departure from the Mosaic history, for although, as he pointed out, 
                                                          
158 Genesis, chap. 7 ver. 11-12 – my italics. 
159 Burnet (1684), 97-9. 
160 Burnet (1684), 270-3. 
116 
 
there is nothing in Genesis stating that all humans descended from Noah but only from Adam, this 
was implied in Moses’ narration of the Deluge in which it is stated repeatedly that all humans and land 
animals died apart from those on the ark.161 
 Other passages of Genesis which play an important foundational role in the theory are those 
that state the lifespans of the antediluvian and postdiluvian patriarchs and the ages at which they 
fathered children, Burnet’s literal interpretation of these passages giving rise to his account of 
antediluvian longevity which I discussed in the previous chapter. A passage which is conspicuously 
absent from the Theory for the most part is Moses’ narration of the Creation in Genesis 1. Apart from 
citing the text as evidence that the earth was created and is not eternal and that it formed from a 
chaos, Burnet makes no attempt in the Theory to reconcile his account of the Creation with this 
chapter of Genesis.162 “I have not mention'd Moses's Cosmopoeia”, he writes in the English edition, 
“because I thought it deliver'd by him as a Lawgiver, not as a Philosopher”.163 He says slightly more in 
the Latin edition, arguing that Moses described the earth at the Creation not as it in fact was at that 
time but as it was at the time he wrote.164 And as I noted above, he had made clear in his 
correspondence with Newton in 1680/1 that he did not believe the Mosaic six-day Creation to be a 
true account of the formation of the earth.165 
 He did, however, find evidence for his theory of the Creation in other biblical texts. Here again 
he drew heavily on the book of Psalms, of which several passages appeared to him to refer to the 
formation of the earth’s surface on a body of water and the enclosure of the abyss within the crust. 
Psalm 136.6 mentions God having “stretched out the Earth above the waters”. Psalm 24.4 relates that 
“he founded the Earth upon the seas, and established it upon the Floods”. And Psalm 33.7 says that 
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“he gathered up waters of the sea together, as in a bag, he layeth up the Abysse in Storehouses”. 
Further notable examples come from the book of Proverbs. Chapter 8, for example, refers to a time 
when there were “no fountains abounding with water” and to God “set[ting] a Compass upon the face 
of the Deep” and “strengthen[ing] the fountains of the Abysse”. The strengthening of the fountains of 
the abyss, Burnet argues, clearly refers to the enclosure of the abyss within the crust, “for the 
Fountains could be strengthened no other way than by making a strong cover or Arch over them”. The 
word translated in English as “compass”, he notes further, more properly signifies “a Circle or 
Circumference, or an Orb or Sphere”. Hence, “there was in the beginning of the World a Sphere, Orb 
or Arch set round the Abysse… And this shews us both the form of the Mosaical Abysse, which was 
included within the Vault, and the form of the habitable Earth, which was the outward surface of this 
Vault, or the cover of the Abysse that was broke up at the Deluge”.166 
I turn now to the central biblical text in Burnet’s overall theory: St Peter’s Second Epistle, 
chapter 3. The centrality of this text in the theory and the extent to which he refers to it warrant 
quoting the relevant verses in full: 
This second epistle, beloved, I now write unto you; in both which I stir up your pure minds by way of 
remembrance: That ye may be mindful of the words which were spoken before by the holy prophets, 
and of the commandment of us the apostles of the Lord and Saviour: Knowing this first, that there shall 
come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts, And saying, Where is the promise of his 
coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the 
creation. For this they willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and 
the earth standing out of the water and in the water: Whereby the world that then was, being 
overflowed with water, perished: But the heavens and the earth, which are now, by the same word are 
kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men… the day of 
the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, 
and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be 
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burned up. Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be 
in all holy conversation and godliness, Looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God, 
wherein the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat? 
Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth 
righteousness.167 
This is how the text is rendered in the King James Bible. Burnet, however, makes an alteration which 
has important consequences for his theory: he retranslates the fifth verse in line with Latin Vulgate, 
replacing “standing out of the water and in the water” with “Consisting of Water, and by Water”.168 
 In book one, Burnet presents this text as proof of three central components of his theory: first, 
that the earth itself and not merely life on earth was destroyed at the Deluge; second, that the 
antediluvian earth was of a different constitution from the present earth; and third, that it was in 
virtue of this constitution that the antediluvian earth was destroyed at the Deluge.169 That the physical 
world was destroyed at the Deluge was evident from the context of the passage. The “scoffers” to 
whom the apostle refers sought to cast doubt on the Old Testament prophecies about the 
Conflagration. The basis of their doubt was the apparent immutability of the natural world, the notion 
that “all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation”. Here the scoffers clearly 
refer to the physical world, for it was the future destruction of the physical world that they doubted. 
To counter their scepticism, St Peter tells them that the earth was destroyed at the Deluge. He too 
must therefore refer to the physical world, for if he refers merely to the animate world, his argument 
cannot counter the scoffers’ scepticism. They claimed that the physical world had not changed since 
the Creation, and on this basis argued that it would not change in the future. He, therefore, must point 
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to the destruction of the physical world at the Deluge in order to demonstrate that nature is not 
immutable and remove the grounds for their scepticism.170 
  The second key tenet that was proved by this passage was of course the first “proposition” 
of the theory. That the antediluvian earth was of a different constitution from the present earth was 
clear in the first place from the explicit distinction St Peter makes between the two worlds: “the 
heavens… of old, and the earth” and “the world that then was” in the fifth and sixth verses and “the 
heavens and the earth, which are now” in the seventh. Had there been no difference between the 
two, there would be no need for St Peter to make this distinction, and the fifth verse would be 
superfluous. The sixth verse, moreover, being an inference from the fifth, would be without grounds. 
St Peter, however, does not merely tell us that the antediluvian earth was different. He also tells us 
what this difference consisted in. It is here that Burnet’s retranslation of verse 5 is crucial, for here, 
according to the Vulgate, St Peter informs us that “the Earth of old had a particular form and 
constitution as to Water”, that it had a “watery constitution” in that it “consist[ed] or subsist[ed] by 
water, or by the help of water”. This clearly denotes an important difference between the antediluvian 
and the present earth, since the present earth cannot be said to have such a constitution. It is, 
however, true of the antediluvian earth, for this earth may be “said to consist by water, because it was 
built upon it, and at first was sustain'd by it”.171 The different constitution of the heavens Burnet 
interprets as referring not to the celestial but to the “aerial” heavens, that is, the earth’s atmosphere. 
This too, he thinks, had a “watery constitution” before the Deluge in that it contained only “watery 
Meteors”, whereas the present atmosphere clearly has a very different, “fiery constitution” in that it 
contains various “fiery Exhalations and Meteors” – i.e., thunder and lightning.172 
The third and final tenet of book one of the Theory that was evidenced by St Peter, that it was 
in virtue of the antediluvian earth’s different constitution that it was destroyed at the Deluge, was 
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clear in Burnet’s view from the opening clause of the sixth verse. Here, having described this 
constitution of the earth in verse five, St Peter describes its destruction at the Deluge, beginning the 
verse with the connective “Whereby”. This, he argues, clearly denotes a causal dependence between 
the antediluvian earth’s constitution and its destruction. Here, then, St Peter is as important as Moses 
for understanding the Deluge, since he, too, tells us of its cause. Yet where Moses gives us its 
“immediate Causes”, St Peter relates its “more remote and fundamental causes”.173 
Insofar as he makes St Peter Moses’ equal with regard to the causes of the Deluge, this part 
of Burnet’s theory may be considered as much Petrine as Mosaic, since the evidence for it comes as 
much from St Peter as from Moses. As I have noted above, however, it is important to stress that it is 
the Genesis narrative that plays the more foundational role of the two texts in this part of Burnet’s 
theory. Genesis 6-9 is the scriptural basis of Burnet’s theory of the Deluge. It is the primary text with 
which he constructs his theory. The role of St Peter in the first volume is wholly confirmatory. Having 
constructed his theory of the Deluge primarily from reason and secondarily from the Mosaic narrative, 
Burnet finds in St Peter a wealth of confirming evidence for his view. This course of events is stated 
explicitly in book one. “[W]hen I had discover'd in my thoughts from the consideration of the Deluge, 
and other natural reasons, that the Earth was certainly once in another form”, he relates, “it was a 
great assurance and confirmation to me, when I reflected on this place of S. Peter’s; which seems to 
be so much directed and intended for the same purpose, or to teach us the same conclusion”.174 
What is especially interesting about Burnet’s analysis of St Peter and the other confirmatory 
evidence that he finds in Scripture for his account of the Creation and Deluge is that it embodies two 
important points that we discussed in the previous chapter. The first is the Protestant literalism. 
Burnet’s literalism is often overlooked. This is ultimately because his non-literal interpretation of the 
first three chapters of Genesis in the Archaeologiae caused so much controversy, and this controversy 
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has obscured the important fact that his exegesis more generally is very much literal. Indeed, apart 
from these first chapters of Genesis – which he discusses much later in his debate with Herbert Croft 
and Erasmus Warren and in the Archaeologiae – virtually all the biblical texts interpreted by Burnet 
are interpreted literally. With regard to St Peter’s Epistle and the above passages of the Psalms and 
Proverbs, Burnet is keen to emphasise that he is giving a literal interpretation of passages which 
previously did not seem to allow such an interpretation.175 Indeed, in the case of St Peter, the obscurity 
of the text and the fact that it seems to relate things which are contrary to common beliefs had led 
certain Church Fathers to doubt its authenticity.176 These texts had been interpreted non-literally, or 
in the case of St Peter its authenticity doubted, because we lacked a philosophical theory of the earth 
that could make sense of them. It was a significant virtue of the theory, then, that it enabled us to give 
a literal gloss to these passages. 
The second point is the notion that there are hidden philosophical truths in Scripture. These 
passages, Burnet believes, are designed to teach us something new about the world. He admits that 
they are obscure and capable of various interpretations but argues that this obscurity enhances rather 
than diminishes their evidentiary value. Where biblical texts appear unusual and contrary to common 
notions, he argues, this is a sign that they are intended to teach us something novel, for there can be 
no other reason for this contrariety. He illustrates this point with the example of heliocentrism. If there 
are several passage of Scripture, he argues, which refer to the motion of the sun, and just one that 
refers to the motion of the earth, the latter should be considered of greater evidentiary weight than 
the former, since the former are clearly not meant to teach us anything new about the world but 
merely to cohere with common beliefs, whereas the latter is evidently designed to teach us something 
novel.177 Thus, 
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what might otherwise be made an exception to some of these Texts alledg'd by us, viz. that they are 
too obscure, becomes an argument for us: as implying that there is something more intended by them, 
than the present and known form of the Earth. And we having propos'd another form and structure of 
the Earth, to which those characters suit and answer more easily, as this opens and gives light to those 
difficult places, so it may be reasonably concluded to be the very sence and notion intended by the holy 
Writers.178 
This was an interesting move. By introducing this criterion for distinguishing between passages of 
Scripture that contain philosophical truths and those that do not, Burnet was able, firstly, to elevate 
the evidentiary status of those passages that he believed supported his theory, and secondly, to 
discount passages which seemed to contradict it. Passages – like the Mosaic history of the Creation – 
which describe the earth in its present form before the Deluge and which therefore appear prima facie 
to constitute evidence against the theory do not in fact constitute such evidence. They are not 
designed to teach us anything about the physical world and therefore speak in terms of common 
beliefs. Expressions in Scripture which are contrary to common opinion, on the other hand, “are more 
remarkable and more proving; in that there is nothing could give occasion to such, but an intention to 
express the very truth”.179 
What also emerges from the above analysis is that these texts for Burnet do much more than 
straightforwardly confirm his theory in the sense of providing textual evidence that supports it. The 
ability of the theory to elucidate these obscure texts made it a powerful hermeneutical tool. It could 
provide a coherent explanation of several apparently disparate texts whose true meaning was 
impossible to uncover without it. For Burnet, this explanatory power that the theory possessed with 
regard to biblical exegesis was compelling evidence that it was correct. Here the confirming instances 
which he finds in St Peter, the Psalms, Proverbs, and other passages of Scripture function essentially 
as novel empirical successes. In modern times, we ordinarily think of such successes in terms of 
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explanations and predictions of physical phenomena. In Burnet’s time, however, texts played an 
important role in natural philosophy, and a philosophical theory’s ability to elucidate textual 
phenomena was viewed as just as compelling confirmation as its ability to explain and predict physical 
phenomena. Burnet’s theory was derived primarily from reason. The above passages to which he 
applied it were not used in its construction. Yet it could give a unifying explanation of them. And it 
could do so without needing to be modified in any way. Though its empirical successes pertain to 
textual rather than physical phenomena, then, the logical form of these confirming instances is 
essentially the same as those more commonly associated with the notion of novel empirical success.180 
Turning now to the use of Scripture in the Theory’s second volume, it should be noted in the 
first place that Burnet draws here on a much wider array of texts and refers to them much more 
extensively than he does in the first volume. As one would expect in an apocalyptic treatise, the 
volume abounds with references to the Book of Revelation and the Book of Daniel.181 It also contains 
several references to Job, various Psalms, Isaiah, Malachi, the Gospels of Matthew, Luke, and John, 
Acts, Romans, Corinthians, Thessalonians, Hebrews, and a number of other texts.182 The use of these 
texts in Burnet’s account of the Apocalypse is highly complex, and a detailed exposition of it would 
take up far more space than I have here. I shall limit my discussion for the most part, then, to the 
central text in this volume of the Theory, that is, St Peter’s Second Epistle.183 
In this volume, St Peter plays a much more foundational role than in the first. Here again 
Burnet is very explicit about this role. He states upfront in the preface to book three “that, in following 
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S. Peter's Philosophy, I suppose, that the burning of the Earth will be a true Liquefaction or dissolution 
of it, as to the exteriour Region. And that this lays a foundation for New Heavens and a New Earth”. 
He refers in his account of the burning of the earth to “S. Peter, who is our chief Guide in the doctrine 
of the Conflagration” and in his theory of the formation of the new earth to “S. Peter, whose doctrine 
we have… followed”.184 The role of St Peter in this volume, then, is essentially very similar to that of 
Moses in the first. The dissolution of the earth at the Conflagration and the subsequent formation of 
a new heavens and earth and Millennium according to St Peter are, like the core aspects of the Deluge 
according to Moses in the first volume, taken essentially as axiomatic. And the purpose of this volume 
is analogous to that of the first in that Burnet wants to provide a philosophical theory of the burning 
and renovation of the earth in order to make St Peter’s account of these events intelligible. Other 
texts, as I have noted, are discussed at length, but their role is predominantly to confirm and embellish 
Burnet’s view of the events and the Petrine writings on which it is based. 
There are essentially three main components of Burnet’s theory of the Conflagration and 
Millennium that are drawn primarily from St Peter. The first is the cause of the Conflagration. This 
cause, like that posited by St Peter for the Deluge, is not the immediate cause of the event but its 
more fundamental cause. And again, like the cause of the Deluge, this cause is the earth’s constitution. 
This Burnet had already noted in the first volume, and he repeats his argument in the second. As 
Burnet interprets him, St Peter, having stated that the antediluvian earth was destroyed as a result of 
its constitution, describes next the different constitution of the present earth and the different fate to 
which this constitution disposes it. “But the heavens and the earth, which are now”, the Apostle 
writes, “are kept in store, reserved unto fire”. This Burnet interprets as communicating that the 
present heavens and earth have a “fiery” constitution. They are disposed to destruction by fire. And 
it is in virtue of this different constitution and disposition that they will be destroyed at the 
Conflagration. This analysis of St Peter is central to Burnet’s account of the Conflagration. It is the 
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present heavens and earth’s constitution, in contradistinction to that of the antediluvian heavens and 
earth, that is the ultimate cause of the Conflagration. This text, then, provides a foundation for 
Burnet’s inquiry into its immediate causes, which are to be found in his view not in such things as the 
central fire or the proximity of the earth to the sun but in the various geological and meteorological 
phenomena which answer to St Peter’s description of the present earth’s more general constitution.185 
The second core tenet of Burnet’s theory of the Conflagration which is grounded in St Peter is 
its extent. There are two key points here, both of which are drawn primarily from St Peter. The first 
pertains to the bounds of the Conflagration. By comparing the destruction of the earth at the 
Conflagration with that at the Deluge, Burnet argues, St Peter sets the same bounds for both events. 
And since the earth at the Deluge was destroyed from the top of the atmosphere to the bottom of the 
ocean, this too will be the bounds of the Conflagration.186 The second point concerns the extent of the 
destruction. St Peter states that “the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements 
shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up”. He says 
also that “all these things shall be dissolved”. This implies for Burnet a total dissolution rather than 
superficial burning of the heavens and earth.187 This was evident also in Revelation 15.2 where St John 
refers to the burning of the earth as a “Sea of Glass, mingled with Fire” and several other prophecies 
in which we hear of “Lakes of fire and brimstone, a molten Sea mingled with fire, the Liquefaction of 
Mountains, and of the Earth it self”, clearly indicating that the earth will be dissolved rather than 
superficially burned. Here again, Burnet’s literalism comes to the fore. Such “terms of Liquefaction 
and Dissolution cannot”, he emphasises, “without violence, be restrained to simple devastation and 
superficial scorching. Such expressions carry the work a great deal further”.188 His theory could make 
such a dissolution intelligible, thereby vindicating the literal sense of the prophecies. “We need not 
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now look upon these things as Hyperbolical and Poetical strains”, he affirms, “but as barefac'd 
Prophecies, and things that will literally come to pass as they are predicted”.189 
In addition to the above passages, St Peter says in his Epistle that a new earth will follow the 
destruction of the present earth. In his sermon to the Jews in Acts 3.21, moreover, he alludes to the 
return of Christ at the “restitution of all things”, which indicates that the new earth will form out of 
the remains of the present earth. This new earth is “wherein dwelleth righteousness”. This, too, 
implied a total dissolution of the present earth, for if the earth is to be merely superficially burned 
rather than completely dissolved, it will not provide a foundation from which a new earth may form, 
much less one that can provide suitable habitation for the righteous.190 Another important point about 
the extent of the Conflagration that was entailed by the formation of a new earth was that only the 
form and not the matter of the earth will be destroyed, for a new earth cannot form if the matter is 
annihilated.191 This also ruled out Glanvill’s theory of the central fire breaking out, since the earth’s 
core must remain intact if it is to provide a foundation for a new earth.192 That a new earth will form 
from the present earth following the Conflagration and that only the form and not the matter will be 
destroyed was corroborated by various other texts. Matthew 19.28, for example, speaks of a 
“Regeneration or Reviviscency” which is to occur before the reign of Christ on earth.193 St Paul in 
Corinthians 1.7.31 states that “[t]he figure of this World passes away”, that is to say, “the form, fashion 
and disposition of its parts” are destroyed “but the substance still remains”.194 
The third Petrine element of Burnet’s second volume pertains to the question of who will 
inhabit the new earth. It is important to note here that at this point in the Theory philosophy ceases 
to be Burnet’s principal source of evidence, for where philosophy can be employed in explicating the 
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formation of the new earth, it cannot in his estimation determine anything about its inhabitants. This 
must be done using Scripture – aided to an extent by the writings of Church Fathers. Burnet’s final ode 
to philosophy is worth quoting, for it underscores the extent to which he viewed the Theory up to this 
point in the fourth book as primarily a philosophical work and only secondarily a work of scriptural 
exegesis. It also reveals the regret with which he is forced to acknowledge philosophy’s limitations. 
“Farewel then, dear Friend”, he writes, 
I must take another Guide: and leave you here, as Moses upon Mount Pisgah, only to look into that 
Land, which you cannot enter. I acknowledge the good service you have done, and what a faithful 
Companion you have been, in a long journey; from the beginning of the World to this hour, in a tract of 
time of six thousand years. We have travel'd together through the dark regions of a First and Second 
Chaos: seen the World twice shipwrackt. Neither Water, nor Fire, could separate us. But now you must 
give place to other Guides.195 
As to who will inhabit the new earth, here too “St. Peter answers this question for us”. He 
speaks, as we have seen, in the Second Epistle of a “new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth 
righteousness”.196 He talks also in the First Epistle, chapter 2.9 of “a chosen generation, a royal 
priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people”.197 This indicates to Burnet that only a select class of 
just and pious individuals are to inhabit the new earth. That St Peter refers here specifically to the 
martyred saints is confirmed by other texts. In Revelation 20.4, St John relates that he “saw the Souls 
of them… that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the Word of God… and They lived and 
reigned with Christ a thousand years” and in 20.9 describes Gog and Magog besieging “the Camp of 
the Saints, and the beloved City”.198 That the Millennium and Kingdom of Christ are to occur on the 
new earth rather than the present was clear from the above verse of St Peter’s Second Epistle. This 
too was corroborated by the book of Revelation, for here in 21.1 St John says that he “saw a new 
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heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth were passed away”, taking notice also 
of one of the central features of the new earth according to the theory: that “there was no more 
Sea”.199 It was evident also from Revelation 21.3-4 and from Isaiah 65.17-18 that the resurrected saints 
are to enjoy superior health and longevity, things which are impossible on the present earth but 
inevitable on the new earth, it once again being perfectly balanced and its axis perpendicular to the 
ecliptic as it was in the beginning.200 
2.5. Antiquity 
Burnet’s use of ancient texts in the Theory is essentially very similar to his use of Scripture. This 
similarity, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, was quite typical of seventeenth-century 
thinkers, by whom Scripture was treated in ultimately the same way as any other ancient source, its 
distinguishing feature being its greater degree of reliability rather than any difference of kind. This 
difference in degree of reliability, however, is clearly important to Burnet. And his rule of not appealing 
to the ancients unless they are corroborated by reason and Scripture is adhered to throughout the 
work. A result of the ancients’ inferior reliability and their consequent tertiary evidentiary status in 
the Theory is that non-sacred writers do not play the kinds of foundational role given to Moses in the 
first volume and St Peter in the second. Their role is wholly confirmatory.  
The authors to whom Burnet refers collectively in the Theory as “the ancients” actually applies 
to two very distinct sets of writers. The first is the Church Fathers and other early Christian and Jewish 
writers. The second is the ancient pagan philosophers, theologians, historians, and poets. Burnet’s 
most extensive appeals to Judeo-Christian authors appear in his discussion of Paradise and in his 
history of the doctrine of the Millennium, which we have discussed in the previous chapter. He makes 
much more extensive use of pagan authors. We have seen in the previous chapter how he appeals to 
various pagan flood myths in arguing for the universality of the Deluge and as evidence of its cause. 
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Also supported by pagan antiquity was Burnet’s account of the antediluvian earth. The ancients, he 
notes, in their various descriptions of the Elysian Fields, Fortunate Islands, Gardens of Hesperides, and 
other paradisiacal worlds, consistently describe two key features of the antediluvian earth according 
to his theory: (1) a lack of seasonal variation; and (2) greater health and longevity of humans. This in 
Burnet’s view indicated two things: (a) that the antediluvian earth’s axis was at a right angle to the 
ecliptic; and (b) that there was a causal connection between the position of the earth’s axis and 
consequent lack of seasonal variation on the one hand and the longevity of humans on the other.201 
Another central feature of the antediluvian earth that was supported by the ancients was the 
generation of animals from the soil,  this having been taught by Epicurus, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, 
and other more ancient cultures such as the Phoenicians and Egyptians.202 Also important, and this as 
we shall see in later chapters would become a significant bone of contention between Burnet and his 
critics, was that several ancient philosophers taught of the earth’s axis having shifted at some point in 
the past, which was further evidence of its former perpendicularity and alteration at the Deluge.203 
The foregoing notions straightforwardly corroborated the theory in that they were doctrines 
taught by the ancients which cohered with it. Burnet’s treatment of other ancient doctrines, however, 
is analogous to much of the confirmatory evidence he finds in Scripture. Like the above cases of St 
Peter and the Psalms and Proverbs, he sees his theory as being able to explain various obscure 
doctrines. And as in the case of those biblical passages, he views these explanations essentially as 
novel empirical successes and therefore as powerful confirming evidence for the theory. One such 
case was the strange but highly prevalent belief among the ancients that the torrid zone was 
uninhabitable and unpassable, a closely related and equally widespread doctrine being the ancients’ 
notion of the southern hemisphere which they called “Antichthon”, or “Opposite Earth”, or “Other 
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World”, believing it to be inaccessible.204 Without the theory, these notions lacked grounds, for the 
obliquity of the earth’s axis entails that even the hottest regions have varying seasons and so the 
equatorial region is both habitable and passable and the southern hemisphere accessible. These things 
were, however, true of the primitive earth according to the theory, since its axis was perpendicular to 
the ecliptic and the sun shone perpetually on the equator. These notions could therefore be easily 
explained. They were simply derived from that time and continued to be believed after the Deluge 
when the original grounds for them had been removed until eventually being corrected by observation 
and experience. So although erroneous when applied to the present earth, these notions of the 
ancients concerning the torrid zone and southern hemisphere were, firstly, true of the primitive earth, 
and secondly, not without grounds.205 
Another example was the ancients’ obscure characterisations of the chaos. Rather than 
describing it in terms of natural principles, they used moral terms. They spoke on the one hand of 
strife, discord, hatred, and disaffection, and on the other of love, friendship, kindness, and union, 
claiming that in the beginning the former prevailed before the latter gained the upper hand and united 
the chaos into a habitable world. Or they described the formation of the earth in genealogical terms, 
of the chaos being the parent of all things, giving birth to “Nox” or “Night” and “Oceanus” or 
“Tartarus”; of Night giving birth to ether and the earth; and of the earth under the influence of the 
ether conceiving and bringing forth life.206 Such accounts appeared prima facie to be “Poetical 
fiction[s] rather than Philosophy”, yet when considered in light of the theory, they become intelligible 
accounts of the formation of the earth and of life. The notions of strife, discord, etc. refer simply to 
the disorder of the elements before the division of the chaos, whereas love, harmony, and so on 
pertain to the rising of the oily parts of the liquid and the union of the particles on its surface.207 Nox 
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and Oceanus refer to the initial two regions of the chaos: the dark, impure air and the body of liquid. 
The former separated into the earth below and ether above, and the earth being impregnated by the 
seminal principle in the ether conceived and generated animals.208 
One further puzzling doctrine of the ancients which I have noted in my discussion of Burnet’s 
Cartesianism was the peculiar “doctrine of the mundane egg”. This, Burnet observes, “seems to be a 
mean comparison, the World and an Egg, what proportion, or what resemblance betwixt these two 
things? And yet I do not know Symbolical doctrine or conclusion that hath been so universally 
entertain’d by the Mystae, or Wise and Learned of all Nations”.209 This obscure doctrine, however, 
was easily accounted for by his model of the primitive earth, for the primitive earth according to the 
theory was oval, its circumference slightly extended at the poles. It was composed of concentric orbs: 
a fire at the centre surrounded by a solid membrane resembling the yolk of an egg; an abyss of water 
resembling the white; and a solid crust resembling the shell. To this apparently obscure notion, then, 
the theory “gives a solution so easie and natural, and shows an aptness and elegancy in the 
representation, that one cannot doubt upon a view, and compare of circumstances, but that we have 
truly found out the Riddle of the Mundane Egg”.210 
It is clear from the above examples that Burnet not only thinks the application of his theory as 
a hermeneutical tool in these cases provides confirmation of the theory itself but also that it vindicates 
ancient learning. The ancients’ belief in the uninhabitability of the torrid zone and inaccessibility of 
the southern hemisphere was not without grounds. They understood the separation of the chaos. 
They knew about the structure of the primitive earth. Crucially, Burnet believed his theory to have 
uncovered important truths about the formation and early history of the earth. It could therefore be 
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used to assess the ancients’ knowledge of nature. As he surmised at the beginning of the chapter 
dedicated to the above doctrines, 
[w]e have drawn this Theory chiefly to give an account of the Universal Deluge, and of Paradise; but as 
when one lights a Candle to look for one or two things which they want, the light will not confine it self 
to those two objects, but shows all the other in the room; so, methinks, we have unexpectedly cast a 
light upon all Antiquity, in seeking after these two things, or in retrieving the Notion and Doctrine of 
the Primaeval Earth, upon which they depended. For in ancient Learning there are many Discourses, 
and many Conclusions deliver'd to us, that are so obscure and confus'd, and so remote from the present 
state of things, that one cannot well distinguish, whether they are fictions or realities: and there is no 
way to distinguish with certainty, but by a clear Theory upon the same subjects; which showing us the 
truth directly, and independently upon them, shows us also by reflection, how far they are true or false, 
and in what sence they are to be interpreted and understood. And the present Theory being of great 
extent, we shall find it serviceable in many things, for the illustration of such dubious and obscure 
doctrines in Antiquity.211 
In subjecting the ancients to this test, he could show that, notwithstanding the apparent obscurity of 
their doctrines, the ancients possessed a superior knowledge of the natural world. 
This of course was exactly analogous to the hidden philosophical truths which Burnet held 
were present in Scripture and which he believed his theory to have uncovered. Again we see an 
instance of Scripture and other ancient writings being treated in essentially the same way. This notion 
of prisca sapientia, the view that the ancients possessed superior wisdom and that there is hidden 
philosophical knowledge in ancient texts, was widespread in the seventeenth century, its most famous 
adherent being Isaac Newton. As Magruder argues, Burnet most likely imbibed this notion from More 
and Cudworth, with whose efforts to uncover the prisca sapientia in both Scripture and other ancient 
sources he was undoubtedly familiar.212 His view of the ultimate source of the ancients’ superior 
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wisdom, however, is quite different from that of More and Cudworth in that where they trace the 
ancients’ knowledge back to Moses, Burnet, like Newton, believes it can be traced back further, that 
is, to Noah.213 This view he discusses at some length in 1692 in a chapter of the first book of the 
Archaeologiae on “the Origin of the Barbaric Philosophy”, but it is already present in the Theory in his 
discussion of the ancients’ views on the Conflagration.214 Here, as we saw in the previous chapter, he 
conducts a survey of the doctrine of the Conflagration among various sects of ancient philosophers. 
The doctrine’s main proponents among the ancient pagans, he observes, were the Stoics. They, like 
other Greeks, had evidently taken the notion from one of the more ancient eastern cultures who had 
taught it. In the case of the Stoics, this was most likely the Phoenicians, since Zeno, the founder of the 
Stoics, was of Phoenician descent. And the Phoenicians and other ancient cultures likely derived the 
doctrine from Noah, who possessed a secret philosophy of nature which he passed down to his 
progeny.215 As with the above passages of Scripture, Burnet’s notion of prisca sapientia and the ability 
he believes his theory to possess in uncovering it serves to elevate the evidentiary status of ancient 
pagan sources. What emerges here for Burnet is essentially a kind of virtuous circle. In elucidating the 
obscure writings of the ancients, the evidence confirms the theory and the theory confirms the 
evidence. The evidence thus becomes more powerful evidence for the theory, and so on. 
2.6. Conclusion 
These, then, are what the three bases of Burnet’s theory – reason, Scripture, and antiquity – 
essentially consisted in and the roles they played in his history of the earth. One of the principal 
aspects of the theory that comes under the head of reason, as is well known, was the Cartesian 
cosmogony, and as I have argued, the physical details of Burnet’s theory of the Creation and Deluge 
                                                          
213 For discussion of More’s, Cudworths, Burnet’s, and Newton’s views of the source of ancient learning, see 
Gascoigne (1991). 
214 Burnet (1736b [1692]), 237-46. 
215 Burnet (1690c), 13-24. For discussion of Burnet’s view of Noah as the as the source of ancient learning, see 
Rossi (1984), 38-9. 
134 
 
correspond closely with this cosmogony, more closely even than historians have suggested. There are 
important foundational points on which Burnet diverges from Descartes, however, such as the scope 
of the theory, its empirical basis, and its substantial use of final cause theorising. It is also important 
that Burnet’s account of the Conflagration owes little to Descartes. This, rather, is guided principally 
by St Peter, who directs Burnet to the constitution of the earth, and specifically to those features of 
the present earth which distinguish it from the antediluvian. The second core foundation of the theory 
that comes under the head of reason is Burnet’s rational theology, which derives ultimately from the 
Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians. It is this rational theology, I have argued, and not Burnet’s 
Cartesianism as many have suggested, that underpins his commitment to natural over extraordinary 
providence and also his closely-related commitment to angelic over direct providence. As to Scripture, 
the most important thing to note here is that Burnet’s interpretation of the texts, apart from his brief 
remark about the six-day Creation, is literal, and as we have seen, this literalism is extended to texts 
which had previously been interpreted hyperbolically or poetically, and the ability to vindicate the 
literal sense of these texts is seen as a significant virtue of the theory. This literalism of Burnet’s has 
not been adequately appreciated in the literature. This, as I have argued, is essentially because the 
aforementioned brief remark on the six-day Creation and his later extensive elaboration on it 
attracted so much attention. I shall trace this elaboration and its origins in the next chapter. There we 
shall see also how Burnet’s use of antiquity, which played a limited but important role in the theory, 








3. A prologue to a controversy: Croft, Warren, and the Archaeologiae 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Though it was to become the subject of intense controversy during the 1690s, the Theory was 
generally well received in the decade of its publication. Isaac Newton read the work in manuscript and 
was largely sympathetic. “Of our present sea, rocks, mountains &c”, he wrote to Burnet in 1680/1, “I 
think you have given the most plausible account”. 1  The book was “discoursed of and well approved 
of” by the Fellows of the Royal Society in 1681.2 King Charles II was impressed and encouraged Burnet 
to produce an English edition, a request to which Burnet obliged, translating the book himself and 
dedicating the new edition to the King in 1684.3 That same year, John Evelyn wrote to Samuel Pepys 
informing him that he had read the Latin edition “with greate delight” and found the English version 
“still new, still surprizing, and the whole hypothesis so ingenious and so rational, that I both admire 
and believe it at once”.4 
Notwithstanding this general approval, the Theory in the 1680s was not without its critics. 
While praising Burnet and the Theory in his letter to Pepys, Evelyn noted disapprovingly that “some 
peevish and odd men” believed the work to “derogate from the Holy Scriptures”.5 Newton, who had 
praised much of the work, nevertheless expressed misgivings about its implications for Scripture. “[I]n 
ye third day for Moses to describe ye creation of seas when there was no such thing done neither in 
reality nor in appearance”, he wrote to Burnet, “is something hard”.6 Newton’s friend John Locke, 
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when asked his opinion of the work in 1686 by the political theorist and historian James Tyrrell, noted 
several issues which he believed rendered the Theory irreconcilable with either “philosophy, scripture, 
or itself”. 7 An apparent internal inconsistency was that Burnet seemed to make the earth spherical in 
the first volume and spheroidal in the second without any argument or explanation.8 Following 
Newton, he took issue with there being no sea on the antediluvian earth, for if this was the case there 
would be no place for the whales mentioned in Genesis 1.9 Another problem was the abundance of 
land in the torrid zone, which would surely not be the case if the crust had broken at the equator. 
Indeed, if had it broken at all, it would appear that it did so in precisely the opposite direction.10 “I 
imagine”, he wrote in conclusion, “that if I should trouble you with my fancies, I could give you an 
hypothesis would explain the deluge without half the difficulties, which seem to me to cumber this”.11 
By this time, more sustained attacks on the Theory had begun to appear. The first was the 
Leipzig pastor Christian Wagner’s Animadversiones in T. Burnetii telluris theoriam sacram, a sixty-four-
page pamphlet published in 1683 in which Wagner took issue with the Theory’s incompatibility with 
Scripture.12 A similar set of objections was composed the following year by the politician and FRS Sir 
Robert Southwell in his “C & S Discourse of Mr Burnetts Theory of the earth”, a dialogue which 
remained unpublished at the time but is now available together with insightful scholarly analysis 
thanks to the efforts of William Poole.13 The first published, book-length attack on the Theory came in 
1685 from Herbert Croft, the Bishop of Hereford. The second arrived five years later from Erasmus 
Warren, the Rector of Worlington in Suffolk. Croft’s Animadversions upon a book intituled, the theory 
of the earth and Warren’s Geologia, or, a discourse concerning the earth before the deluge were 
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essentially similar to Wagner’s Animadversiones and Southwell’s “Discourse” in that their authors’ 
principal concern was the Theory’s incompatibility with Scripture. Croft’s main issue, as we shall see, 
was with those passages which Burnet had adduced as evidence for his theory and which Croft 
believed he had misinterpreted. Warren’s, on the other hand, was with certain passages that Burnet 
had not discussed, and which Warren believed contradicted his theory. 
Burnet replied to both critics, though only explicitly to Warren. Burnet’s reply to Warren 
elicited a further rejoinder and so ensued what would become a hostile exchange of pamphlets. 
Shortly after this, Burnet published his controversial Archaeologiae philosophicae, thus beginning the 
“Burnet controversy” of the 1690s. The controversy will be examined in the next chapter. Here I shall 
discuss this earlier phase in the public life of the Theory, looking in detail at Croft’s and Warren’s 
objections, Burnet’s replies, and the Archaeologiae, and considering the relationship between this 
latter work and these earlier debates between Burnet and Croft and Warren. The chapter consists of 
three main sections. The first focusses on Croft’s Animadversions and Burnet’s Review of the theory of 
the earth, a fifty-two-page essay appended to the English edition of the Theory’s second volume 
which, I shall argue, was evidently a surreptitious reply to Croft. The second section examines 
Warren’s Geologia and the series of objections and replies that followed in the first three years of the 
1690s. The third and final section explores the Archaeologiae and the relationship between this work 
and these earlier debates. 
3.2. Some Animadversions and a Review 
Croft’s Animadversions has attracted little attention from historians. Though often discussed cursorily 
in work on Burnet’s theory, no one has yet examined it in any depth.14 This may be due in part to 
Marjorie Nicolson’s dismissive assessment of the work in her hugely influential study of Burnet and 
                                                          
14 Brief discussions of Croft’s attack on Burnet appear in Macklem (1958), 27-8; Nicolson (1959), 237, 259; Porter 
(1977), 24, 84; Hunter (1981), 174; Mandelbrote (1994), 153, 157; Rappaport (1997), 143, 148; Poole (2008), 73, 
80; (2010), 46, 59, 62-3; Gaukroger (2010), 36n, 55; Levitin (2015), 183n. 
138 
 
his critics. “There is nothing original in the general argument”, she writes of Croft’s work, “the 
orthodox churchman opposed to Burnet’s liberal science his own belief in miracle and disputed 
Burnet’s learning by insisting on a more literal interpretation of Genesis”.15 She also claims that “[s]o 
far as published record shows, Burnet paid no attention to an answer of Herbert Croft, Bishop of 
Hereford, and issued no reply to any other early [i.e., earlier than Warren’s Geologia] document in 
which his theory may have been challenged”.16  
Neither of these statements is quite right, however. Firstly, Croft was no orthodox churchman. 
Indeed, one recent historian has described him as a decidedly “unorthodox cleric”.17 Most notably, he 
had caused significant controversy during the previous decade with his 1675 pamphlet The naked 
truth, or, the true state of the primitive church. The naked truth was a plea for “comprehension”, that 
is, a broadening of the church to include nonconforming Protestants. In it, Croft had argued that the 
established Church should make certain concessions in order to accommodate dissenters.18 The 
pamphlet was praised by nonconformists and attacked by high churchmen and moderates, even 
Latitudinarians like Gilbert Burnet who, while in favour of comprehension, felt that the concessions 
proposed by Croft were too contrary to Anglican beliefs.19 Secondly, as I will argue below, while it is 
true that Croft insisted on a more literal reading of some chapters of Genesis, this is not the case with 
all chapters. On the chapters dealing with the Deluge, it is arguably Burnet rather than Croft who 
wants to maintain the more literal interpretation. Certainly this was how Burnet saw things. Genesis, 
moreover, is not Croft’s primary concern. His main focus rather is on those other texts that Burnet had 
appealed to in support of his theory. And in the case of these texts, it is very clearly Burnet and not 
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Croft who is the literalist. Thirdly, and this will also be discussed below, there is good reason, on the 
basis of published record, to believe that Burnet did pay attention to Croft’s objections. 
Croft’s main emphasis in the Animadversions was on Burnet’s interpretation of St Peter.20 
There were essentially four main problems which Croft pinpointed. The first two derived in his view 
from Burnet having paid inadequate attention to the other chapters of the Epistle. The first 
consequence of this was his failure to take note of a passage from the previous chapter which in Croft’s 
view indicated that St Peter refers only the animate world, for here in verse 5 he describes God 
“bringing in the flood upon the world of the ungodly”, “of the ungodly” indicating that he does not 
mean to refer to the physical world but merely to life on it, and in particular those “ungodly men” to 
whom he refers elsewhere in the Epistle.21 The second consequence was a more fundamental 
misunderstanding of the text as a whole. When viewed within the context of the Epistle, it was clear 
that the passages Burnet had cited are not designed to teach us about any difference between the 
antediluvian and present earth or of the earth’s destruction at the Deluge but about the dangers of 
sin. This is why St Peter refers to several other instances of God punishing the wicked. By taking the 
chapter out of context, Burnet had interpreted St Peter as being concerned solely with the Deluge and 
Conflagration. This had led him to misunderstand the basis of St Peter’s argument, which was not 
derived from the scoffers’ claim about the immutability of nature, but from the word of God. The 
Apostle was teaching the scoffers to heed God’s word, for as with those other punishments, God’s 
word had been fulfilled at the Deluge and would be fulfilled at the Conflagration. The commonality 
between the two judgements was not the destruction of the earth but that both resulted from the 
word of God. And the opposition St Peter makes between them is not meant to convey any difference 
between the two worlds but between the two judgements, the one being a Deluge and the other the 
burning of the earth.22 
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The third issue Croft raised with Burnet’s interpretation concerned his retranslation of the 
passage from verse 5. More virulently anti-Catholic than Burnet, Croft naturally took issue with 
Burnet’s use of the Vulgate, retranslating the passage himself from the Greek Septuagint as “situated 
out of the Water and by the Water”, which, he argued, clearly shows that the earth before the Deluge 
was of the same form as the present earth.23 The final issue pertained to the Scoffers’ ignorance. The 
scoffers in chapter 3 verse 5, Croft pointed out, were willingly ignorant. Burnet had argued that they 
were ignorant of the physical earth being destroyed at the Deluge. Yet this cannot have been what 
they were ignorant of, for if they were ignorant of this, they cannot be said to have been willingly 
ignorant, for this had not been taught. What they were ignorant of was the Deluge itself. Moses had 
taught of the Deluge, so of this they may be said to have been willingly ignorant. They were willingly 
ignorant because they had not paid due attention to the Old Testament.24 
Croft’s overall contention was that Burnet had misinterpreted these passages of Scripture, 
and probably deliberately so, in order to manufacture evidence for his theory and to give what was 
essentially an atheistic or deistic account of earth history some semblance of being grounded in 
Scripture.25  He had done the same with other passages. In the case of Psalms 24.2 and 136.6, for 
example, in which God is said to have “founded it [the earth] upon the seas, and established it upon 
the floods” and “stretched out the earth above the waters” and which Burnet had presented as 
evidence for his account of the formation of the crust on the abyss, he had simply exploited certain 
translational ambiguities, for in these passages “upon” and “above” can equally be translated as “by” 
or “near”. Even on the former translation, they were more plausibly interpreted as figurative or 
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hyperbolic expressions designed to express wonder at God having created land above sea level, or 
they may simply refer to underground caverns of water.26 
 Though Croft’s main concern was with Burnet’s interpretation of St Peter, he is also keen to 
emphasise the theory’s incompatibility with Genesis 1. This text was straightforwardly contradicted 
by the theory. Moses teaches in chapter 1.9-10 that the earth in the beginning was covered with water 
and that God gathered it up, making dry land appear, and called the land “Earth” and the water “Seas”. 
Yet on Burnet’s view, there was only dry land in the beginning, and no sea until after the Deluge.27 In 
1.11-12, the earth is complete and fully populated with plant life by the end of the third day of 
Creation, yet Burnet described a gradual separation of the chaos, which would surely take much 
longer.28  Even if the earth had formed within three days, there were further difficulties. In chapter 
1.20-1, God creates “great whales” and other marine life. Yet it seemed highly implausible that such 
creatures could live in his enclosed sea. Birds, too, are said in 1.20 to have been brought forth by the 
sea, which is surely impossible if it was wholly contained within the crust. There was also the Creation 
in 1.16 of the sun, moon, and stars which Burnet had ignored altogether.29 
 Turning now to the Deluge, Nicolson is certainly correct to say that Croft ultimately defends a 
miraculous interpretation of the event. God in the beginning, he emphasised, created everything from 
nothing. He could therefore create water for the Deluge. It is not clear, however, that in interpreting 
the Deluge in this way Croft is thereby insisting on a more literal interpretation of Genesis as Nicolson 
seems to suggest. As we shall see below, Burnet certainly believed his interpretation of the Deluge to 
be more in keeping with the literal sense of Genesis than Croft’s miraculous interpretation. 
Furthermore, the motivation behind Croft’s attack on Burnet’s account of the Deluge was not so much 
scriptural as theological. That is, his primary concern was not whether Burnet’s explanation cohered 
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with the literal sense of Genesis but with the fact that he insisted on explaining it in terms of natural 
processes. What troubled Croft was not that Burnet had strayed from the literal sense of Moses, but 
that he seemed to rule out the possibility of miraculous intervention. Which interpretation of the 
Deluge was more consistent with a literal reading of Genesis was not his main concern.30 
 I turn now to Nicolson’s claim that Burnet “paid no attention to” Croft’s objections. It is true 
that Burnet did not respond explicitly to Croft as he did with Warren. There is, however, significant 
evidence to suggest that he paid close attention to Croft’s attack and that his Review of the theory of 
the earth was essentially intended as a reply to Croft. There are three important things to consider 
here. The first is that Croft relates at the end of the preface to the Animadversions that he had written 
to Walter Kettilby, Burnet’s publisher, “to enquire what kind of Person the Author [of the Theory] 
was”. Kettibly had then informed Burnet of this, and Burnet had written a letter to Croft, to which 
Croft replied, thereby initiating “some correspondency with him in Letters” in which he attempted to 
“reclaim him from his Errours” but, finding him “so stiff and pertinacious in them…, was soon out of 
all hopes to do any good”.31 Burnet, then, even if he did not read the Animadversions, certainly knew 
Croft’s objections to his theory and had discussed them with him. 
The second thing to consider is that, when responding to Warren’s attack in 1690, after 
rebuking Warren for unfairly describing the theory as an “affront to Scripture”, Burnet notes 
nevertheless that “he is a very Saint in comparison of another Animadverter, who hath writ upon the 
same subject, but neither like a Gentleman: nor like a Christian: nor like a Scholar”.32 Here already it 
is likely that he is referring to Croft, since Croft’s book was the only major attack on the theory to have 
been published in England prior to Warren’s. In his response to Burnet, Warren writes that he knows 
not “[w]ho that Animadverter is, of whom he [Burnet] complains... I have seen no other Writings or 
Animadversions upon the Subject he speaks of, but the Lord Bishop of Hereford's. And I own that his 
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Lordships publishing his Animadversions, was good encouragement to me to Print my Exceptions at 
first, and to Defend them now”.33 By this time, as we shall see in more detail in the next section, the 
debate had become increasingly hostile, and in his next reply, immediately after having referred to 
Croft, Burnet writes that he “was so civil to him [Warren] in the Answer [his previous response to 
Warren], as to make him a Saint in comparison of that former Animadverter: but, by the style and 
spirit of this last Pamphlet, he hath forfeited with me all his saintship, both absolute and 
comparative”.34 That he refers to “that former Animadverter” immediately after discussing Croft 
seems to indicate that the “Animadverter” to whom he refers is Croft, and therefore that he refers to 
Croft in his previous reply to Warren, too. If this is correct, then given that he describes this 
“Animadverter’s” writing in his initial reply to Warren, it seems highly likely that he had at this point 
read not only Croft’s letters but also the Animadversions. 
My third point is the most important and is ultimately the subject of the remainder of this 
section. This is that the content of Burnet’s Review is such that, even in the absence of the above 
connections between Burnet and Croft, we could reliably infer that it was intended as a response to 
the Animadversions. That Burnet did not present it explicitly as such as he did with his replies to 
Warren is easily explained. Warren was a provincial rector. Attacking him in public therefore would 
not present any threat to Burnet’s career. Croft, on the other hand, was a Bishop, and one who was 
known to have considerable political influence.35 An explicit response to the Animadversions would 
hence have been unwise from someone like Burnet who was trying to progress in his ecclesiastical 
career. 
The full title of the Review is A review of the theory of the earth and of its proofs, especially in 
reference to Scripture. This final clause is important to emphasise, for the vast majority of the essay is 
dedicated to Scripture. This emphasis is stated up front in the introduction. The purpose of the work, 
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he writes, is to “recollect the general proofs of that explication [the Theory], from reason and nature: 
but more fully and particularly shew how it is grounded upon Scripture”.36 The particular texts that 
Burnet discusses, the extent to which he discusses them, and the specific interpretations that he aims 
to confute, make it clear that he is responding to Croft, for all these things correspond exactly to the 
content of Croft’s book. 
As we have observed, Croft’s chief concern in the Animadversions was Burnet’s interpretation 
of St Peter. Accordingly, then, the Review was dedicated mainly to defending this interpretation. The 
Second Epistle, and principally the third chapter, was “the Sacred Basis upon which the whole Theory 
stands”.37 Given its importance, it was necessary “to free it from those false glosses or mis-
interpretations, that lessen the force of its testimony, or make it wholly ineffectual”.38 The “false 
glosses” to which Burnet refers are essentially those proposed by Croft. They consist principally in 
Burnet’s view of two key assertions. The first is that St Peter refers only to the animate world. The 
second is that he communicates no difference between the antediluvian and postdiluvian earth.39 
Burnet sets about confuting these two claims in turn, reiterating and expanding upon his 
earlier point that St Peter must necessarily have referred to the natural world in order to confute the 
scoffers’ argument. In response to the claim that the scoffers were ignorant of the Deluge, he argues 
in the first place that the scoffers were Jews, and Moses had taught the Jews of the Deluge. They were 
clearly educated, too, for they advanced a philosophical argument, casting doubt on the Conflagration 
by appealing to the immutability of nature. This indicated that they were likely either followers of 
Maimonides or Aristotle, both of whom subscribed to the view that the natural world is unchanging. 
Certainly they were not “the vulgar” and would therefore have been familiar with the teachings of 
Moses. Croft’s claim that they had not attended to the Old Testament was especially implausible, since 
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they clearly refer to it in the clause “since the fathers fell asleep”. They could not, then, have been 
ignorant of the Deluge.40 
A further issue with Croft’s reading was that interpreting St Peter as referring only to the 
animate world rendered much of the Epistle either obscure or redundant and therefore most 
unbecoming of a sacred writer. If, for example, he was referring only to the animate world, then the 
constitution of the earth was irrelevant and his mentioning it superfluous. Furthermore, he had 
already mentioned that the animate world perished in the previous chapter, verse 6, and so were he 
not referring to something more in the following chapter, he would have been repeating himself 
unnecessarily. Had he meant nothing more than the animate world, moreover, he surely would not 
have rendered himself ambiguous by appearing to say more, for surely, at the very least, there is such 
an appearance.41 And the juxtaposition between “destroyed by water” and “destroyed by fire” must 
refer to the same thing, since nothing in the text indicates that the former is restricted in any way. 
Croft’s interpretation of the supposed qualification “of the ungodly” in the previous chapter was 
forced, for nothing in this phrase limits the scope of the Deluge. And given the context both before 
and after the phrase and in the following chapter the “world of the ungodly” most plausibly refers to 
the natural world, too.42 
Turning to the claim that St Peter communicated no difference between the antediluvian and 
present earth, Burnet notes that he makes a clear antithesis between the two, with the adversative 
“but” clearly denoting opposition.43 In the sixth verse, he argues moreover, expanding upon his earlier 
argument in the Theory, the connective “whereby” clearly indicates a causal dependence, for it implies 
that the world was overflowed with water and perished in virtue of something. This must be the thing 
mentioned before the connective, which was the worlds constitution, that is, its “consisting of water 
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and by water”.44 Here he takes issue with Croft’s retranslation. The correct translation from the Greek, 
he notes, that which is most in keeping with the true sense of the words, is in line with the Vulgate. 
The received translation that Croft had effectively replicated was obviously rendered merely to cohere 
with the features of our present earth rather than the natural sense of the words.45 
Having stated the above arguments, Burnet next invokes the authority of Church Fathers and 
theologians, several of whom had interpreted St Peter in this way.46 He also appeals to other sacred 
writers. Drawing on his earlier observations in the Theory, he notes that St John refers in Revelation 
21.1 to the future earth following the Conflagration having no sea. Other sacred writers had referred 
to the new earth as a restitution or renovation, indicating a return of the earth to its antediluvian 
state. If the new earth is to be a restitution of the antediluvian earth, and if the future earth is to have 
no sea, then the antediluvian earth of which the new earth is to be a restitution must also have had 
no sea. St Paul, too, spoke of a former earth which had been subjected to vanity, and a future earth 
which would no longer be subject to vanity. Thus, like in St Peter, we find in St Paul a “threefold” state 
of the earth: a paradisiacal earth which was subjected to vanity; a present earth in subjection to vanity; 
and a future earth which is no longer subject to vanity.47 
Following his lengthy analysis of St Peter, Burnet turns his attention to some other points 
raised by Croft in the Animadversions. Here he pays particular attention to the Psalms, in which Croft 
argued that he had exploited an ambiguity. To this, he replies that these Psalms were expressing 
wonder at the Creation. What wonder, he asks, is there “in this; that the shores lie by the sea-side; 
where could they lie else?”. Likewise, if God “stretched out the Earth near the Waters, How is that one 
of God’s great wonders? as it is there represented to be”. More importantly, translating Psalm 24.2 in 
this way removes the very reason for the earth being “the Lords, and the fullness thereof” as it is 
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stated to be in the preceding verse, for his founding it by or near the seas does not evoke his great 
power and wisdom. “But if he founded it upon the Seas, which could not be done by any hand but his, 
it shows both the Workman and Master”, thereby justifying his ownership of the work.48 Croft’s 
argument that the passages may relate merely to land being above sea level or to underground 
caverns was weak, too. “Because a Rock hangs its nose over the Sea”, he implores, “must the body of 
the Earth be said to be stretched over the waters? Or because there are waters in some subterraneous 
cavities, is the earth therefore founded upon the Seas?” When we have no better way of making sense 
of Scripture, he allows, such hyperbolic interpretations are permissible, “but when an explication is 
offer’d, that answers the propriety, force, and extent of the words, to reject it, onely because it is not 
fitted to our former opinions…, is to take an ill method in expounding Scripture”.49 
Clearly in the case of these passages it is Burnet rather than Croft who wants to maintain a 
literal reading of Scripture. Croft had claimed that these expressions, if rendered according to the 
received translation to which Burnet appealed, did not support his theory, for they are more plausibly 
figurative or poetic expressions and are not meant to convey a literal formation of the crust on a body 
of water. Burnet, on the other hand, wants to insist on a literal interpretation. The same is true of his 
interpretation of St Peter. Where Croft wants to maintain that in referring to “the world” perishing at 
the Deluge St Peter does not literally mean the world but the world in a restricted sense, Burnet wants 
to adhere to the literal sense of the Apostle’s words. 
Precisely the same insistence on a literal interpretation is at work in Burnet’s defence of his 
theory of the Deluge. The miraculous creation of new waters at the Deluge, he asserts against Croft, 
departs from the literal sense of Genesis. Here he pairs Croft’s view with the notion of a partial Deluge. 
Moses’ account, he stresses, makes two principal points: one concerning the extent of the Deluge; 
and one concerning its causes. Regarding the extent, Moses makes the Deluge universal. As to its 
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causes, Moses assigns two: the rupture of the abyss; and forty days rain. Both the extent and causes 
in the Mosaic account, then, cohere with the theory, for both render the Deluge universal and both 
identify the same two causes. Croft’s view and the notion of a local Deluge stray from the Mosaic 
account, for as the latter conflicts with Moses as to the extent of the Deluge, the former conflicts with 
him as to its causes, since he assigned only two and mentioned nothing of the creation of new 
waters.50 
In answering Croft’s objections about the above passages and the Deluge, then, Burnet wants 
to demonstrate that his interpretation of sacred texts is correct and that the theory is supported by a 
literal reading of Scripture. Croft’s hyperbolic, figurative, or restricted interpretations of these texts 
and his miraculous interpretation of the Deluge, on the other hand, are untenable, for they contradict 
this literal reading. Nicolson’s assessment that Croft is “insisting on a more literal interpretation of 
Genesis” is thus not entirely correct, at least not as far as Burnet is concerned with respect to Genesis 
6-9, for here Burnet is insisting on such an interpretation in opposition to Croft. Nicolson’s assessment 
is correct, however, with regard to Genesis 1, for here Croft had appealed to a literal reading in order 
to confute Burnet’s account of the Creation. And on this chapter Burnet’s response is not, as it was in 
the above cases, to show that that his account is consistent with such an interpretation. Rather, he 
concedes that it is not, and argues instead that this text should not be interpreted literally. 
In arguing this, Burnet adopts the principle of accommodation, or condescension, the notion 
that sacred writers sometimes accommodate their teachings to the limited capacities and mistaken 
apprehensions of their intended audience. Moses, he argues, very clearly in this case, “accommodated 
his Six-days Creation to the present form of the Earth, or to that which was before the eyes of the 
people when he writ” in order to adapt the account to the limited understanding of the Jews. He did 
not present a true account of the Creation. When interpreting the Creation, Burnet emphasises, we 
must not ascribe to Moses opinions that contradict other sacred writers. Neither, he added, should 
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our interpretation be “repugnant to clear and uncontested science”, for in passages of Scripture 
pertaining to the natural world, science must always be considered. If interpreted literally, the Mosaic 
account of the Creation renders Moses contrary to both Scripture and nature, “but is easily 
reconcileable to both, if we suppose it writ in a Vulgar style, and to the conceptions of the people”.51 
A “Vulgar style”, Burnet notes further, is frequently employed in Scripture. Talk of God, for 
example, is often accommodated in this way. We find, for example, references to his limbs, passions, 
and local motions, “things that do not belong, or are not compatible with the Divine nature”. So, too, 
with the natural world. The sun’s motion, for example, and the figure of the earth and heavens are 
frequently described “according to the appearance of sence and popular credulity; without any 
remorse for having transgressed the rules of intellectual truth”. This evident use of accommodation 
or “the Vulgar style”, when interpreted literally, had led to numerous errors concerning both God and 
the natural world. The “anthropomorphites”, for instance, believed God to have a human form. More 
recently, the motion of the earth was denied. All this had resulted from a literal reading of passages 
which were clearly not expressing the truth about the world but were accommodated to the limited 
capacities of their audience. In these cases, “reason, at length, got the upper hand of Literal authority”. 
Yet just as the motion of the earth was denied in the previous century, so too 
[t]he original or the Earth from a Chaos, drawn according to the rules of Physiology, will not be 
admitted: because it does not agree with the Scheme or the Six-days Creation. But why may not this be 
writ in a Vulgar style, as well as the rest? Certainly there can be nothing more like a Vulgar style, than 
to set God to work by the day, and in Six-days finish his task: as he is there represented. We may 
therefore probably hope that these disguises of truth will at length fall off, and that we shall see God 
and his Works in the pure and naked Light.52 
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The foregoing argument in the Review was Burnet’s first in-depth, explicit, public statement 
of his rejection of the literal interpretation of the Mosaic Creation. As I noted in the previous chapter, 
he briefly alluded to this view in the Latin edition of the Theory, suggesting that, in his account of the 
Creation, Moses described the earth not as it in fact was at that time but as it was at the time he 
wrote. In the English edition, he stated that Moses’ account of the Creation was “deliver’d by him as 
a Lawgiver, not as a Philosopher”, and that this was something he “intend[ed] to show at large in 
another Treatise” – a promise he repeated in the Review. 53 The argument articulated in the Review 
was nevertheless fully formed when he wrote the Theory, for in his correspondence with Isaac Newton 
in 1680/1, he offered an explication of the six-day Creation which closely resembled that given in the 
Review and advanced many of the same arguments for rejecting a literal interpretation as would later 
appear in this work. He also rejected a number of suggestions from Newton as to how his theory may 
be made to cohere with the Mosaic account, resolutely adhering to the view that “Moses his 
hypothesis of 6 days work is but ye Idea of a creation accommodate to ye people & to ye present 
forme of ye Earth”.54 As we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, this assessment of Moses would 
resurface again at various points in his debate with Warren before being developed further and 
explicated at length in that “other Treatise” he had promised to produce, that is, the Archaeologiae. 
Before concluding this section, there are two things I want briefly to discuss. The first is the 
foundation of Burnet’s rejection of the literal interpretation of the Mosaic six-day Creation. Burnet 
does not reject this interpretation simply because it conflicts with his theory. Indeed, he likely rejected 
it long before he even conceived of the theory. This is likely true also of his rejection of the literal sense 
of the Mosaic doctrine of Paradise in Genesis 2-3, which is not yet apparent in his response to Croft 
but comes out later in the Archaeologiae. Rather, his rejection of the literal sense of these chapters is 
grounded in a number of those core Cambridge Platonist and Latitudinarian principles discussed in 
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chapter two. One of these is the essential compatibility of reason and religion. On this principle, 
Scripture must not be interpreted in a way that contradicts reason and philosophy, for reason and 
Scripture, being divinely instituted, are necessarily consistent with one another, and if true reason and 
philosophy appear to conflict with Scripture, then our interpretation of the latter must be incorrect. 
More fundamentally, however, Burnet’s rejection of these texts, like his insistence on natural over 
miraculous and angelic over omnipotent causes, is underpinned by his emphasis on God’s wisdom and 
his anti-voluntarism. This is evident in the above quotation. It is “Vulgar”, beneath God’s wisdom, “to 
work by the day, and in Six-days finish his task”.55 It is contrary to his nature and therefore not 
something he is permitted to do. Underpinning this further is another core tenet of the Cambridge 
Platonists’ and Latitudinarians’ theology, that is, their emphasis on the fundamentals of Christianity 
over inessentials. For Burnet, the most fundamental tenet of Christianity is the nature of God, and in 
particular the wisdom of God. Where inessential doctrines such as a literal interpretation of Genesis 
1-3 conflict with this fundamental tenet of the Christian faith, they must be abandoned, and the 
relevant passages of Scripture must be reinterpreted so as to conform to it. 
My final point concerns the issue, which has been discussed at various points in this section, 
of literal and non-literal interpretations of Scripture. What emerges from Croft’s attack on Burnet in 
the Animadversions and Burnet’s response in the Review is not so much a simple picture of literalism 
versus non-literalism but rather, as Kerry Magruder has characterised the debate between Burnet and 
his critics on biblical interpretation, a disagreement about which texts are and are not to be 
interpreted literally.56 Underpinning this was the fact that this was something about which one was 
faced with a choice. Not all biblical texts can be interpreted literally, since literal interpretations of 
different texts are often incompatible with one another. Magruder argues that in interpreting St Peter 
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literally, Burnet was forced to abandon the literal truth of Moses. Critics like Croft, however, did not 
want to abandon the latter, and so had to reject Burnet’s literal interpretation of St Peter.57 
Magruder makes an important observation here about the logic of these authors’ biblical 
interpretations.  In the case of Burnet and Croft, however, a finer-grained analysis is required. Most 
significantly, there is an important distinction to be made between the different chapters of Genesis. 
It is not a literal reading of Moses that Burnet has to abandon in order to interpret St Peter literally, 
only the first chapters of Genesis. This is important because it is not only his reading of St Peter that 
forces him to abandon a literal reading of these chapters, but also, and equally, his reading of Genesis 
6-9. In order to maintain a literal interpretation of Genesis 6-9, Burnet has to suppose that the 
antediluvian earth was of a radically different form, a form which contradicts a literal reading of these 
earlier chapters. He would rather do this than suppose that God miraculously created water. Of 
course, part of his motivation for this as we have seen is the various philosophical and theological 
problems with such a creation. But another important part of it is a desire to stay close to the letter 
of Moses on the Deluge. He prioritises the literal sense of these later chapters of Genesis over that of 
the earlier chapters. Croft, on the other hand, is less concerned than Burnet with adhering closely to 
the literal sense of Genesis 6-9, and so is willing to posit a miraculous creation of water, even if this 
not explicitly stated in the Mosaic narrative. 
What is also important to note is that in Burnet’s debate with Croft, the authors’ different 
interpretations of other biblical texts is governed by the same logic. Burnet is able to interpret the 
Psalms literally because they cohere with his literal interpretation of Genesis 6-9 and St Peter. That 
they conflict with the literal sense of earlier chapters of Genesis is no problem for him because he has 
abandoned the literal interpretation of these texts. For Croft, on the other hand, they, like St Peter, 
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cannot be interpreted literally, because he has not abandoned the literal reading of these chapters of 
Genesis. 
3.3. The Geologia, an Answer, a Defence, a Short consideration, and some Reflections 
Published nearly ten years after the first Latin edition of the Theory, Warren’s Geologia was only the 
second major attack on Burnet to be published in England. Warren’s book and subsequent debate 
with Burnet have received slightly more scholarly attention than Croft’s Animadversions. Like the 
Animadversions, it is often discussed briefly in work on Burnet’s theory and the debate surrounding 
it.58 More extensive discussions appear in work by Nicolson, Katherine Brownell Collier and H.V.S. 
Ogden. Nicolson’s and Ogden’s discussions concern Warren’s arguments from the aesthetics of 
mountains and other geological phenomena in response to Burnet’s assessment of the present 
earth.59 Collier’s analysis attends mainly to his philosophical arguments.60 What I want to focus on 
here is his arguments from Scripture, since these are by far the main emphasis of the work and receive 
a much larger share of Warren’s attention and yet have seen relatively little discussion from historians. 
Warren’s book was similar in certain ways to Croft’s in that his main concern was the theory’s 
incompatibility with Scripture. In important respects, however, Warren’s attack on Burnet was quite 
different from Croft’s. The crucial difference between them, as Stephen Gaukroger has observed, is 
that where Croft “set out to show that Burnet had misinterpreted biblical passages”, Warren “sought 
to refute Burnet simply by pitting scriptural passages against his claims”.61 In other words, as I have 
stated above, Croft focussed predominantly on those passages of Scripture that Burnet had cited as 
evidence for his theory and argued that they do not in fact support it, whereas Warren attended 
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mainly to passages which Burnet had not discussed and which he believed contradicted the theory. 
Croft did of course discuss the early chapters of Genesis. Likewise, Warren discussed St Peter and 
Genesis 6-9. Nevertheless, Gaukroger’s assessment holds true for the most part and played a 
significant role in determining which passages of Scripture were the main focus. In Croft, we have 
observed, the main emphasis was on St Peter, the text which in his view Burnet had most egregiously 
misinterpreted. In Warren, unsurprisingly, the principal focus was on those texts which were most 
conspicuously absent from the theory and which seemed to constitute the most compelling evidence 
against it, namely, the first three chapters of Genesis. 
 Of these three chapters, Warren devotes most space to Genesis 1, citing numerous passages 
which appear to conflict with Burnet’s theory. In the Mosaic account of the Creation, for example, it 
is the entire universe that is created in six days, not merely the earth. Light was visible on the first day, 
which is surely impossible if the air was filled with particles. The separation of Burnet’s Chaos 
according to natural principles would take too long for the earth to be fully formed on the third day.62 
The formation of rivers, too, would certainly take longer than a day, for the sun, having been created 
only on the fourth day, could not raise sufficient vapours from the crust to supply the earth with rivers. 
And yet there must be rivers by the fifth day, for it is at this time that fish were created.63 At the time 
Warren was writing the Geologia, Burnet had not yet published his Review and so Warren was not 
aware of Burnet’s position on the six-day Creation. He nevertheless anticipates to some extent 
(perhaps on the basis of Burnet’s brief allusion to the issue in the Theory) Burnet’s later arguments 
about the untenability of a literal interpretation of the Mosaic six-day Creation. He notes with Burnet 
the importance of the principle of accommodation but argues that there is nothing in Moses’ account 
to suggest that it has been accommodated in the way Burnet was soon to suggest. Moses very clearly 
presents his narrative as a history of the Creation and is very explicit about the earth being created in 
                                                          
62 Warren (1690), 73-85. 
63 Warren (1690), 106-20. 
155 
 
six literal days, stating that the days consisted of an evening and a morning which clearly implies that 
they are of the same length as our days.64 
 Genesis 2 and 3 are invoked by Warren primarily to confute Burnet’s account of the 
antediluvian earth and the dissolution of the crust at the Deluge. The most interesting point in 
Warren’s discussion of Genesis 2 in that the subject would resurface in subsequent rejoinders 
between him and Burnet and again in Burnet’s Archaeologiae pertained to Moses’ description of the 
rivers of Paradise in verses 10-14. The four rivers described by Moses, Warren argues, show that Eden 
was located not in the southern hemisphere as Burnet had claimed but in Mesopotamia. These rivers, 
he argues further, are extant today. If, however, the crust had collapsed at the Deluge as Burnet had 
contended, then they would surely have been destroyed. Burnet had argued that the rivers described 
by Moses did not match the description of any four rivers on the present earth and that this was 
evidence that the crust, and therefore also the rivers, had indeed been destroyed at the Deluge. For 
Warren, this conclusion was untenable, for it implied that Moses’ description of these rivers was both 
superfluous and false, and to affirm this would be a severe censure not only on Moses but also on 
God, since Moses’ description of Paradise was divinely inspired.65 
 The most significant aspect of Burnet’s theory that Warren saw as incompatible with Genesis 
3 was the notion of a perpetual spring on the antediluvian earth. God’s curse on the ground in verses 
17-18, he points out for example, is surely inconsistent with such a temperate and immutable climate. 
In such an environment, moreover, God’s making coats for Adam and Eve in verse 21 was surely 
unnecessary.66 Burnet’s notion of a perpetual spring was of course a result of his theory of the 
antediluvian earth’s axis. On this point, Warren also devotes much attention to Burnet’s use of ancient 
texts. This, too, as we shall see below, would be debated at length in subsequent rejoinders and dealt 
with extensively by Burnet in the Archaeologiae. Warren’s main argument here is that, if there was a 
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change in the earth’s axis, there would surely be abundant evidence of it in human history, as there is 
in the case of much less significant events. He is unconvinced by Burnet’s appeals to ancient 
philosophers on this point and examines these philosophers at some length in order to confute 
Burnet’s claim. Here he articulates two principal objections. The first is that these philosophers all 
assigned very different causes than Burnet for the change in the earth’s axis. Thus, even if such a 
change had occurred, their testimonies did not support Burnet’s contention about the axis becoming 
oblique to the ecliptic due to an imbalance caused by the dissolution of the crust. The second is that 
these philosophers mention only a change in the earth’s axis. They say nothing of its former position. 
Hence, even if they are to be taken seriously (which Warren also doubts), all that is implied by their 
testimony is that the earth’s axis was altered, not that that it was perpendicular to the ecliptic prior 
to the Deluge.67 
 Turning now to Warren’s response to Burnet’s account of the Deluge, what is interesting here 
is that, like Croft’s objection, Warren’s dissatisfaction with Burnet’s theory was much more 
theologically than scripturally motivated. Warren’s issue was similar to Croft’s in that it concerned 
Burnet’s positing natural rather than miraculous causes. The conclusion he drew from it, however, 
was very different. Where Croft had worried that Burnet’s unwillingness to appeal to miracles 
amounted to a kind of deism, Warren was much more concerned with how such an explanation 
reflects on God. The purpose of the Deluge was to punish sin. If, however, in order to punish sin, God 
had, as Burnet supposed, made the constitution of the earth such that the Deluge will occur inevitably 
via natural causes, then had the people not sinned or had they repented, the Deluge would have 
occurred anyway and thus God would have punished the innocent.68 
What is most interesting here is that underlying this disagreement between Burnet and 
Warren is the question of which aspect of God’s nature is to be emphasised over others and what this 
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emphasis implies for God’s role in the natural world. As we saw in chapter two, Burnet’s emphasis on 
God’s wisdom implied an anti-voluntarist conception of God and a view of providence which consisted 
primarily in natural – and secondarily, angelic – providence. God does not intervene in the world 
because it is contrary to his wisdom. Warren, in common with Burnet’s mentor Ralph Cudworth, 
emphasised God’s goodness over his wisdom. Yet unlike Cudworth for whom God’s goodness, like his 
wisdom for Burnet, entailed an anti-voluntarist conception of God, God’s goodness for Warren implied 
a certain degree of voluntarism. The Deluge for him must be a voluntaristic act, because people might 
not have sinned or they might have repented, and had this been the case, a non-voluntaristic God 
would have punished them unfairly, and such unwarranted punishment is contrary to God’s nature. 
 It is also interesting here to compare the different implications that Burnet’s account of the 
Deluge has for Croft on the one hand and Warren on the other. Croft thinks ultimately that Burnet’s 
explanation of the Deluge amounts essentially to deism, for Burnet seems to him to deprive God of 
any role in the natural world beyond the creation of matter ex nihilo. It is for this reason that he 
assesses in the preface that Burnet “seems to be a kind of Deist, acknowledging God as the supream 
Origin of all: But after his first Creation, he takes all out of his hands, and would have Nature only to 
act by a constant course in all things conteined in this sublunary World”.69 Warren is ultimately less 
hostile than Croft – indeed, at this stage in the debate at least “he is a very Saint in comparison”. He 
does not think Burnet’s explanation of the Deluge amounts to deism or atheism. He does, however, 
think it is conducive to such heterodoxies in that he believes Burnet’s theory will please deists and 
atheists and provide them with arguments in favour of their heretical beliefs. This concern was well 
founded. The notorious deist and freethinker Charles Blount, whose popularising efforts were soon to 
help destroy Burnet’s career and reputation, had in 1683 quoted from the Theory in his controversial 
pamphlet Miracles, no violations of the laws of nature.70 The central focus of Warren’s concern here 
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is also very different from that of Croft. Both are concerned with the threat of deism and atheism, but 
where for Croft it is Burnet’s more general unwillingness to admit miraculous intervention that is the 
problem, this is not the case for Warren. For him, it is not Burnet’s use of natural causes as such that 
is problematic but rather how this use of natural causes in the case of the Deluge reflects on God. Here 
again, the central problem is the possibility that God might have punished the innocent. This, he 
thinks, will be pleasing to atheists and deists: 
For what can more encourage so wicked a person, than to disparage and lessen GOD's Goodness and 
Equity? And how can those Attributes be more disgraced and diminished… than by supposing that in 
the Works of His Providence… He laid a cruel Train of inavoidable Death, for Millions of his Innocent or 
Penitent Creatures.71 
 In his reply to Warren, Burnet objected strongly to the above argument that God, on his view, 
might have punished the innocent. His response to it was to argue that human sin was predetermined. 
Scripturally, this was unproblematic, since many events in Scripture are predetermined. If human sin 
was predetermined, then God’s punishing it via natural causes orchestrated in the beginning was not 
contrary to his goodness and is therefore consistent with his nature, since things could not have been 
otherwise. The alternative scheme of God voluntaristically intervening in nature, however, was not 
consistent with God’s nature, for such intervention is contrary to his wisdom. Here, then, while Burnet 
still places greater emphasis on God’s wisdom, he is careful not to do so at the expense of his 
goodness, and the predetermination of human sin allows him to do this. God’s synchronicity between 
the natural and moral world, therefore, “as it is more to the honour of his Wisdom, so it is in no way 
to the prejudice of his… Justice”.72 
Burnet also reacted strongly to Warren’s claims about the theory’s conduciveness to atheism. 
His response to this was to reassert his maxim of the essential compatibility of reason and Scripture. 
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Warren, he thought, was guilty of opposing the two, and this in his view was far more conducive to 
atheism than positing natural explanations for biblical events, for if our interpretation of Scripture 
conflicts with reason and philosophy, this more than anything else exposes it to the ridicule of atheists. 
This, he argues as he had in the Theory, is especially the case with regard to passages of Scripture 
concerning the natural world. In such passages, reason and philosophy should govern our 
interpretation of Scripture rather than the other way around, for Scripture being opposed to 
philosophy in such things is prejudicial to the former and therefore conducive to atheism.73 
 This response from Burnet to Warren appeared during the same year as the Geologia. As I 
have noted above, Burnet’s response to Croft in the Review was surreptitious. He did not name his 
adversary, likely because of his influential position in the Church. Here, however, he was dealing with 
a little-known rector of an obscure parish and could therefore present his defence of the theory 
explicitly as a reply to Warren. This work, then, entitled An answer to the late exceptions made by Mr. 
Erasmus Warren against the theory of the earth, was Burnet’s first explicit, published reply to any of 
his critics. Croft’s main emphasis in the Animadversions had been Burnet’s interpretation of St Peter. 
As a result, Burnet had devoted most of the Review to defending this interpretation. In contrast, the 
principal focus of Warren’s Geologia was the theory’s conflict with the first chapters of Genesis. 
Consequently, it is this alleged conflict that constitutes the main emphasis of Burnet’s Answer. 
 Burnet’s discussion of these chapters of Genesis in the Answer consists essentially of two very 
different and seemingly contradictory approaches. In several places, he adheres to the position 
advanced earlier that year in the Review concerning the importance of adopting a non-literal 
interpretation of the six-day Creation and to the view that he would soon articulate at length in the 
Archaeologiae on the need for a similar interpretation of the doctrine of Paradise. He concedes that 
his Theory contradicts the literal sense of Moses but stresses that it does so only in relation to passages 
which pertain to “natural things”. Expanding on his earlier point about the importance of consulting 
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science when interpreting passages of Scripture concerned with the natural world, he stresses that in 
“matters of pure revelation”, where we have no other source of knowledge than God’s word, we must 
adhere to the literal sense of the texts. In moral, theological, and natural things, however, we can use 
reason and philosophy, and therefore are allowed latitude in how we interpret Scripture. Warren’s 
censure of the theory for departing from the letter of Scripture, then, was unreasonable. For merely 
departing from the literal sense is not by itself blameworthy. It is only blameworthy if one departs 
from it without good cause. He points out that at numerous points in the Geologia, Warren himself 
departs from the literal sense of Scripture, for example in stating that the earth is not at the centre of 
the universe and that it moves. In such cases, departing from the literal sense is permissible, for where 
Scripture pertains to the natural world, we are allowed, indeed required, to use reason and philosophy 
in our interpretation.74 
 Elsewhere in the Answer, however, Burnet takes a different tack entirely and endeavours to 
show how his theory was – or at least could be made – compatible with a literal interpretation of these 
chapters of Genesis. In order to do so, moreover, he often appeals to extraordinary providence, 
apparently violating, as Warren would point out in his reply, his own maxim of not having too ready 
appeal to miraculous intervention from God. Answering Warren’s objection about the separation of 
the chaos taking too long for the earth to be fully formed on the third day, for example, he argues that 
God’s extraordinary providence could accelerate the process. It could also speed up the production of 
rivers, another of Warren’s concerns. Here, quoting parts of the Theory where he had noted the 
involvement of miracles in the Creation, he reminds Warren that “’tis plain that the Theorist never 
excluded an extraordinary Providence in the formation and construction of the Earth”.75 
 We have already seen in chapter two that the above arguments were not intended to 
communicate Burnet’s true position but merely to suggest possible ways that the theory might be 
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reconciled with the literal sense of the Mosaic Creation, his actual view being that which he had 
articulated in the Review and in his earlier correspondence with Newton. Other examples are less 
clear-cut, however, and it is not easy to tell whether Burnet is presenting merely possible arguments 
or his actual position. One intriguing example which as we shall see contrasts in interesting ways with 
his later interpretation of the doctrine of Paradise in the Archaeologiae is his response to Warren’s 
argument concerning the rivers of Paradise. Here he emphasises that his theory is actually the best 
way to vindicate a literal interpretation of Moses’ description of the rivers. Warren’s supposition that 
these rivers are still extant, on the other hand, renders Moses’ description inadequate, for there is 
nowhere on the present earth that answers to Moses’ description. If, however, the earth was radically 
altered at the Deluge, then Moses’ description of the rivers may be considered an adequate 
representation of part of the former earth as opposed to an inadequate depiction of an area of the 
present earth. Indeed, the inadequacy of Moses’ description of the rivers with respect to the present 
earth was a compelling argument for the truth of the theory. Moses’ description does not represent 
anywhere on the present earth. So, either Moses’ description is deficient, or the earth has changed. 
To suppose the former would be to censure Moses, and indeed God, by whom his description was 
inspired. Hence, the earth must have changed. The theory, therefore, “makes the fairest Apologie 
for… Moses… in this particular”.76 
 The final thing that is important to discuss from Burnet’s Answer is his response to Warren’s 
arguments against the position of the antediluvian earth’s axis. Here Burnet takes issue primarily with 
Warren’s observations concerning the ancient philosophers he had cited in the Theory as evidence of 
a change in the earth’s axis. To Warren’s first point, Burnet stressed simply that whether these authors 
assigned the correct cause of the change in the position of the earth was irrelevant. That they had 
knowledge of the event having occurred was sufficient evidence that it did occur. In response to the 
second point, he appealed to further evidence from various other ancient writers which suggested not 
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only that a change in the earth’s axis had occurred but also that its previous situation was indeed as 
he had supposed. As we shall see in the next section, he would expand upon this latter point at length 
two years later in the Archaeologiae.77 
 Warren replied to Burnet the following year in a lengthy pamphlet entitled A defence of the 
discourse concerning the earth before the Flood. As I have discussed in the second chapter, one of 
Warren’s principal objections in the Defence concerned Burnet’s appeals to extraordinary providence, 
which Warren believed contradicted his commitment to natural providence and rendered his theory 
superfluous.78 Another important issue for Warren was Burnet’s purported license to contradict 
Scripture “in natural things”. This was dangerous, for as with Burnet’s account of the Deluge, 
contradicting Scripture, even in this restricted sense, frequently reflects unfavourably on God, and this 
is conducive to irreligion. Certainly it does in the case of Burnet’s theory. If, for example, God promised 
humans dominion over the fish in the sea at the Creation despite the seas being enclosed within the 
earth and therefore inaccessible to humans until after the Deluge, then it would seem that we cannot 
trust God’s promises. Here, then, contradicting Scripture “in natural things” “turns the most solemn 
Grants of Heaven, into shameful Mockeries; and besides the dishonour it brings to GOD, lets in fatal 
despondency upon men”. Warren agrees with Burnet that departing from the literal sense of Scripture 
is permissible if the literal sense implies absurdity. References to the sun’s motion, for instance, are 
evidently absurd and therefore should not be interpreted literally. Burnet, however, had in Warren’s 
view not applied this principle correctly in his theory and had strayed from the literal sense of Scripture 
in passages which, if interpreted literally, implied no absurdity.79 
 One other issue which is important to discuss in the Defence because it resurfaces in Burnet’s 
Archaeologiae is Warren’s response to Burnet’s point concerning the rivers of Paradise. Here again 
Warren attacks Burnet’s view of Eden being in the southern hemisphere. The doctrine of Paradise, he 
                                                          
77 Burnet (1690a), 27-38. 
78 Warren (1691), 8-12, 38-9, 148-9. 
79 Warren (1691), 197-215. 
163 
 
argues, had been obscured by the very writers that Burnet had cited on the question. This testimony 
of philosophers, Church Fathers, and poets should be disregarded, the only authority on Paradise 
being Moses. And Moses, in describing the rivers of Paradise, evidently placed it not in the southern 
hemisphere as Burnet supposed but in Mesopotamia, the rivers Moses describes being located around 
this area. To Burnet’s contention that either the earth has changed or Moses’ description of Paradise 
is inadequate, Warren concedes that the course of the rivers must inevitably have altered to some 
extent. This was why we could not pinpoint the exact location of Paradise. Moses’ description was 
nevertheless adequate at the time he wrote.80 
 Burnet issued one last reply the same year, A short consideration of Mr. Erasmus Warren’s 
defence of his exceptions against the theory of the earth. There is little of interest in this pamphlet. 
Burnet largely just restates the arguments advanced in the Answer. Two things are noteworthy, 
however. The first is his response to Warren concerning his use of extraordinary providence in which 
he distinguishes between direct omnipotence and the ministry of angles. This of course has been 
discussed in depth in chapter two. The second is his position on the six-day Creation. Here, he does 
not attempt to show how his theory may be reconciled with the literal sense of Moses as he did in the 
Answer. Rather, he develops and makes more explicit his other line of argument about adopting a 
non-literal interpretation. He also cites pages in both the Latin and English editions of the Theory 
where he had indicated that this was his view as well as his discussion of the issue in the Review. 
Warren’s arguments concerning the theory’s incompatibility with Genesis 1, he argues now, are 
without any grounds or force, for “the Theorist hath no where asserted, that Moses’s Cosmopoeia… 
is to be literally understood”. There are, he emphasises, “as good reasons, and better Authorities, that 
Moses’s six-days Creation should not be literally understood, than there are, why those Texts of 
Scripture that speak about the motion of the Sun, should not be literally understood”.81 In trying to 
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adhere to philosophy on the one hand and maintain a literal interpretation of Genesis 1 on the other, 
Warren had adopted an incoherent position, and had therefore failed both in his attempt to accord 
with philosophy and in his effort to vindicate Scripture. “This Gentleman”, writes Burnet,  
hath a mind to appear a Virtuoso: for the new Philosophy, and the Copernican Systeme: and yet would 
be a Zealot for orthodoxy, and the Church-way of explaining things. Which two designs do not well 
agree, as to the natural World; and so betwixt two Stools he falls to the ground, and proves neither 
good Church-man, nor good Philosopher.82 
Warren’s final reply to Burnet appeared the following year. Its cumbersome title, Some 
reflections upon the short consideration of the defence of the exceptions against the theory of the 
earth, is highly illustrative of how protracted the debate had become. As is evident in the foregoing 
quotation from Burnet, it had also become increasingly hostile. Chaplain to the King at the time the 
debate began and now Clerk of the Closet, Burnet seemed greatly offended that someone so much 
his inferior in the Church would attack his theory. He had repeatedly chided the provincial rector for 
his “Country-Rhetorick” and “rustical wit”.83 In return, Warren levelled further accusations of “horrid 
blasphemy” and “Contradictions to Scripture”.84 Like Burnet’s Short consideration, Warren’s 
Reflections contains little of interest, consisting largely of arguments advanced in his previous replies. 
Ultimately, he remained unconvinced that Burnet’s departure from the literal sense of Moses was 
justifiable. In his view, the literal interpretation of the six-day Creation implied no absurdity, and 
Burnet had not shown anything to the contrary. His objections concerning the conflict between 
Burnet’s theory and Genesis 1, therefore, had both grounds and force. 
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Toward the end of the Reflections, Warren issued the following challenge. If the literal sense 
of Moses’ six-day Creation implies any absurdity, and should, in light of this absurdity, be abandoned, 
then Burnet must demonstrate that this is the case. If, writes Warren, 
Moses’s Cosmopoeia be not to be literally understood… let him [Burnet] speak it out and prove it; that 
so they who believe it to be an history of the Creation, may be undeceived. And by his Arguments may 
be throughly convinc’d, that it is but a System of Philosophic Notions, or the like, symbolically 
delivered”.85 
Burnet issued no further reply to Warren. He did, however, produce a work, promised in both the 
Theory and the Review and in his replies to Warren, in which he explicated and defended his 
interpretation of Moses’ six-day Creation. In this work, he also dealt extensively with Warren’s and 
Croft’s objections concerning Paradise and the antediluvian earth and took up Warren’s challenge, 
demonstrating at length not only the absurdity of a literal interpretation of the Mosaic six-day Creation 
but also, and more controversially, the Mosaic doctrine on Paradise.  
3.4. The Archaeologiae 
The work Burnet had promised throughout the 1680s and early 1690s on the Mosaic six-day Creation 
finally appeared in 1692, Burnet not wanting to produce the work until after the second volume of the 
Theory was complete.86 This work, however, the Archaeologiae philosophicae: sive doctrina antiqua 
de rerum originibus, is a great deal more than just an account of the Hexameron. Indeed, it consists of 
two books, and only the final three out of ten chapters of the second book deal with the Hexameron. 
The preceding chapter discusses the Mosaic doctrine of Paradise in Genesis 2-3, and the first six are 
dedicated to corroborating different parts of the theory from other sacred, Judeo-Christian, and pagan 
texts. The first book is a general history of ancient philosophy. As Burnet had promised, the 
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Archaeologiae was published in Latin, the subject in his estimation not being “proper for the Vulgar 
Tongue”.87 A full English translation did not appear until after his death, though as I shall explain in the 
next chapter, two chapters of the second book were translated into English and published in 1693.88 
The first book is an extensive survey of ancient philosophy, and in particular ancient doctrines 
concerning the origin and history of the earth, beginning in chapter two with “the Scythians, Celts, and 
Aethiopians” and concluding in the penultimate chapter with “the Platonics, Aristotelians, and 
Epicureans”.89 This part of the Archaeologiae has been discussed at length by Luciano Malusa and 
Dimitri Levitin, so rather than go into too much detail on this subject I refer the interested reader to 
their more extensive treatments.90 What I want to discuss for the most part in this section is the 
second book, which has received less sustained attention from historians.91 
 The final chapter of the first book, however, “Concerning the Origin of the Barbaric 
Philosophy”, and Burnet’s overall intentions in producing his extensive history of philosophy, are 
important to outline briefly.  As I noted in chapter two, it is in this last chapter that Burnet articulates 
at length his view of Noah as the fountain of ancient learning. He first notes that the origins of Greek 
philosophy are uncontroversial, for it was well established that they derived their learning partly from 
other, more ancient cultures and partly from their own inquiries.92 The origins of these earlier peoples’ 
learning, however, was less clear. The two most common views about this were, firstly, “that it was 
found out by the Wit and Industry of those Nations themselves”, and secondly, that it was “derived 
from the Jews to other Nations; namely from Moses or Abraham”.93 The first of these views was highly 
implausible, for these cultures delivered their philosophy not on the basis of reasoning, argument, or 
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experimentation, but plainly and factually on the basis of authority.94 The second view was also 
implausible. It was evident from Scripture that Egyptian learning predates Moses, and that Moses 
learned his philosophy from them rather than instructing them in it. The Arabian philosophy, too, was 
clearly older than Moses, since we find examples of it in Job, who certainly lived before Moses, for 
among other things he lived over two hundred years, which places him most likely in the third 
generation after the Flood.95 As to Abraham, it was highly implausible that the Egyptians could have 
learned their philosophy from him, for he was in Egypt less than two years, surely too short a time for 
someone who spoke a different language to have instructed a wholly ignorant nation. Thus, the 
Egyptians’ philosophy must also predate Abraham.96 
 We must, therefore, affirms Burnet, “ascend higher in search after the Original of the Barbaric 
Philosophy”, beyond Moses and Abraham and to Noah, “the common Father of Jews and Gentils; a 
great Man, a sincere Worshiper of the Deity…, whose Knowledge extended to both Worlds” – that is, 
the antediluvian and the postdiluvian.97 Noah, notes Burnet, is known to have taught moral philosophy 
to his progeny, the so-called “precepts of Noah”. He therefore most likely taught natural philosophy 
and theology, too, for doctrines concerning the natural world, its origin, its fate, the soul, the afterlife, 
and other doctrines which we find in ancient philosophy and theology, are of equal importance.98 
Given their long lives, it was reasonable to suppose that the antediluvian fathers possessed superior 
philosophical and theological wisdom, which Noah, being six hundred years in their company, surely 
imbibed. “This Inhabitant of both Worlds”, then, likely transmitted the antediluvian learning to his 
offspring, and from there it spread throughout the postdiluvian world.99 
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The philosophy of Noah, then, was the basis of all ancient learning from the Deluge to Ancient 
Greece. And much of the Greeks’ philosophy was derived from those earlier “Barbaric” tribes who 
inherited theirs from Noah. Burnet believed of course that this philosophy of Noah had been 
significantly corrupted, “strained with many Blots…, mixed with many Impurities”.100 Yet “Truth having 
been discovered another Way, it is not very difficult to wash away these Stains”.101 This other way of 
course was the philosophical inquiry of Burnet’s own time. This, he argued, was essential, since the 
corruption of Noah’s philosophy was such that it could not be rediscovered merely through 
antiquarian studies.102 It will not, as Burnet put it, be “restored from ancient Monuments, but rather 
all Things are to be renewed by the Principles of Nature and clear Reason, and amended and 
established by solid Theories”.103 One of the “solid Theories” Burnet has in mind here of course is his 
own. His theory could help to re-establish the lost knowledge of Noah. Firstly, it could rediscover the 
truths about the earth which Noah knew and taught. Secondly, as we have observed in the second 
chapter, it constituted a powerful hermeneutical tool which could be used uncover the true Noachian 
philosophy in those ancient writings which were essentially heavily corrupted versions of it. 
As Levitin correctly notes, the purpose of this first book is ultimately to show that the central 
tenets of the theory are grounded in a tradition which dates back to antediluvian times. As Levitin 
observes, however, the evidence Burnet advances for this is presented in this book in a highly 
intelligent and compelling way. He does not, as one might expect, focus on specific examples of 
ancient doctrines which support his theory or which his theory can illuminate and explicitly connect 
these doctrines with the theory. Rather, he conducts a thorough, extensive, critical study of the history 
of ancient philosophy.104 There are numerous instances in this history of ancient doctrines which 
support the theory. We read of examples of the earth being formed on a body of water, a great abyss, 
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the primitive earth’s egg-like structure, successive periods of the earth, different states of the earth 
punctuated by destructions resulting from water and fire, renovations of the earth, and so on.105 Yet 
at no point in this history of the ancients are these examples explicitly connected with the theory. 
Rather, they are embedded within a comprehensive, impartial intellectual history and the evidence 
which they present for the theory is left to speak for itself. 
It is not until the first six chapters of the second book that Burnet explicitly applies the ancient 
pagan philosophy and theology that he had surveyed in the first book, along with numerous biblical 
texts and writings of Church Fathers and Jewish and Christian theologians, to the theory. This purpose 
is stated up front in the opening chapter. “THE THEORY of the EARTH”, he writes, “having been lately 
published, entirely drawn from its own Causes, as from the Bowels of Nature: It is now thought proper 
to confirm it by the Authority and Testimonies of the Ancients, that so nothing may be wanting to the 
Work which we have proposed”.106 This first chapter is dedicated to showing how his theory of the 
Chaos and its separation coheres both with discussions of the chaos in Scripture and those of ancient 
pagan philosophers.107 The next two chapters are devoted to the form of the primitive earth, the 
difference between it and the present earth, and the “threefold” state of the earth. These two 
chapters consist largely of further detailed exegesis of St Peter.108 Burnet makes clear at the beginning 
of chapter two that his target is those critics – i.e., Croft and Warren – who had argued against his 
theory on textual grounds. The different form of the antediluvian earth, he remarks, is the central 
tenet of the theory: 
On this single Point, the whole System depends; and when this Conclusion is proved, the Cause remains 
impregnable: we shall not now attempt to prove it by Physical Reasons, for that is already done…, our 
Design is therefore different, namely, to show that this Opinion has been delivered by ancient wise 
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Men; that there are plain Footsteps of this Doctrine extant, not so much in the Books, as in the 
Fragments, of the Ancients, or small Extracts from them.109 
“We do not undertake this Task”, he continues, clearly alluding to Croft and Warren, 
as though it were necessary for the Support of the… Theory, which stands, firm on its own Foundation; 
but to remove every Objection against Providence, and comply a little with their Obstinacy, who will 
not receive the Truth it self, unless delivered and recommended to them by their Ancestors.110 
To this end, Burnet conducts much the same kind of defence of the literal sense of St Peter that we 
saw in the Review, yet greatly expands it, showing in more detail how this reading of St Peter is 
vindicated by other biblical texts and the interpretations of the Fathers and adding also the testimony 
of several ancient pagan philosophers who had taught of the same doctrines.111 
 The fourth chapter deals with the Deluge, showing how a literal interpretation of Moses and 
St Peter corresponds to the theory and how this literal sense of the texts is supported by other 
passages of Scripture and various ancient pagan expositions of deluges.112 The fifth and sixth chapters 
are especially interesting. They discuss at length the position of the antediluvian earth, something 
which, as we have seen, was especially troubling for Warren, and for which Burnet had presented 
further evidence from ancient texts in response. These chapters of the Archaeologiae are essentially 
a continuation on this response in that they consist entirely of further evidence from ancient sources 
for his theory about the primitive earth’s axis. The first of these chapters is devoted solely to Plato, 
whose writings concerning the ages of Saturn and Jupiter clearly implied a right situation of the axis 
during the former period. The earth during the age of Saturn in Plato, Burnet points out, had 
spontaneous fertility, purer air, equality of seasons. Its inhabitants enjoyed great health and longevity, 
all things which follow from a right situation of the earth. Plato also supported the view that the 
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change in the earth’s position was brought about at the Deluge in that he described a great disaster 
at the transition from the age of Saturn to the age of Jupiter in which life on earth was all but 
extinguished. Other aspects of Burnet’s antediluvian earth were corroborated by Plato, too, in that he 
mentioned also a uniform, unbroken surface and subterraneous waters. He also supported a literal 
interpretation of St Peter on the threefold state of the earth and a “restitution” of the antediluvian 
state, since he wrote of a future earth similar to the first.113 
 The final chapter of the book continues in the same vein, referring to various other ancient 
writings and secondary literature in support of this antediluvian axis. Here Burnet cites several 
discussions of the Golden Age or Age of Saturn which refer to an equality of seasons. In Ovid, for 
example, we read that “[w]hen good old Saturn, banished from Above, was driv’n to Hell, the World 
was under Jove. Then Summer, Autumn, Winter did appear; And Spring was but a season of the Year”. 
Ancient writings on the Elysian Fields pointed to similar characteristics, that is, a perpetual spring, 
spontaneous fertility, longevity, equality of day and night, all things which indicate a perpendicular 
axis. Various Jewish, Arabic, and Christian writers had described a perpetual spring in their accounts 
of Paradise. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, for example, the inquisitor most famous for his role in the 
Galileo affair, had argued against the notion of Paradise being situated in Mesopotamia on the basis 
of several Church Fathers who had taught of a perpetual spring in Paradise. This, Bellarmine had 
argued, showed that none of the proposed locations of Paradise could be correct “unless the Course 
of the Sun had been different from what it is at present”. Transposing Bellarmine’s observation into 
the heliocentric system of his time, Burnet emphasises that this characteristic of Paradise can only be 
explained by supposing that “the Course of the Sun had been different from what it now is; or, which 
comes to the same Thing, there had been another situation of the Earth”.114 
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 By far the most interesting part of the Archaeologiae, and the part to which I shall devote the 
remainder of this section, is the last four chapters of this second book. It is here that we receive 
Burnet’s frequently promised explication of the Mosaic six-day Creation and what would be an 
immensely controversial exposition of the Mosaic doctrine of Paradise. His position on the former of 
course had already been made public two years earlier in the Review. His discussion in the 
Archaeologiae, however, is much longer and much more inflammatory in that he is far more intent on 
exposing the absurdity of a literal interpretation of Genesis 1. Indeed, his examination of Moses’ six-
day Creation in the Archaeologiae, consists essentially in demonstrating, as Warren had challenged 
him to do, that the Hexameron, if interpreted literally, implied numerous absurdities. Burnet’s 
objections to the literal sense of Moses fell essentially into two categories. The first set of objections 
pointed to various discrepancies between the Hexameron and our philosophical knowledge of the 
natural world. The second set emphasised various internal inconsistencies in the Mosaic account. 
 In the Review and in his replies to Warren, Burnet had repeatedly compared the six-day 
Creation with passages of Scripture that referred to the motion of the sun. Even the most orthodox 
divines, he had stressed, agree that the true philosophy and the heliocentric system of the world have 
amply demonstrated that such passages are not to be understood literally. Here too he appeals at 
length to the heliocentric system. Here, though, his appeals are rather different from those earlier 
appeals. In responding to Croft and Warren, he had invoked the heliocentric system primarily in order 
to give an example of passages of Scripture which are inconsistent with reason and philosophy and 
which it is generally agreed are not to be interpreted literally in order to show that it was 
unproblematic to recede from the literal sense of Scripture in such cases. In the Archaeologiae, 
however, he appeals to the heliocentric system as the central philosophical doctrine with which the 
six-day Creation is inconsistent.  
 According to the literal sense of Moses, he notes, the entire universe was created around 
6,000 years ago. Light was created prior to the sun or any other heavenly body. The earth was created 
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before the sun and stars. The latter were created solely to serve the earth. Both the earth and the sun 
and stars were formed from a single chaos. And this chaos filled the entire universe. This, he 
emphasises, “is what the very Letter of the Hexaemeron seems to import”.115 Yet according to the 
heliocentric model, the sun is at the centre of the planetary system, which would surely not be the 
case if the earth was the first body to have formed out of the chaos. If the earth was the first body to 
have formed and the chaos extended to the entire universe, moreover, then it would surely be much 
larger than it is. On the heliocentric model, the sun and stars are noble bodies. They were not created 
merely to serve the earth. Each star is located at the centre of its own vortex (as will become clear in 
the final chapter, Burnet never abandons the Cartesian philosophy), and so are highly unlikely to have 
been created from a single chaos. The appearance of new stars, moreover, indicates that their 
formation is wholly independent of the earth. And given the vast periods of comets, the idea that the 
entire universe was created only 6,000 years ago is implausible. And there can have been no light 
before the creation of the sun, for light must necessarily have a source.116 
 The internal inconsistencies in the Hexameron pertained mainly to the disproportionate 
amount of work that God purportedly completed on the various days of Creation. The work done on 
the first and second days, for example, was wholly disproportionate to the time taken and to the work 
done on the third day. The notion of super-celestial waters and the division of these from terrestrial 
waters was obscure. Typically, this was made sense of by supposing that the waters above the 
firmament referred to the clouds. Yet this, too, was problematic, since it implied that God spent an 
entire day merely creating a small amount of space. The amount of work completed on the fourth, 
fifth, and six days, on the other hand, was implausibly large. The creation of the sun, moon, and stars 
would surely take far longer than a day. The moon, moreover, should more plausibly have been 
created on the same day as the earth and other planets, since it, too, is a planet and not a star. And 
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given the perfect design of animal bodies, it was highly implausible to suppose that the entire animate 
world could be created in merely two days.117 
 From these two sets of objections, Burnet arrived at two sets of conclusions. The first 
concerned how the earth was in fact formed. This of course was the formation of the earth according 
to the theory. The Mosaic Epoch of roughly 6,000 years applies only to the earth, not the entire 
universe, the sun and the stars evidently being much older than the earth and therefore already extant 
at the time of the earth’s formation. The earth and other planets formed separately from their own 
chaoses in the manner described in the Theory and are very likely former stars and thus probably have 
fire at the centre.118 
 His second set of conclusions is especially interesting from an exegetical point of view and 
concerns the reasons why Moses gave this particular account of the formation of the world. Appealing 
again to the principle of accommodation, Burnet argues that Moses adapted his account, firstly, to 
suit the limited capacities of his audience, and secondly, to suit the purpose for which he was giving 
an account of the Creation. Moses’ account was not designed to teach the people, who were incapable 
of receiving a philosophical account of the Creation, about the true physical formation of the world, 
but to instil in them a belief in the true religion. The various aspects of the six-day Creation were 
contrived precisely for this end. That God created light on the first day is taught simply because the 
people were incapable of imagining how God could work in the dark. The separation of the waters 
above and below the firmament was not designed to impart knowledge of super-celestial waters but 
contrived to accommodate the mistaken apprehensions of the Jews who had no understanding of the 
natural processes that produce rain and believed it to be sent from heaven by some divine being. 
Condescending to such notions, Moses fabricated the idea of super-celestial waters in order to convey 
an appearance of God’s omnipotence. He spoke of the moon being created on the same day as the 
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sun and the stars to suit the “philosophy of the vulgar” which associates the moon with these other 
bodies. He made the sun, moon, and stars subservient to the earth to prevent idolatry. He did not 
distinguish between the earth and the wider universe because the “vulgar” did not distinguish 
between them. He made God rest on the seventh day in order that people observe the Sabbath. Most 
importantly, he described the earth at the Creation not as it actually was at that time but as it was at 
the time he wrote, for owing to their limited capacities, the Jews would have found the true form of 
the antediluvian earth wholly unintelligible.119 
 Following the above explication of the six-day Creation, Burnet devotes a chapter to 
anticipating and answering objections.120 The one to which he devotes most attention is the notion 
that Moses would not depart from the truth because truth is sacred. Burnet’s answer to this objection 
was an important part of what made the Archaeologiae so controversial, for here he states explicitly 
that Moses’ account of the Creation was expressly designed to deceive the Jews. This would seem to 
many to go beyond mere accommodation, for on this view, Moses was not merely condescending to 
the capacities of the Jews but actually lying to them. Burnet acknowledges that truth is sacred and 
admits that Moses departed from it. He argues, however, that there are many sacred things besides 
truth and that sacredness admits of degrees. Things are not simply sacred or not sacred but have 
greater and lesser degrees of sacredness in different contexts. Inevitably, in some contexts, different 
sacred things may conflict with one another. In such cases, the thing that possesses the greater degree 
of sacredness must be given priority. Truth is sacred, but so is preventing harm. If truth is harmful, 
then deception is necessary for preventing harm. In such cases, then, deception may be more sacred 
than truth. Applying this maxim to Moses, he argues that the physical truth about the formation of 
the earth would have been harmful, for had Moses told the truth about the formation of the earth, 
the people, not having the capacity to understand, would have dismissed and ridiculed him rather 
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than seeing him as a prophet and thus would have not been led to believe in the true religion. Moses 
made a kind of utilitarian calculation and gave the Jews the account of the Creation that would most 
benefit them, and this necessarily involved deceiving them.121 
 A further rejoinder that Burnet anticipates here is that if Moses was to instruct people 
incapable of receiving the truth about the Creation, then he would have been wiser to remain silent 
on the issue rather than deceiving them. Here again Burnet conceives of Moses’ decision to deceive 
the Jews in utilitarian terms. Not treating the issue at all, he contends, would have been more harmful 
even than giving a true account of the Creation. Here he draws on his history of ancient learning from 
the first book. The various pagan traditions to which the Jews had been exposed, he notes, all 
connected creation myths to their theogonies, and hence a system of religion was expected to include 
an account of the creation. Had Moses given no account of the Creation, then, the religion he was 
trying to teach would have appeared inadequate, and the people would instead have followed one of 
these other traditions. These traditions’ accounts of the creation were more contrary to the true 
religion than Moses’. Thus, he could “not pass by the Doctrine concerning the Original of the World, 
though in its Purity it cannot be explained to the Vulgar; but he digested and unfolded it in such a 
Method as might be most serviceable to Religion, and least burdensome to the Understanding of the 
People”.122 
 Turning now to Burnet’s controversial discussion of Genesis 2-3, one of the principal concerns 
here, as in his debate with Warren, was the rivers of Paradise. What is interesting here is that Burnet 
departs quite radically from his previous argument against Warren. There, as we have observed, he 
had argued that the rivers were destroyed at the Deluge and that the theory therefore vindicates a 
literal interpretation of Moses’ description of them because his description does not correspond to 
any rivers on the present earth. Here, in contrast, he claims that Moses’ description is entirely fictional. 
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The Church Fathers and theologians who had identified the four rivers Moses’ describes with the 
Ganges, Tigris, Nile, and Euphrates, he argues, contradicting his earlier position, were correct to do so. 
Yet this is not because they were the actual rivers of Paradise, but because Moses, giving a wholly 
fictional account of Paradise, simply named “four of the most celebrated and most fertile Rivers” on 
the present earth by way of illustration. Also interesting here is that Burnet invokes an argument made 
earlier by both Croft and Warren against the theory and brings it to bear on Moses’ description of the 
rivers. Moses’ description, he argues, must be fictional, because it would take time for rivers to form 
from vapours raised from the crust and so there could be no rivers this soon after the Creation.123  
 As with his exposition of the Hexameron, Burnet is intent here on showing conclusively that a 
literal interpretation of the Mosaic doctrine of Paradise in Genesis 2-3 is absurd. His main issues with 
a literal interpretation of Genesis 2 are the notion of Paradise being a single garden rather than the 
entire earth and the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib. The idea that a single small garden could be 
paradisiacal and the rest of the earth not was highly implausible, since the physical environment 
depends on the state of the air, which could not be restricted to a small area. As to the Creation of 
Eve, he maintains that this is highly counterintuitive if interpreted literally. If, in the beginning, Adam 
had the requisite number of ribs, then God must have maimed him by creating Eve, since the body is 
perfectly designed and therefore contains nothing superfluous. If, on the other hand, Adam had an 
extra rib from which God created Eve, then he was like a monster in the beginning when all things are 
said to have been perfect. A single rib, moreover, does not contain enough matter to create a woman. 
And yet if the rest of the matter used to create Eve was taken from elsewhere, then she cannot be 
said to have been made principally from Adam’s rib.124 
 Burnet’s assessment of Genesis 3 was much more scathing and would prove highly 
controversial. To begin with, he summarises the chapter, retelling the story in an especially sarcastic 
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tone which amounts effectively to a satirical treatment of a sacred text. The part that would be 
deemed most offensive, not just in his paraphrasis of Genesis but in the entire volume, is his summary 
of Eve’s dialogue with the serpent and God’s punishment. “Eve sitting solitary under the Tree without 
her Husband”, he writes, “there came to her a Serpent or Adder; which, though I know not by what 
means or power, civilly accosted the Woman”.125 “What do I hear!”, exclaims the serpent, “who is that 
God that envies his Creatures, the innocent Delights of Nature? Nothing is sweeter, nothing more 
wholesome than this very Fruit; why then should he forbid it, unless he were in jest?”.126 Upon eating 
the apple, Burnet continues, Adam and Eve “became both (I know not how) ashamed of their 
Nakedness, and sowing together Fig-leaves, made them a sort of Aprons to cover their punenda”.127 
Next comes God’s wrath, which is portrayed in a somewhat comedic manner reminiscent of an overly 
strict parent or schoolmaster scolding children and imposing unreasonably harsh punishments for 
what was ultimately a rather trivial transgression: 
You have finely ordered your Business, you and your Wife!... This Apple shall cost you dear, and not 
only you, but your Posterity, and the whole Race of Mankind. Moreover, for this Crime, I will curse and 
spoil the Heavens, the Earth, and the whole Fabrick of Nature. But thou, in the first place, vile Beast…, 
[h]ereafter thou shalt go creeping on thy Belly, and instead of eating Apples, shalt lick the Dust of the 
Earth. As for you Mrs. Curious, in Sorrow shall you bring forth Children…128 
 The above relation of Genesis 3 would be widely censured. Just as scathing, however, and 
therefore seen as equally heretical, was Burnet’s assessment of the literal sense of the text. Here every 
verse of the chapter is attacked. Serpents, he argues, cannot speak. Thus, Eve, rather than entering 
into dialogue with it, would surely have been greatly perturbed by its use of language. Or if serpents 
had this ability before the Fall, then their loss of language was surely a greater punishment than their 
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crawling on their bellies, and would surely have been mentioned by Moses.129 “[G]reat Sticklers for 
the literal Interpretation” typically dealt with these issues by supposing that the body of the serpent 
was merely a vehicle for the devil or some evil spirit. Yet there was no authority for such a reading, 
since nothing is mentioned of this in the text to whose literal sense they wish to adhere. Moreover, if 
the serpent was merely a medium through which the devil or an evil spirit acted, then the punishment 
inflicted on the serpent was surely unjust.130 God’s threat to Adam and Eve and his punishment made 
little sense, too. They were forbidden from eating from the tree on pain of death. Yet the warning of 
such a consequence could have no effect on their actions, for they had no experience of death and 
hence could not have known what it was.131 Upon eating the fruit, they sewed together fig leaves. Yet 
they could have had no needles or thread, “since the Thread-maker’s Art was not yet found out, nor 
yet the Art of working in Iron”.132 Perhaps most importantly, the consequences inflicted by God, not 
merely on our first parents but the entire human race, were wholly disproportionate to the crime 
committed.133 
 From these and numerous other absurdities in the literal interpretation, Burnet concludes 
that the Mosaic doctrine of Paradise, like the Hexameron, is essentially a fictional account delivered 
by Moses in a style suited to the capacities of his audience and was designed for purposes other than 
giving a true account of events in the beginning. One of the most interesting things about Burnet’s 
assessment of these chapters of Genesis is that, for all its heterodoxy, he was ultimately engaged in a 
practice which, as I have noted in chapter one, was widespread and quite uncontroversial in the 
seventeenth century. That is, he was engaging in a critical reading of Scripture, assessing sacred texts 
in essentially the same way as one would assess any other historical document. He is quite explicit 
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about this. In any other author, he notes, we would not accept such absurdities uncritically. “Great is 
the Force of Custom and a pre-conceived Opinion, over human Minds”, he laments, 
[w]herefore these short Observations or Accounts of the first Originals of Men and Things, which we 
receive from the Mouth of Moses, are embraced without the least Demur or Examination of them. But 
had we read the same Doctrine in another, for Example, in a Greek Philosopher, or in a Rabbinical or 
Mahometan Doctor, we should have stopped at every Period with our Mind full of Objections and 
Scruples.134 
We are uncritical of Moses, he assesses, because he was divinely inspired. His being divinely inspired, 
however, is not a sufficient reason to interpret him literally. We need not doubt that Moses was 
divinely inspired to question the intent and style of his account. Numerous other passages in Scripture 
are evidently adapted to the capacities of their audience and are clearly intended for purposes other 
than giving a true account of things. “And if in this Rank you place the Narration we have now in Hand, 
preserving always the good Name and Honour of the Author, I shall not think it amiss”.135 
Although he is arguing for a non-literal reading of the text, then, his methods are very much 
derived from the Protestant literalism discussed in chapter one, for he is treating Scripture as a 
historical document, assessing it on the basis of such considerations as the intent of the author and 
the nature of his intended audience. As with the conclusions he draws from his examination of the six-
day Creation, it is these two concerns that guide his assessment of why Moses gave this fictional 
account of Paradise. The excessive punishment for Adam’s seemingly insignificant crime, he suggests 
for example, was likely contrived by Moses in order to instil deference to his laws.136 Eve being created 
from Adam’s rib was most plausibly invented to create a stronger bond between the sexes in order to 
recommend the institution of marriage.137 Most important for Burnet’s theory, however, was the 
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question of why Moses described only a single garden rather than the entire earth as being 
paradisiacal. Again, his answer to this question derives from his consideration of Moses’ intentions 
and certain facts about his audience, for whom a discussion about the different constitution of the 
earth in the beginning would have been unintelligible and would have hindered his purpose. Rather 
than teach them that the entire earth in the beginning was of a different constitution, then, 
Moses puts the Part for the Whole, and laid one Example before the Eyes of the People, instead of a 
greater Number; because it was more suitable to the Genius and Understanding of the Vulgar, to 
conceive a pleasant Garden or single Field, than that, the whole Globe of the Earth should put on a new 
Face and new Nature entirely different from what we now enjoy.138 
The final chapter of this final book of the Archaeologiae is dedicated to justifying the above 
arguments against a literal interpretation of the Hexameron and Paradise. Here Burnet makes four 
key points. The first concerns the style of both scriptural and other ancient writers. Pagan, sacred, and 
Judeo-Christian writers, he notes, have frequently observed a “twofold” doctrine of teaching the 
learned and the common people in different styles. Varro, for example, divided ancient theology into 
three parts, the fabulous, civil, and philosophical, advocating the civil method for teaching the 
common people as a middle way between the fabulous, which was harmful, and the philosophical, 
which was of no use to the multitude.139 Pythagoras taught two different systems of philosophy 
depending on his pupils’ capacities.140 The same twofold practice had been employed in Christian 
teaching. The primitive Church, for instance, distinguished between the Catechumen and the learned, 
employing different methods for each in their teachings.141 The Apostles made similar distinctions 
when teaching Doctrine. And Christ kept things from his disciples which he deemed to be beyond their 
understanding.142 An interesting aside here is that Burnet was consciously employing this method 
                                                          
138 Burnet (1736a [1692]), 9-10. 
139 Burnet (1736a [1692]), 68-9. 
140 Burnet (1736a [1692]), 69-70. 
141 Burnet (1736a [1692]), 70. 
142 Burnet (1736a [1692]), 70. 
182 
 
himself in this very work, which he insisted on writing only in Latin because the subject was unsuitable 
for the “Vulgar”. This, as Peter Harrison points out, is evident in Burnet’s other work.143 In a 
posthumously published essay entitled Hell torments not eternal. Argumentatively proved, from the 
attribute of divine mercy, for example, in which he argues that eternal damnation is contrary to the 
nature of God, he warns that “the People, too easily prone to Vice, but not so easily terrified from Evil, 
must have… the commonly received Doctrine”.144 As Harrison argues, Burnet ”was committed to the 
view that the masses required traditional, if erroneous religious beliefs to keep them from straying 
from the path of virtue”.145 Moses, in his view, shared this principle, and gave the Jews a false story of 
the Creation and first humans because a true account would have been harmful. 
The second point Burnet makes concerns the capacities of the Jews. These, he argues, had 
been affected by four hundred years of servitude. They had also been schooled in the idolatry of a 
heathen nation, lessons which they needed to unlearn. They were thus wholly incapable of receiving 
the truth about natural and divine things and it would have confounded Moses’ purpose to deliver it 
to them. It was for the same reason that he did not teach them of the immortality of the soul, 
something of which he was surely not ignorant. “If Moses”, then, 
(for fear of Disdain and Contempt) durst not open the Springs of a future Life and Immortality which it 
so much concerns all Men to know; how much less had it become a wise Man to expose himself and 
his Laws to the same Inconveniences and Dangers upon the Account of some philosophical Doctrines 
which were not necessary, and would have been, odious to the People.146 
Burnet’s third point consists of a brief survey of how the Church Fathers had interpreted 
Moses on these issues. Many, he notes, had interpreted Moses in precisely the same way. Eusebius, 
for example, had stated likewise that a true account of the origin of things would not have served 
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Moses’ purpose, that his public teachings were adapted for the common people, and that he privately 
related a true, philosophical account of these things to the learned. Responding to Celcus’ objections 
concerning the implausibility of Christian teachings, Origen had answered that Moses taught the 
common people in accordance with their capacities, concealing higher matters which he reserved for 
those better equipped to receive them. And countering Julian’s preference for the Platonic account of 
the Creation over the Mosaic account, Celsus urged that Moses was prevented by the capacities of his 
audience from giving a true, philosophical account, and that he adapted his account for his purpose, 
which was not to teach them of the true origin of things but to instil belief in a single God distinct from 
all things in order to combat idolatry.147 
Burnet’s final point deserves special attention, for it relates in interesting ways both to his 
debate with Croft and Warren and to certain of Burnet’s Cambridge Platonist and Latitudinarian 
principles discussed in chapter two. Both Croft and Warren had claimed that departing from the literal 
sense of Moses was conducive to irreligion. In his Review and responses to Warren, Burnet’s main line 
of defence was to argue that interpreting Scripture in ways that conflict with reason and philosophy 
is for more conducive to irreligion than leaving the literal sense of the texts. At the end of the 
Archaeologiae, Burnet introduces a new and decidedly Cambridge Platonist- and Latitudinarian-
inspired argument from the nature of God. God, he notes, is infinitely perfect. When interpreting 
Scripture, then, we must admit of anything that is unworthy of an infinitely perfect being. If 
understood literally, many of God’s actions in both the Hexameron and the Mosaic doctrine of 
Paradise are unbecoming of such a being. The disproportionate assignment of tasks to days in the 
Hexameron, for instance, is contrary to his wisdom. The disproportionate punishment for Adam’s sin 
is unworthy of his goodness.148 
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By interpreting these chapters of Genesis literally, then, we impute actions to God that are 
unworthy of his nature. This in Burnet’s view is conducive to irreligion. In arguing this he points to 
several examples of early opponents of Christianity who had used a literal interpretation of Moses to 
argue that the Christian God’s actions are unbecoming of an infinitely perfect deity. Simplicius and 
Celcus, for example, had argued that the Creation according to the Mosaic account seemed most inept 
and unbefitting a supposedly divine intelligence. Regarding the doctrine of Paradise, Julian had urged 
that Eve’s dialogue with a serpent and numerous other aspects of the Mosaic doctrine were no 
different from Greek fables, and that the expulsion of Adam from Paradise was unjust and unworthy 
of the Christian God’s supposed divine nature.149 “You see here”, Burnet emphasises, 
what Offence is taken by the Heathen Philosophers at those Things, because they supposed them to be 
unworthy of God, and of a Religion which came from Heaven; that is, if we adhere to the Skin or Bark 
of the Words. Therefore, I think, that Interpretation ought to be commended which removes this 
Odium, these Scandals from our Religion.150 
Underpinning both this argument and this book of the Archaeologiae more generally are 
various notably Cambridge Platonist and Latitudinarian principles. This particular argument 
exemplifies the emphasis on God’s wisdom and goodness and the anti-voluntarism that results from 
this emphasis. It is simply not possible in Burnet’s view for God to act in the ways that are implied by 
a literal interpretation of Genesis 1-3. The law of God’s wisdom and goodness prevents it. Also 
important here is the emphasis on the fundamentals of Christianity and their priority over inessential 
doctrines. The chief fundamental tenet of the Christian religion for Burnet is this conception of God’s 
nature. Literal interpretations of these chapters of Genesis are inessentials, and to the extent that 
these inessentials conflict with the fundamentals, they must necessarily be abandoned. Important 
here also is the use of reason in religion, for this conception of God’s essential nature is derived not 
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merely from revelation but equally from rational reflection about God’s essential attributes. This tenet 
of Cambridge Platonism and Latitudinarianism is of course exemplified throughout the work. So, too, 
is the essential compatibility of reason and Scripture. Indeed, this principle is taken much further here 
than in the work of any Cambridge Platonist or Latitudinarian. For Burnet, a consistent application of 
this principle resulted in a conclusion that few Christians would be willing to accept, for in order to 
reconcile Scripture with reason in his view, the literal truth of the first three chapters of Genesis had 
to be abandoned. 
The final thing to discuss before concluding this section is the influence of Burnet’s debate 
with Croft and Warren on the Archaeologiae. Although it is not easy to discern the precise extent of 
this influence, it appears arguably to have been quite considerable. Many of the points that Burnet 
discusses at length in the work seem to have been motivated in large part by this debate. Burnet’s 
literal interpretation of St Peter, which he goes to great lengths to vindicate in chapters two and three 
of the second book, had been disputed by Croft. The perpendicularity of the antediluvian earth’s axis, 
for which he adduces a wealth of new textual evidence in the final two chapters of the same book, 
had been attacked by Warren, who had argued that Burnet’s view on this was not well supported by 
human history. And he alludes to both Croft and Warren at various points in this book, referring for 
example to Croft’s interpretation of St Peter and Warren’s argument concerning the ancients’ 
ignorance of the cause of the change in the earth’s axis.151 As to the first book, this as Dimitri Levitin 
has argued was evidently the result of an extensive program of reading in the history of philosophy 
and theology in the first years of the 1690s, which as Levitin shows is evidenced by Burnet’s heavily 
self-annotated copy of the 1689 Latin edition of the Theory.152 The application of this reading in the 
second book of the Archaeologiae to the problems posed by Croft and Warren may be an indication 
                                                          
151 Burnet (1736c [1692]), 19, 34, 36-7 76-7. 
152 Levitin (2015), 183-4. 
186 
 
that he was motivated in part by these debates to engage in such research, but this must remain a 
matter of conjecture. 
Assessing the influence of these debates on those inflammatory final few chapters of book 
two is also difficult. We know of course that both Burnet’s interpretation of the six-day Creation and 
his intention to produce a treatise on the subject predate Croft’s and Warren’s attacks. Nevertheless, 
in his treatment of this topic, Burnet is very much intent on demonstrating the absurdity of a literal 
reading of Moses, something Warren had explicitly challenged him to do. So while his interpretation 
of Genesis and his producing the work do not result from this debate, this particular aspect of it was 
likely motivated in part by Warren’s challenge. It is likely that Burnet’s view of the Mosaic doctrine of 
Paradise also predates this debate, for as we have seen, this interpretation was based on principles 
that he had held for a long time. His intention to write about the topic, however, is not stated either 
in the Theory, the Review, or his replies to Warren, and so his treatment of this topic in the 
Archaeologiae may have been influenced in part by Warren’s frequent appeals to these chapters of 
Genesis in the Geologia and in his subsequent rejoinders to Burnet’s replies. This too, however, is 
merely a plausible conjecture. We cannot be sure of Warren’s influence here. What can be reliably 
inferred, however, is that the general tone of this book of the Archaeologiae was heavily coloured by 
this debate with Warren. Throughout this debate, we witness Burnet becoming steadily more 
impatient with Warren’s appeals to a literal interpretation of these chapters of Genesis, and this 
frustration is clearly evident in the caustic tone of this book. It was this tone as well as the book’s 
content that made it so controversial, and so this increasingly hostile dispute in which Burnet was 
engaged while writing the work surely had an effect on the finished product itself and consequently 
on its reception among the reading public and therefore played an important role in bringing about 




These early debates with Croft and Warren, then, are important for understanding the controversy 
that I shall be discussing in the next chapter, for these debates played important roles in shaping the 
Archaeologiae, the work which ultimately uncovered the heterodox implications of Burnet’s theory 
and exposed it to much wider and more thorough scrutiny than it had received during the decade of 
its publication. The central motivation for this scrutiny and the attacks on the theory which it 
engendered would be Burnet’s interpretation of Genesis 1-3 and his unpalatable conclusion that 
Moses essentially lied to the Jews about the Creation and Paradise. As we shall see, this interpretation 
would not only be attacked but would inspire a number of new theories in which authors endeavoured 
to give a philosophical account of the earth’s history which would vindicate a more literal 
interpretation these chapters. 
In interpreting these chapters as he did, Burnet very much embodied the post-Reformation 
approach to Scripture in that he treated Moses’ account as any other historical document, assessing 
the author’s intentions and the audience for which the texts were written, and concluding from this 
assessment that they are not a true account of the Creation and Paradise. Also important to note is 
that, although Burnet argues for a non-literal interpretation of these texts, this interpretation 
nevertheless embodies the Protestant literalism in Harrison’s broad sense of “determinacy of 
meaning”. There was in his view a single, correct interpretation of these texts, and this was a fictional 
one. The six-day Creation and the doctrine of Paradise were literally fictions. This in his view was the 
only way these texts could be reconciled with reason, the nature of God, and other texts of Scripture 
and the numerous pagan writings which he wanted to interpret literally in a narrower sense and which 
he believed contained important philosophical truths. This view that there was philosophical 
knowledge in numerous other ancient texts, not only sacred but also heathen, but not in Moses, would 
prove highly controversial. As John Woodward, whose alternative theory of the earth I shall discuss in 
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the next chapter, would point out, Burnet seemed to believe “that all the antient nations… were 
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4. The Burnet controversy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The appearance of the Archaeologiae saw Burnet become the subject of increased attention and 
marked the beginning of the “Burnet controversy” which lasted from its publication until the first 
decade of the eighteenth century. It should be noted here that many historians define the controversy 
rather differently as beginning essentially with the publication of the Theory’s first volume and 
consider the pre-Archaeologiae attacks of Croft and Warren to have been part of it. Marjorie Nicolson, 
Rhoda Rappaport, and Kerry Magruder, for example, discuss these works under the head of the Burnet 
controversy.1 Michael Macklem, too, in his list of contributions to the controversy, includes these early 
attacks.2 Yet as I discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter, the general opinion of Burnet’s 
theory at this earlier time was largely positive, and the relatively few attacks published before the 
Archaeologiae hardly warrant the title of “controversy”. Macklem’s list is in fact highly illustrative of 
this, for if we discount works by Burnet himself, only seven of the remaining twenty-nine titles were 
written before the Archaeologiae.3 One of these is Newton’s letter to Burnet which, though 
characterised by Macklem as purely critical, was largely sympathetic and part of what is better 
described as a cordial exchange of letters than anything controversial. Another is a 1686 paper by 
Edmond Halley which has nothing at all to do with either Burnet or the Theory.4 This takes the total 
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down to just five out of twenty-seven. Macklem’s list, moreover, omits many post-Archaeologiae 
works involved in the controversy – several of these will be discussed below.5 
 The controversy has been well documented, historians having examined at length many of 
the major contributions to it in a variety of contexts.6 What is lacking, however, is a broad, concise, 
and comprehensive (that is, as comprehensive as is possible in the space of a single chapter of a PhD 
thesis) overview of the controversy, and this is what I aim to provide here. To this end, I discuss all the 
major contributions to the debate as well as some of the more minor ones and some which have been 
overlooked by historians. My approach here is broad-brushed, the aim being to give the reader an 
idea of the extent of the debate rather than discuss the numerous contributions in detail, something 
that would require much more space than I have here, and I refer the reader to more detailed 
discussion in secondary literature where such literature is available. The only exceptions here are two 
texts which I examine in some detail in the penultimate and final sections. The first is a manuscript in 
the Royal Society archives which has received almost no attention from historians and which is 
particularly important in that it contains an especially novel objection to Burnet’s theory and elicited 
a reply from Burnet himself. The second is an apocalyptic work by Edward Waple which draws heavily 
on Burnet’s theory of the Conflagration and illustrates nicely how the Theory’s second volume was 
ultimately far less controversial than the first. The most important contributions to the controversy 
for our purposes are those of the Newtonians William Whiston and John Keill. The importance of 
Whiston’s New theory of the earth lies in the extent to which it was influenced by Burnet, something 
which has not been sufficiently appreciated by historians. Keill’s work is significant because it is the 
only post-Archaeologiae attack on Burnet to have elicited a published reply from him. It is also widely 
regarded to have brought the controversy to a close. These will be mentioned only briefly in this 
chapter and discussed extensively in the next two chapters. 
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 The chapter consists of six main sections. In the first section, I discuss the reception of the 
Archaeologiae and the main published attacks on the work that appeared in the 1690s and early 
1700s. In section two, I turn my attention to the major attacks on the Theory that followed the 
publication of the Archaeologiae. In the third section, I attend to some alternative theories of the 
earth proposed during this time by some of Burnet’s critics and to various authors’ responses to these 
theories. Section four is dedicated to briefly discussing some works which were not primarily 
dedicated to Burnet or theories of the earth but in which discussion of these topics appears. In the 
fifth section I examine some unpublished writings on the subject. Many such writings exist, and so I 
limit my attention to the aforementioned Royal Society manuscript and to the correspondence of John 
Locke which, I argue, is illustrative of the general interest of late-seventeenth-century thinkers in 
Burnet and theories of the earth among authors who had little public involvement in the debate. 
Finally, section six is devoted to the reception of the Theory’s second volume and the question of why 
this volume, unlike the first, did not elicit any significant controversy. 
4.2. The reception of the Archaeologiae 
Unlike the Theory, the Archaeologiae was immediately highly controversial. Facing heavy criticism, 
Burnet attempted to recant his views in a letter – probably written to his patron and Archbishop of 
Canterbury John Tillotson – pleading that “if I have expressed myself either in so crude or sharp a 
Manner, as to offend the wise and pious, I am willing that all such Passages should be looked upon as 
retracted”.7 He also wrote to his bookseller, requesting that the offensive parts be removed from 
future editions. Burnet had apparently been favoured by Tillotson as his successor as Archbishop. The 
controversy over the Archaeologiae, however, was such that when Tillotson died in 1694 and Burnet 
was considered for the Archbishopric, several Bishops intervened protesting that his ideas were too 
heterodox and another divine, the Latitudinarian Bishop of Lincoln Thomas Tennison, was appointed 
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instead. Shortly after this, Burnet was forced to resign as Clerk of the Closet and returned to his 
position at the Charterhouse.8 
By this time, Burnet’s name had become thoroughly associated with heterodoxy. This was 
largely due to the actions of the notorious deist and freethinker Charles Blount. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, Blount had earlier quoted Burnet alongside such heterodox thinkers as Thomas 
Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza in his controversial pamphlet Miracles, no violation of the laws of nature.9 
In the year following the publication of the Archaeologiae, he published a collection of letters entitled 
Oracles of reason in which he included both a defence of Burnet and English translations of the 
Archaeologiae’s controversial chapters on the Hexameron and Paradise. Here Burnet’s views were 
translated and defended alongside defences of pre-Adamism, Epicureanism, materialism, eternalism, 
and various other heretical ideas.10 
The first published response to the Archaeologiae came from John Edwards, an Anglican 
clergyman and vocal opponent of the heliocentric system who in the opening chapter of the second 
volume of his 1693 book A discourse concerning the authority, stile, and perfection of the books of the 
Old and New-Testament launched a brief, polemical attack on Burnet in which he highlighted various 
dangers of departing too radically from the literal truth of the Mosaic history of the Creation and 
Paradise.11 Especially troubling for Edwards was Burnet’s appeal to the interpretations of the Church 
Fathers in justifying his own, for where the Fathers had indeed allegorised certain passages, they had 
paired their allegorical readings with historical ones.12 Burnet, on the other hand, had claimed 
explicitly and unambiguously that there was no truth whatsoever in the Mosaic history, that it was 
merely a fable designed to deceive the Jews. While Edwards allowed that the Sacred writers 
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sometimes accommodate their teachings to the limited capacities and mistaken apprehensions of 
their audience, Burnet had in his view stretched the principle too far in denying the truth of what was 
clearly intended as a history of the formation of the earth and the first humans.13 
A more substantial and considered response to the Archaeologiae appeared three years later 
in the first volume of the theologian and Rector of Selsey William Nicholls’ Conference with a theist, a 
three-part dialogue in which a character named Philologus presents Nicholls’ mouthpiece Credentius 
with various heterodox arguments which are promptly confuted by the latter. Parts two and three of 
this volume deal with the Creation and Fall and consist almost entirely of Philologus advancing 
precisely the same arguments that Burnet had put forward in the Archaeologiae concerning the 
apparent absurdity in a literal reading of Genesis and Credentius removing the various difficulties in 
order to maintain such a reading.14 On the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib, for example, Philologus 
repeats almost verbatim Burnet’s argument in the Archaeologiae, noting, for instance, the difficulty 
of Adam either being deformed in the beginning or maimed following the creation of Eve and the 
insufficient quantity of matter in a single rib.15 Against Philologus – and ultimately Burnet – Credentius 
replies that had Adam lacked a rib following Eve’s creation, then God could have furnished him with 
another. Neither did his having an additional rib in the beginning imply that he was deformed, for the 
rib was not superfluous but necessary for the creation of Eve.16 As to the problem regarding matter, 
Credentius appeals to the creation of plants from seeds: “if you will be pleased to think but of an 
Acorn, or Mustard-seed”, he tells Philologus, “you will never use that Argument more”.17 
A similar approach to the Archaeologiae was taken by John Witty in his 1705 work An essay 
towards a vindication of the vulgar exposition of the Mosaic history of the fall of Adam. Witty’s Essay 
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is not a dialogue like Nicholls’ Conference but consists of a series of letters. It also has a narrower remit 
in that it deals only with the Fall and not the Creation and discusses fewer issues and does so in greater 
depth. The work is nevertheless very similar in that it consists principally of Witty introducing specific 
objections to the literal interpretation of Genesis 3 and answering those objections in order to defend 
that interpretation. Like Nicholls, the objections Witty introduces are taken primarily from the 
Archaeologiae, and the answers that he gives are the largely same.18 In answering Burnet’s objections 
concerning Eve’s dialogue with the serpent, for example, both authors insist that the serpent was the 
devil, and both cite the same passages of Scripture in support of their claim and against Burnet’s 
assertion that there is no scriptural support for this interpretation.19 
 The primary motivation for these authors’ responses to the Archaeologiae was the 
appearance of Burnet’s chapters on the Creation and Paradise in English translation and the defence 
of Burnet in Blount’s Oracles. Edwards even went so far as to attribute Blount’s death that year to his 
having promoted Burnet’s views: “a remarkable Example of the Divine Justice!”, he noted,  
on the bold Gentleman who lately englished that part of the Doctor's Book which derides 
the 3d Chapter of Genesis… I wish the ingenious Theorist would seriously reflect upon it, and learn 
thence to make Sport with the Bible no more.20 
All three authors acknowledged that Burnet had not intended to attack revealed religion.21 Ultimately, 
however, his work, and in particular these chapters of the Archaeologiae, was being employed by 
deists and atheists for precisely this purpose. While both chapters were problematic, the one 
concerning Paradise, and specifically the part that dealt with the Fall, was especially pernicious, for as 
Edwards and Witty both argued, if the Mosaic history of the Fall in Genesis 3 is not literally true, then 
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the Redemption and coming of Christ, that is, the very foundation of the Christian religion, will be 
undermined.22 
The two “englished” chapters of Burnet’s Archaeologiae were certainly not the most 
heterodox part of Blount’s Oracles. As I noted above, the work contained several more dangerous 
ideas. What set the chapters of the Archaeologiae apart from the rest of the work was not so much 
their content but the status of their author. Other views promoted by Blount were taken chiefly from 
philosophers. In contrast, Burnet was an Anglican clergyman, and high profile one, possibly even in 
line to become the next Archbishop of Canterbury. His position in the church thus gave his views on 
Genesis a level of authority which could be highly damaging in the hands of freethinkers who sought 
to discredit revealed religion. “This Theorist”, wrote Edwards, 
is become much more pleasing to them [atheists and deists] than Mr. Hobbs. This new Archaeologist is 
far more taking than the Leviathan, because he nips the Bible more closely, and also because he is not 
(as the other) a Layman, but a professed Divine, and that of the Church of England. This makes his 
Enterprize so acceptable to these Men; for now they have a Clergyman to vouch them; they have the 
Warranty of a Churchman.23 
4.3. Attacks on the Theory 
As controversial as the text undoubtedly was, the number of published replies to the Archaeologiae 
was relatively small compared with those directed primarily at the Theory. Crucially, the controversy 
surrounding the Archaeologiae drew renewed attention to the Theory. The text also alerted readers 
to the Theory’s implications for revealed religion, implications which were not readily apparent in the 
Theory itself. As a result, the number of replies to the Theory that appeared from 1692 onwards far 
eclipsed the number produced during the decade that followed its publication. Additionally, the focus 
of the debate shifted away from scriptural issues and toward more philosophical concerns. Earlier 
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critics like Croft and Warren were most concerned with the former. In replying to these critics in the 
Review, the responses to Warren, and the Archaelogiae, Burnet had made it clear his theory did indeed 
contradict certain passages of Scripture and argued that these passages should not be understood in 
their literal sense. Pointing out its incompatibility with Scripture therefore became a far less effective 
way of attacking it, since it had become clear to all that Burnet was prepared to deny the truth of 
these passages of Scripture in order to defend it. While the theory’s conflict with Scripture was still 
discussed and was still one of the main reasons for the attacks, it was no longer the main focus of 
them. Rather, authors turned their attention to its philosophical problems. This approach which 
typified post-Archaeologiae attacks on the theory and the motivation for this approach are summed 
up nicely by Keill. “THERE are two sort of Arguments”, he writes in the conclusion to his devastating 
attack on Burnet, 
that may be brought against the Theory, the one depends only on the principles of Reason and 
Philosophy, and the other on the Authority of the writings of Moses: but these which might be gathered 
from Moses would be of no force against the Theorist; since he denyes the truth of his narrations, which 
he imagines to be invented by that excellent Lawgiver to please and amuse the Jews: I have therefore 
in this Treatise only made use of Arguments which are drawn from Philosophy, which he cannot refuse 
to admit since he appeals to them, for the Truth of his own Hypothesis.24 
These post-Archaeologiae philosophical objections to the theory fell essentially into two 
categories. The first of these was concerned with final causes. These objections pointed to evidence 
of design in the present earth, the purpose being to undermine Burnet’s view that the earth’s present 
features are the result of accidental changes brought about at the Deluge and that the antediluvian 
earth was of a different form. The second kind of objection concerned efficient causes. These took 
issue with the particular processes that Burnet had proposed for the Creation and Deluge and 
attempted to show that the causes to which Burnet attributed these events were insufficient to bring 
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about their purported effects. An early example of the first kind of objection was the final sermon of 
philologist and classical scholar Richard Bentley’s 1692 Boyle Lectures, delivered in December of that 
year and published the following year. Though not explicitly framed as an attack on Burnet, it is clear 
from the content of the sermon that the theory was Bentley’s principal target. The overall aim of the 
sermon was to prove the existence of God from the form and situation of the earth. Bentley’s method 
was to consider various facts about the earth and to imagine the kind of situation that would obtain if 
things were different than they are. If, given these counterfactual conditions, our situation would be 
worse, then it could be concluded that God designed the earth in its present state for the purpose of 
supporting life.25 
After briefly considering the earth’s distance from the sun and its orbit and diurnal rotation, 
Bentley devoted the larger share of his sermon to those features of the earth that Burnet had claimed 
manifested no evidence of divine contrivance and had attributed instead to the dissolution of the crust 
at the Deluge. Against Burnet, Bentley listed numerous advantages of the present earth’s oblique 
situation relative to the ecliptic and various geological phenomena, arguing that, had the earth been 
in its antediluvian state according to the theory, then human life would be greatly impoverished.26 The 
implication for Burnet’s theory was that the earth was designed by God in its present state, and that 
the antediluvian earth’s form and situation were therefore no different from those of the present 
earth. 
This same implication was stated more explicitly against the theory by Edwards in his 1696 
book A demonstration of the existence and providence of God, from the contemplation of the visible 
structure of the greater and the lesser world. Edwards, having as we have seen already attacked the 
Archaeologiae three years earlier, took aim in this work at the Theory, arguing that evidence of design 
in the oblique course of the sun (Edwards, recall, subscribed to a geocentric model of the universe) 
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and in the earth’s mountains and seas clearly refutes Burnet’s view that the antediluvian earth lacked 
these characteristics.27 
 Other replies to the Theory placed greater emphasis on efficient causes. In his 1697 book The 
abyssinian philosophy confuted, the Scottish author Robert St Clair questioned Burnet’s account of the 
Creation. He argued that after the heavier matter and fluid had subsided there would not have been 
enough matter in the air to form the crust. Even if there was sufficient matter, the right angle of the 
axis would surely prevent the heat of the sun from consolidating the crust at the poles. At the very 
least, then, the crust would have hardened at the equator long before the polar regions which would 
have disrupted its continuity, causing the equatorial region to sink and the softer polar regions to 
rise.28 St Clair also translated into English the Italian physician Bernardino Ramazzini’s Of the wonderful 
springs of Modena in which Ramazzini had claimed that Burnet’s theory was not original but in fact 
revived, and was likely derived from, an ancient “abyssinian” myth, an observation from which St Clair 
derived the title of his book.29 
Another author who took issue with Burnet’s account of the Creation was the Oxford 
theologian Samuel Parker. In his essay “The foundations of Dr. Burnet’s theory of the earth”, a 
dialogue between “Philalethes” and “Burnetianus” published in 1700, Parker questioned Burnet’s 
assumption that the chaos was a fluid mass, arguing that if instead it was simply a mass of atoms, then 
the parts of the chaos would attach together in larger masses, creating a mountainous surface rather 
than Burnet’s uniform one. Even if the chaos was fluid, he added further, echoing Newton’s earlier 
suggestions about the origin of mountains in his correspondence with Burnet, heat from the central 
fire would cause chemical reactions in the fluid, resulting in both vacuities and inequalities. Thus, 
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Burnet’s claim that the antediluvian earth was of a different form from the present, the main 
foundation of his theory, was undermined.30 
 The two most substantial replies to the Theory to be published during the 1690s employed a 
combination of arguments concerning both final and efficient causes. The most significant and 
ultimately damaging of these was Keill’s 1698 work An examination of Dr. Burnet's theory of the earth, 
which I shall discuss at length in the final chapter. A similar work and the first book-length attack on 
the Theory to appear after the Archaeologiae was the Somerset naturalist John Beaumont’s 
Considerations on a book, entituled the theory of the earth, published in 1693. In this book, Beaumont 
examined the first two books of the Theory in their entirety, discussing and confuting each chapter in 
turn. Against Burnet’s account of the Creation, he argued following Newton and anticipating Parker 
that chemical “ferments” in a fluid chaos would produce mountains.31 To his explanation of the 
Deluge, he replied that the sun’s heat could not penetrate the abyss, pointing out that the 
temperature in caves does not vary with the seasons.32 To the purported change in the earth’s axis at 
the Deluge, he noted that the mass of the earth’s surface is extremely small relative to the size of the 
earth and that such a minor change would therefore be insufficient to alter the planet’s posture.33 And 
against the supposed differences between the antediluvian and present earth he pointed at length to 
the numerous advantages of the latter’s characteristics and the various deleterious effects that would 
result from their absence.34 He also dedicated considerable space to casting doubt on the evidentiary 
value of Burnet’s frequent appeals to ancient learning, stressing that “every trifling ungrounded 
Opinion is not to be lookt upon as a Tradition”.35 
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4.4. New theories and their opponents 
Both Keill and Beaumont maintained that the Creation and Deluge were wholly miraculous and as 
such were not amenable to philosophical explanation.36 Other critics of Burnet proposed alternative 
philosophical theories of the earth. Some focussed predominantly on the Deluge. John Woodward, 
professor of physic at Gresham College, published his Essay toward a natural history of the earth in 
1695. Woodward contended that at the Deluge, after the water had risen from the abyss and covered 
the earth, God suspended gravity. This caused all inorganic matter to disintegrate and mix with the 
water, reducing the earth to a great mass of fluid. Following the Deluge, the particles of matter 
descended in order of their specific gravity, forming the present earth’s strata. Originally horizontal, 
the strata were uplifted and depressed to form mountains and valleys. Plants and animals suspended 
in the fluid also descended according to their specific gravity and became petrified in the strata. That 
they did not disintegrate along with the rest of the earth’s matter Woodward attributed to their being 
held together by fibres rather than attraction as is the case with inorganic matter.37 
Though Woodward did not give an account of the Creation, he did discuss at length the 
antediluvian earth and the differences between it and the present earth. Against Burnet, he argued 
on many of the same grounds detailed above that the earth before the Deluge had seas, mountains, 
metals, and minerals, and that its axis was oblique and not perpendicular to the ecliptic.38 He also 
advanced several arguments on the basis of fossils. That the antediluvian earth had seas and that 
antediluvian seas were of similar proportions to those on the present earth, for example, was evinced 
in his view by the numerous fossilised remains of marine animals found in the strata which were 
evidently suspended in it during its dissolution at the Deluge.39 
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 Another attempt at an alternative philosophical explication of the Deluge was published the 
following year by Archibald Lovell, a pensioner of the Charterhouse where Burnet was Master. 
Dedicated to the governors of the Charterhouse in the hope of their protection from the “Censure and 
Mallice” of the Master, Lovell’s essay A summary of material heads which may be enlarged and 
improved into a compleat answer to Dr. Burnet's theory of the earth was as its title makes clear 
presented primarily as a response to Burnet rather than an alternative theory.40 His principal concern 
about the theory, echoing to an extent that of Edwards and Witty regarding the Archaeologiae, was 
that in making the earth paradisiacal until the Deluge rather than the Fall, Burnet had undermined the 
doctrine of Original Sin and with it the Redemption.41 To confute Burnet, Lovell attempted to show 
that the Deluge could be accounted for without either the supposition that the antediluvian earth was 
of a radically different form or recourse to miraculous intervention from God. To this end, he proposed 
that the Deluge was caused by the earth’s bodies of water and air being broken up into their 
constituent particles and blended together into a single body of fluid thinner than water and 
sufficiently vast to submerge the entire surface. That such a mixture of air and water could occur from 
purely natural processes he argued was evident from his own observations of tropical storms at sea 
in which the sea and air appeared to coalesce with one another. 42 
 Other theorists focussed not only on the Deluge but emulated Burnet’s attempt to trace the 
entire history of the earth. The first to do so in the years following the publication of the Archaeologiae 
was the prominent naturalist and theologian John Ray. Ray’s 1693 book Three physico-theological 
discourses was essentially a heavily revised and retitled second edition of his Miscellaneous discourses 
concerning the dissolution and changes of the world, a work published the previous year and which 
focussed primarily on the Conflagration but also included two relatively brief “digressions” on the 
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Creation and Deluge.43 The Three physico-theological discourses was Ray’s attempt at a more 
complete account of the history of the earth and allotted roughly equal space to the three events and 
dealt with them in chronological order.44 
Ray was largely circumspect about the specific causes of biblical events, preferring to propose 
and consider various hypotheses rather than set down a single theory. The creation he explained in 
familiar terms of the chaos containing all the earth’s matter and possibly also the seeds of plants and 
animals. Following its separation, the earth was covered entirely with water. The formation of 
mountains and seas he attributed to either the direct action of God or subterraneous fires and 
earthquakes, arguing on the grounds of final causes that these and other geological phenomena have 
existed from the Creation.45 For the Deluge, he considered a number of different possibilities. One 
was the transmutation of other elements into water, a hypothesis which he dismissed on scriptural 
grounds. Another was a change in the centre of the earth, bringing the continents nearer to the centre 
and causing them to be overflowed by the sea. This, he noted however, would only produce a partial 
deluge. What seems have been his preferred hypothesis was the idea that pressure exerted on the 
surface of the ocean may have forced subterraneous waters with which the ocean was connected out 
onto the earth. He was characteristically noncommittal about whether this occurred via natural or 
miraculous causes.46 His account of the Conflagration was decidedly Burnettian. Like Burnet’s account, 
it was based primarily on St Peter’s Third Epistle, chapter three and insisted on a total dissolution 
followed by a new earth.47 As to the physical causes, after considering three other possibilities Ray 
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essentially followed Burnet in concluding that it would most likely be brought about by the earth 
drying out and the simultaneous eruption of volcanoes.48 
Two further theories appeared in 1696. The first of these was the Cambridge theologian and 
natural philosopher William Whiston’s New theory of the earth which I shall discuss in detail in the 
next chapter.49 The second was the natural philosopher and Rector of Ousby Thomas Robinson’s New 
observations on the natural history of this world of matter, and this world of life in two parts, a text in 
which he expanded upon various ideas previously communicated in his short 1694 treatise The 
anatomy of the earth.50 Robinson’s theory owed much the alchemical theories of the earlier part of 
the century. He conceived of the chaos as a mass of particles in motion. The separation of the chaos 
and formation of the earth he conceptualised not in mechanical terms as we find in most other late-
seventeenth-century theorists but in alchemical terms of the contrary “qualities” of different particles. 
The particles’ “antipathies” caused them to react with and separate from one another and to unite 
together with “kindred” particles. The hot, volatile particles coalesced together in the centre. The 
antipathy between these hot, fiery particles and the cold and watery particles drove the latter to the 
periphery of the chaos where they formed a watery mist. Between the two formed a body of 
“intermediate”, terrestrial particles, those which were neither hot nor cold but participated equally in 
both qualities. These particles then receded from one another according to their mutual antipathies 
and collected together in distinct sections.51 
After the separation of the intermediate particles, the air separated from the water. The water 
sank down, covered the earth, pressed together the strata, and then drained into its pores. The 
draining of the water forced sections of strata upwards, making the surface unequal. The strata were 
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consolidated by either heat from the central fire or “juices of Salt and Nitre” depending on the kinds 
of matter of which they were composed. The draining of the water separated it into pure and salt 
water, the latter being too thick to pass through the pores and draining into channels to form the 
ocean and the former passing through the pores into subterraneous cavities. These subterraneous 
waters are continually rarefied by the central fire and emerge at the tops of mountains, forming 
springs and rivers.52 
As the title of his earlier treatise suggests, Robinson saw the earth as strongly analogous to an 
animal body. The cavities in the earth through which fresh water travels he referred to variously as 
“veins”, “lymph ducts”, etc. The water cycle was essentially like the circulation of the blood. Fresh 
water enters the pores and travels through the veins. It is rarefied by the heat of the central fire, 
emerges at the tops of mountains, flows back into the sea, separates from the salt water, re-enters 
the pores, and so on.53 Robinson calculated that there are seventy-two oceans of water in the earth’s 
“veins”, more than enough to supply the Deluge which he attributed to a “Preternatural Fermentation 
and Dilation of those angry Volatiles” which constitute the central fire. This agitated the subterraneous 
waters such that they rose and erupted at various points on the surface, causing the sea to rise and 
cover the earth leaving only the tops of the highest mountains extant. This was what Moses had 
referred to as the “breaking up of the Fountains of the great Deep”. The forty days rain resulted from 
the vortex of the moon pushing against the earth’s atmosphere and condensing vapours in the air.54 
The Conflagration in Robinson’s theory would result, as Joseph Glanvill and George Rust had 
argued earlier in the century, from the central fire engulfing and consuming the earth. The earth, 
Robinson contended, is one third volatile, one third combustible, and one third liquid. Hence, it is in 
equilibrium, the liquid part preventing the combustible part being overcome by the volatile part. The 
earth’s liquid, however, provides a lifeforce or vital fluid to its various lifeforms. It is therefore being 
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continually used up, and this depletion will result in disequilibrium and the volatile matter, no longer 
checked by the liquid, will overcome the combustible part of the earth.55 
An important aim of these new theories was to provide an account of the earth’s history that 
cohered better with Scripture than Burnet’s theory. The most important biblical text here was the first 
chapter of Genesis. In this respect Burnet was very different from these later theorists, for where he 
disregarded entirely the Mosaic history of the Creation, they went to great lengths to reconcile their 
theories with it. Even those like Woodward who gave no account of the Creation but focussed mainly 
on the Deluge were at pains to give an account of the latter which did not contradict the Mosaic history 
of the former. A theory of the Deluge could not, for example, imply, as Burnet’s did, that the 
antediluvian earth had no sea, since Moses mentions the creation of the sea, its bringing forth fish 
and fowl, and Adam’s dominion over the fish in his history of the Creation.56 Those like Whiston and 
Robinson who did give an account of the Creation went further, offering detailed explanations of how 
their accounts were to be reconciled with that of Moses. Whiston, as I will discuss in detail in the next 
chapter, prefaced his New theory with a lengthy dissertation of how the Mosaic history of the Creation 
was to be interpreted in order to show that his theory of the formation of the earth from the 
atmosphere of a comet did not contradict it.57 Robinson, too, provided extensive exegesis of Genesis, 
introducing a threefold cabbala similar to – and likely influenced by – that of More, arguing that Moses 
wrote in three senses – literal, philosophical, and mystical – and explaining in detail how his account 
of the Creation cohered with the philosophical sense of Moses.58 
Notwithstanding their efforts to reconcile their theories with Genesis, these new theorists 
nevertheless took significant liberties with Scripture. Both Whiston and Robinson, for example, argued 
that the Days of Creation were not literally twenty-four-hour periods, the former claiming that the 
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diurnal rotation of the earth did not commence until the Fall and so days and years were the same, 
and the latter arguing that the days merely signified six distinct productions, the evening and morning 
of each day signifying the “Principles of Activity and Passivity” which were the efficient causes of these 
productions.59 Woodward’s theory of the Deluge, too, while perhaps not obviously contradicting 
Genesis 1, appeared to many inconsistent with the Mosaic history of the Flood, which, among other 
things, did not seem to imply a total dissolution of all inorganic matter. 
Owing in part to their inconsistency with Scripture and partly to more philosophical concerns, 
these new theories of the earth were scarcely less controversial than the old one, and almost 
immediately following their publication a number of objections appeared. The nature of these 
objections was slightly different from those directed at Burnet during this period. Firstly, as I have 
noted, objections to Burnet based on Scripture had become to a large extent redundant following his 
open rejection of the Mosaic history of the Creation and Paradise in the Archaeologiae. These other 
theorists, however, claimed to offer hypotheses which did not contradict Scripture in the ways 
Burnet’s did. Thus, pointing out the ways in which they, too, were inconsistent with Scripture would 
undermine their claims to have provided superior theories. Secondly, where, as I have argued above, 
philosophical arguments against Burnet focussed on both final and efficient causes, those advanced 
against other theorists focussed only on the latter, that is, on the processes the theorists had posited 
to explain the Deluge and other events. The reason for this was that, unlike Burnet, these theorists 
did not claim that the antediluvian earth was radically different from the present earth. The 
antediluvian earth in these theories had an oblique axis, mountains, seas, coastlines, caverns, and so 
on. There was thus no need for critics to point out evidence of design in these phenomena. 
Arguably the most controversial of the new theories was that of Woodward, the first attack 
appearing the same year from an anonymous author known only as “L.P.”. In his Two essays sent in a 
letter from Oxford to a nobleman in London, L.P. sought, among other things, to cast doubt on the 
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organic origin of fossils which had been Woodward’s principal source of evidence for a total 
dissolution of matter at the Deluge, arguing instead that what Woodward and others had claimed 
were the remains of living organisms were in fact productions of the earth that merely resembled such 
organisms. 60 L.P. also defended Burnet.61 This, however, served only to compound the latter’s 
reputation as a heretic, since the author defended materialism and polygenism in the same work.62 
A further attack on Woodward appeared two years later from the Scottish physician and 
satirist John Arbuthnot, who in his Examination of Dr. Woodward's account of the Deluge ably and 
elegantly dismantled Woodward’s theory in a manner that anticipated – and likely inspired in part – 
Keill’s attack on Burnet the following year. Marshalling evidence from mechanics, hydrostatics, and 
empirical observations of strata, and producing mathematical proofs in support of his objections, 
Arbuthnot, in fewer than thirty pages, amply revealed the numerous weaknesses of Woodward’s 
theory.63 The amount of fluid on the earth at the time of the deluge, he calculated for example, would 
according to Woodward’s hypothesis be merely 1/240th of the particles solid matter, and so the 
mixture of the two could not have achieved any degree of fluidity.64 The bodies of animals would not 
settle according to their specific gravity, since the descent of bodies in a medium depends not only on 
their specific gravity but also their size.65 He also pointed out various ways in which Woodward’s 
theory contradicted the Mosaic history of the Deluge. Moses, for instance, has the mountains standing 
throughout the Deluge, whereas Woodward has them being dissolved at the beginning and recreated 
at the end.66 Arbuthnot would also be instrumental in some of the satirical treatments of Woodward 
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and his theory that would appear during the last years of the seventeenth century and well into the 
eighteenth.67 
 Whiston’s New theory also generated its share of controversy. The year following its 
publication, Edwards, becoming now a serial antagonist to the theorists, published his Brief remarks 
upon Mr. Whiston's new theory of the earth, his principal concern being the reinterpretation of the 
Mosaic history of the Creation with which Whiston had prefaced his theory.68 Whiston was also the 
main target of Witty’s Essay towards a vindication of the vulgar exposition of the Mosaic history of the 
creation of the world, published just prior to his attack on Burnet’s Archaeologiae in 1705 and adopting 
a similar approach in discussing and confuting in turn each of Whiston’s reasons for departing – though 
it should be noted, nowhere near as radically as Burnet – from the literal interpretation of Genesis 1.69 
A rather different approach was taken by Keill who appended a number of more philosophical 
objections to Whiston’s theory to his 1698 attack on Burnet.70 I shall discuss this work in detail in the 
next chapter. 
 The above attacks provoked several further responses, both from the theorists themselves 
and from other authors looking to defend them. Burnet and Whiston replied to Keill shortly after the 
publication of the latter’s Examination.71 Keill published another book in response to both authors in 
1699, to which Whiston issued a further rejoinder the following year.72 (These texts, too, will be 
discussed in depth in the next two chapters.) In 1697, the recently elected FRS and Rector of 
Winchelsea John Harris published his Remarks on some late papers relating to the universal deluge, 
and to the natural history of the earth, a lengthy tract in which he defended Woodward against L.P. 
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and also attacked Robinson’s New observations.73 This provoked an irate response from the latter’s 
namesake, the physician and naturalist Tancred Robinson whom Harris had accused of being L.P., a 
charge which Robinson denied though he admitted having assisted the author, whose name he did 
not disclose.74 Robinson’s letter elicited an equally ill-tempered reply from Harris the same year.75 
4.5. Peripheral comments 
The works discussed above constitute the main body of published works which emerged in England in 
the wake of Burnet’s Archaeologiae and which focussed either solely or primarily on either Burnet’s 
work or those other theories of the earth which it inspired. There were numerous other works 
published during the same period, however, which were not primarily concerned with theories of the 
earth but in which authors commented on both Burnet and other theorists. Some of these works 
concerned topics obviously related in various ways to the theories. William Sherlock, Dean of St Paul’s 
Cathedral and Chaplain to the King and Queen, clearly alluded to Burnet in his 1693 book A discourse 
concerning the divine providence when remarking on those “who profess to believe the Story [of the 
Deluge], [yet] think themselves much concerned to give a Philosophical Account of it, without having 
recourse to Miracles, and a Supernatural Power, which they say unbecomes Philosophers”.76 In 
opposition, he stressed that a Christian must necessarily admit miracles, and one who admits miracles 
should have no problem ascribing the Deluge to them, especially given that no satisfactory 
philosophical theory of the Deluge, that is, no theory which does not contradict Moses on various 
points, had been proposed.77 William Nicholl, who as we have seen above tackled the Archaeologiae 
in the first volume of his Conference with a theist, digressed in the second volume – published in 1697 
and primarily concerned with the issue of natural religion – into a discussion of the Deluge in which 
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Credentius voices several objections to Burnet’s, Woodward’s, and Whiston’s theories before 
following Sherlock in defending a miraculous interpretation of the event.78 
 Other works which discussed Burnet and other theories of the earth were devoted primarily 
to topics ostensibly unrelated to the subject. An especially curious example is the physician and 
millenarian Thomas Emes’ 1698 work A dialogue between alkali and acid containing divers 
philosophical and medicinal considerations, a medical tract in which Emes objects to the view that 
alkali causes and acid cures disease and discusses Burnet’s theory in relation to the question of 
whether or not there was salt on the antediluvian earth.79 Perhaps the most significant work which 
was generally unrelated to the topic but which discussed it and even had some influence on the debate 
was John Locke’s 1693 book Some thoughts concerning education. In a section of the work devoted to 
educating children in natural philosophy, Locke suggested that the Deluge was brought about by God 
altering the earth’s centre of gravity, claiming that this would “more easily account for Noah’s Flood, 
than any Hypothesis yet made use of to solve it”.80 To the anticipated objection that he was appealing 
to a miraculous power rather than natural causes, he offered the characteristically Newtonian reply 
that his proposed cause was “a thing as intelligible as gravity it self”, having argued on the previous 
page that gravity is “impossible to be explained by any natural Operation of Matter or any other Law 
of Motion, but the positive Will of a Superiour Being, so ordering it”.81 Locke also intimated that he 
had designs to compose a theory of the Deluge himself, stating that he was “reserving to a fitter 
opportunity, a fuller explication of this Hypothesis, and the application of it to all the Parts of the 
Deluge and any Difficulties can be supposed in the History of the Flood as recorded in the Bible”.82 
Locke’s brief conjecture caught the attention of Woodward, who alluded to it – unfavourably – twice 
in his Essay and, according to Alexander Beresford in a letter written to Locke in 1695, wrote but never 
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published a tract in which he discussed Locke’s view in depth and argued that an alteration of the 
earth’s centre of gravity would cause only a partial deluge.83 
4.6. Unpublished remarks 
As well as the above published works, there are numerous unpublished writings relating to Burnet’s 
theory and other late-seventeenth-century theories of the earth, and there were almost certainly 
more – and likely many more – written at the time which are no longer extant.84 An especially 
intriguing example which I have transcribed and appended to this thesis and shall now discuss in some 
depth is a manuscript held at the Royal Society’s archives entitled “A remark on a passage in 
Dr Burnet's telluris theoria Sacra”, a three-page essay in which the author takes issue with Burnet’s 
discussion of other planets, and in particular Saturn, in the final chapter of book one of his Theory.85 
There is no author name on the essay, but it was evidently sent to Burnet at the request of the Royal 
Society along with a letter – which is no longer extant – from the Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed, 
for Burnet replied to the essay in a letter to Flamsteed, thanking him and the Society for both the 
letter and the essay.86 A copy of Burnet’s reply to Flamsteed is extant and held in the Royal Greenwich 
Observatory Archives at Cambridge University Library and reprinted in the second volume of 
Flamsteed’s correspondence.87 Burnet’s letter to Flamsteed is dated 6th December 1693 and Burnet 
states that he received Flamsteed’s letter on the 5th.88 The editors of Flamsteed’s correspondence date 
his letter to Burnet at some time in November or early December (before the 5th), and it is likely that 
the essay was written around the same time.89 
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It is not entirely clear who wrote the essay. Burnet refers in the letter to “[t]he learned 
Gentleman whose paper you where [sic] pleased to send me”, indicating that Flamsteed presented 
the essay as having been written by a third party.90 The copy letter is heavily annotated with replies 
to various points Burnet had made in the letter, but as the editors of Flamsteed’s correspondence 
note, the letter was copied by two different amanuenses, so it is not possible to tell whether these 
annotations were made by Flamsteed or someone else.91 What is clear is that the annotations were 
written by the author of the essay, since the content of the essay is repeatedly referred to in the 
annotations in the first person, for example: “to favor him [Burnet] I suppose it [Saturn] perfectly 
sphericall”.92 
Aside from some remarks by the editors of Flamsteed’s correspondence and a brief comment 
in a footnote from David Kubrin, neither the essay nor Burnet’s letter to Flamsteed has received any 
scholarly attention.93 The editors of Flamsteed’s correspondence attribute the essay to Beaumont on 
the grounds that he attacked Burnet in his Considerations earlier that year.94 Given, however, how 
widespread the opposition to Burnet was at this time, this seems like an insufficient reason to ascribe 
the essay specifically to Beaumont. Moreover, the author states in the annotations that he “hopes to 
make it plaine to him [Burnet] in another paper that our earth never had such a shell on it as he 
imagins; or if it had that shell could not be broke as he conceaves”, points which Beaumont had already 
argued at length in his Considerations.95 Additionally, in the Considerations, Beaumont showed little 
interest in Burnet’s observations about other planets, stating after a brief discussion of Venus that he 
would  
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add [no] more… concerning the other Planets, being willing first to see whether we can establish any 
thing certain concerning this Planet we inhabit; concerning which we have much more hopes to arrive 
at some solid Knowledge, than of Bodies so remote from us; and I little pleasing my self in opining 
concerning things undeterminable by Man.96 
It is also worth noting that throughout the Considerations Beaumont refers to the English edition of 
Burnet’s Theory, whereas the author of the essay, both in the essay itself and in the annotations on 
Burnet’s letter to Flamsteed, consistently cites the Latin edition. 
Kubrin suggests that the essay may have been written by Flamsteed himself.97 This seems far 
more plausible. Indeed, it is highly likely. Although Flamsteed presented it to Burnet as having been 
written by someone else, it is of course possible that he did so deceptively. And the letter from Burnet 
being addressed to Flamsteed, it was certainly in his possession, and so was plausibly annotated by 
him. If this is the case, then given what we have observed above about the views in the essay being 
referred to in the annotations in the first person, Flamsteed was surely its author. Flamsteed, 
moreover, is known to have to have been unsympathetic to Burnet’s theory and to have had designs 
to write against it. Hans Sloane reported in the second volume of his A voyage to the islands Madera, 
Barbados, Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica that “Mr. Flamstead… said… that he would prove and 
make him [Burnet] know, that there went more to the making of the World then a well turn’d Period”, 
the latter clause a reference to Burnet’s masterful prose style.98 Even more telling here in that it 
appears to connect Flamsteed more conclusively to this particular essay is an anonymous discussion 
of Sloane’s book in Michel de la Roche’s New memoirs of literature in which the author, when 
commenting on Sloane’s note on Flamsteed, remarks that “[t]his passage puts me in mind that the 
same Mr. Flamsteed told me one day, that he was able to overthrow Dr. Burnet’s Theory of the Earth 
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in one sheet of paper”.99 The essay consists of three sheets, not one – four if we include the small 
illustration of Saturn on a separate sheet. Nevertheless, the sentiment that the theory can be 
decisively refuted in few words is there in Flamsteed’s purported remark, and as we shall see 
presently, this is something the author of the essay claimed to have done. 
 Turning at last to the content of the essay, its main focus was on Burnet’s hypothesis about 
the ring of Saturn. As I have discussed in chapter one, Burnet argued that Saturn’s ring formed during 
the planet’s deluge as a result of its crust breaking toward the poles and leaving the equatorial part 
intact and suspended above the surface of the planet.100 “Tis a Pleasant Conjecture”, wrote the author, 
“& were it probable would almost force us to believe his Theory, but I fear our ingenious Author has 
pitcht upon it too hastily & yt when it is seriously considered it will rather wholy overthrow it”.101 One 
difficulty with the hypothesis was that it was highly unlikely that the crust would break so neatly as to 
leave intact such a flat, uniform section at the equator. Equally unlikely was its leaving intact a section 
so thin as to be invisible when the earth is in its plane.102 
What was most problematic about Burnet’s conjecture regarding Saturn, however, was the 
volume of the planet’s antediluvian crust which seemed to be entailed by Burnet’s hypothesis relative 
to the volume of its central sphere. If Saturn’s ring were formed from its crust, then the thickness of 
the crust at the equator must have been the same as the breadth of the ring. If the rest of the crust 
broke and fell into the abyss as Burnet had claimed, then the matter of the crust must now be 
contained within the planet’s central sphere.103 The ratio of the diameter of the central sphere to the 
outer diameter of the ring, the author noted, is 4/9. And the ratio of the diameter of the central sphere 
to the inner diameter of the ring is 4/6.6. Thus, the ratio of the diameter of the sphere to the breadth 
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of the ring is 4/2.4. The author favoured Burnet by supposing the planet in its antediluvian state to 
have been spherical rather than a prolate spheroid which his theory implied and which would make 
its crust thicker at the poles than at the equator and therefore to contain more matter. Since the 
volume of a sphere is proportional to the cube of its diameter, the original volume of the crust could 
be calculated from the cube of the outer diameter of the ring minus the cube of the inner diameter of 
the ring: 729-287.5 = 441.5. The volume of the central sphere, however, is only 64, and so on Burnet’s 
hypothesis the central sphere must now contain a quantity of matter nearly seven times its volume.104 
 In his letter to Flamsteed, Burnet noted first that he had never claimed that all planets in their 
antediluvian state took the form of a prolate spheroid. As to the uniformity of Saturn’s ring, he argued 
that this in fact favours his hypothesis, since it indicates that the ring was part of an originally uniform 
crust. The thinness of the ring he claimed was of little consequence, for we cannot know what kind of 
matter it is composed of or indeed how thin it is at such distance.105 And regarding the quantity of 
matter in the crust relative to the volume of the central sphere, he claimed that this cannot be 
calculated unless we know (a) the figure of the planet in its antediluvian state, (b) the depth of the 
crust, and (c) whether the crust was of equal depth throughout. “Till these praeliminaries be 
determined”, he stressed, “no certain Judgment can be made of the effect, nor his [the author’s] 
calculus be demonstrative”.106 He concluded the letter by emphasising that the author’s claim to have 
refuted the theory was unwarranted: 
For whatsoever becomes of this conjecture about Saturne, or howsoever he came into this unusual 
form, (which I cannot beleive to have been Original) it does not from thence follow that our Earth, which 
we know ris from a Caos and fluid mas, came immediately from that Caos, into that unequall and broken 
mountanous from [sic – he means to write “form”], that we now find it.107 
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What is most perhaps most remarkable about Burnet’s letter to Flamsteed is just how weak 
his reply to this essay was compared with his earlier responses to Croft and Warren. Croft and Warren 
had challenged his theory primarily on the basis of theological and scriptural concerns. Burnet’s 
superior ability in theology and biblical exegesis – aided by his remarkable knowledge of antiquity, 
both pagan and Judeo-Christian – enabled him to defend his theory very effectively – albeit 
controversially – against these authors. As will become increasingly apparent in the final chapter when 
we discuss Burnet’s response to Keill, when the debate took a more philosophical turn, Burnet was far 
less well equipped to deal with the objections. Ironically, then, given Burnet’s priority of reason and 
philosophy over Scripture and antiquity, it was the latter two in which he was better skilled. 
Furthermore, in the period between the publication of Burnet’s Theory and the controversy of the 
1690s, natural philosophy in England had undergone a radical shift away from the Cartesian natural 
philosophy in which Burnet was schooled and toward a Newtonian experimental mathematical 
natural philosophy. The essay on Saturn was highly illustrative of this shift and prefigured in important 
respects Keill’s later attack on Burnet (as well as his attack on Whiston and also Arbuthnot’s attack on 
Woodward) in advancing a mathematical argument against Burnet’s hypothesis concerning Saturn. 
Burnet’s weakness was instantly recognised by the author of the essay, who in the annotations 
on the letter compared Burnet’s defence of the hypothesis to that of “a Lawyer that pleads an ill 
cause”.108 Burnet, the author noted, had expressly claimed “that all the planets of our sky proceeded 
from chaos in approximately the same way, and had the same elementary regions, and the same 
structure or exterior orb of them built over an abyss”.109 Saturn, then, according to Burnet’s theory, 
must in the beginning have taken the form of a prolate spheroid and therefore its crust must have 
been thicker at the poles than at the equator. Notwithstanding this, the author had favoured Burnet’s 
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hypothesis by supposing the planet to have been spherical and the crust therefore to have been the 
same depth throughout and also by not taking into account the matter of the central core and abyss 
which in reality would reduce the capacity of the central sphere to accommodate the matter of the 
crust. Despite these concessions, the mass of the crust was nevertheless nearly seven times the 
capacity of the central sphere. Thus, the author asserted, “there is no need of determineing his 
[Burnet’s] new praeliminaries”.110 An additional argument not present in the original paper but 
advanced in the annotations to Burnet’s letter was the obvious point that if the earth’s crust had 
broken first at the equator due to the sun’s heat, then the equinoctial part of Saturn’s crust where the 
sun’s heat was greatest must also have been first to break and surely could not have remained intact. 
As Burnet had stressed in his Theory, “similar judgments should be made about similar things”.111 
Burnet was of course right in his assertion that the author’s claim to have “wholy 
overthrow[n]” his theory was unwarranted. As he noted in his letter, his conjecture about Saturn could 
be wrong and his theory of the earth correct. It was not the decisive refutation the author believed it 
to be. It was however, as I have noted, precisely the kind of mathematical objection that Burnet had 
difficulty dealing with and the kind of objection that would appear in abundance five years later in 
Keill’s Examination. Keill, however, as we shall see in detail in the final chapter, would focus his attack 
not merely on a peripheral conjecture as we find in this author, but on the core tenets of the theory. 
And his objections would come widely to be viewed as having successfully refuted it. 
I have dwelled on the above manuscript for some time largely because it has not received the 
scholarly attention it deserves and because it is one of only two attacks on the Theory to have 
appeared following the publication of the Archaeologiae which are known to have elicited a response 
from Burnet himself – the other being Keill’s Examination. There are of course numerous other 
unpublished writings concerning Burnet and other theorists, many of which are to be found in various 
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authors’ private correspondence. It is of course impossible in the space of this section to discuss all or 
even many of these writings. What I propose to do instead is focus on the correspondence of one 
author who had little publicly to do with the debate but who paid close attention to it and 
corresponded at some length about it with various acquaintances, since this illustrates just how 
prominent the debate was and the extent to which some of the most important thinkers of the period 
attended to it, even those who had little public involvement in it. The example I want to discuss is the 
correspondence of John Locke. As we have seen above, Locke’s published output on theories of the 
earth amounted to less than a single page in his Thoughts concerning education. As Peter Anstey has 
discussed, however, Locke maintained an avid interest in the subject and paid close attention to the 
debate. He owned books by Burnet, Woodward, Whiston, Robinson, St Clair, Edwards, and Keill, and 
corresponded on the subject with a variety of acquaintances.112 
We have seen Locke’s early comments on Burnet’s theory at the beginning of chapter four. 
Most likely revived by the controversy that was sparked by the publication of the Archaeologiae, 
Locke’s and his correspondents’ interest in theories of the earth spiked again in the 1690s. It was at 
this time of course that Locke made his brief comment on the Deluge in his Thoughts concerning 
education.113 This comment, and in particular Locke’s intimation that he may produce a theory himself, 
appears to have excited a number of his acquaintances. The religious writer Benjamin Furly wrote to 
Locke the same year, abruptly asking “[w]hen shall we see your explication of the hypothesis by you 
mentiond concerning the Generall deluge?”.114 More subtly, the Irish philosopher William Molyneux, 
in a letter to Locke written in 1696, noted that his comment appeared “to Imply that you have some 
thoughts of Writing on that subject; it would be a mighty satisfaction to me to know from you the 
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certainty thereof”.115 He also enquired as to “what the Opinion of the Ingenious is concerning Mr. 
Whiston’s Book”, which had been published earlier that year.116 
In his reply early the following year, Locke evaded the first question but answered the second, 
noting that Whiston’s theory had been well-received. His own praise for the book, however, was 
somewhat guarded and indicated that although he applauded Whiston’s creativity and ingenuity he 
was not entirely convinced of his theory. “I think he is more to be admired”, he wrote, 
that he has lay’d down an hypothesis, whereby he has explain’d so many wonderful, and, before, 
unexplicable things in the great changes of this globe, than that some of them should not go easily 
down with some men, when the whole was entirely new to all. He is one of those sort of writers that I 
always fancy should be most esteem’d and encourag’d. I am always for the builders who bring some 
addition to our knowledge, or, at least, some new thing to our thoughts.117 
A similar sentiment was communicated to Locke later that year by the Genevan theologian Jean Le 
Clerc. Le Clerc criticised Whiston for contradicting Moses. He also took issue with both Burnet’s and 
Whiston’s use of antiquity, arguing that the mere conjectures and poetic fictions of the ancients are 
not to be viewed as learned traditions and that the connections these authors had drawn between 
Sacred and pagan history were ungrounded. He nevertheless praised the theorists for their ingenuity, 
love of truth, and freedom of thought, qualities which he noted are rarely to be found among 
theologians.118 
4.7. The reception of the second volume 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important briefly to discuss the reception of the second volume 
of Burnet’s Theory. As William Poole correctly observes, most of Burnet’s contemporaries saw him 
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primarily as a “world maker” and Flood maker”.119 Certainly this is true of the critics discussed above, 
most of whom paid little or no attention to the second volume. Modern historians have typically 
followed suit, with discussions of Burnet’s Creation, Deluge, and antediluvian earth far outnumbering 
those of his Conflagration and Millennium. This is both unsurprising and understandable in that it was 
the former and not the latter that received the larger share of his contemporaries’ attention and 
elicited so much controversy. As Poole rightly points out, however, Burnet was also a “world 
destroyer”. And for a brief period between the publication of the second volume in 1689 and the onset 
of the controversy over the first in 1692, it was this latter role that was most prominent.120 
 Burnet’s second volume appears generally to have been well received among millenarian 
writers at the time. One such writer was the Anglican clergyman Drue Cressener, who had received a 
pre-publication manuscript of the volume in spring 1688 while writing his own millenarian tract The 
judgments of God upon the Roman-Catholick Church from its first rigid laws for universal conformity 
to it unto its last end. Cressener’s book was published the same year as the second part of the Theory 
and included a note from Burnet dated 25th March 1689 stating that “[t]his Treatise… was perused by 
me, to the Nineteenth Chapter of it, near a Year ago”.121 The reason for this note was that Cressener 
had made a remarkable prediction in the book about the Revolution of 1688-9 and enlisted Burnet 
and several others to attest to having read his prediction before the event.122 Having almost completed 
the work when he read Burnet’s manuscript, Cressener praised “the late Learned and Ingenious 
Discoveries about the future State of this Earth” which he had received from his “Honoured Friend, 
The Author of the New Theory of the Earth” and dedicated the penultimate chapter of his book to 
“communicat[ing] some of mine own Reflections in confirmation of what he has there advanced”.123 
Here he concurs with most of the principal points of Burnet’s theory. He agrees that the Millennium 
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will take place on earth; that it will obtain not on this earth but on a new earth which will form after 
the Conflagration; that the New Jerusalem is to be coeval with the Millennium; that the martyred 
saints will be literally and physically resurrected on earth; that the Conflagration will commence in 
Italy; and that the early Church Fathers supported a literal interpretation of the Millennium.124 
Cressener is not entirely uncritical of Burnet, however, and disagrees with him on one very 
important point. Although he agrees that Antichrist is to be identified with the Catholic Church and 
that therefore the Conflagration must begin in Italy and is a single, continuous event culminating in 
the destruction of the earth and the formation of a new earth on which the Millennium will obtain, he 
contends that this destruction will be gradual and that there will be an intermediate state of the 
Church on the present earth in which Christ will reign but which is not to be identified with either the 
New Jerusalem or the Millennium. His main basis for this is the Book of Daniel which he interprets as 
implying that, after the destruction of the Papacy, other regions of the earth will remain for a period 
of time intact but will be free from the rule of Antichrist, a view on which he elaborates in another 
treatise published the following year.125 He also believes this view of the Conflagration to be more 
consistent with the maxim that God exercises his judgements upon the earth primarily via natural 
causes, for on this principle, it is more plausible to expect the fire to spread gradually rather than 
instantaneously throughout the earth. Here, he rejects Burnet’s appeal to the ministry of angels, 
wanting instead to maintain that the destruction of the earth at the Conflagration will result from 
purely natural causes as appeared to be the case in Burnet’s account of the Deluge which in all other 
respects he had “made the great Parallel of the destruction of the World by Fire”.126 
Another author who had evidently read a manuscript of Burnet’s second volume was John 
Evelyn. Evelyn, who as we saw in the previous chapter had praised the first volume of the Theory in 
his letter to Samuel Pepys, was apparently no less impressed by the second. In 1688, he wrote – 
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though never published – an essay “Concerning the Millennium” in which he adopted all the central 
components of Burnet’s theory. The Millennium, he argued, stressing the non-radical nature of his 
interpretation, will not take place on this earth but “in that renewed Heaven & Earth” which will form 
after the present earth and its atmosphere are destroyed at the Conflagration – to which, following 
Burnet, he did not assign a date. The new earth which is to follow the Conflagration, “as that of the 
most ingenious author of the New Theorie”, will be entirely smooth and home to the thousand-year 
Kingdom of Christ which will be seated in the New Jerusalem.127 
The connections between Burnet’s and Cressener’s and Evelyn’s apocalyptic writings have 
been noted by a number of historians.128 The most rigorous application of Burnet’s theory of the 
Conflagration and Millennium in late-seventeenth-century millenarian writing, however, appears to 
have gone unnoticed, or at least unacknowledged. I refer here to a work entitled The Book of the 
Revelation paraphrased; with annotations on each chapter, a five-hundred-page treatise abounding 
with references to Burnet, published in 1693 by Edward Waple, the vicar of St. Sepulchre’s in 
London.129 The most interesting part of this work in connection with Burnet is Waple’s application of 
Burnet’s theory in interpreting the Seven Vials in chapters 15 and 16 of the Book of Revelation. The 
pouring of the Vials in chapter 16, Waple observes, appears to represent a series of preparatory and 
immediate causes of the burning of the world.130 “Which Observation”, he notes, “is the more 
Remarkable, in that there is a very surprising Agreement betwixt the Vials thus interpreted, and the 
most ingenious Hypothesis of Dr. Burnet, concerning the gradual Dispositions to, and progress of the 
great Conflagration”.131 For Waple, the pouring of the Vials by angels are symbolic representations of 
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natural processes aided, as in Burnet’s theory, by the ministry of angels. Also remarkable here is that 
Waple implements a distinctly Burnettian application of the principle of accommodation. These 
natural processes, he argues, are communicated in the way that they are in order to suit the capacities 
of the text’s intended audience. “The Philosophy of Scripture being generally Popular, according to the 
Common, and Received Opinions of those to whom it was primarily written”, he writes citing Burnet 
in a footnote, 
these Vials must also be understood after the same manner. And the Preparations to the general Fire 
must be consequently conceived to be effected by fit and proper Natural Causes (but under the Ministry 
of the Angels of each Vial) hinted at only, and intimated by the Types in the Old Testament, to which 
each Vial alludes; and that after a popular manner, according to the common Sentiments of Mankind, 
but especially of the Jews, to whom the Scriptures were primarily written..132 
Waple proceeds to interpret each of the Seven Vials in accordance with Burnet’s theory. The 
first Vial which is poured upon the earth in verse 2 represents the droughts which according to Burnet 
are to desiccate the earth and its plant life prior to the Conflagration.133 The second Vial, poured into 
the sea and turning it “as the Blood of a Dead Man” in verse 3, refers to the reduction and consequent 
stagnation of the oceans resulting from the aforementioned drought which will render the water 
“clotty, thick, and glutinous” – like “[t]he Blood of a Man who has received a deadly wound, or of a 
Carcase” – and therefore pervious to fire134. The pouring of the third Vial into the rivers represents a 
similar process, the rivers being dealt with after the sea in accordance with “the Philosophy of 
Scripture” and the common conceptions of the audience for whom it was written, according to which 
the rivers are supplied by the sea rather than vice-versa.135 The fourth Vial, poured on the sun in verse 
8, represents the angels in Burnet’s theory intervening and increasing the sun’s heat.136 The fifth Vial 
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being poured onto the seat of the Beast in verse 10 refers to the beginning of the Conflagration in 
Italy.137 The pouring of the sixth Vial into the Euphrates represents the drying out of this river resulting 
from the drought and the increased heat of the sun and providing passage to the New Jerusalem for 
the resurrected Saints.138 Finally, the seventh Vial is poured into the air in verse 17 and represents the 
“fiery meteors” in Burnet’s theory which are to result from the same natural/angelic causes.139 
In addition to his use of Burnet’s theory in interpreting the Seven Vials and his Burnettian 
application of the principle of accommodation, Waple adopts all the central tenets of Burnet’s theory 
of the Conflagration and Millennium and explicitly cites Burnet on every point. The earth and its 
atmosphere are to be totally destroyed, forming a second chaos out of which a new heavens and earth 
will form.140 The new earth will be devoid of seas and mountains. This, he argues, is evident in chapter 
16, verse 20 of Revelation – “And every Island fled away, and the Mountains were not found” – referring 
the reader to 
Dr. Burnet…, whose ingenious Hypothesis gives great light to this place; according to which (as 
is here foretold) the Mountains are to be destroyed in the last place; and there are to be no 
Islands, because no Sea, in the New Earth; which is to be plain and level.141 
The martyred saints will be physically resurrected and will reign on the new earth in the New Jerusalem 
where they will be free of illness, pain, and death.142 Waple also adopts Burnet’s interpretation of St 
Peter and his threefold (i.e., antediluvian, postdiluvian, and millennial) state of the earth.143 And 
although he calculates that the Millennium will begin in 1772, he does not assign dates or times to 
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141 Waple (1693), 359. 
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either the Conflagration or the pouring of the Vials. Here, too, he explicitly cites “Dr. Burnet”, who, he 
notes, 
very prudently admonishes us not to be too positive, or presumtuous in our Conjectures about these 
Things; because if there be an invisible Hand, Divine, or Angelical, that touches the Springs and Wheels 
of Nature, it will not be easie for us to determine with Certainty, the Order of their Motions..144 
Waple’s book was intended as a popular treatise, written for the general reader rather than 
the theologian or divine. Its purpose, Waple made clear in the subtitle, was to make the Book of 
Revelation “plain to the meanest capacity”. That a popular work aimed at the lay-reader could make 
such extensive and explicit use of the views promulgated by Burnet in the second volume of the Theory 
is testament to just how uncontroversial these views were at the time. A similar point has been made 
by Poole with regard to Evelyn, who sent his Burnettian essay on the Millennium to Flower Backhouse, 
the Countess of Clarendon and wife of Henry Hyde, the second Earl. That Evelyn could unabashedly 
share these apocalyptic speculations with the wife of one of his most influential royal patrons, Poole 
argues, “shows how open such speculations had become”.145 Crucially, as I have discussed at length 
in chapter one, Burnet’s second volume was very much an expression of what was at the time 
mainstream moderate Anglican millenarianism. He sought to provide a physical theory of the 
Conflagration and Millennium which would vindicate a historicist interpretation of prophecy and a 
literal reading of the resurrection of the Saints and Kingdom of Christ on earth, but which at the same 
time could not be used as a pretext for political instability. This goal of providing a literal, historicist, 
but non-radical interpretation of the Apocalypse was shared by many late-seventeenth-century 
thinkers. Thus, while the first volume of the Theory was unorthodox, and much more visibly so 
following the publication of the Archaeologiae, the second volume was not, and therefore did not 
excite any significant controversy. 
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In her discussion of the Burnet controversy, Nicolson notes that a full bibliography of all the primary 
sources connected with the debate would be a useful resource for scholars.146 Such a resource would 
indeed be extremely useful. Given the extent of the debate, however, a full bibliography would take 
a great deal of work to produce. In the above overview, I have detailed the major works produced in 
England, some of the more peripheral contributions, and a very small number of unpublished works 
written in connection with the controversy during the 1690s and early 1700s. There are many more 
works connected with the debate, however. As I have noted above, there are many more unpublished 
writings. There was also a substantial reaction to Burnet’s and other English theories on the continent 
and many works produced there which I have not discussed.147 Additionally, there were various 
literary works which satirised both Burnet’s and other authors’ theories which, due to space 
constraints, I have also been unable to examine.148 Another issue is the question of when the 
controversy came to an end. I have treated it as ending in the early years of the eighteenth century 
when the number of publications debating these theories began to decline. Yet Burnet’s theory, as 
well as Woodward’s and Whiston’s, continued to be discussed long into the eighteenth century, and 
so it is difficult to determine a precise cut-off point.149 These observations show just how significant 
the controversy was and the extent to which it popularised thinking about the earth and its history. 
Also significant is that the controversy intersects in interesting ways with other important 
developments in late-seventeenth-century natural philosophy such as the emergence of 
Newtonianism, the “ancients and moderns” controversy, and debates about the shape of the earth, 
Cartesian vortices, occult qualities, final causes, and the possibility of a vacuum. These connections I 
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shall explore in the final two chapters when I look in detail at the relationship between Burnet’s theory 


















5. Burnet and the Newtonians part one: Whiston’s Newtonian-Burnettian synthesis 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The publication of the first and second volumes of Burnet’s Theory bookended rather neatly one of 
the most momentous events in the history of science. This of course was the publication of Isaac 
Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica in 1687. By the time of the publication of 
Burnet’s Archaeologiae in 1692 and the ensuing controversy, Newton had gained a considerable 
number of followers and the Newtonian system of natural philosophy had largely replaced the 
Cartesian system which had prevailed in England during previous decades and on which Burnet had 
based much of his theory. Inevitably, then, the new Newtonian philosophy played a number of 
important roles in the controversy surrounding Burnet and his theory of the earth. The first Newtonian 
to become involved with Burnet, as I have discussed in previous chapters, was Newton himself in his 
correspondence with Burnet just prior to the publication of the Theory. Newton’s correspondence 
with Burnet, of course, predated the Principia by several years and as such contained only a nascent 
form of Newtonianism. Nevertheless, as will become apparent in this chapter, the views espoused by 
Newton in this correspondence would become during the 1690s an important part of Newtonian 
thinking and would play a significant role in the debate over the history of the earth. 
The first of Newton’s disciples to become involved in the debate during the 1690s was Richard 
Bentley, whose attack on Burnet in his final Boyle Lecture in 1692 I have discussed in the previous 
chapter. The next Newtonian involvement came from Edmond Halley, who had played midwife in the 
publication of Newton’s Principia the previous decade.1 In a paper delivered to the Royal Society in 
December 1694, Halley briefly criticised Burnet’s theory “as jarring as much with the Physical 
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Principles of Nature, as with the Holy Scriptures, which he has undertaken to reconcile” and proposed 
an alternative hypothesis for the Deluge, suggesting that it might have resulted from an interaction 
between the earth and a comet which caused a great agitation in the sea and drowned the earth and 
altered the landscape.2 In another paper delivered the same month, Halley suggested that a similar 
interaction might have reduced a former world to a chaos, and that the present earth may have 
formed from this chaos.3 “[B]eing sensible that he might have adventured ultra crepidam; and 
apprehensive least by some unguarded Expression he might incur the Censure of the Sacred Order”, 
Halley opted not to publish his papers at the time but eventually allowed their publication in the 
Philosophical Transactions some three decades later in 1724.4 
 In these final two chapters, I want to discuss two rather more substantial Newtonian 
contributions to the Burnet controversy. The first of these is William Whiston’s 1696 work A new 
theory of the earth, the most comprehensive and arguably the most important alternative to Burnet’s 
theory to be published during the 1690s. The second is John Keill’s 1698 book An examination of Dr. 
Burnet’s theory of the earth together with some remarks on Mr. Whiston's new theory of the earth, a 
work in which he attacked both Burnet and Whiston, eliciting responses from and subsequent debate 
with both theorists. Keill’s attack on and debate with Burnet will be the subject of the next chapter. In 
this chapter, I shall discuss Whiston’s New theory, its connection with Burnet, and Keill’s response to 
it and the subsequent debate between these two very different Newtonians. I have dedicated entire 
chapters to Whiston and Keill primarily because their work was more closely connected with Burnet 
than that of other authors involved in the debate. Keill’s book, as we shall see in detail in the next 
chapter, was the only attack on Burnet to be published after the Archaeologiae which provoked a 
published response from Burnet himself. It also played an important role in bringing the controversy 
to a close and was widely viewed as having decisively refuted both Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories. 
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Whiston’s connection with Burnet is rather less obvious. The two authors did not engage in any public 
debate. And although Whiston commented extensively on Burnet in his New theory, Burnet did not 
defend his theory against any of Whiston’s objections and did not pass comment on Whiston’s theory. 
Furthermore, as far as the historical record shows, there was no private communication between 
them. The two authors were nevertheless closely connected in important ways, and this is the main 
thing I intend to show in this chapter. 
In his New theory, Whiston attempted to produce a comprehensive alternative to Burnet’s 
Cartesian theory of the earth based on Newtonian mechanics and the newly discovered periodicity of 
comets.5 He argued that the earth formed from the atmosphere of a comet and has undergone or will 
undergo in the future a series of alterations at the Fall, Deluge, Conflagration, and final consummation 
resulting from various interactions with comets. This of course bears some resemblance to Halley’s 
hypotheses, of which Whiston claims to have arrived at his theory independently.6 At the time of 
writing his New theory, Whiston was employed as Chaplain to the Bishop of Norwich John Moore and 
was a fellow of Clare Hall, Cambridge where he had received his BA and MA degrees in 1689 and 1693 
respectively. His interest in earth history arose while studying for the former when he discovered 
Burnet’s Theory and wrote about the work as part of his examination. Not long after the publication 
of his New theory, Isaac Newton, having become Warden and then Master of the Royal Mint and 
apparently being impressed by Whiston’s work, made Whiston his substitute in the Lucasian Chair of 
Mathematics and shortly afterwards secured the professorship for Whiston when he resigned to 
concentrate on his duties at the Mint. Whiston remained in the Chair until 1710 when he was banished 
from Cambridge for his anti-trinitarian views.7 
                                                          
5 Whiston takes the periodicity and elliptical orbits of comets to have been established by Newton – Whiston 
(1696b), 36. 
6 See Whiston (1698), preface.  
7 Snobelen (2009). 
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Whiston’s New theory has received a fair amount of scholarly attention, the most in-depth 
and focussed analysis coming from James Force in his 1985 biography William Whiston: Honest 
Newtonian.8 The historical literature on Whiston’s New theory has tended to emphasise two things: 
first, the differences between Whiston’s and Burnet’s theories of the earth; and second, the influence 
of Newton and Newtonianism on Whiston’s theory. I do not wish to deny either of these. Certainly 
there were numerous important differences between the two theories. And the Newtonian influence 
in Whiston was undeniably very profound and hugely significant. Nevertheless, the emphasis on these 
two aspects of Whiston’s theory has tended to obscure two equally important aspects of it. These are: 
(a) the remarkable similarities between Whiston and Burnet; and (b) the influence of Burnet on 
Whiston’s theory. While these aspects of Whiston’s theory have received some acknowledgement 
from historians, they have not been given any sustained attention or discussed in any depth. As a 
result, the prevailing picture of Whiston’s theory is of a Newtonian attack on Burnet, or at least a 
Newtonian theory of the earth which bears little resemblance, and owes little, to Burnet’s theory. 
In this chapter, I want to propose a slightly different reading of Whiston which takes into 
account these neglected aspects of his theory. What emerges from such an analysis, I argue, is not so 
much a Newtonian attack on Burnet but rather a synthesis of both Newton’s and Burnet’s ideas 
concerning the earth, Scripture, theology, and antiquity. The chapter consists of five main sections. In 
section one, I give an overview of Whiston’s theory of the earth and the principal motivation behind 
it which, I argue, was ultimately to produce a theory which cohered better with Scripture – and in 
particular the Mosaic Creation – than Burnet’s and Woodward’s. In the second section, I discuss the 
Newtonian influence on Whiston, paying particular attention to the similarities between Whiston’s 
                                                          
8 Force (1985), 32-62. Force has also discussed Whiston’s theory in his (1983); (1990), 144-52; (2004). Force 
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and Newton’s interpretation of Genesis 1. In section three, I turn to the various Burnettian aspects of 
the New theory. I return to Newtonianism in the fourth section where I explicate Whiston’s Newtonian 
conception of miracles and the distinction between the natural and the miraculous, comparing his 
views on these issues with those of Burnet. Finally, in section five, I examine Keill’s attack on Whiston 
and the subsequent debate between these two authors. 
5.2. A more sacred theory of the earth 
In Whiston’s New theory, the biblical chaos was the atmosphere of a comet which had left its eccentric 
orbit and adopted a circular orbit about the sun. The matter of the comet’s atmosphere descended in 
much the same way as in Burnet’s theory to form a solid crust on the surface of a body of fluid.9 The 
formation and characteristics of Whiston’s primitive earth differed in important ways from Burnet’s, 
however. First, the varying specific gravity of the solid matter resulted in it being immersed in different 
degrees in the fluid with unequal amounts of matter extant on the surface. Additionally, the order in 
which the matter settled on the surface of the fluid depended not only on its specific gravity but also 
on its place in the Chaos. And since the matter was distributed non-uniformly throughout the chaos, 
it became distributed likewise on the surface of the abyss. Hence, the surface of Whiston’s primitive 
earth was uneven and mountainous.10 Second, when the matter of the chaos had subsided, the sun’s 
heat raised vapours from water in the pores of the crust which condensed during the night, fell as rain, 
and filled the lower parts of the crust. Thus, Whiston’s primitive earth was terraqueous.11 
Though both mountainous and terraqueous, the primitive state of the earth in Whiston’s 
theory was nevertheless different in certain respects from later states just as it was in Burnet’s. 
Perhaps most importantly, its orbit was circular rather than elliptical.12 Its annual, circular motion 
about the sun, moreover, was its only motion. It had no diurnal rotation in the beginning. And owing 
                                                          
9 Whiston (1696b), 69-76, 217-64. 
10 Whiston (1696b), 59-62. 
11 Whiston (1696b), 241-8. 
12 Whiston (1696b), 110-18. 
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to its lack of diurnal motion and the consequent absence of centrifugal force, the primitive earth was 
spherical rather than an oblate spheroid as Whiston believed the present earth to be.13 Finally, 
although it had lesser seas, the earth in the beginning had no ocean, for the inequality of the surface 
could not have been significant enough to create such a large channel and the sun’s heat could not 
have raised sufficient vapour from the earth to fill such a channel.14 
The earth’s diurnal motion commenced at the Fall, the centrifugal force of the rotation 
changing the shape of the earth from a sphere to an oblate spheroid.15 Whiston does not assign a 
cause for the earth’s diurnal motion in the first edition of his New theory, attributing it instead to “a 
miraculous Power”.16 He ascribes it in the second edition to an oblique collision with a comet at some 
point on the earth’s present equator.17 The Deluge resulted from another comet passing close to the 
earth in its ascent toward the sun. The involvement of the earth in the comet’s atmosphere caused 
the biblical forty days rain and the gravitational attraction of the comet raised a double tide in the 
abyss which fractured the crust at various points and released the waters onto the surface – the 
breaking open of the fountains of the great deep (Fig. 1). The tide raised by the comet’s passing altered 
the shape of the crust, forming the channel of the ocean. The attraction of the comet also accelerated 
the earth’s projectile motion, thereby changing its orbit from circular to elliptical and lengthening the 
year by just over ten days. 18 The Conflagration would be caused by another comet passing close to 
the earth. Unlike at the Deluge, this comet will approach the earth in its descent from the sun, and, 
having gathered intense heat at its perihelion, will scorch the earth creating a second chaos from 
which the new, millennial earth will form via much the same process as the first earth. The final 
consummation will be brought about by yet another comet colliding directly with the earth and 
                                                          
13 Whiston (1696b), 51-7, 79-104, 168-74, 265-82. 
14 Whiston (1696b), 259-62, 298-300. 
15 Whiston (1696b), 51-7, 79-104, 173-4, 274-82. 
16 Whiston (1696b), 282. 
17 Whiston (1708), 111-2. He argues that this comet did not cause a deluge because it had little or no atmosphere. 
18 Whiston (1696b), 123-54, 187-208, 300-68. 
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diverting it from its current, moderate elliptical path into an eccentric orbit, thereby turning it back 
into a comet.19 
 
Fig. 1 
                                                          
19 Whiston (1696b), 209-15, 368-78. 
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 As with other theorists writing in the 1690s, the central aim of Whiston’s theory was to 
provide an account of the earth’s history which cohered better with Scripture than that of Burnet. It 
was to this end that Whiston prefaced the work with a tract nearly one hundred pages long entitled A 
discourse concerning the nature, stile, and extent of the Mosaick history of the creation in which he 
set out a complex and sophisticated exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis.20 Whiston’s interpretation 
of Genesis 1 consisted essentially of the following two key points. First, the Mosaic Creation of the 
world in six days pertains only to the earth and its atmosphere. It does not include the celestial 
heavens which were created before the earth, and importantly, it does not include the creation of the 
matter but only the form of the earth, its formation as a habitable world, the matter having been 
created ex nihilo prior to the six days.21 Second, the Mosaic history is not a philosophical account of 
the formation of the earth. Neither, however, is it false as Burnet had alleged. Rather, it is a true 
account of the various changes that the earth underwent during the six days of creation, told from the 
perspective of someone on earth. In other words, it describes in common-sense terms what a 
hypothetical observer on the earth would have witnessed during those six days.22 
 It was in the New theory itself that Whiston introduced the claim that the earth’s diurnal 
motion commenced not at the Creation but at the Fall. This of course meant that the six days of 
Creation were not twenty-four-hour periods but entire years – though ten days shorter than our years 
due to the earth’s circular orbit.23 Whiston offered a variety of arguments for this view. He pointed 
out that the annual and diurnal motion of the earth are entirely independent of one another, and so 
it was perfectly rational to conceive of the former without the latter. He noted that the central spheres 
of comets do not appear to have a diurnal motion. Thus, the earth being a former comet, it was likely 
that it, too, had no such motion in the beginning.24 The identification of days with years was equally 
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corroborated by Scripture and religious tradition. Moses and other sacred writers often use the terms 
“day” and “year” interchangeably. The Jews commemorate the Creation with periods of work and rest 
measured using both days and years, indicating that the periods of Creation were equally both.25 It 
was implausible to suggest, moreover, that the work done on each of the six days could be completed 
in mere twenty-four-hour periods. Adam’s naming of the animals, for example, just one of many things 
completed on the sixth day, would require sufficient time for him to master language and to acquire 
knowledge of them.26 
 The reading of the first chapter of Genesis proposed by Whiston in his Discourse together with 
his reinterpretation of the days of creation as years enabled him to construct a physical theory of the 
Creation which in his view aligned closely with the Mosaic History, something Burnet had singularly 
failed to do. The “creation” of light on the first day, he argued, was not literally its creation but the 
clearing of the atmosphere that resulted from the descent of the heavier fluid and solid matter and 
which enabled light to penetrate the chaos such that day could be distinguished from night.27 The 
division of the waters on the second day referred to the raising of vapours from the air and earth 
which rendered the middle region of the earth clear, thereby separating the higher from the lower 
waters.28 The division of land and sea on the third day was the vapours being condensed and falling 
as rain during the night (the first part of the third day) and filling the lower parts of the earth.29 As with 
the creation of light on the first day, the “creation” of the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day did 
not refer to the literal creation of these bodies but to the atmosphere becoming clear enough to 
render them visible from the earth.30 Finally, the sun’s heat being intensified by the clearing of the 
atmosphere enabled the production of fish, fowl, and land animals from seeds in the sea and land on 
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the fifth and sixth days. The Creation of humans required the direct action of God, which in this 
instance consisted in Christ appearing in human form and creating Adam and Eve.31 
 Whiston’s accounts of the Fall and Deluge were likewise designed to align more closely than 
Burnet’s theory with the Mosaic History. Burnet was not Whiston’s only target here, however. 
Woodward, whose Essay was published the year before Whiston’s New theory, had also attempted to 
account for these events. And Whiston commented extensively on Woodward’s theory, adopting his 
view of the distribution of plant and animal fossils but rejecting the central idea of a complete 
dissolution of inorganic matter at the Deluge.32 Turning back to Burnet, a major problem with his 
theory, as we have seen in previous chapters, was the earth’s being paradisiacal until the Deluge rather 
than the Fall. In the Theory, Burnet ignored the Fall altogether. Worse, however, was his assertion in 
the Archaeologiae that there was no truth in the doctrine whatsoever. Woodward had not done much 
better. Like Burnet, he held that the earth was paradisiacal until the Deluge when the dissolution and 
rearrangement of matter rendered it barren and suitable to fallen creatures. Although he addressed 
the issue of the Fall, he claimed simply that its effects were delayed until the Deluge. Paradise had in 
a sense been “lost” at the Fall in that this was God’s punishment for Adam’s sin, but God granted 
mankind a stay of execution until the Deluge.33 Difficulties with this position Woodward promised, as 
he did with virtually all of his theory’s shortcomings, would be dealt with in that elusive “Larger Work” 
of which his Essay was “only the Module or Platform”.34 
For Whiston, accounting for the Fall was at least as important as explaining the Deluge, for 
according to Scripture, the Fall was a more significant event and the difference between the state of 
innocence and the state of sin more pronounced than that between the antediluvian and 
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postdiluvian.35 His hypothesis concerning the diurnal rotation accounted perfectly in his view for this 
difference. The longer days prior to the Fall explained the growth of animals from seeds implanted in 
the soil and sea by God, something which the earth has been unable to do since because eggs and 
embryos require a continuous temperature as opposed to the extremes of heat and cold that result 
from the earth’s diurnal motion. Paradise, which Whiston argued – contra Burnet – was located in 
Mesopotamia, was on the ancient ecliptic and so especially warm and therefore peculiarly suited to 
the growth of animals, something which was impossible elsewhere on the earth. As with Burnet’s 
perpendicular axis, the lack of diurnal rotation and consequent lack of an axis distinct from the ecliptic 
meant that there was no seasonal variation. And the sphericity of the earth ensured that the heat 
from the central fire was distributed equally throughout the earth – it also meant that the ecliptic was 
closer to the central fire than it was after the Fall, which contributed further to the generation of 
animal life.36 What was perhaps most important about Whiston’s theory of the Fall in his view was 
that he was the first theorist to give an account the event at all. Others, he observed, had tried to 
explain the Deluge. But despite its significance, none had yet attempted to account for the Fall. His 
New theory, therefore, was “the first attempt at an Intire Theory, or such an one as takes in All the 
great Mutations of the Earth”.37 
Turning now to causes of the Deluge, the aspects of Burnet’s theory that Whiston considered 
most problematic were those which I discussed in chapter one: the timing and relative significance of 
the causes mentioned by Moses; the forty days rain being merely preparatory rather than the main 
cause of the Deluge as appears to be the case in the Mosaic account; and the forty days rain preceding 
the breaking open of the fountains of the abyss where in Moses it seems to begin at the same time. 
Once again, Woodward’s theory fared little better, for as Whiston noted, he attributed the Deluge 
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entirely to the waters of the abyss, taking no notice whatsoever of the forty days rain.38 By ascribing 
the Deluge to the close passing of a comet, Whiston, in contrast, could make the rain that resulted 
from the involvement of the earth in the comet’s atmosphere its primary cause. The onset of the rain 
and breaking open of the abyss, moreover, both occurred when the comet came close enough for the 
earth to be involved in its atmosphere and for the gravitational attraction to raise a double tide in the 
abyss and break the crust. Additionally, the rain being derived from the atmosphere of a comet 
resonated with such expressions as “the Windows, Flood-gates, or Cataracts of Heaven” which seem 
to imply a celestial rather than terrestrial source.39 The apparent problem of there being no mention 
in the Mosaic history of a comet passing close to the earth was dealt with by Whiston’s precise 
calculation of the earth’s position at the time of the comet’s passing, according to which the comet 
passed in the opposite hemisphere to where Noah and his family boarded the ark, meaning that no 
survivors of the Deluge could have witnessed it.40 
5.3. The Newtonian influence 
As is well known, Whiston’s New theory was heavily influenced by Newton in various ways.41 To begin 
with, as Peter Anstey has noted, Whiston presented his theory in the style of a mathematical treatise 
closely resembling Newton’s Principia, the four books of the work entitled “Lemmata”, “Hypotheses”, 
“Phaenomena”, and “Solutions”.42 Whiston’s theories of the Creation, Fall, Deluge, Conflagration, and 
final consummation were all derived principally from Newtonian mechanics and Newton’s work on 
comets, both of which were explained in depth in the Lemmata, making this book of the New theory 
the first popular exposition of Newtonian natural philosophy to be published in English.43 Also 
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important is that, as Peter Harrison and James Force have discussed, Whiston adopted a distinctly 
Newtonian conception of miracles and of the relationship between miracles and the ordinary course 
of nature – I shall discuss this in more detail in the final two sections of the chapter. 44 
As Force has argued at length, the Newtonian influence in Whiston’s theory went beyond the 
above philosophical and theological issues and into exegetical territory.45 As Force explains, the origins 
of Whiston’s “Newtonian method of scriptural exegesis” are to be found in Newton’s correspondence 
with Burnet just prior to the publication of the latter’s Theory. In his letter to Burnet, Newton proposed 
“in germ”, as Force puts it, the same interpretation of Genesis 1 that we find in greatly extended form 
fifteen years later in Whiston’s Discourse.46 Perhaps most significantly, Newton proposed precisely the 
same notion of the Mosaic history being an unphilosophical but true of the account of the Creation as 
it would have appeared to a hypothetical observer on the earth. “As to Moses”, he wrote to Burnet, 
“I do not think his description of ye creation either Philosophical or feigned, but that he described 
realities in a language artificially adapted to ye sense of ye vulgar”.47 And later, “Moses 
accommodating his words to ye gross conceptions of ye vulgar, describes things much after ye manner 
as one of ye vulgar would have been inclined to do had he lived & seen ye whole series of wt Moses 
describes”.48 He also applied this interpretation to the days of Creation in ways that anticipated 
Whiston, arguing for example that the “creation” of the sun, moon, and stars refers to their apparent 
rather than actual Creation: 
the heavens becoming clear for ye Sun in ye day & Moon & starrs in ye night to shine distinctly through 
them on the earth & so put on ye form of lights in ye firmament so that had men been now living on ye 
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earth to view ye process of ye creation they would have judged those lights created at this time, Moses 
here sets down their creation as if he had then lived & were now describing what he saw.49 
 The other key point in Whiston’s Discourse, that is, that the Creation narrative pertains only 
to the earth and its atmosphere and that other bodies are mentioned only insofar as they are relevant 
to the earth, is also present in Newton. The sun, moon, and stars, he told Burnet, are considered not 
“as they were physicall bodies in themselves…, but only as they were lights to this earth”. 50 Moses 
could not omit them, he continued, “wthout rendring his description of ye creation imperfect in ye 
judgment of ye vulgar”. Yet, 
[t]o describe them distinctly as they were in them selves would have made ye narration tedious & 
confused, amused ye vulgar & become a Philosopher more then a Prophet. He mentions them therefore 
only so far as ye vulgar had a notion of them, that is as they were phaenomena in our firmament & 
describes their making only so far & at such a time as they were made such phaenomena.51 
Also significant here is that Newton proposed to Burnet the idea, later to be taken up by Whiston, that 
the earth’s diurnal motion began after the six days of creation. And like Whiston at the time of writing 
the first edition of his New theory, Newton could not conceive of a sufficient natural cause of the 
earth’s diurnal motion, ascribing instead to direct intervention from God. He also made the very same 
point about the generation of animals in the earth being better facilitated by a continuous heat rather 
than short successions of heat and cold in response to Burnet’s objection that the long nights entailed 
by a lack of diurnal rotation would be disadvantageous to life on earth.52 
It is not known whether Whiston had seen Newton’s correspondence with Burnet. Paolo Rossi 
suggests that this was probably the case, and the congruence between the two authors’ views on the 
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above points indicates that he is very likely correct.53 What we do know from what Whiston wrote in 
1698 in the preface to his Vindication of the new theory of the earth, his first response to Keill, is that 
he sent a “a hasty imperfect draught” of his theory first to Bentley and then to Newton in 1695. He 
subsequently met with Newton twice to discuss the work, and “by the Hints and Directions I received 
from these Learned Persons, especially from the latter [Newton]…, much corrected, improved, and 
enlarged my Hypothesis”. Following this, he “brought it to an intire Systeme, and sent it to Cambridge 
for Mr. Newton's final Review and Correction”. It was only after this that he added his Discourse to 
the work.54 Thus, whether or not Whiston saw Newton’s correspondence with Burnet, it is highly likely 
that, either in his comments on those two earlier drafts of the New theory or in his conversations and 
correspondence with Whiston, Newton communicated the above views on Genesis 1 and the length 
of the days of creation, and that this communication had a significant impact on the finished product. 
5.4. The Burnettian influence 
I will discuss the Newtonian influence on Whiston further in the next section. For now, it will suffice 
to refer the reader to the work of Force and others who have examined Whiston’s Newtonianism in 
greater depth than I am able to here.55 What I want to turn my attention to instead is an aspect of 
Whiston’s theory that has received far less attention in the historical literature, namely, the extent to 
which it was influenced by Burnet. As I have noted above, Whiston’s New theory has been 
characterised by some as an attack on Burnet.56 This is certainly by no means false. Whiston does 
criticise Burnet quite extensively at various points in the work.57 And crucially, he was proposing an 
alternative theory of the earth because he believed Burnet’s to be inconsistent with both Scripture 
and philosophy. Nevertheless, this reading of Whiston has tended to obscure his equally extensive use 
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of decidedly Burnettian ideas, and his often-outspoken respect for, and admiration of, the original 
theorist of the earth. 
The Burnettian influence in Whiston’s theory is hardly surprising. As Whiston explained in the 
preface to the Vindication, having discovered “the New [Cartesian] Philosophy” upon arrival at 
Cambridge, he “fell into an exceeding liking of the main part of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth; and 
thought my self never more pleas'd than in a repeated perusal of so ingenious and remarkable a 
Book”.58 He notes here that he wrote a defence of the work as part of his BA examination and 
continued to believe Burnet’s theory until reading Newton’s Principia showed it to be inconsistent 
with philosophy and further reflection on Scripture revealed it to be incompatible with that, too, 
though several parts remained plausible.59 In his Discourse, moreover, Whiston confessed to having 
previously subscribed to the interpretation of Genesis controversially espoused by Burnet in the 
Archaeologiae.60 
 It is in the Discourse that Whiston’s admiration for Burnet is most evident. As Force notes, one 
of Whiston’s principle aims in this work was to provide an interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis 
which occupied a middle ground between two equally unpalatable extremes. These two extremes 
were, first, the literalism of such divines as Edwards who adhered to a reading of Genesis which was 
inconsistent both with reason and philosophy and with the wisdom of God, and second, the fictional 
interpretation of those like Burnet, for whom the aforementioned inconsistencies warranted an 
outright denial of its truth.61 In Whiston’s view, both extremes were equally pernicious. Yet it was only 
the latter position which seemed to attract censure, and this was problematic.62 Burnet, he stressed, 
was “a great and good man” who had attempted to give a rational account of the Creation and Deluge 
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in order to remove the apparent unintelligibility of the events which had been conducive to irreligion. 
His intentions, therefore, were pious and highly laudable. And he had executed his design with 
considerable skill, employing the best system of natural philosophy known at the time and combining 
it with rigorous study of Scripture and ancient learning. Yes, he had erred. Yes, he had dishonoured 
both God and Moses. And his work had been used to attack revealed religion by the very freethinkers 
from whom he sought to protect it. Nevertheless, Burnet deserved no more censure than those like 
Edwards who, from equally pious motives, had harmed religion by setting Scripture at odds with 
reason and philosophy and with a rational conception of God.63 
 As may already be evident to some extent in the foregoing paragraph, although Whiston 
disagreed with Burnet’s interpretation of Genesis 1, his reasons for rejecting what he referred to as 
the “vulgar exposition”, that is, the view that both the matter and form of the entire universe were 
literally created in six twenty-four-hour periods, were strikingly similar to the arguments advanced by 
Burnet in the Archaeologiae. Among other similarities, both authors noted that the common 
interpretation of the text was incompatible with the heliocentric system.64 Both pointed out the 
absurdity of light being created before its source.65 Both discussed in depth the disproportionate 
amount of work done on the different days, emphasising in particular that the earth alone, which is 
but an insignificant part of the Creation, is allotted four days whereas the sun and stars, which are 
vaster and nobler bodies, are apportioned merely a day between them.66 The two authors also offered 
very similar arguments as to why Moses gave the account he did, both for instance arguing that 
Moses’s mentioning the creation of the sun, moon, and stars and his subjugation of them to the earth 
were designed to discourage idolatry.67 Also important is that Whiston, like Burnet, placed particular 
emphasis on the vulgar Creation being contrary not only to reason and philosophy but also to the 
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wisdom of God, a point he expanded upon at length by introducing various analogies with human 
works which, if executed in such a disorderly manner, would reflect unfavourably on their authors.68 
Given the similarity of their arguments and Whiston’s extensive study of Burnet’s work, it is highly 
likely that the arguments against the literal interpretation of the Creation in the Archaeologiae, which 
Whiston confesses to having previously convinced him of Burnet’s interpretation, were the principal 
source of his rejection of the “vulgar exposition” of Genesis 1.69 
 Burnet’s influence is evident also in various physical details of Whiston’s theory. One of these 
is the earth’s central fire, which Whiston explains in terms of the central sphere of the comet from 
which the earth formed having gathered and retained intense heat each time it passed close to the 
sun at perihelion.70 Two others are mentioned by Whiston in the preface to the Vindication as being 
aspects of Burnet’s theory to which he continued to subscribe after becoming convinced that the 
theory as a whole was untenable. These were (a) the formation of the earth on a body of fluid and (b) 
the perpetual equinox on the primitive earth, both of which, notwithstanding the theory’s more 
general implausibility, “seem'd very reasonable, and very agreeable to the Accounts Sacred and 
Profane of those ancient Ages of the World”.71 Perhaps the most Burnettian tenet of Whiston’s theory 
was his view of the earth’s formation. There were of course important differences between the two 
theories. Burnet’s chaos was a former star, Whiston’s the atmosphere of a comet. Burnet’s crust was 
uniform and devoid of seas, whereas Whiston’s was unequal and terraqueous. The two authors’ 
conceptions of gravity, moreover, the main force at work in the earth’s formation from a chaos, were 
very different, Burnet subscribing to the Cartesian theory of vortices and Whiston explicitly rejecting 
vortices and conceptualising gravity in Newtonian terms.72 Nevertheless, the formation of the earth 
in both cases results from matter descending as a result of its gravity to form a solid crust 
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encompassing a body of fluid. Indeed, the two theories were so similar in this respect that, when 
discussing the earth’s formation, Whiston repeatedly refers the reader to the illustrations in Burnet’s 
account as accurate representations of his own.73 
What is also important here is that the passages of Scripture to which Whiston appealed in 
support of his account of the formation and constitution of the earth were precisely the same as those 
invoked by Burnet. He notes, for example, “the Earth's being founded on the Seas, and established on 
the Floods” and “the stretching out the Earth above the Waters” in Psalms 24.2 and 136.6, “a Compass 
or Orb being set on the Face of the Deep” in Proverbs 8.27. Perhaps most tellingly, he appeals to St. 
Peter’s Second Epistle, Chap. 3.5 and at one point even follows Burnet in translating the passage as 
“consisting” rather than “standing” out of the water.74 This latter point is important. Kerry Magruder, 
as I discussed in chapter four, has argued that Burnet prioritised St. Peter over Moses, and abandoned 
the literal sense of the latter in order to preserve the literal sense of the former. As I argued there, 
Magruder’s assessment must be amended to account for the fact that Burnet only abandoned the 
literal sense of Genesis 1-3, and the fact that he abandoned it not only to preserve the literal sense of 
St Peter but also the literal sense of Genesis 6-9. It is nevertheless true, though, that St Peter took 
precedence over the Mosaic account of the Creation and Deluge. This priority of St Peter, Magruder 
argues, was rejected by Burnet’s opponents.75 Elsewhere, Magruder discusses specifically Whiston’s 
rejection of Burnet’s priority of St Peter, which he suggests is especially evident in Whiston’s use of 
Burnet’s illustrations, for here he assigns Burnet’s images of the different stages of the earth’s 
formation to specific days of creation in order to reconcile his account with the Mosaic six-day 
Creation, something Burnet made no attempt to do.76 
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Magruder’s point is important and illustrates a significant difference between Whiston and 
Burnet. Unlike Burnet, Whiston maintains that the Mosaic history of the Creation, though 
unphilosophical, is nevertheless true. This forces him to reconcile his theory of the earth’s formation 
with his interpretation this text. It is important to emphasise, however, that Whiston does not reject 
the Petrine component of Burnet’s theory. Indeed, where other critics of Burnet had argued that St 
Peter’s Epistle should not be interpreted literally or is not relevant to the constitution of the earth, 
Whiston follows Burnet in arguing that the earth’s “consisting out of the water” literally indicates that 
it formed on a body of fluid.77 He also quotes from St. Peter when arguing that the Mosaic history of 
the Creation does not pertain to the wider universe. Here he rehearses Burnet’s observation that St 
Peter restricts both the Deluge and Conflagration to the earth and its atmosphere and uses this 
observation – along with a passage from Hebrews – to argue that the same restriction must apply to 
the Creation.78  He also follows Burnet in making St. Peter the main scriptural basis of his account of 
the Conflagration.79 Thus, although he does not follow Burnet in abandoning the literal sense of the 
Mosaic Creation in favour of St Peter, he does not reject Burnet’s interpretation of the latter. The 
difference rather is that where Burnet thinks the literal sense of the Mosaic Creation cannot be 
reconciled with St Peter, Whiston finds a way of making them cohere with one another. 
Turning now to Whiston’s primitive perpetual equinox, this too differs in certain respects from 
that of Burnet. What is perhaps most important here is the difference in timing. In Burnet, the 
perpetual equinox ends at the Deluge, whereas in Whiston it ends at the Fall, something he 
emphasised was more consistent with Scripture than Burnet’s hypothesis.80 The seasons become less 
temperate at the Deluge, yet this results not from any change in the earth’s axis but from the 
heterogeneity of the air introduced by the comet’s atmosphere and the earth’s orbit becoming 
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elliptical as opposed to circular.81 The cause of the change from a perpetual equinox to seasonal 
variation in the two authors was also very different. In Burnet it is the disequilibrium introduced by 
the newly unequal surface of the earth which shifts the axis on which the globe was already rotating 
diurnally. In Whiston, it is the commencement of the earth’s diurnal rotation, caused in the first edition 
by direct intervention from God and in the second by an oblique collision with a comet at some point 
on the present equator, which gives the earth an axis distinct from its ecliptic. 
Notwithstanding the above differences, it is abundantly clear that the idea of a perpetual 
equinox on the primitive earth came from Burnet, for Whiston states this explicitly in the preface to 
the Vindication.82 This idea, moreover, appears also to have had a profound impact on other aspects 
of Whiston’s theory. As he explains, the plausibility of a perpetual equinox together with the 
inadequacy of the cause to which Burnet had ascribed the obliquity of the present earth’s axis had led 
him to consider whether the earth’s obliquity might instead have been brought about by the 
gravitational attraction of a comet passing close to the earth. Around “November or December 1694”, 
he calculated whether this hypothesis could account for the present earth’s twenty-three-and-a-half-
degree angle but determined that the attraction of a comet was not sufficient to effect such a change. 
The failed hypothesis, however, occasioned further consideration as to the possible effects of a comet 
passing near the earth. This resulted in a new hypothesis, which he then communicated to Bentley, 
that the involvement of the earth in a comet’s atmosphere may have caused the Deluge. “These”, he 
wrote, “were my first and crude thoughts of this matter; which tho' the particulars were but ill 
adjusted, and uncertain; yet gave me an eagerness of considering the matter farther, and occasion'd 
all the subsequent discoveries which are contain'd in the New Theory”.83 
One of the main reasons for Whiston being sympathetic to Burnet’s notion of a perpetual 
equinox on the primitive earth was that the view was, as Burnet had argued at length in the 
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Archaeologiae, corroborated by numerous ancient writings.84 This close attention to antiquity was yet 
another distinctly Burnettian component of Whiston’s theory. Whiston attended to precisely the same 
canon of ancient writings as Burnet, observed the same maxim of only appealing to the ancients if 
their views are corroborated by reason and Scripture, and, like Burnet, viewed his theory’s ability to 
make sense of ostensibly obscure notions in ancient learning as one of its major strengths. On this 
latter point, Burnet’s theory was an important point of reference in assessing the success of his own. 
The ancients’ notions of a perpetual equinox and the ecliptic not being distinct from the equator, for 
example, were accounted for by both theories. Other ancient doctrines, however, were inconsistent 
with Burnet’s theory but accommodated easily by his. Plato and Herodotus, for example, had related 
various ancient traditions concerning a former state of the earth in which the sun and other planets 
rose in the west and set in the east, something which could not be accounted for by Burnet’s theory 
but which, Whiston pointed out, was fully explained by his hypothesis that the earth in the beginning 
had no diurnal motion.85 
As Magruder has argued, the theorists’ and their opponents’ shared canon of Scriptural and 
classical texts played an important role in enabling communication and debate between authors from 
very different disciplinary backgrounds.86 This is certainly correct. In this controversy, we see divines 
such as Burnet and Robinson, naturalists like Woodward and Beaumont, and mathematicians like 
Whiston and Keill, authors not just from different disciplinary backgrounds but also using very 
different philosophical and theological frameworks, all bringing radically different perspectives on the 
history of the earth. Their main common ground was indeed as Magruder argues a body of sacred, 
pagan, and also early-Judeo-Christian texts. A significant component of this, I want to suggest, was the 
ability of this shared canon of ancient writings to provide an important point of comparison between 
competing theories, a way of measuring their relative success and the likelihood of their being true 
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accounts of the earth’s history. As I have noted above, Burnet took the ability of his theory to explain 
ostensibly obscure notions in Scripture and other ancient writings as important evidence of its truth, 
as instances of novel empirical success. We find the same kind of use of the same ancient texts in 
Whiston. He employs the same canon of texts and uses it in precisely the same way in order to show 
that his theory was better confirmed by antiquity than Burnet’s and was therefore more likely to be 
correct. His theory, he believed, could account for all the same textual phenomena as Burnet’s: the 
ancient chaos; the mundane egg; the perpetual equinox; the excerpts from the Psalms, Proverbs, and 
St Peter. Yet it could also explain many more besides and was therefore a superior theory. 
The above notion of the sun’s rising in the west and setting in the east was one example of an 
ancient doctrine which could be accounted for on Whiston’s but not on Burnet’s theory. But there 
were numerous others. An aspect of Whiston’s theory that was especially successful in this regard was 
his hypothesis of the antediluvian earth’s circular orbit and the change from a circular to an elliptical 
orbit at the Deluge. Conducting a brief survey of ancient astronomy, Whiston noted that the true 
length of the year was unknown for a long time following the Deluge. This indicated that the length of 
the year changed at this time. The postdiluvians clearly observed that the year was longer, for they 
lengthened it from 355 to 360 days, the latter number likely influenced by its correspondence with 
the degrees of a circle and an imagined correspondence with lunar years. This was later corrected with 
astronomical observations and lengthened to 365 – the Julian year. This lengthening of the year, he 
emphasised, could only be explained by his hypothesis of the attraction of the comet at the Deluge 
altering the earth’s orbit and lengthening its period.87 
Another ancient puzzle that could be solved by the earth’s circular orbit was the perplexing 
discrepancy between different translations of Scripture and ancient chronologies as to the length of 
time Noah was aboard the Ark. In the Hebrew Bible and in Hebrew chronologies, Noah was aboard 
the Ark for one year and ten days, whereas in the Greek Septuagint and in the chronology of Flavius 
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Josephus, he was aboard for one year. The clear solution, and the only way to reconcile the two, was 
to suppose that at the Deluge the year lengthened by ten days, and that the Hebrew bible and 
chronologies on the one hand and the Septuagint and Josephus on the other measured Noah’s time 
on the Ark in antediluvian and postdiluvian years respectively. The lengthening of the year by ten days 
was of course what Whiston calculated as resulting from the acceleration of the earth caused by the 
passing of the comet. The ability to reconcile these two apparently conflicting accounts of Noah’s time 
on the Ark, then, provided important confirmation of Whiston’s hypothesis concerning the original 
circular orbit of the earth.88 
What is also noteworthy here about Whiston’s view of the primitive earth’s circular orbit is 
that it mirrors in interesting ways Burnet’s notion of a symmetrical, uniform globe. As David Kubrin 
argues, although Whiston’s insistence on symmetry was directed toward the earth’s orbit rather than 
its geological features, it evinces a similar commitment to an orderly first creation that we find in 
Burnet.89 I want to go further than Kubrin and suggest that this commitment was very likely inherited 
from Burnet. To begin with, the language used by Burnet and Whiston on this point is strikingly similar. 
“[A]ll nature’s first motions and her first forms” writes Burnet, “are regular, and whatsoever is not so 
is but secondary, and the consequence of some degeneracy, or of some decay”.90 Likewise for 
Whiston, “‘[t]is most Philosophical, as well as most Pious, to ascribe only what appears wise, regular, 
uniform, and harmonious, to the First Cause…, but as to such things as may seem of another nature, 
to attribute them intirely to subsequent changes”.91 Also very similar here are the two authors’ 
arguments from final causes. For Burnet, as we saw in the second chapter, the earth was designed in 
such a way as to best serve its purpose of supporting life. The present earth’s geological phenomena 
were ill-suited to this and therefore could not have been part of the first creation. While Whiston 
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disagreed with this point in relation to the present earth’s geological phenomena, he advanced an 
almost identical argument concerning its orbit. The earth, he argued following Burnet, was clearly 
designed for habitation. All life on earth requires a particular quantity of the sun’s heat and is therefore 
not well-adapted to a much greater or lesser quantity and so peculiarly suited to a circular orbit. The 
earth’s orbit, he conceded, is only mildly elliptical and the effects of its varying proximity to the sun 
are therefore not especially sensible. Nevertheless, it is suboptimal, and hence cannot be, as Whiston 
put it, 
the immediate effect of the Divine Power and Wisdom in the first frame of the World, when all things 
just coming out of the Creator's hands, must be allow'd to have been perfect in their kind, and 
exceeding good; when the rational Creatures being Pure and Innocent, the natural state of things was 
to be suited to them; and dispos'd agreeably to reason, proportion, and the convenience of the same 
unspotted and sinless Creatures.92 
The final point I want to emphasise about the influence of Burnet in Whiston’s theory is 
Whiston’s commitment to natural as opposed to miraculous causes. This central component of 
Burnet’s theory Whiston adopts and sets down at the end of the Discourse as the second postulate of 
his New theory.93 Force has characterised this aspect of Whiston’s theory as Newtonian.94 Certainly 
this was a view to which Newton subscribed, having stated in his correspondence with Burnet that 
“[w]here natural causes are at hand God uses them as instruments in his works”.95 And, as I shall 
discuss in more detail shortly, Whiston’s distinction between the natural and the miraculous was 
decidedly Newtonian. However, given Burnet’s continued emphasis on the priority of natural over 
miraculous causes both in his Theory and in subsequent work relating to it, it is likely that Whiston’s 
commitment to explaining events in terms of natural processes was influenced at least as much by 
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Burnet and almost certainly predates both his reading of the Principia and any communication he had 
with Newton. 
Burnet’s influence in this area is evident throughout Whiston’s often-extensive discussion of 
this issue. Perhaps most salient here is the similarity between the two authors’ emphasis on God’s 
prescience and the synchronicity between the natural and moral world being more in keeping with his 
wisdom than any extraordinary intervention. Just as Burnet had argued with regard to the dissolution 
of the crust, Whiston stressed that God’s contriving the world such that the comet would pass at 
precisely the correct proximity to the earth and would yield exactly the requisite quantity of water to 
drown the earth to the specific depth of fifteen cubits above the highest mountains and would do so 
at precisely the moment of man’s maximal sinfulness was far greater evidence of his wisdom than his 
simply bringing about the event by divine fiat. “God's Praescience”, he emphasised, 
enables him to act after a more sublime manner; and by a constant Course of Nature, and Chain of 
Mechanical Causes, to do every thing so as it shall not be distinguishable from a particular Interposition 
of his Power, nor be otherwise than on such a particular Interposition wou'd have been brought to pass. 
He who has created all things, and given them their several Powers and Faculties, foresees the Effects 
of 'em all: At once looks through the intire Train of future Causes, Actions, and Events, and sees at what 
Periods, and in what manner twill be necessary and expedient to bring about any changes, bestow any 
Mercies, or inflict any Punishments on the World: Which being unquestionably true, 'tis evident he can 
as well provide and praedispose natural Causes for those Mutations, Mercies, or Judgments before-
hand; he can as easily put the Machin into such Motions as shall, without a necessity of his mending or 
correcting it, correspond to all these foreseen Events or Action, as make way for such Alterations 
afterward by giving a random force to the whole: And when these two ways are equally possible, I need 
not say which is most agreeable to the Divine Perfections, and most worthy of God.96 
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As the foregoing quotation makes clear, this argument in Whiston very closely resembles the parallel 
argument both in Burnet’s Theory and in his debate with Warren – with which Whiston, having studied 
Burnet extensively at exactly the time of this debate, was surely familiar. And just as Burnet had 
repeatedly done in this debate, Whiston stressed that construing biblical events in terms of natural 
processes was not a denial but an affirmation of God’s providence. “To assign Physical and Mechanical 
causes for the Deluge, or such mighty Judgments of God upon the Wicked”, he emphasised echoing 
Burnet, “is so far from taking away the Divine Providence therein, that it supposes and demonstrates 
its Interest in a more Noble, Wise, and Divine manner than the bringing in a miraculous Power wou'd 
do”.97 
In many respects, Whiston takes this commitment to natural causes further than Burnet. 
Indeed, he even extends it to petitionary prayer. Prayers, he argues, are answered not by God 
intervening and violating the ordinary course of nature but by natural processes themselves. 
Essentially, God has divine foreknowledge of all our prayers and engineers natural causes so as to 
answer them in a way that appears indistinguishable from his particular intervention.98 This greater 
commitment to natural causes is evident throughout the New theory. As I discussed in the second 
chapter, Burnet ascribed the protection of the Ark during the Deluge to the ministry of angels. He then 
gave angels an even more significant role in the Conflagration by having them organise and manipulate 
natural processes. Whiston, in contrast, is committed in his accounts of the Deluge and Conflagration 
(and also the Fall in the second edition) solely to natural causes. The Conflagration results purely from 
a comet passing close to the earth in its descent from the sun.99 The commencement of the earth’s 
diurnal motion at the Fall, too, which he initially attributes to miraculous intervention, eventually 
becomes the result of a comet striking the earth at its present equator.100 
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As to the protection of the Ark during the Deluge, this is rather more complicated, for here 
Whiston concocts a quite elaborate scenario – though one which he argues is entailed by his 
calculation of the time of the comet’s passing and its proximity to the earth – in order to avoid any 
miraculous intervention. As I have noted above, during the comet’s initial passing, the Ark was 
protected by being in the opposite hemisphere. To guard it from the storms and tumultuous waters 
of the Flood, it rested on land at the top of Caucasus, which at that time was most elevated point on 
earth due to the figure of the earth being distorted by the double tide in the abyss, and so the water 
there was shallow enough for the Ark to come to ground. These details, too, Whiston sees as 
remarkable examples of God’s prescience, more befitting his wisdom than Burnet’s angels. God, he 
argues, foresaw that Caucasus would be the most elevated point on the earth during the Deluge and 
had Noah build and board the ark in that specific location in light of this.101 Whiston, then, takes the 
commitment to natural causes further than Burnet, but he does so for the distinctly Burnettian reason 
that they are more in keeping with God’s wisdom than his particular intervention in the world. 
5.5. Newtonian miracles and Burnettian motivations 
I have argued above that Whiston is more committed to naturalistic explanations than Burnet. I now 
want to suggest that there is an important sense in which he is more committed to miracles as well. 
This is not as paradoxical as it initially sounds. Here we must remember Whiston’s Newtonian 
distinction between miracles and the ordinary course of nature. As Harrison has discussed in depth, 
for Whiston, as for Newton and other Newtonians such as Richard Bentley and Samuel Clarke, gravity 
requires continual intervention from God. This blurs the distinction somewhat between the natural 
and the miraculous.102 “‘Tis not very easy”, emphasises Whiston, 
exactly to determine how far, and in what particulars, a supernatural or miraculous Interposition of the 
Divine Power is concern'd; and how far the Laws of Nature, or Mechanical Powers ought to be 
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extended. Nay, indeed, 'tis difficult enough, in several instances, to determine what is the effect of a 
natural and ordinary, and what of a supernatural and extraordinary Providence. 'Tis now evident, That 
Gravity, the most mechanical Affection of Bodies, and which seems most natural, depends entirely on 
the constant and efficacious, and, if you will, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty 
God.103 
This construal of gravity as requiring a continual “supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty 
God” allows Whiston to maintain that the Deluge and other biblical events are both the result of 
natural causes and “the effect of the peculiar and extraordinary Providence of God”.104 For, as he puts 
it, 
[a]ll those powers of Attraction or Gravitation, &c. and those Laws of Motion by which these Bodies are 
capable of producing such Effects, are alike owing to the Divine Operation, Appointment, and Efficacy, 
both in their primitive Impression, and continual Energy; and so still the Effects themselves are to be 
ascrib'd to a Divine Original.105 
The Deluge, Conflagration, and so on, then, are in an important sense both natural and miraculous 
events, for although they are not contrary to the laws of nature and so are not miraculous in the 
traditional sense, their causes nevertheless require God’s direct intervention. 
 As Kubrin notes, Whiston’s Newtonian conception of gravity made his theory more 
theologically acceptable than Burnet’s.106 To fully appreciate this point, it is instructive to imagine 
Whiston’s theory without this notion. In Whiston’s theory, interventions from God which seem 
contrary to or beyond the laws of nature – miracles in the traditional sense – occurred only in the very 
beginning, prior even to the six days of Creation. In Burnet, on the other hand, angels protect the Ark 
during the Deluge. They also intervene in nature to bring about the conflagration. And as I have argued 
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in the second chapter, they seem to be involved in the formation of the earth at the Creation and in 
its dissolution at the Deluge. Although this is not direct intervention from God himself, the angels are 
carrying out God’s commands. It is therefore a form of extraordinary providence which originates with 
God and occurs long after the Creation. Without his Newtonian conception of gravity, then, Whiston’s 
theory appears decidedly deistic compared with Burnet’s, since Burnet in this case would seem to 
allow more supernatural intervention in the world following the Creation. With his Newtonian 
conception of gravity, however, Whiston can give God a constant, essential role in nature, and so can 
escape the charge of deism more effectively than Burnet. Both authors share the view that God 
violating the laws of nature is contrary to the divine wisdom. Both want to avoid this state of affairs 
in their theories. They avoid it, however, in very different ways. Burnet wants to avoid any direct 
intervention from God, and so effectively rules it out by making any miraculous intervention the result 
of angels carrying out God’s commands rather than God himself intervening. Whiston has no problem 
with God intervening directly in the world. Indeed, he sees it as necessary for maintaining the laws of 
nature. What he does not want is God violating the laws of nature. And since God is continually 
intervening in nature anyway, Whiston can maintain both God’s direct involvement in biblical events 
and the view that God executes his design through natural causes and does not violate his own laws. 
As will be apparent at various points in this chapter and as Harrison has correctly noted, 
Whiston, again in common with Newton and other Newtonians, appears prima facie to admit of some 
miracles in the traditional sense of violations of laws of nature or events which cannot be explained 
in naturalistic terms.107 Indeed, in the New theory, he discusses, among other things, the creation of 
matter, the formation of animal and vegetable seeds, and the creation of humans as events which 
appear to be contrary to or to go beyond natural law and which seem to be inexplicable in terms of 
natural processes.108 As Harrison argues, however, there is an important sense in which these miracles 
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in Whiston are only inexplicable from our limited perspective and are in principle explainable in 
naturalistic terms. We lack the requisite knowledge of nature to explain them at present, and so we 
describe them as inexplicable, but the possibility or potentiality of their being explained is very much 
open.109 
Harrison illustrates the foregoing point with an example from Whiston’s Vindication, but it is 
equally evident in the New theory itself.110 At the very end of the work, for example, one of Whiston’s 
“corollaries from the whole” is that events in Scripture which seem prima facie to be inexplicable given 
our present knowledge of the natural world may, with progress in the sciences, prove not to be 
inexplicable.111 From this, he draws a conclusion against Blount and others who had used the 
unintelligibility of biblical events to undermine the veracity of Scripture. The apparent inexplicability 
of biblical events, he argues, is no reason to deny the truth of Scripture, for these events may in fact 
be consistent with and explicable in terms of natural law and the seeming unintelligibility of the events 
merely a result of our imperfect knowledge of the natural world. He had shown this to be the case 
with the Creation, Fall, Deluge, Conflagration, and final consummation, and it would likely be the case 
with other biblical events, too. “The Measure of our present Knowledge”, he emphasised,  
ought not to be esteem'd the… Test of Truth; or to be oppos'd to the Accounts receiv'd from Profane 
Antiquity, much less to the inspir'd Writings. For notwithstanding that several Particulars relating to the 
Eldest Condition of the World, and its great Catastrophe's, examin'd and compar'd with so much 
Philosophy as was till lately known, were plainly unaccountable, and, naturally speaking, impossible; 
yet we see, now Nature is more fully, more certainly, and more substantially understood, that the same 
things approve themselves to be plain, easie, and rational…. 'Tis therefore Folly in the highest degree, 
to reject the Truth, or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, because we cannot give our Minds 
particular Satisfaction as to the manner, nay or even possibility of some things therein asserted. Since 
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we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible, and gave 
the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophick Minds, so fully and particularly attested, and next to 
demonstrated from certain Principles of Astronomy and Natural Knowledge; 'tis but reasonable to 
expect, in due time, a like Solution of the other Difficulties.112 
The foregoing quotation strongly evinces what Harrison has stressed concerning the 
subjectivity of Whiston’s conception of miracles, something we discussed in the second chapter. For 
Whiston and other Newtonians, miracles in Scripture are not objectively or ontologically distinct from 
the laws of nature. They merely appear so due to our limited knowledge of the world. They are 
subjective or epistemic miracles, “miracles for us”, and are, at least in principle, explicable in terms of 
natural processes.113 This, as I argued in chapter two, is quite different from Burnet’s understanding 
of miracles. For him, miracles are objectively and ontologically distinct from the ordinary course of 
nature. Biblical events are largely explicable in terms of natural processes, but to the extent that they 
are explicable in such terms, they are not miracles. What Burnet and Whiston do have in common 
here is their commitment to explaining them. I have of course discussed this similarity between Burnet 
and Whiston at length in the previous section, but it is worth stressing further here, since it, too, is 
very much in evidence in the above passage of the New theory. For both authors, regardless of 
whether biblical events are to be considered miraculous, explaining these events served an important 
purpose in countering the arguments of deists and atheists who appealed to the apparent 
unintelligibility of biblical events to undermine Scripture. Herein lies a quite fundamental and 
important point of agreement between Whiston and Burnet. Both believed that the best way to deal 
with this threat to revealed religion was to make these events intelligible. And both tried to do 
precisely this in their respective theories. Crucially, then, although they disagreed on many details, 
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Whiston and Burnet were ultimately engaged in fundamentally the same pursuit and were so for 
essentially the same reasons. 
5.6. Whiston vs. Keill 
One author who disagreed emphatically with Burnet’s and Whiston’s assessment of the apologetic 
value of explaining biblical events naturalistically was Whiston’s fellow Newtonian John Keill, an 
Oxford philosopher and mathematician and protégé of David Gregory – one of the first to adopt the 
Newtonian system following the publication of the Principia. Keill’s Examination was published two 
years after Whiston’s New theory. It was an attack primarily on Burnet and only secondarily on 
Whiston, with a forty-eight-page essay on the latter appended to the 176-page treatise on the 
former.114 The work prompted replies, first from Whiston and then from an anonymous defender of 
Burnet, who I will argue in the next chapter was almost certainly Burnet himself.115 In response to 
these replies, Keill published another book in 1699 entitled An examination of the reflections on the 
theory of the earth together with a defence of the remarks on Mr. Whiston's new theory, a work of 
roughly the same length and with a similar division of attention between the two theorists.116 This 
latter book occasioned yet another response from Whiston but no further reply from Burnet.117 Keill 
issued no response to Whiston’s second reply. 
 As well as being shorter, Keill’s attack on Whiston – at least the first one – was less hostile 
than his attack on Burnet. Unlike Burnet, and Descartes before him, Whiston had applied 
mathematics, the touchstone of the true philosophy in Keill’s estimation, in his theory of the earth. As 
a result, Keill found much to praise. “I cannot but acknowledge”, he writes at the beginning of his 
attack, “that Mr. Whiston… has made greater discoveries, and proceeded on more Philosophical 
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Principles than all the Theorists before him have done”.118 He was, moreover, convinced by Whiston’s 
calculations that a comet likely did pass close to the earth on the day the Deluge began, and that the 
attraction of this comet changed the motion of the earth from a circular to an elliptical orbit.119 What 
he was not convinced of was that the passing of a comet was sufficient to cause a universal Deluge. 
Nor was he persuaded that the earth formed from a comet’s atmosphere. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Keill’s criticisms of Burnet were almost entirely 
philosophical. This, he noted, was necessary, for scriptural objections could not be effective against 
an author who denies the truth of Scripture.120 In responding to Whiston, however, and in particular 
on the issue of the Creation, Keill combines his philosophical attack in several places with a scriptural 
one. Ultimately, Whiston had not denied the truth of the Mosaic account of the Creation but had 
reinterpreted it. Thus, as well as considering the philosophical difficulties with Whiston’s theory, it 
was open to Keill also to assess (a) whether his theory of the earth cohered with his interpretation of 
Moses, and (b) whether his interpretation of Moses was the correct one.  
Keill begins his discussion of Whiston’s theory by noting several problems with the supposition 
that the chaos was the atmosphere of a comet. Comets, for example, are bright, luminous bodies with 
pellucid atmospheres through which their central solids are clearly visible, whereas the chaos is 
explicitly stated in Scripture and universally agreed by the ancients to have been dark. Whiston’s 
cometary chaos, moreover, conflicted with his own claim that the sun and stars were not created but 
merely rendered visible on the fourth day, for given the pellucidity of comets’ atmospheres, they must 
always on his view have been visible. Though he had claimed that the darkness mentioned in Scripture 
referred to the atmosphere being clouded with the dense fluid which subsided first and surrounded 
the central solid, he himself had noted that the heat comets gather at perihelion lasts many thousands 
of years. The agitation of the matter resulting from this heat, therefore, would only subside as the 
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comet cools. So it would be several millennia rather than merely one or two years before an amount 
of matter sufficient to obscure the light of the sun could subside. It was also clear that the matter of 
the earth had never been subjected to such heat. The upper strata of the earth are composed mainly 
of stones, sand, and gravel, substances which, when heated considerably, are liquefied and turned to 
glass. Had the strata ever been part of a comet’s atmosphere, they would have undergone precisely 
this process at perihelion and would not appear as they do on the present earth.121 
Regarding the primitive earth, although Keill was sympathetic to Whiston’s notion of an 
originally circular orbit, he was not receptive to the idea of the earth having no diurnal motion until 
the Fall. To this issue he devoted considerable attention.122 And as we shall see shortly, his objection 
against Whiston on this point would have an appreciable impact on Whiston himself, forcing him to 
modify his theory quite significantly in this area. Interestingly, Keill’s argument here closely resembles 
Burnet’s response to Newton’s similar suggestion in their correspondence nearly two decades 
previously. Newton had suggested that the earth’s diurnal motion may have been considerably slower 
in the beginning, making the days longer and allowing more time for the Creation.123 Against this, 
Burnet had protested that “if ye day was thus long wt a dolefull night would there bee?”.124 Keill 
stressed similarly against Whiston that the long periods of extreme heat and cold entailed by the earth 
having no diurnal motion could not be endured by humans and other animals. Though creatures are 
adapted to hotter or colder environments, none are fitted to survive successive six-month periods of 
each.125 Such conditions would be even more unfavourable to vegetable life, which requires a 
determinate heat, too little or too much either preventing its growth or destroying it before it can go 
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to seed. If the primitive earth’s plants were adapted to such conditions, they would necessarily have 
been destroyed at the onset of the earth’s diurnal motion, which would introduce conditions for which 
they were not adapted, requiring God to create all plants anew, “which we can hardly imagine to be 
done”. It was hence “far more agreeable to the Laws of Nature and Philosophy, that the Earth received 
both its annual and diurnal motions at the same time, viz. when it was first Created”.126 
Turning now to the Deluge, Keill allows that a comet passing close to the earth would raise a 
tide in the seas. The waters of the abyss, however, were enclosed within a solid orb with no void space. 
There would therefore be no agitation of these waters and no breaking of the crust, since liquids are 
no more attracted than solids, and so the fluid would apply no more pressure on the crust than if the 
entire abyss were filled with a solid substance.127 As to the involvement of the earth in the comet’s 
atmosphere, this would indeed cause a prodigious rainfall, but this could not last forty days as Whiston 
– and Scripture – required, for the resistance of the air would condense all the vapours into water 
almost instantaneously. According to Whiston’s own account, the velocity of the vapours descending 
from the comet’s atmosphere was 868 miles per minute. It was well known that the resistance of the 
air condenses common vapours into rain. The resistance of a medium is proportional to the square of 
the velocity of the body moving through it. The velocity of the vapours descending from the comet’s 
atmosphere being thousands of times greater than that of common vapour, the resistance they met 
with from the air would have been millions of times greater than that which condenses common 
vapour. The air, then, would have condensed all the vapours into water, and this would have 
descended in a single short rainfall.128 
Whiston’s mechanism for releasing water from the abyss onto the surface was also deficient. 
He had claimed that the weight of the water from the rain would press down the crust and force water 
from the abyss up onto the surface. To illustrate this, he described a hydrostatics experiment in which 
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a cylinder of stone with holed drilled through it is placed into a cylindrical vessel half filled with water. 
If we then then pour oil or some other fluid which is lighter than water (the fluid of the abyss being 
heavier than the water derived from the comet’s atmosphere) onto the cylinder, he argued, this will 
augment its weight, and the pressure of the cylinder on the water will force both oil and water up 
through the holes and onto the surface.129 In response to this, Keill noted an important disanalogy 
between Whiston’s experiment and his account of the Deluge. The pressure of a stone cylinder on the 
surface of the water would force oil and water through the holes onto the surface only because stone 
is specifically heavier than water. But Whiston had clearly stated that the crust was specifically lighter 
than the waters of the abyss. So, the experiment needed to be rectified and the cylinder of stone 
replaced with one of wood, which is specifically lighter than the water, and in this case, neither the oil 
nor the water would rise above the cylinder.130 
Keill now describes an experiment similar to those which, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
he had used so effectively against Burnet in order to “demonstratively prove” that the pressure of the 
water on the crust would not force fluid out of the abyss but on the contrary would make the crust 
rise higher than it did before (Fig. 5). ABCD is a vessel half filled with water. F is a solid placed in the 
vessel. F will descend into the water until the pressure of the solid on the surface ik of the water is 
equal to the pressure of the incumbent fluid on the surfaces hi and kl. We now pour oil eMGn into the 
vessel. Now the surfaces hi and kl are pressed also by the additional columns of oil mEor and qpGn, 
and the surface ik is pressed by the column ropq. Since mEor and qpGn are greater than ropq, the 
pressure on hi and kl will be greater than that on ik. The water at hi and kl, therefore, will descend, 
and force the water at ik, and therefore also the solid, further up. Applying this to Whiston’s Deluge, 
the water derived from the comet would descend into the fissures and would exert more pressure on 
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the abyss than it did on the crust and would therefore force the water under it to descend and that 




The final point in Whiston’s account of the Deluge with which Keill takes issue is the means by 
which he supposed the waters were removed from the surface of the earth at the end of the Flood. 
This Whiston claimed was effected partly by winds and partly by the water descending through 
fissures in the earth. To assess this claim, Keill conducted a rigorous computation of the amount of 
water required for a universal Deluge, calculating that twenty-three oceans of water would be 
required to cover the entire surface of the earth. Since Whiston had conceded that the amount of 
water drawn off the earth by winds would be insignificant, Keill focusses his attention solely on the 
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descent of waters through the fissures. He notes first the obvious point that water could not collect 
on the surface until all the fissures were filled and so there would be no empty fissures through which 
the water could descend. But even supposing that the fissures were empty – “which is indeed an 
impossible supposition” – they could not contain more water than was derived from them, which 
Whiston held was only half the waters of the Deluge. Thus, there would remain a further eleven 
oceans of water on the surface.132 
 We shall see in the next chapter how Burnet struggled to respond to Keill’s deft attack. More 
skilled than Burnet in philosophy and mathematics, Whiston fared slightly better, but on the whole 
his replies were rather uncompelling and easily answered by Keill. Certainly this was the view of 
subsequent commentators on theories of the earth, who as I will discuss in the next chapter generally 
viewed Keill’s books as having successfully refuted both Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories. Many of 
Whiston’s replies merely gifted Keill an opportunity to embellish and strengthen his previous 
arguments. To Keill’s objection from the luminosity of comets, for example, Whiston replied that 
comets do not become planets until their ascent toward the sun, at which point they have travelled 
through cold regions of space and have lost their luminescence.133 This Keill saw as an invitation to 
produce another mathematical demonstration of the kind he had used to such impressive effect 
against Burnet. On Whiston’s own admission, he notes, comets at this point have retained enough of 
their heat for their atmospheres to remain in a chaotic state. It was impossible that they could be hot 
enough to raise sufficient vapours to sustain such an atmosphere without also being luminous bodies. 
To “bring this point into numbers, that we may see it more evidently”, he continues, it followed from 
Whiston’s own supposition that the heat of a comet even in its ascent toward the sun is capable of 
acting on its atmosphere at a height of 100,000 miles and of raising vapours in its tail for millions of 
miles. The intensity of its heat at 100,000 miles relative to the intensity at ten miles is 102/100,0002, 
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or one to 100 million. If, therefore, the central solid is sufficiently hot to affect its atmosphere at such 
a distance, it must be prodigiously hot and therefore undoubtedly luminous.134 In response, Whiston 
changed tack completely, arguing that, notwithstanding the luminosity of the central solid, within the 
atmosphere it would be dark, that is, the hypothetical observer from whose point of view Moses had 
written would receive no light from either the central solid or the sun.135 
 Other responses were met simply with ridicule. To Keill’s point about the comet’s atmosphere 
taking far longer than a year or two to subside to the point at which it could obscure the light of the 
sun, for instance, Whiston argued simply that there was no reason to believe that the laws governing 
the descent of bodies on Earth obtain in the atmospheres of comets.136 “This I own to be an Answer”, 
wrote Keill in reply, 
not only to this one Argument, but to all that can be said against his Theory. But may not any other 
Theory be defended at the same rate? Might not Dr. Burnet have maintained his Theory this way? And 
when it was objected against it, that heavy Bodies, such as Earth, Clay and Stones, could not swim upon 
Oil or Water, would it not have been easy for him to have said, that Bodies had then other Laws, 
Properties, and Operations, than they have now, and that it was at that time the Law of Nature, that 
the heaviest Bodies should swim uppermost, and the lightest fall to the bottom?137 
To this Whiston replied that the atmospheres of comets are evidently very different from that on 
Earth. Even other planets, which seem prima facie to be similar bodies, appear to be governed by 
different laws, Saturn’s ring for example being “hard to account for by the Mechanical Laws upon our 
Earth”. There was thus “no reason to imagine that, because God has been pleas'd to fix several 
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arbitrary Laws, and Powers of Bodies resulting from them, in our little System; that therefore he has 
confin'd himself to ordain no others in different ones”.138 
 On a number of points, Whiston simply conceded that Keill’s objections were insurmountable 
and adjusted his theory in light of them. Two of these are especially interesting in that they resulted 
in substantial changes to the theory. The first concerns the primitive earth’s lack of diurnal motion. 
Here Whiston acknowledges that “Mr. Keill's Reasoning… is strong and forcible” and takes the 
opportunity to “set this matter in a new and clear Light” in order to clear his theory “from this Obvious, 
Popular, and not inconsiderable Objection”.139 What is interesting here is that he does not change this 
aspect of his theory but makes an adjustment elsewhere, altering instead his view on the antediluvian 
earth’s circular orbit. He still maintains “that the Original Orbits of the Planet, and particularly of the 
Earth were perfect circles”.140 He changes, however, what is meant by “Original Orbits”, stating that 
this now refers not to their orbits in the very beginning but to “those in which they were to revolve 
immediately after they were intirely form’d, and were to be universally inhabited”.141 It is this last 
clause that is central here, for ultimately, the earth was not “universally inhabited” until after the Fall. 
 Whiston now argues that the change from the eccentric orbit of the comet from which the 
earth formed to the circular path it followed before the Deluge did not occur all at once. Instead, the 
greater part of it occurred at the Creation and the rest at the Fall. It is here that Whiston first argues 
that the diurnal motion of the earth was caused by an oblique collision with a comet. Such a collision 
would not only impart a diurnal motion to the earth but would also alter its orbit. It was this collision, 
then, that brought the earth into a circular orbit. Prior to this, its orbit was moderately elliptical. 
Although Whiston still maintains that a circular orbit is the best possible for supporting life, he adds 
now the condition that such an orbit is best only for a planet that is inhabited throughout. The earth 
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before the Fall, however, was only inhabited in a single place, and so an elliptical orbit was optimal. 
This enabled Whiston to mitigate the effects of the earth having no diurnal rotation, for he could now 
claim that the earth was at aphelion at noon and at perihelion at midnight in Paradise, making the 
respective heat and cold at these times less intense than if the earth’s orbit were circular.142 
 Keill’s response to this is very interesting, for as well as noting that the primitive earth being 
habitable in only one area “will scarcely be allowed”, he also makes an intriguing methodological or 
epistemological point about the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. “We know”, he writes, 
the more Hypotheses any Theory is clogg'd with, the more precarious it looks; such of them especially 
as do not naturally result from the whole Theory, but are only introduced to remove some urgent 
difficulty, are generally thought least of all to deserve any credit.143 
In addition to this, he passes an interesting aesthetic judgement on the theory. “One of the great 
Beauties of the Theory”, he observes, 
was, That as soon as the Comet was turned into a Planet, it had a Circle for its Orbit, and tho this beauty 
is not perfectly spoil'd, yet its luster seems to be considerably diminished by the new supposition of his 
new sort of Figure call'd a moderate Ellipse.144 
Perhaps predictably, Whiston’s response to the first point about the habitability of the primitive earth 
was that the earth at this time only needed to be inhabited in one area, and so its more general 
uninhabitability is unproblematic. It was 
no great matter if all the Earth, excepting the Regions about Paradise, were uninhabitable at a time 
when they were not to be inhabited. For to what great Purpose is it that all proper provision be made 
for the Entertainment of a Company of Guests at a Table, when 'tis certainly known that not one Guest 
will be there? Providence does ever wonderfully provide for the Accommodation of his Creatures 
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wherever it places them: But that a suitable Provision is made for them where they will never be plac'd, 
I see no reason to imagin.145 
As to Keill’s other points, Whiston sees no problem with the introduction of new hypotheses. He views 
this as simply an inevitable and unproblematic part of the development of scientific theories and sees 
Keill’s assessment as merely symptomatic of his general hostility against theories, declaring 
unapologetically that 
[i]f I ever attempt another Edition of my Book, this Hypothesis, with several other Discoveries since 
made, will be inserted; and will, I believe, with fair and considering Persons, be thought far from spoiling 
the Beauty of the Theory; whatsoever Mr. Keill, who is no friend to Theories in general, may think to 
the contrary.146 
Whiston of course did publish another edition of his book in 1708, and this hypothesis – complete with 
dinner table analogy – was indeed included in it.147 
 The second major alteration of Whiston’s theory that resulted from his debate with Keill did 
not come quite so easily. This change concerned the release of waters from the abyss resulting from 
the pressure of the water on the crust. In his initial reply to Keill’s argument and hydrostatic 
experiment, Whiston was unconvinced and maintained resolutely that, notwithstanding the crust 
being specifically lighter than the fluid of the abyss, the addition of the water on the surface will 
augment its weight, pushing it downward and forcing the waters up through the fissures and onto the 
surface. This was so “plainly express’d” in his book that he was “a little surpriz’d that one so well vers’d 
in Hydrostaticks as Mr. Keill, should be so perplex’d in this matter”.148 “Because Mr. Whiston answers 
my demonstration, as if he did not rightly understand it”, writes Keill in reply, “I will here put it into a 
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clearer light, and apply it more particularly to the present case”.149 He then produces what is 
essentially a scaled-up version of the same experiment, replacing the vessel, water, solid, and oil with 
the earth, abyss, crust, and Flood waters (Fig. 6). ABKD represents the abyss, EFGH the fractured crust 
floating on it. The crust will sink into the fluid until the pressure of the fragment of crust on the surface 
ki is equal to the pressure of the incumbent fluid on ih. Suppose the crust is now covered with water. 
The water must descend into the fissures and fill all the gaps between them before it can cover the 
surface. If the pressure of the water on mn, the surface of the abyss in the fissure, were equal to the 
pressure on the crust, the pressure on the surfaces ki and ih would be the same, and the parts of the 
fluid and therefore also the fragments of crust would remain in the same position. But in this case, the 
surface ih is pressed by a deeper column of water than the surface ki. So the fluid mnih must descend 
and raise the crust higher.150 
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 “I must own”, Whiston acknowledges in his reply, “that I see the force of his Demonstrations 
now, which I did not before. And I heartily thank Mr. Keill for correcting so considerable a mistake in 
the New Theory”.151 He now agrees that the pressure of the fluid could not raise waters from the abyss 
and claims instead that the breaking of the crust was not effected to release waters from the abyss 
but to provide channels through which the waters could be drained from the earth. This, he argued, 
cohered perfectly well with Scripture, since there was nothing in the Mosaic narrative explicitly stating 
that water from the abyss was released onto the earth and contributed to the Flood. Although this 
was typically inferred, it was not strictly entailed, for  
[a]ll that Moses says relating to this matter, is, That the Fountains of the Great Deep were 
broken up at the beginning, and shut up at the Conclusion of the Deluge, without the least 
Affirmation that any Waters issued out of them; as has hitherto been universally suppos'd, 
and as I accordingly believed also.152 
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The second edition of the New theory sees another shift in Whiston’s position. He now argues once 
again that the weight of the fluid did press the parts of the crust downward and force water up through 
the fissures. Here he acknowledges Keill’s point that if the parts of the crust were fully immersed in 
the fluid in accordance with hydrostatic principles then the pressure of the water on the crust could 
not sink it any further down. Now, however, he argues that the crust was in fact not fully immersed in 
the fluid since its parts mutually supported one another in an arch. Thus, the weight of the water on 
the surface would press it further into the fluid, and this pressure would force fluid up through the 
fissures.153 
  An aspect of Whiston’s initial reply that Keill found especially unconvincing was his answers 
concerning the removal of the waters. Here Whiston largely just reiterates his view that the fissures 
would receive the waters, taking little notice of Keill’s arguments to the contrary. He also argues that 
additional water could be drained through the “pores and interstices” of the earth, noting that “30 or 
40 Miles of dry Earth are capable of receiving 3 or 4 Miles of Water into 'em”.154 Replying to this, Keill 
stresses again that the fissures along with any other vacuities in the earth would already have been 
full of water. “I am surpriz'd”, he writes, “to hear him tell us of dry Earth, that was capable of receiving 
vast quantities of water, for I cannot suppose an Earth that has been watered by eleven Oceans of 
water gushing thro' its Pores, to be very dry”.155 Even supposing that all the fissures and pores were 
empty, the substances of which the crust is largely composed are dense bodies, and so their vacuities 
are surely not extensive enough to receive twenty-two oceans of water.156 And even if we suppose 
that the fissures and vacuities were sufficiently extensive and that the water of the Deluge lay on the 
surface without descending into them, “that is, let us grant to Mr. Whiston so many impossibilities”, 
even this is not sufficient to remove the water in accordance with the Mosaic narrative, according to 
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which the waters of the Flood were removed in six months. Here Keill calculates the amount of time 
it would take for the waters to be drained. In his discussion of Burnet’s theory in the Examination, he 
had calculated that all the earth’s rivers would take 812 years to fill the channel of the ocean if it were 
empty. Supposing that the fissures were equal to the mouths of all the rivers, then, it would take 
17,864 years for the water to drain. And even if we suppose the velocity of the waters to be ten times 
that of the rivers, it would still take 1786.4 years.157 
 Whiston’s response to this was rather more extensive than his initial reply to Keill. He notes 
first that the “Pores and Interstices” of moist earth can receive further water. He also attempts to cast 
doubt on Keill’s assessment that the earth’s crust consists principally of dense substances, listing 
various different materials observed by the German geographer Bernhardus Varenius in a study of 
strata in Amsterdam.158 Regarding Keill’s computation of the time it would take for the waters to drain, 
although Whiston disagrees with Keill’s calculations, believing that the velocity of the waters was 
greater due to its immense weight and the fissures wider than Keill had allowed, he nevertheless 
concedes that the draining of the water would take longer than according to the Mosaic narrative as 
commonly interpreted. These last three words are of course important, for Whiston now reminds Keill 
that he believes this interpretation to be erroneous and refers him to the Scholium near the end of 
the Vindication where he had argued this, and “which 'tis a little strange he should not discover before, 
and so perceive that he was, by the last Computation, but confirming one of the Points I had observ'd 
since the publishing of the New Theory”.159 
 Whiston closes his debate with Keill firstly by stating once again his intention to produce a 
second edition of his theory. “The Remarks and Objections Mr. Keill and Others have made against 
some Branches of the New Theory”, he writes, 
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have occasion'd me to correct some Parts, to confirm others, and to improve the whole. But so little do 
I esteem the principal Foundations of that Book destroy'd by all that has been hitherto said, (Though 
Mr. Keill is pleas'd to presume, that by those few Objections he before made against a few particulars 
in it; And this after he had granted me the principal Point of all, it was in general already confuted:) 
That I may venture to say, I am prepar'd, upon a Second Edition, more fully to confirm and establish the 
main Conclusions in it than ever; as I hope will appear in due time.160 
The “principal Point of all” which Keill had granted of course was that a comet passed close to the 
earth on the day the Deluge began. That Keill had granted this but had nevertheless rejected his theory 
was something that Whiston found especially troubling, for in his view, the theory followed necessarily 
from the passing of the comet. It was, as he put it at the very beginning of his first response to Keill, 
the main Point I contend for; and… once establish'd, the rest (as I think I can still demonstrate) must, 
when fully understood, be granted also; 'Tis a little surprizing that he [Keill] of all Men should in Publick 
appear against me. And truly I am ready to hope I have but few competent Judges besides Mr. Keill, 
who, yielding me that main Point of all, do yet reject my Account of the Phaenomena of the Deluge; 
which are, I think, but natural Consequents of such a Concession.161 
Whiston revisits this point at the end of the Vindication. Here he poses two questions to Keill. First, if 
a comet passed at the beginning of the Deluge but had no causal relevance to that event, then to what 
purpose did it pass the earth? And second, how were those effects which he had calculated to be the 
necessary consequences of a comet passing avoided?162 At the end of his second reply, Whiston notes 
that Keill had not addressed these questions in his response to the Vindication, and he closes his reply 
by posing them again.163 Keill, perhaps feeling that he had done enough already to confute Whiston’s 
theory, issued no response. If Whiston saw Keill’s silence on the above questions as a weakness, few 
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others did, and, as I have noted above, his two books would come to be seen as a decisive refutation 
of both Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories. 
Before concluding this chapter, I want to discuss some more fundamental disagreements 
between Keill and Whiston which underpinned much of their debate. It should be noted in the first 
place that at a foundational level there was substantial agreement between these two authors. Most 
of the fundamental disagreements which, as we will see in the next chapter, characterised Keill’s 
debate with Burnet are not present here. Both believed in an oblate figure of the earth. Neither 
believed in vortices. Neither had a problem with final causes or attraction. Both held that mathematics 
and experiment were essential components of natural philosophy. Above all, both were Newtonian, 
and reasoned from recognisably Newtonian principles throughout the debate. Their disagreement for 
the most part centred not on fundamentals but on the question of whose application of these 
principles was the correct one. There were, however, two quite fundamental disagreements between 
these two authors. The first of these concerned miracles. On this issue there were two main points of 
disagreement. The first was what miracles consist in, and how one should distinguish between the 
natural and the miraculous, between miracles and the ordinary course of nature. The second was how 
readily one should appeal to miracles to explain biblical events, or to put it another way, how far one 
should go in trying to explain biblical events in terms of natural causes. 
As I have discussed above, Whiston subscribed to the same Augustinian conception of 
miracles as Newton and other Newtonians such as Richard Bentley and Samuel Clarke which I outlined 
in chapter two. Keill, in contrast, subscribed to the modified version of the Thomist conception – also 
outlined in chapter two. Miracles for him are violations of laws of nature. This important difference 
between the two authors plays a significant role in their debate. This is most clearly evinced at the 
very beginning of Whiston’s Vindication and at the same point in Keill’s subsequent reply. Here 
Whiston accuses Keill of being “deeply engag'd against my design by a peculiar fondness he seems to 
277 
 
have for the Introduction of unaccountable Miracles”.164 This phrase, “unaccountable Miracles”, 
makes perfect sense to Whiston, who believes that because miracles are not violations of the laws of 
nature they can, at least in principle and insofar as we know the relevant laws, be accounted for. Some, 
of course, since our knowledge of nature is imperfect, cannot be accounted for, and in these cases 
Whiston is content to ascribe them to a “miraculous power” (though as I have argued in the previous 
section, he seems not to want to rule out the possibility of their being accounted for in the future as 
our natural knowledge progresses – they are “unaccountable” only relative to our limited 
understanding of the world). For Keill, on the other hand, the phrase is simply tautologous, for miracles 
are by their very nature unaccountable, and so its negation “accountable miracles” is self-
contradictory. “If I had a mind to criticise upon words”, he asserts, “I would ask him what he means 
by unaccountable Miracles, and whether there be any that can be accounted for, since it is the 
common opinion, that what can be accounted for by natural causes, is no Miracle”.165 
In his book William Whiston: Honest Newtonian, Force correctly observes that in adopting 
“the common opinion” about miracles Keill “isolated himself” from other Newtonians like Whiston 
and Bentley and indeed from Newton himself who had adopted an Augustinian conception.166 Force’s 
argument on the other issue concerning miracles that was at stake in the debate between Keill and 
Whiston – that is, the issue of how far one should go in explaining biblical events in terms of natural 
causes and how readily one should appeal to miracles – is rather less convincing. On this point, Force 
claims that “Whiston resorts to miraculous explanations only when there is no adequate mechanical 
hypothesis, whereas Keill refuses ever to depart from the literal words of Moses”.167 In doing so, Force 
argues, Keill “departed from Newton’s and Whiston’s rule… [that] ‘that which is clearly accountable in 
a natural way is not without reason to be ascrib’d to a Miraculous Power’”, this being the second 
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“Postulate” of Whiston’s New theory and, Force notes, a view to which Newton subscribed, having 
stated it in his earlier correspondence with Burnet.168 Force concludes that, to the extent that he 
departed from this rule, Keill “was a Newtonian dissident”, Whiston of course being the titular “Honest 
Newtonian”.169 
 There are two main problems with Force’s argument here. The first is that it is based on a 
quite fundamental misrepresentation of Keill’s position, and in particular of why he adopts a 
miraculous interpretation of the Creation and Deluge. By claiming that Keill “refuses ever to depart 
from the literal words of Moses” and contrasting this with Whiston’s policy of “resort[ing] to 
miraculous explanations only when there is no adequate mechanical hypothesis”, Force creates the 
impression that Keill adopts this interpretation regardless of whether there is an “adequate 
mechanical hypothesis”. But this is not the case. Rather, he adopts it because he believes there is no 
“adequate mechanical hypothesis”. Far from departing from this rule, then, Keill is essentially applying 
it but reaching a different conclusion from Whiston. And the fundamental disagreement between the 
two authors is not whether the rule ought to be applied but the results one obtains from doing so. 
Keill is not necessarily against all mechanical explanations of biblical events. Neither does he want to 
impose miraculous interpretations on events which can be explained mechanically. Like others who 
subscribed to the modified Thomist conception, Keill held that miracles serve important apologetic 
purposes. And in common with these other authors, he believed that these purposes could be 
undermined not only by denying true miracles but also by affirming false ones.170 As he emphasises in 
the first chapter of his initial attack on Burnet, 
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tho' our holy Faith stands so well confirmed by real miracles, that we are neither to make nor admit of 
any false ones, yet certainly we are not to detract from the value of the true ones, by pretending to 
deduce them from Natural and Mechanical causes, when they are no ways explicable by them.171 
His central argument in the Examination and in his reply to Burnet and Whiston the following year is 
not that we should accept a miraculous reading of Scripture uncritically but that a miraculous 
interpretation of the Creation and Deluge is necessary because in these cases mechanical explanations 
are inadequate. 
 The second problem with Force’s argument is his characterisation of Whiston’s rule of only 
appealing to miracles if there are no adequate natural explanations as a specifically Newtonian 
principle. This rule, Force claims, together with “Whiston’s view that God’s providence is best 
evidenced by an orderly progression of natural law”, a view shared by Newton, are “the criteria by 
which this facet of Newtonianism must be measured”.172 But it is not at all clear that these views of 
Whiston’s are essentially Newtonian principles at all. Certainly they were by no means exclusive to 
Newton and his circle. As we have seen at length throughout this thesis, both these views were 
strongly held and extensively argued for by Burnet, a Cartesian. And as I have argued above, Whiston’s 
statement of these principles is highly reminiscent of Burnet’s, and so these aspects of Whiston’s 
worldview were likely influenced more by him than by Newton, since he studied the Theory 
extensively – and subscribed to the views in it – long before he discovered the Principia and even 
longer before he became personally acquainted with Newton. 
 The other fundamental disagreement between Keill and Whiston has already been touched 
upon to some extent in the above discussion of Keill’s response to Whiston’s account of the Creation 
of the earth from the atmosphere of a comet. It is worthy of further comment here, however, since it 
is highly relevant to the foregoing issue of Whiston’s and Keill’s Newtonianism. This disagreement 
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concerned how the six-day Creation was to be interpreted. As I have discussed at length above, 
Whiston departs to some extent from a literal reading of Moses, converting the days of creation into 
years and making the “creation” of the sun, moon, and stars apparent rather than actual – they were 
not literally made but merely appeared to Moses’s hypothetical observer as the atmosphere cleared. 
Keill, on the other hand, wanted to maintain a wholly literal reading of Moses, according to which the 
sun, moon, and stars were actually created on the fourth day. He was less explicit about the length of 
the days but seems to have held that they were literal days, as he believed, contra Whiston, that the 
earth’s diurnal rotation began at the Creation, making days distinct from years from the beginning. 
Some of the reasons for Keill’s literal reading of the Mosaic account were purely scriptural. 
Whiston’s interpretation, he observed, “seems to be extreamly forced, and no way agreeable with the 
design of the sacred Pen-men”.173 The principal problem here was that in the Hebrew Bible Moses, 
who speaks very clearly and unambiguously throughout his narration, uses precisely the same words 
– which Keill translates as “and he made” – to refer both to the creation of the sun, moon, and stars 
on the fourth day and to that of the animals on the fifth. And since the animals did not merely become 
visible but were literally created, then so too were the heavenly bodies.174 More significant for Keill, 
however, were the various philosophical problems with such an interpretation. The main issue here 
was that this interpretation of Moses, which Whiston had clearly contrived expressly to support his 
view that the earth formed from the atmosphere of a comet, singularly failed to cohere with such a 
view. We have seen examples of this at the beginning of this section. Another significant one was the 
supposed appearance rather than actual creation of the moon. This was even more problematic than 
that of the sun and stars, for comets do not have satellites. The creation of the moon on the fourth 
day, therefore, must pertain to its actual and not merely apparent creation. And if the moon was 
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created on the fourth day, then so too were the sun and stars, for the term “made” is applied to all 
three and must hence be understood in the same sense for the latter as for the former.175 
 Here, Force is certainly right to emphasise the similarities between Whiston’s interpretation 
of Moses and that expressed by Newton in his correspondence with Burnet. Whether this makes 
Whiston the truest proponent of Newtonianism and therefore a truer Newtonian than Keill as Force 
suggests, however, is highly questionable. As both Simon Schaffer and Mordechai Feingold argue in 
their reviews of Force’s book, it is not at all clear that concordance with Newton’s views is necessarily 
the measure by which a “true Newtonian” is to be judged.176 And as Schaffer points out, there were 
important disagreements between Newton and Whiston on exegetical issues which do not fit with 
Force’s portrayal of the latter as being more closely aligned with “the master” on such topics than 
other Newtonians.177 It seems more reasonable to conclude that Whiston and Keill were simply 
promoting different, and on certain points conflicting, versions of what may loosely be considered a 
Newtonian worldview. Part of Whiston’s version was his interpretation of Moses. Another was his 
conception of miracles. These views of Newton’s were not made public, and so unless Whiston arrived 
at them independently, which seems unlikely given how similar their views were on these issues, 
Newton must have related them to Whiston in private – and we know that that they corresponded 
extensively prior to the publication of the New theory and that Newton commented on earlier drafts 
of the book. There is no evidence, on the other hand, that Keill was personally acquainted with Newton 
at the time of his debate with Burnet and Whiston. He therefore most likely knew nothing of Newton’s 
views on these topics. Keill’s version of Newtonianism was derived rather from his close reading of 
the Principia and consisted essentially in the kind of methodology that he believed was exemplified in 
this text and which he promoted in his Oxford lectures (which I shall discuss in the next chapter) and 
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applied to Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories in the Examination and in his subsequent reply to these 
authors. 
5.7. Conclusion 
In his New theory, Whiston, who had studied Burnet’s theory extensively during his BA, retains certain 
key details of it such as an orderly, symmetrical first Creation, the earth’s central fire, a perpetual 
equinox on the primitive earth, and the formation of the earth on a body of fluid. He removes these 
things from Burnet’s Cartesian framework and transposes them into a Newtonian system of natural 
philosophy, explains them in terms of Newtonian laws, and presents them in a Newtonian, 
mathematical style. His motivation for constructing his theory of the earth is essentially the same as 
Burnet’s, namely, a desire to make biblical events intelligible in order to reconcile revealed religion 
with philosophy. To this end, he adopts the same commitment to explaining such events in terms of 
natural processes, the same emphasis on God’s prescience, and the same notion of divine 
synchronicity between the natural and moral world that we find in Burnet, but he combines these 
things with a distinctly Newtonian conception of miracles and a Newtonian distinction between the 
natural and the miraculous in order to maintain God’s direct involvement in these events. His theory 
is supported by largely the same passages of Scripture and the same canon of ancient texts as Burnet’s, 
and he appeals to these texts as confirmation of his theory in essentially the same way as Burnet did. 
The one exception here is that where Burnet discards Genesis 1, Whiston goes to great lengths to 
reconcile his theory with it. This he achieves by employing a Newtonian style of exegesis but one which 
was motivated ultimately by a decidedly Burnettian antipathy with the “vulgar” interpretation of the 
text. What emerges from focussing on both the influence Newton and that of Burnet is not so much a 
purely Newtonian theory of the earth, but rather an interesting synthesis of Burnet’s and Newton’s 
ideas. 
 As to Whiston’s debate with Keill, Force is certainly correct to suggest that, on exegetical 
issues and on the definition of miracles and the distinction between the natural and the miraculous, 
283 
 
Whiston’s views are much closer to Newton than Keill’s, though whether this makes Whiston a truer 
Newtonian than Keill is highly questionable. Force’s argument concerning the other facet of Whiston’s 
theory that he characterises as distinctly Newtonian and juxtaposes with Keill’s contrary view, that is, 
his commitment to natural over miraculous causes, is unconvincing. In the first place, as I have argued, 
it is not clear that the two authors’ views on this matter are as contrary as Force suggests. More 
importantly, however, this commitment in Whiston’s theory does not appear to be Newtonian at all. 
Certainly it was not an exclusively Newtonian commitment. We saw in the second chapter that Joseph 
Glanvill made the same commitment in 1662. Burnet, I argued there, most likely inherited it from 
Glanvill. And Whiston more likely inherited it from Burnet than from Newton, for as I have argued 
here, Whiston was acquainted with – and subscribed to – Burnet’s theory long before he discovered 
Newton, and his statement of this principle, with his emphasis on God’s prescience and the divine 
synchronicity between the natural and moral world, very closely resembles Burnet’s. This only 












6. Burnet and the Newtonians part two: Keill’s Examination and “T.B.”’s Reflections 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Having discussed Whiston’s synthesis of Newtonian and Burnettian ideas and his dispute with Keill, I 
turn now to the latter’s attack on and debate with Burnet. At the time of writing his Examination, Keill 
was resident at Balliol College having received a “Scotch Exhibition” and having been incorporated 
M.A. after following his mentor Gregory from Edinburgh when the latter became Savilian Professor of 
Astronomy earlier in the decade.1 While at Balliol, Keill developed experimental demonstrations of 
Newtonian mechanics and was appointed lecturer in experimental philosophy at Hart Hall, making 
him the first to teach Newtonian natural philosophy at either of the English universities. These 
lectures, as I shall discuss below, would become the basis of the first textbook of Newtonian natural 
philosophy. After his Exhibition expired in 1703, Keill moved – again following Gregory – to Christ 
Church. Unsuccessful in his attempt to be elected Savilian Professor upon Gregory’s death, he 
nevertheless secured the chair in 1712 following the death of Gregory’s successor John Caswell.2 It 
was around this time that he became embroiled in – or according to some accounts, occasioned – the 
dispute between Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz over the invention of calculus after publishing 
a paper in the Philosophical Transactions in 1710 accusing Leibniz of plagiarism.3 
 Keill’s penchant for controversy is already evident in the Examination, his first book. In it, he 
attacked not only Burnet and Whiston but several other contemporaries. The main emphasis of the 
work, however, was of course Burnet’s theory, and as I noted in the previous chapter, he devoted 
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much more of the work to Burnet than Whiston. Keill’s Examination and subsequent debate with 
Burnet have been discussed by several historians in relation to the Burnet controversy but have 
typically not been dealt with in any considerable depth.4 The significance of the work in the context of 
this debate, nevertheless, has been widely noted, and a number of historians have credited Keill’s 
books with providing a decisive refutation of Burnet – and also Whiston – and as such bringing the 
controversy to a close.5 What precisely it was about Keill’s work that enabled it above all other 
responses to the theorists to achieve such closure, however, remains somewhat obscure. It is widely 
acknowledged that Keill’s attack was especially able, that Keill was more adept than others at 
recognising and demonstrating the weaknesses of these theories.6 This is certainly correct. But it raises 
further questions. Why was Keill more adept than other critics of the theorists? What did his criticisms 
of the theorists bring to the debate that others did not? What impact did Keill’s work have on debates 
about the history of the earth beyond the Burnet controversy? Another important question which has 
been given little consideration by historians is why he became involved in the controversy at all; what 
motivated his attack on Burnet and Whiston?7 It is generally agreed that Keill was not merely attacking 
the theorists themselves but also, and more fundamentally, the Cartesian philosophy. This again is 
correct, and again it raises further questions. Which tenets of the Cartesian philosophy did Keill 
consider most pernicious? What were the main issues at stake in his debate with Burnet? Why did he 
direct his attention to theories of the earth rather than another manifestation of Cartesian thinking? 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the above questions about Keill’s Examination and 
subsequent debate Burnet and the role this work and this debate played in the controversy and in 
later developments in earth science. The chapter consists of four main sections. In the first, I discuss 
                                                          
4 The most extensive discussions of Keill’s Examination appear in two PhD theses: Kubrin (1968), 318-37; 
Magruder (2000), 143-58. The most in-depth published discussions are: Allen (1949), 110-12; Force (1983), 7-8; 
(1985), 60-2; Rossi (1984), 70-4; Friesen (2008), 42-8; Coppola (2010), 132-4; Lynall (2012), 57-64, 79-82. 
5 See, e.g., Taylor (1950), 196; Macklem (1958), 35; Kubrin (1968), 319, 330-1, 335. 
6 Allen (1949), 110-112; Tuveson (1950), 63; Nicolson (1959), 237; Kubrin (1968), 319, 330; Rappaport (1997), 
143; Harrison (2000), 177; Poole (2008), 73 (2010), 46, 59, 71-2; Coppola (2010), 132. 
7 Notable exceptions here are Kubrin (1968), 318-30; Magruder (2000), 153-8; Friesen (2008), 42-8. 
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Keill’s attack on Burnet, considering in particular what distinguished it from other responses to the 
Theory and why it constituted such a devastating attack. In section two, I turn my attention to Keill’s 
motivations, discussing first his dislike for the Cartesian philosophy before focussing on patronage as 
a further possible motivating factor. In the third section, I examine Burnet’s response and Keill’s 
subsequent reply to Burnet. I first explain why I believe this anonymous response did indeed come 
from Burnet. I then turn to the content of Burnet’s defence and Keill’s reply, discussing first two 
important foundational issues that underpinned much of the discussion before examining the role the 
debate played in strengthening Keill’s case against Burnet’s theory. Finally, in section four, I consider 
Keill’s role in bringing the controversy to a close and the impact his work had on thinking about earth 
history during the next century. 
6.2. Keill’s Examination 
Keill’s Examination was in many respects similar to those other responses to Burnet’s Theory which I 
discussed in chapter five. As with the other attacks on the Theory that appeared in the wake of 
Burnet’s Archaeologiae, the arguments in the Examination were chiefly philosophical rather than 
scriptural as had been the case with earlier attacks, Keill noting firstly that the Theory’s incongruence 
with Scripture had already been dealt with at length by authors better qualified than him to comment 
on such issues and secondly that attacks based on Scripture had effectively been rendered impotent 
by Burnet’s reinterpretation in the Archaeologiae – which as we have seen amounted essentially to a 
denial – of those passages of Scripture with which his Theory seemed to be inconsistent.8 Keill’s 
objections against Burnet consisted of essentially the same combination of arguments from efficient 
and final causes that we find in other authors, the former designed to show that the physical processes 
to which Burnet attributed the Creation and Deluge were insufficient to produce such effects, and the 
latter pointing to evidence of design in the present earth in order to undermine Burnet’s claim that 
the antediluvian earth was of a different form and underwent a radical change at the Deluge. Keill also 
                                                          
8 Keill (1698), 26-7, 170. 
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emphasised many of the same individual points that we find in other responses to Burnet. Like 
Whiston and Parker, he took issue with Burnet’s assumption that the chaos was fluid, arguing that the 
quantity of solid matter on the earth made this unlikely to have been the case.9 Following Beaumont, 
he noted the inability of the heat of the sun to penetrate through the crust and into any supposed 
abyss of water.10 And echoing Bentley, he stressed at length that the obliquity of the present earth is 
preferable to the supposed perpendicular situation of Burnet’s antediluvian axis.11 
  So what was it about Keill’s Examination that set it apart from other responses to Burnet and 
made it above all others such a decisive refutation of the Theory? My answer to this question is that 
there were essentially three factors that distinguished the Examination from other replies to the 
Theory. These factors will already be evident to some extent from our discussion of Keill’s attack on 
Whiston in the previous chapter, but they are much more pronounced in his more thorough and 
sustained attack on Burnet. To illuminate these factors, it is instructive to compare the work with the 
attack on Burnet with which it was most similar, namely, Beaumont’s Considerations on a book, 
entituled the theory of the earth, published half a decade earlier in 1693. Both Beaumont’s 
Considerations and Keill’s Examination were book-length responses to Burnet and were roughly the 
same length as one another. Both, like the vast majority of replies to Burnet, dealt solely with the first 
volume of the Theory, ignoring the second volume entirely. Both, in common with other post-
Archaeologiae responses to Burnet, focussed primarily on philosophical issues with the Theory, both 
authors noting that scriptural issues had been dealt with by persons better qualified to do so. Both 
advanced essentially the same kinds of arguments from efficient and final causes, emphasising many 
of the same specific points about the same phenomena. Finally, and importantly, both authors 
maintained that the Creation and Deluge were miracles, and as such were not explicable in terms of 
                                                          
9 Keill (1698), 48-50. 
10 Keill (1698), 148-51. 
11 Keill (1698), 63-76. 
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natural processes. Both, moreover, conceptualised miracles in precisely the same terms, that is, as 
violations of the laws of nature resulting from God’s direct intervention. 
The first thing I want to emphasise about Keill’s Examination that distinguished it from other 
attacks on Burnet is that it was more focussed, and as a result constituted a more in-depth and 
thorough set of criticisms than any that had previously been attempted. In his Considerations, 
Beaumont had essentially followed Warren in trying to confute every detail of the first volume of the 
Theory, dealing with each of the book’s twenty-one chapters in turn and dedicating an entire chapter 
of his own work to all but a few of them.12 In contrast, aside from a brief introduction and conclusion, 
Keill’s Examination consisted of only seven chapters, each criticising in depth a key constituent of 
Burnet’s Theory. The content of the Examination was dictated largely by Burnet himself, Keill 
respecting the Theorist’s request that critics “keep themselves close to the substance of the Theory, 
and wound that as much as they can” rather than “make excursions upon things accidental or 
collateral, that do not destroy the Hypothesis”.13 
As to what the “the substance of the Theory” consisted in, Keill closely follows the summary 
given by Burnet immediately after the foregoing request. “[T]he substance of the Theory”, Burnet 
writes here, 
is this, THAT there was a Primitive Earth of another form from the present, and inhabited by Mankind 
till the Deluge; That it had those properties and conditions that we have ascrib'd to it, namely, a 
perpetual Equinox or Spring, by reason of its right situation to the Sun; Was of an Oval Figure, and the 
exteriour face of it smooth and uniform, without Mountains or a Sea. That in this Earth stood Paradise; 
the doctrine whereof cannot be understood but upon supposition of this Primitive Earth, and its 
properties. Then that the disruption and fall of this Earth into the Abyss, which lay under it, was that 
which made the Universal Deluge, and the destruction of the Old World; And that neither Noah's Flood, 
                                                          
12 Beaumont (1693). 
13 Burnet (1684), 287. 
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nor the present form of the Earth can be explain'd in any other method that is rational, nor by any other 
Causes that are intelligible: at least that have been hitherto propos'd to the World.14 
This summary, Keill uses as a model for his attack, offering in-depth criticisms of what were, by 
Burnet’s own admission, the core components of his theory. The only ostensible exception here is 
Keill’s extensive discussion of Burnet’s view of the antediluvian earth’s hydrography, something 
Burnet does not mention explicitly in the above summary but to which Keill dedicates more than an 
entire chapter of his Examination.15 It is important to stress, however, that this exception is only 
apparent, for as Burnet himself had explicitly stated, the watering of the primitive earth was an 
essential part of its being “inhabited by Mankind till the Deluge” and the seat of Paradise. 
Keill’s more focussed approach enabled him to cut much more deeply than other critics into 
Burnet’s most central claims, exposing their weaknesses in a way that made other attacks on the 
Theory look decidedly superficial. An illustrative example of this is the aforementioned discussion of 
the antediluvian hydrography. Here, Keill produces a compelling, multi-layered confutation which 
exemplifies the depth of argument employed throughout the Examination.16 Burnet, recall, held that 
on the antediluvian earth the sun penetrated through fissures in the crust at the equator, raising 
vapours from the abyss which travelled toward the poles and upon coming into contact with the cooler 
air condensed and formed reservoirs in the northern and southern hemispheres from which rivers 
formed and flowed back toward the equator due to the earth’s prolate figure. 
This proposed antediluvian water-cycle Keill sets about confuting at several junctures. He first 
argues that the heat of the sun could not raise sufficient vapours to furnish the antediluvian earth with 
rivers. The amount of vapour raised from a body of water by a determinate heat, he notes, is directly 
proportional to the surface area of the water. Suppose, then, that the total surface area of the fissures 
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15 Keill (1698), 84-109. 
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at the antediluvian equator amounts to 1/10,000th of the surface area of the earth, which “is as much 
as the Theorist can reasonably allow” since it is nearly equal to a single, continuous, mile-wide fissure 
encompassing the entire equator. Following Burnet’s assumption that one half of the present earth is 
land and the other half sea, the amount of vapour raised from the sea to supply the present earth’s 
rivers is 5,000 times what can be raised from Burnet’s abyss. Thus, if the amount of land were the 
same on the antediluvian earth as it is now, there would be merely 1/5,000th of the water on it. But, 
Burnet’s antediluvian earth had no seas, and therefore double the amount of dry land. So, on Burnet’s 
view, 1/5,000th of the water had to furnish double the land with rivers. Any given portion of land on 
Burnet’s antediluvian earth, then, would have merely 1/10,000th of the water which it has now. This, 
however, is supposing that the sun raises as much vapour from the abyss as it does from the same 
area of sea. In the former case, however, the sun can only raise vapours from the abyss when it is 
more or less directly above the fissures, for at all other times, the sun’s rays are intercepted and 
obscured by the crust. This latter point, Keill illustrates with the following diagram (Fig. 1) in which S 
represents the sun in the equator, PQ the sensible horizon, and mn the surface of the abyss opened 
by the fissure PnmR. The sun must be at the height HS above the Horizon before it can begin to raise 
any vapour from the surface of the abyss.17 
 
                                                          




The next step in Keill’s argument is to show that even if the sun were able to raise sufficient 
vapours from the abyss, these vapours would not travel toward the poles as Burnet had supposed but 
would remain at the equator. Here Keill makes use of a notion that had been the subject of much 
attention among English natural philosophers since around mid-century when experiments using 
Torricellian vacuums and air-pumps revealed the capacity of air particles to expand and fill a given 
space.18 This elasticity or “spring” of the air, Keill uses to show that the equatorial region on Burnet’s 
antediluvian earth would be subject to a continual wind blowing from east to west. “It is well known 
to all the Philosophers”, he notes, “that the air is a very elastick fluid body”. If every part of the air is 
equally dense, the particles would resist each other’s pressure and there would be no movement. If, 
however, any part of the air is thinner than the rest, the surrounding atmosphere, which is grosser 
and therefore has a greater capacity to expand, will rush in upon the thinner air and maintain 
equilibrium. 
Keill now introduces another diagram (Fig. 2). EZWN represents the air surrounding the earth 
T at the equator. If the sun is shining directly on the air at Z, the air here will be considerably rarer 
than the air at E, but due to the heat, it is more expanded and so remains in equilibrium with it. When 
the sun shifts to the west, however, and comes to shine on the air at W, the air at Z will be rarer than 
the air at E, but its heat being gone, its capacity to expand is not as strong as the air at E, and so the 
air at E will rush into Z to maintain equilibrium. So too, when the sun shines directly on the air at W, 
the air here is rarer than the air at Z, but it is expanded by its heat and so is in equilibrium. When the 
sun moves to shine on the air at N, the air at W is cooled and rarer than the air at Z, which will rush 
into W. For the same reason, when the sun shines on E and Z, the air will move from W to N and from 
N to E respectively, and so on. That is to say, there will be a continual wind from east to west at the 
equator, as there indeed is on the present earth. Any vapours raised from the abyss at the equator, 
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then, being the same specific weight as the air, will be carried by this wind and will move from east to 
west, thus remaining at this latitude rather than moving toward the poles.19 
 
Fig. 2 
The final step in Keill’s argument is to demonstrate that even if the sun was able to raise 
sufficient vapour from the abyss and this vapour were able to travel toward the poles, the prolate 
figure of Burnet’s antediluvian earth would not enable rivers to flow toward the equator. Here, Keill 
rather cleverly uses part of Burnet’s own theory against him. Burnet had claimed that the earth’s 
prolate figure resulted from the centrifugal force of its diurnal motion which caused the fluid of the 
chaos to recede from the axis, meet with resistance from the atmosphere, and move toward the poles 
where the atmosphere exerted less pressure on the chaos. This, of course, Keill rejects, arguing that 
the earth’s atmosphere does not exert pressure on the earth but moves with it, that if the atmosphere 
did exert pressure on the chaos there is no reason why it would exert less pressure at the poles than 
at the equator, and that, owing to the centrifugal force created by the earth’s diurnal motion, the 
figure of the earth is an oblate rather than a prolate spheroid. Notwithstanding this, Keill uses Burnet’s 
argument for the earth’s prolate figure to show that, according to his own principles, this figure would 
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not facilitate the flow of rivers from the polar regions to the equator. Since the earth is still rotating 
diurnally, he argues, the same pressure of the atmosphere which in Burnet’s view caused the fluid of 
the chaos to move toward the poles will continue to exert the same force on any fluid on the surface 
and will therefore prevent the water descending from the poles to the equator. The fluid will ascend 
toward the poles or descend in the direction of the equator only until the two forces are in equilibrium, 
at which point it will remain, neither ascending nor descending. It was evident, then “from the 
Theorists own principles, and his Oval figure of the Earth, that there could be no course of Rivers in 
the Antediluvian world, if his Theory were true”.20 
The second distinctive element of the Examination was Keill’s frequent use of experiments, 
both physical and conceptual, in confuting Burnet’s claims. Where other authors appealed to empirical 
evidence in their arguments against Burnet, these appeals were typically observations of the natural 
world which appeared to conflict with his theory. Such observations, of course, are present 
throughout the Examination, but it is the experimental evidence which gives his attack a level of rigour 
not present in other responses. As in his attack on Whiston, the majority of Keill’s physical 
experimental evidence against Burnet came from hydrostatics. In some cases, this evidence was 
employed directly and straightforwardly to show that the processes described by Burnet simply would 
not occur in the manner he had envisaged. Against the formation of the crust on a body of oily fluid, 
for example, Keill first notes Burnet’s claim that this oil was lighter than the watery abyss on which it 
was situated and that the terrestrial particles which would come to form the crust would sink in water. 
From this, it followed that the terrestrial particles were heavier than water. And if they were heavier 
than water, and water heavier than oil, then a fortiori they were heavier than oil and must therefore 
sink also, and more easily, in that fluid. It was well established, moreover, that many substances which 
float in water sink in oil but not vice versa for this very reason.21 
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What “seem[ed] to have deceived the Theorist” on this matter in Keill’s view was that he had 
observed small dust particles floating on the surface of oil. From this, he had concluded that if a vast 
quantity of such particles were to accumulate over a period of time, they would not sink but would 
form a contiguous, solid body on the surface. If, however, we consider the hydrostatic principles 
behind the buoyancy of these particles, Keill argued, Burnet’s conclusion will not hold up. No liquids 
in nature, he notes first, are perfectly fluid. All liquids have some degree of resistance to the separation 
of their parts, and this resistance will retard to some extent the descent of bodies through them. All 
other things being equal, this resistance is always directly proportional to the surface area of the 
descending body. Thus, a small body whose surface area is large relative to its weight will float on the 
surface of a liquid, since its weight cannot overcome the resistance of the fluid. The surface area of a 
body, however, typically increases disproportionately to its weight, and so the resistance of a fluid to 
the descent of a small body will be greater than its resistance to a larger body of the same specific 
gravity. If, for example, we place a sphere of one-inch diameter into a fluid whose resistance is equal 
to the gravity of the sphere, then the two being in equilibrium, the sphere will float on the fluid. But 
if a sphere of two-inch diameter and of the same intensive gravity is placed into the same fluid, it will 
sink, since its weight is eight times, but its surface area only four times, that of the former sphere, and 
so the resistance of the fluid will not impede its descent. So while small particles of dust may float on 
a body of oily fluid, as they accumulate, their weight will increase disproportionately with their surface 
area, and the fluid having the same degree of resistance as before, it will no longer impede their 
descent, and they will sink through it.22 
Elsewhere in the Examination, Keill’s use of hydrostatics is rather less direct and more 
analogical. An interesting example of this is his argument against Burnet’s assumption that the 
uniform distribution of the primitive earth’s mass would result in its axis being perpendicular to the 
plane of the ecliptic, “[f]or a Body sayes he freely left to its self in a fluid medium will settle it self in 
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such a posture as will best answer to its gravity, and the Earth being uniformly ballanced, there is no 
reason why it should incline at one end more than at the other towards the Sun”.23 There was, 
however, no reason at all why specially the axis of the earth should be perpendicular to the ecliptic, 
for it is demonstrated by the writers of Hydrostaticks, that a sphere whose centre of Gravity is the same 
with its centre of Magnitude if put in a fluid of the same specifick gravity with it self, will retain any 
given position, and therefore there can be no reason drawn from the earths gravity or equilibration 
why the position of its axis should be perpendicular to the plane of the Ecliptick rather than any other 
of its diameters.24 
Keill, then, uses this hydrostatic experiment essentially as an analogy or model of the earth in space 
in order to demonstrate that the mass of Burnet’s primitive earth being uniformly distributed entails 
nothing whatsoever about its position relative to the ecliptic. 
As I have noted above, many of the experiments used by Keill against Burnet were conceptual 
or thought experiments – often aided by diagrams – rather than physical experiments. In this respect, 
they were similar to the experimental demonstrations used in his Hart Hall lectures which were 
developed around the same time and published as a textbook four years after the Examination, most 
of which, as John Henry notes, were also conceptual rather than physical.25 We have seen examples 
of these above in Keill’s arguments against Burnet’s antediluvian hydrography. One further example 
from Keill’s discussion of the Deluge is worth taking notice of, however, for it is highly illustrative of 
how Keill used these thought experiments to embellish arguments that other critics had advanced in 
order to provide a more convincing critique of Burnet than had previously been achieved. Burnet had 
claimed that the heat of the sun on the earth rarefied the waters of the abyss, likening the crust to an 
aeolipile or hollow sphere full of water which, when heated by the sun, turned the subterraneous 
water into vapour, exerting pressure on the crust. Against this, several authors had argued that the 
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sun does not penetrate deep enough into the crust to rarefy the waters of any supposed abyss. 
Beaumont, for example, noted that a thermometer placed in a cave gives the same reading in summer 
as in winter.26 Keill repeats this point, adding also the testimony of miners who report that the 
temperature in mines does not vary sensibly with the seasons.27 He does not rest here, however. 
Wanting to “bring this point to a Calculation as near as I can”, he introduces the following thought 
experiment. Suppose the earth’s crust was composed of one hundred concentric spheres. And 
suppose that the amount of the sun’s heat that is transmitted diminishes by half with each sphere, 
which “may be… easily allowed; for it is plain, that the Surface of the Earth does not transmit the half, 
nay not the hundredth part of the Suns beams which fall upon it”. In this case, half the heat which falls 
on the first surface will fall on the second, one quarter on the third, one eighth on the fourth, and so 
on until the one-hundredth sphere which will receive just one part of the sun’s heat to 299 parts on 
the outer sphere, “a number which if written at length would consist of a hundred Figures”.28 
The third and final aspect that distinguished Keill’s work from other responses to Burnet was 
his use of mathematical demonstrations. This of course is already evident in many of the above 
arguments. One further example is worth briefly taking notice of, however, for it illustrates how Keill’s 
use of mathematical demonstrations extended not only to the kinds of arguments concerning efficient 
causes discussed above but also to arguments about final causes. It also illuminates how Keill’s use of 
mathematics set his work apart from other responses to the Theory, for in this example he is 
essentially advancing an argument that many other critics of Burnet had made but using mathematics 
to make it more compelling. The example comes from Keill’s discussion of Burnet’s perpendicular axis. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, this part of Burnet’s theory had been subject to frequent 
objections from final causes, Bentley, Beaumont, and several others noting the advantages accrued 
from the present earth’s oblique position on the one hand and the disadvantages that would obtain if 
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the earth’s axis were perpendicular to the plane of the ecliptic on the other.29 Keill repeats many of 
these arguments, adding also a detailed discussion of Johannes Kepler’s observations on the same 
subject.30 In addition to this, however, he points to a further “considerable advantage which we reap 
by the present position of the earth” which had not yet been noted. With the present inclination of 
the earth’s axis, he explains, in the northern and southern hemispheres above forty-five degrees 
latitude the sum of the sun’s heat throughout the year is greater, and at fewer than forty-five degrees 
latitude the sum of the sun’s heat throughout the year is less, than if the axis was perpendicular to the 
ecliptic. This he demonstrates with rigorous calculations of the aggregate heat of the sun throughout 
the year at different latitudes to show that 
we who live in this part of the World, and have greatest need of the Suns heat, have more of it take the 
whole year about, than if the Sun moved continually in the equator, whereas they that live in the Torrid 
Zone and in places near them, and who are rather too much exposed to the heat of the Sun, than too 
little, have by this means less of his heat than they would have had the earth observed a right position.31 
6.3. Attacking Cartesianism and courting patronage 
I turn now to Keill’s motivations for attacking the theorists. Here it is important to emphasise that as 
well as Burnet and Whiston, Keill’s examination has a much broader target. That is, it was a response 
to what Keill believed were fundamentally flawed methods of philosophical inquiry which, firstly, had 
led to erroneous views about the natural world, and secondly, were conducive to irreligion. Theories 
of the earth, and Burnet’s in particular, were simply an especially pernicious, and at the time especially 
prominent, manifestation of this more general problem. This broader target is immediately evident in 
the book’s introduction. “WHAT Plutarch particularly proves of the Stoicks”, writes Keill at the very 
beginning of the work, 
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that they spoke more improbabilities than the Poets, may be extended to a great part of Philosophers, 
who have maintained opinions more absurd than can be found in any of the most Fabulous Poets, or 
Romantick Writers. The one as well as the other fancied that their character did oblige them to say 
things, which were not common or obvious to vulgar capacities, and therefore scorning the Instructions 
of sense and reason, they only cultivated their own wild imaginations, which seldom produce any thing 
but what is extravagant and unaccountable. This will soon appear to any who will be at the pains to 
examin either the Ancient or Modern Philosophers.32 
He then conducts a survey of various “extravagant” notions which had been promulgated by 
philosophers, both ancient and modern. Of the former, his main target is Epicurus, the first 
philosopher to whom Keill gives the title of “world-maker”.33 This philosopher, he notes, had argued 
that the earth is cylindrical, notwithstanding the fact that before his time mathematicians had 
demonstrated its sphericity and developed methods of calculating its proportions. He had conjectured 
that the sun, moon, and stars may be no larger than they appear; that the stars might be kindled in 
the east and extinguished in the west; that the sun and stars might be created anew every day. “I am 
sure a Blind man”, writes Keill, “who had never seen either Sun or Stars, could not have given a worse 
account of them, than this Philosopher has done; and yet with an unpardonable boldness he 
pretended to tell us, how the World was made, when it is plain he knew not what it was”.34 
 As several historians have noted, Keill’s principle target among the moderns is Descartes.35 
After attacking several other contemporary philosophers whose notions were in his view no less 
absurd than those of the ancients, he asserts that 
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M. Des Cartes the great Master and deliverer of the Philosophers from the tyranny of Aristotle, is to be 
blamed for all this, for he has encouraged so very much this presumptuous pride in the Philosophers, 
that they think they understand all the works of Nature, & are able to give a good account of them, 
whereas neither he, nor any of his followers, have given us a right explication of any one thing.36 
He then voices objections to various tenets of the Cartesian philosophy.37 It is important to stress here 
that Keill’s description of Descartes as “the great Master and deliverer of the Philosophers from the 
tyranny of Aristotle” is to be read with a heavy dose of sarcasm. Crucially, in Keill’s view, it was only 
because of the “outcry against Aristotle” that the “absurd notions” set down by Descartes in his 
Principles of Philosophy had become so widely accepted among philosophers.38 Yet the system that 
had come to replace the Aristotelian philosophy was in fact 
much more absurd than Aristotle's ἐντελέχεια or the Schoolmens substantial formes, which must give 
way to Mons. Des Cartes's ingenious hypothesis, who, as his followers pretended, could solve all the 
phaenomena in nature, by his principles of matter, and motion, without the help of attraction and 
occult qualities.39 
It was this claim to be able to “solve all the phaenomena in nature” that Keill viewed as especially 
pernicious. Particularly problematic was that Descartes, by supposing that in the beginning God 
created merely a certain fixed quantity of matter and motion, had claimed to deduce “how, by the 
necessary laws of Mechanisme, without any extraordinary concurrence of the Divine Power, the world 
and all that therein is might have been produced”.40 This made Descartes essentially a modern-day 
Epicurus, “the first world-maker this Century produced”, 
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the first who introduced the fancy of making a World, and deducing the origination of the Universe 
from Mechanical principles. Which notion has been so stifly maintained by his admirers, that by it they 
have given the ignorant Atheists (for so are most of that perswasion) some plausible pretences for their 
incredulity without any real grounds.41 
 Following his discussion of Descartes, Keill turns at last to the theorists. They were engaged in 
essentially the same enterprise of “world-making” as Epicurus and Descartes but were ultimately far 
more dangerous, for they had 
not only asserted, that the world was made by the laws of Mechanism, without the extraordinary 
concurrence of the Divine power, but also that all the great changes which have happened to it, such 
as the Deluge, and other great effects dilivered to us as miracles by the sacred writers, were the 
necessary consequences of natural causes, which they pretend to account for.42 
Like Descartes, “these flood-makers”, though not atheists themselves, had “given the Atheists an 
argument to uphold their cause”.43 Crucially, although the theorists themselves had maintained a role 
for God in the Creation and Deluge, by explaining the events in terms of natural causes, they had 
minimised that role to such an extent that it was now only a short step to denying it altogether, and 
from there only a short step to denying his existence. In making these steps, the atheist was now 
armed with what appeared prima facie to be plausible mechanical explanations of the Creation and 
Deluge, events which, like other miracles in Scripture, had traditionally been seen as requiring God’s 
particular intervention and as such had served important apologetic purposes. These events, that is, 
as instances of God’s interposition in the world, had served as important evidence of the truth of 
Christianity. By explaining them in terms of natural processes, the theorists had undermined this 
purpose, and with it the entire Christian religion. 
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 For Keill, the only way to counter this threat to religion was to show that the causes the 
theorists had assigned for the Creation and Deluge were insufficient to bring about these events. By 
demonstrating that the best physical theories of the earth were inadequate, he could show that these 
events could not have been brought about via natural causes but required miraculous intervention. 
Here it is interesting to contrast Keill’s attitude with that of Burnet and Whiston. His ultimate goal is 
essentially the same as theirs. He wants to vindicate Scripture and to show that it is consistent with 
philosophy. But where Burnet and Whiston believe that the best way to do this is to show that biblical 
events can be explained in terms of natural processes, Keill thinks that the way to go about it is rather 
to show that these events cannot be explained in such terms. This, he tries to do by showing that 
Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories are, as he puts it, 
neither consonant to the established laws of motion, nor to the acknowledged principles of natural 
Philosophy, of that Philosophy I mean, which is founded upon observations and calculations, both 
which are undoubtedly the most certain principles, that a Philosopher can build upon.44 
This latter point was very important, for it was primarily a lack of empirical observation and 
an ignorance of or inattention to mathematics that had in Keil’s view led the philosophers, both 
ancient and modern, and the theorists – though Burnet much more than Whiston – astray. These two 
things, Keill stressed, are essential components of any inquiry into the natural world, for without 
empirical observation we cannot become acquainted with the forces of nature, and without 
mathematics we cannot know whether the causes we assign to explain a given phenomenon are 
proportional to their effects.45 No one, Keill noted, had yet tested Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories 
empirically and mathematically. Whiston’s theory was of course only recently published. And although 
Burnet’s had “been published many years, and has been animadverted upon by several, yet it has not 
been so fully refuted as it might have been, nor has any one shew'd the greatest mistakes in it”.46 It is 
                                                          
44 Keill (1698), 21-2. 
45 Keill (1698), 22. 
46 Keill (1698), 22. 
302 
 
interesting to note here that Keill does not attack Woodward’s Essay, the other prominent late-
seventeenth-century theory of the earth. This is most likely because John Arbuthnot had already 
subjected Woodward’s theory to precisely the kind of mathematical and empirical examination that 
Keill was advocating.47 Indeed, Keill’s and Arbuthnot’s attacks on the theorists are so similar in their 
approach that it is highly likely that the former was influenced to some extent by the latter. 
 Keill’s discussion in the Examination of what true natural philosophy should consist in, and 
also his above assessment of ancient and modern philosophy, were closely mirrored in the preface 
and first lecture of his Introductio ad veram physicam, the published version of his 1700 Oxford lecture 
series published initially in Latin in 1702 and then in English under the title An introduction to natural 
philosophy in 1720.48 In the preface to this book, Keill launches another scathing attack on the 
Cartesian philosophy, noting in particular the inadequacy of vortices in accounting for gravitation.49 In 
lecture one, entitled “Of the Method of Philosophizing”, he discusses four “Sects of Philosophers that 
have wrote on Physical Subjects”.50 The first are the ancient mathematical philosophers such as the 
Pythagoreans and Platonists. Although these thinkers had often obscured their philosophy with 
“Images and Hierogliphicks”, they had nevertheless correctly recognised the necessity of “Geometry 
and Arithmetick” in philosophical inquiry.51 The second are the Peripatetics, who “explained their 
Philosophy by Matter and Forms, Privations, Elementary Virtues, occult Qualities, Sympathies and 
Antipathies, Faculties, Attractions, and the like”, and who, while not uncovering the true causes of 
natural phenomena, had nevertheless formulated an appropriate nomenclature with which these 
phenomena may be described.52 Third are the experimentalists. These philosophers had “too often 
distorted their Experiments and Observations, in order to favour some darling Theories they had 
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espoused”, but had nonetheless enriched philosophy by emphasising the importance of empirical 
investigation.53 The final sect are the ancient atomists and mechanical philosophers, who “imagine 
they can explain all the Phenomena of Nature by Matter and Motion, by the Figure and Texture of the 
Parts, by subtle Particles, and the Actions of Effluvia”.54 
 “AMONGST these various ways of Philosophizing”, writes Keill, “as there is no particular one, 
wherein we do intirely acquiesce; so in each, there are some things which we can approve of. 
Wherefore we shall chuse out of all of them what may be thought useful, and thence compose the 
Method we shall here follow”.55 With the Pythagoreans and Platonists, we must recognise the 
necessity of geometry and arithmetic.56 With the Peripatetics, we may appeal to occult qualities such 
as attraction, for though we may not know the physical causes of these phenomena, we can 
understand the mathematical laws that govern their effects.57 Once we have formulated these laws, 
we must, with the experimentalists, test our theories empirically.58 And following the ancient atomists 
and mechanical philosophers, we may consider the extent to which phenomena can be explained in 
terms of matter and motion and the laws of mechanics. In doing so, however, we must follow three 
important rules, which had typically not been observed by mechanical philosophers. First, we must 
premise appropriate definitions for the phenomenon under investigation. Second, we must use 
abstraction in order to focus our attention on the particular phenomenon in question. And third, we 
must begin with simple cases and uncover the laws governing them before investigating more complex 
phenomena.59 Keill concludes the lecture with a brief note on “the Theorists” who “offend against this 
[third] Rule…; [and] neglecting, or not thoroughly understanding the first and more simple Principles 
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of the mechanical Philosophy, at the very first stroke attempt the most difficult Problems, and rashly 
enough endeavour to shew how a World, a Planet, or an Animal might be formed”.60 
 For Keill, the above synthesis, the method of philosophical inquiry that he was promoting in 
his lectures, was exemplified by Newton in the Principia.61 And it is this synthesis that he employs 
against Burnet in the Examination. We have seen above examples of Keill’s use of mathematical, 
experimental, and mechanical philosophy, and his note on the necessity of occult qualities. There is, 
however, one further aspect of natural philosophy which Keill considers indispensable that he does 
not discuss in the Introduction but attends to at length in the Examination. This is the consideration 
of final causes. Here again, he is explicitly pitting himself against the Cartesians who had tried to 
exclude all consideration of final causes from natural philosophy in favour of formal and efficient 
causes. Against this, Keill stresses in the first place the theological value of final causes. They lead us 
to the admiration of God. They show us that the world could not have been created through mere 
chance. As to their philosophical value, he points out that there are many things in nature for which 
we do not – and in some cases cannot – know the efficient causes. In such cases, final causes are our 
only way of knowing about the natural world. We do not, for example, know the efficient causes of 
mountains, yet we can attain intimate knowledge of them by considering their final causes, since we 
learn, among numerous other things, that they condense vapours and facilitate the flow of rivers.62 
Proper consideration of final causes was also an essential part of reasoning about efficient causes. 
Here Burnet had made several grave errors. When considering the earth’s oblique position relative to 
the ecliptic, for example, by not attending adequately to final causes, Burnet had concluded that this 
position was brought about by an accidental unbalancing of the earth. Had he appreciated the extent 
to which the earth’s oblique posture is essential to its being a habitable world, he would have 
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understood that it was not brought about in the manner he had imagined but was placed in that 
position by God at the Creation. This example in particular, Keill emphasises, 
shews us… how much we ought to regard final causes in Natural Philosophy, which in things of this 
nature are by far more certain and convincing than any of the Physical and Mechanical ones which the 
Theorist brings to prove the truth of his assertion which have brought him into many strange and 
dangerous errors, it being just that God Almighty should deliver these men up to follow strange 
delusions, who neglecting to proceed upon final causes the true principles of Natural Philosophy… have 
followed the wild and extravagant Fancies of their own imaginations.63 
 Before we move on to look at Burnet’s reply to Keill and Keill’s response to this reply, it is 
worth briefly considering some further plausible motivations for Keill’s attack on Burnet and Whiston, 
namely, patronage. John Friesen has very plausibly argued that Keill’s attack was motivated in large 
part by a desire to curry favour with the Christ Church wits, a circle of literary scholars at Christ Church, 
Oxford, the college to which Keill was soon to follow Gregory. The Christ Church wits, all High Church 
Tories, were at the time involved in the so-called ancients-moderns controversy, asserting the 
superiority of ancient wisdom against such authors as Richard Bentley and William Wotton, Low 
Church Whigs who argued for the superiority of modern learning. Keill, and also Arbuthnot, were 
closely associated with the wits, and so their attacks on Burnet, Whiston, and Woodward were likely 
designed to court their patronage by aligning themselves on the side of the ancients in this dispute. 
This, Friesen argues, is plausibly why Keill singles out both Bentley and Wotton in the Examination, 
attacking Bentley in his discussion of the primitive earth’s axis for having claimed in his Boyle Lectures 
that the aggregate heat of the sun on different parts of the earth would be the same regardless of 
whether the axis was perpendicular or oblique to the plane of the ecliptic and for his assertion that 
the moon always shows the same face to the earth because it does not turn on its axis rather than 
because it does turn once on its axis during the time of its orbit, and Wotton for praising Descartes for 
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“Marrying Geometry and Physicks together”, which, Keill argues, “is a clearer demonstration than any 
in Des Cartes's principles of Philosophy, that Mr. Wotton either understands no Geometry, or else that 
he never read Des Cartes's principles”.64 
It is also possible that Keill was looking after his current source of patronage at Balliol, too. As 
well as his Warner Exhibition, Keill was evidently receiving patronage from Roger Mander, who was 
Master of Balliol College from 1687 to 1704 and also Vice Chancellor of Oxford University from 1700 
to 1702. Keill dedicated the work to Mander, praising him for his “prudence in so Industriously 
promoting the Mathematical Sciences” and “prudent Zeal for the Authority of Scriptures”. “We who 
live under the Advantages of these Excellent Qualifications in a Governour”, he continued, 
cannot but be sensible of the Obligations we have to be thankful for them; and indeed the desire of 
Expressing my Gratitude, for these Common and many other Particular Favours You have been pleased 
to bestow on me, was the great motive of my presuming to Inscribe this Discourse to your Name.65 
Like the Christ Church wits, Mander was a High Church Tory, who undoubtedly would have been 
pleased by Keill’s attack on the theorists and may even have suggested the topic to him – Keill 
mentions in the dedication Mander’s “Direction and Encouragement”.66 Like the wits, Mander would 
have been impressed that Keill was arguing – and doing so very effectively – for what was essentially 
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an orthodox reading of Scripture and also by his attack on Whiston, Bentley, and Wotton, who were 
Low Church Whigs.67 
 The orthodox interpretation of Scripture that Keill was promulgating of course was that the 
Creation and Deluge were miraculous and not natural events. Interestingly, though, Keill’s main source 
of evidence for this interpretation was not Scripture itself but nature. Here it is important to remember 
that Keill’s conception of miracles and of the distinction between the natural and the miraculous was 
very different from Burnet’s and Whiston’s conception. As I explained in the previous chapter, unlike 
the theorists, Keill followed Robert Boyle and others in adopting the modified version of the Thomist 
definition discussed in chapter two according to which miracles are violations of laws of nature 
resulting from God’s direct intervention in the world. As Peter Harrison notes, philosophers who 
adopted this definition saw themselves as peculiarly well qualified to distinguish between miracles 
and the ordinary course of nature and thus to differentiate between true and false miracles. 
Ultimately, they understood the laws of nature better than others and so were best placed to judge 
whether a given event constituted a violation of those laws.68 Keill exemplified this attitude. His 
knowledge of the laws of nature, he believed, enabled him to state with absolute certainty that the 
Creation and Deluge could not have been brought about by natural causes but required miraculous 
intervention from God. A miraculous interpretation of these events was the interpretation that was 
best supported by the physical evidence.69 
6.4. Some Reflections and a second Examination 
A year after the publication of Keill’s Examination, a response defending Burnet’s theory appeared 
entitled Reflections upon the Theory of the Earth occasion’d by a Late Examination of it. The tract was 
anonymous, the author not giving a full name but merely signing the work “T.B.” and referring to 
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Burnet in the third person as “the Theorist” throughout. The work was originally attributed to Burnet 
himself and appended to the fifth and subsequent editions of the Theory alongside his responses to 
Warren which were first appended to the fourth edition. Following the title page, an “Advertisement 
from the Bookseller” read: 
THE following Tract hath been much inquired after by some curious Persons, but was so scarce that a 
Copy could not be procured at the time of the former Edition of the Theory. Since that, an intimate Friend 
of Doctor Burnet’s hath favoured me with a Copy; so that the Reader may be assured it is genuine, and 
was wrote by Doctor Burnet; and it is apprehended, it may very well deserve a place in his Works.70 
In the seventh edition, a biography of Burnet written by the Anglican Clergyman Ralph Heathcote was 
added to the preface, and in his discussion of Keill’s attack on Burnet and Whiston, Heathcote also 
attributes the Reflections to Burnet.71 During the nineteenth century, for reasons that are unclear, the 
work came also to be attributed to the millenarian writer Thomas Beverley. The earliest example I 
have seen of this is in an 1813 British Museum catalogue in which it is listed in both Beverley’s and 
Burnet’s works.72 It was later attributed to Beverley (and not Burnet) by Samuel Halkett and John Laing 
in their 1885 Dictionary of the anonymous and pseudonymous literature of Great Britain.73 
In modern discussions of the Reflections, historians have typically followed the above 
bookseller and Heathcote in attributing the work to Burnet.74 Some, however, have cited it as an 
anonymous text.75 And a few have ascribed it to Beverley.76 The first to do the latter was Don Cameron 
Allen in his 1949 work The legend of Noah. Allen discusses the work only very briefly in a footnote and 
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does not question Beverley’s authorship.77 Michael Macklem attributes the piece to Beverley in his 
1958 book The anatomy of the world. Macklem notes that the work had also been attributed to Burnet 
and that it was appended to later editions of the Theory but does not tell us why he disagrees with 
this attribution and ascribes it instead to Beverley.78 It is highly likely that both Allen and Macklem 
were following Halkett and Laing, whose Dictionary was reprinted several times during the twentieth 
century. The only recent work on theories of the earth in which the text is attributed to Beverley is 
that of Kerry Magruder.79 Magruder appears to have followed Macklem, whose list of works 
connected with Burnet’s Theory forms the basis of much of his PhD research.80 He mentions nothing 
of the work being attributed to Burnet. One other attribution to Beverley appears in Warren 
Johnston’s Oxford dictionary of national biography entry on him. In his brief discussion of the 
Reflections, Johnston appears to have confused it with Keill’s Examination, since he claims that the 
work “preserved the mysteriousness of Christianity by maintaining the miraculous nature of the 
creation of the earth, and of the flood”, which of course is what Keill did in the Examination and 
precisely not what was done in the Reflections in which it was maintained against Keill that the 
Creation and Deluge resulted from natural causes.81 
The attribution of the Reflections to Beverley is somewhat puzzling as well as decidedly 
unconvincing. It is not entirely without grounds. Beverley had praised Burnet’s Theory in a number of 
his works and had cited it in support of some of his arguments about the Conflagration and 
Millennium, noting in particular Burnet’s interpretation of St Peter, with which he was especially 
sympathetic.82 Burnet was also named in the dedication in Beverley’s 1690 pamphlet The pattern of 
                                                          
77 Allen (1949), 111 [note 100]. 
78 Macklem (1958), 113. 
79 Magruder (2000), 100-2, 128, 144-5, 157, 504 [note 155], 559, 599-600, 748; (2006), 252, 255; (2009), 58-9. 
80 See Magruder (2000), 143-5. 
81 Johnston (2009). It is interesting to note that the DNB contains three different attributions for the Reflections, 
the other two being Scott Mandelbrote’s entry on Burnet in which he attributes the work to him and John 
Henry’s entry on Keill in which he cites it as an anonymous text – see Mandelbrote (2008); Henry (2009). 
82 Beverley (1689), 41; (1691), 9; (1693), 130, 143; (1694), 11. 
310 
 
the divine temple, sanstuary [sic], and city of the New Jerusalem measured according to Ezekiels last 
and greatest vision. Beverley’s discussions of the Theory, however, are all very brief, and as an 
obsessive millenarian, he was far more interested in its implications for the Conflagration and 
Millennium than anything to do with the Creation and the Deluge, which were of course the sole focus 
of the Reflections. It is important also not to read too much into the above dedication, for here Burnet 
was listed alongside the Archbishop of Canterbury (Beverley’s primary dedicatee), five other Bishops, 
and thirteen other prominent divines, and so was most likely named due to his position in the church 
rather than anything to do with the Theory, which is not mentioned at all in the pamphlet.83  
Beyond his initials, then, there is little reason to think that Beverley was the author. There are, 
however, several very good reasons to attribute the work to Burnet. To begin with, it was written in 
Burnet’s distinctive and much remarked upon prose style. It was also published by Burnet’s publisher, 
Walter Kettilby, who, apart from the third Latin edition, published all the editions of the Theory that 
appeared during Burnet’s lifetime as well as both of Burnet’s responses to Warren and the 
Archaeologiae – that is, almost his entire bibliography – but published none of Beverley’s work.84 
Additionally, as will become increasingly apparent shortly when I discuss the work in more depth, the 
content of the Reflections is highly indicative of Burnet’s authorship. In this regard, two things in 
particular stand out. First is the author’s resolute adherence to, and extensive knowledge of, Cartesian 
natural philosophy, something which is present throughout Burnet’s work but wholly absent from 
Beverley’s. The second is a fervent belief in the existence of extra-terrestrial life, a belief which is not 
expressed in any of Beverley’s other published work but was expressed by Burnet.85 Allen, who as we 
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have seen attributes the work to Beverley, correctly notes that much of the discussion in the 
Reflections was guided by this belief.86 Yet the presence of this belief in Burnet’s work and the absence 
of it in Beverley’s surely point us away from Beverley and toward Burnet as the author. 
 Keill may very well have suspected that the Reflections was written by Burnet. For the most 
part, he does not let on, referring to the author throughout his reply as “the Defender” and often 
distinguishing between “the Defender” and “the Theorist”. At the end of his reply, however, he 
requests that Burnet “spend some time in the study of Numbers and Magnitude, Astronomy and 
Staticks, that he may be the better able to understand the force of my Arguments against his Theory, 
after which I doubt not but that he will easily perceive its errors, and have the ingenuity to 
acknowledge them”.87 Until he does, Keill continues, “all further disputation between him and me, 
must needs be vain and frivolous”.88 Keill’s intimation here is that it was Burnet who had not 
understood the force of his arguments. And his reference to further disputation indicates that he 
believed himself currently to be engaged in disputation with him. This suggests that Keill likely 
suspected “the Theorist” and “the Defender” to have been one and the same author. 
 Turning now to the content of the Reflections and Keill’s reply, what is perhaps most 
interesting about the way this debate progresses is the extent to which it becomes, as Keill had indeed 
intended, about much more than just Burnet’s theory of the earth. That is, it extends to precisely the 
kinds of foundational issues about the nature of philosophical inquiry with which Keill, both in his 
Examination and in his Oxford lectures, was most concerned. Essentially, with Burnet’s reply, the 
debate becomes a battle between Burnet’s Cartesian and Keill’s brand of Newtonian principles, for in 
responding to Keill, Burnet advances several decidedly Cartesian arguments against various of the 
distinctly Newtonian foundations on which Keill’s attack on the theory was based. The conflict 
between Cartesianism and Newtonianism in Burnet’s debate with Keill centred primarily on two 
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closely-related methodological issues concerning the kinds of scientific explanations that should be 
sought and the sorts of concepts that could be employed in explaining natural phenomena. 
 The first issue I want to discuss is the that of final causes. As we have seen, in his Examination, 
Keill argued at length for the necessity of considering final causes when conducting philosophical 
inquiry. In his view, inadequate consideration of final causes had led Burnet to err. In response to this, 
Burnet makes a number of distinctly Cartesian observations on the dangers of theorising about final 
causes and the priority of efficient causes.89 It is important to note here that Burnet does not want to 
banish final causes from natural philosophy as we find in Descartes.90 He agrees with Keill that there 
is some value in understanding final causes.91 Nevertheless, he wants to emphasise the importance 
and ultimate priority of efficient causes. This he illustrates as he did several points in the Theory with 
the example of a watch or clock. He argues that if someone understands the final cause of such a 
machine – that is, to tell the time – yet knows nothing of its internal construction and of how its various 
parts conspire to move the hands on the dial, then that person could not be said to understand this 
machine, or at the very least we should say that this person has a greatly inferior understanding 
compared with someone who understands its efficient causes. And since everything in nature has an 
efficient cause, we must (a) endeavour to understand it, and (b) acknowledge that, in so far as we do 
not understand it, our philosophical understanding of the phenomenon in question is imperfect.92 
 Although Burnet does not want to exclude final causes, then, he does assert the priority of 
efficient causes. He also wants to impose strict limits on theorising about final causes. And it is here 
that his view is most like that of Descartes. Descartes’s main reason for rejecting final causes is that 
he believes theorising about them to be inherently hubristic, for as limited, imperfect beings, we 
cannot presume to understand God’s purposes. As he writes in the Meditations, 
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For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is 
immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also know… that he is capable of countless things whose 
causes are beyond my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the customary search for final 
causes to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of 
investigating the <impenetrable> purposes of God.93  
And in the Principles, 
concerning natural things, we shall not undertake any reasonings from the end which God or nature 
set Himself in creating these things, {and we shall entirely reject from our Philosophy the search for 
final causes}: because we ought not to presume so much of ourselves as to think that we are the 
confidants of His intentions.94 
Burnet does not go as far as Descartes. He believes there are some natural phenomena for 
which the final causes are clear enough that we can acquire reliable knowledge of them. He also 
maintains that such knowledge can lead us to a greater understanding of God’s wisdom. But he wants 
to restrict final cause theorising in natural philosophy only to these clear and obvious cases. And his 
reason for this is precisely the same as Descartes’s reason for rejecting it outright. For Burnet, any 
theorising about final causes beyond such clear cases is presumptuous. It is beyond our capabilities as 
limited beings to understand God’s purposes, and we must therefore acquiesce instead in knowing 
efficient or physical causes, that is, “to know what God hath done, and conclude it to be the best, and 
that we should judge it so, if we had the same extent of thought and prospect its Maker had”.95 As far 
as Burnet was concerned, Keill, in his arguments from final causes, and in particular in arguing for the 
necessity of mountains and an oblique situation of the earth’s axis for providing a habitable world, 
had overstepped this boundary. “‘[T]is a great vanity”, he writes at the end of his discussion of 
                                                          
93 Descartes (1996 [1641]), 39. 
94 Descartes (1982 [1644]), 14. 
95 Burnet (1699a), 17. 
314 
 
mountains, “for short-sighted Creatures and of narrow understandings to prescribe to Providence 
what is necessary and indispensable to the frame and order of an habitable World”.96 
It is in his discussion of final causes that Burnet’s belief in extra-terrestrial life comes to the 
fore. It is highly likely, he argues, that there are other planets without mountains and that there is life 
on these planets. It is known that Jupiter’s axis is perpendicular to the plane of the ecliptic. And it is 
likely that, notwithstanding this, there is animal and vegetable life there, both of which Keill had 
claimed were impossible given such a situation. Moreover, the other planets in our solar system – and 
therefore almost certainly in the universe more generally – have their axes at a great variety of angles 
relative to the plane of the ecliptic. They also have vastly different orbits and diurnal motions and 
therefore greatly varying lengths of days and years. By claiming that the present situation of the earth 
makes it peculiarly capable of sustaining life, Keill was effectively precluding the possibility of life on 
countless other planets. This implied that the creation of these innumerable worlds was to no purpose, 
which was contrary to the wisdom of God, who does nothing in vain.97 
What is noteworthy here is that embedded in this argument is yet another recognisably 
Cartesian consideration which is closely related to the issue of final causes and is articulated by 
Descartes immediately following the above-quoted passage of the Meditations. When reasoning 
about the perfection of God’s works, Descartes argues here, we must consider the universe as a whole 
rather than merely an individual part of the creation in isolation from the rest, for what may appear 
imperfect when viewed from this narrow perspective may in fact be perfect when considered in 
relation to the whole.98 In Burnet’s view, it was from just such a narrow perspective that Keill had 
considered final causes. Because he did not, and could not, have the entire universe in view, the 
conclusions he had drawn from these considerations were unwarranted. Only God can comprehend 
the entire universe. Thus, when reasoning about the natural world from our limited perspective, we 
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must not “tell God Almighty what is best to be done, in this or that World”. Burnet sums up his position 
on final causes at the end of the Reflections. “As to Final Causes”, he writes, 
the Contemplation of them is very useful to moral purposes, and of great satisfaction to the Mind where 
we can attain to them. But we must not pretend to prove a thing to be so or so in Nature, because we 
fancy it would be better so. Nor deny it to be in such a manner, because to our mind it would be better 
otherwise. Almighty Power and Wisdom that have the whole complex and composition of the Universe 
in View, take other measures than we can comprehend or account for.99 
 In his reply, Keill recognised immediately the fallacy of relevance in Burnet’s argument. His 
arguments from final causes, he emphasises, pertained only to life on earth. Other planets are 
irrelevant. If there is life on other planets, it will be differently constituted and adapted to different 
environments, as is indeed the case with life in different areas of the earth. His argument did not 
prescribe to or place limits on God. God can create animal and vegetable life which is suited to 
different environments. Life on earth is better adapted to the present state than to Burnet’s 
antediluvian state and is therefore advantaged by the former and would be disadvantaged by the 
latter. But this implies nothing whatsoever about life – or the possibility of life – on other planets.100 
Crucially, Keill rejects Burnet’s Cartesian-inspired principle that the entire universe must be considered 
when reasoning about final causes. As we have seen above, this principle had led Burnet to place strict 
limits on final cause theorising, since only God can comprehend the entire universe. Keill does not 
disagree that we have only a limited view of things compared with God. But he does not feel the need 
to limit final cause theorising to the same extent, because he sees such theorising as necessarily 
localised, as relative to the needs of life on this planet. The rest of the universe is irrelevant. It need 
not be considered, and therefore our inability to comprehend it in its entirety presents no impediment 
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to our understanding of final causes in relation to the earth. As he emphasises with regard to the 
position of the earth’s axis, 
Conveniencies and inconveniencies are relative terms, and therefore to prove a position 
incommodious, we must not only consider the consequences of the position its self, but the Nature and 
Constitution of those Animals to which it is to be adapted; and I hope I may affirm (without any 
reflection on Divine Providence) that the present position in which God hath put the Earth, is more 
suitable and agreeable to the Nature and Frame of our Animals and Plants, than any other, and 
especially than that which the Theorist assigns to the Primitive Earth.101 
Regarding the issue of final versus efficient causes, Keill does not explicitly give either one 
priority over the other. He does, however, want to impose strict limits on explanations about efficient 
causes, and these limits are essentially very similar to those which Burnet places on explanations 
concerning final causes. That is, he believes we should only give explanations of efficient causes when 
those causes are “plain and obvious”.102 By “plain and obvious”, he means those which are in 
accordance with empirically derived laws of nature and which can be articulated in mathematical 
terms. Burnet had accused Keill of censuring him simply for considering efficient causes. This, Keill 
emphatically denies. What he censured Burnet for was, firstly, claiming to have uncovered the 
efficient causes of things for which such causes cannot be known, and secondly, positing efficient 
causes for these things which are contrary to the established, mathematical laws of nature.103 In Keill’s 
view, it was ultimately a lack of understanding of these laws that had led Burnet and the various other 
philosophers he attacked in the Examination to believe they could discover such causes, whereas 
those who do understand them also understand their limitations and acknowledge that there are 
many phenomena for which we cannot ascertain the efficient causes and must be content instead to 
consider their final causes, of which we can obtain reliable knowledge. “I never knew any”, he stresses,  
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that cry'd down… Physical causes, when they were plain and obvious. But it is no wonder if there are 
some that are displeased with the… causes that are assign'd, by a set of Philosophers who think they 
can give a Mechanical account, how an Animal, a Mountain, a Planet, or a World may be made; and yet 
they know not so much of the principles of Staticks and Geometry, as to explain the most common and 
ordinary appearances of nature, which are really explicable by Mechanical principles… And tho' one 
would think that it were but reasonable, that a man who pretends to give the Physical causes of all 
those things, should be very well skill'd in Arithmetick, Geometry, Mechanicks, and the Laws of motion; 
yet it generally happens, that those that are least acquainted with those Sciences, pretend most to the 
solution of such intricate problems, whereas they, who know them best, can best discover how far they 
may proceed upon Physical causes, how far their principles will lead them in the discovery of truth, and 
where it is that they must be content to be ignorant; they know that they have not sufficient Data to 
determine such problems, nor a great many others that have not the hundredth part of the difficulty 
of those I have mentioned; and they are well pleas'd if they know their final causes, the uses for which 
they were design'd by their wise Contriver, and never trouble themselves with that which it is 
impossible to discover.104 
 The other foundational issue at stake in this debate was the status of “occult qualities”. This 
of course was closely related to the issue of final causes in that it, too, was an essentially Aristotelian 
notion that Descartes had sought to banish from natural philosophy and which Newton and his 
followers appeared to many to be bringing back. This, as is well known, was a significant bone of 
contention between Cartesians and Newtonians at this time, and it is present in the debate between 
Keill and Burnet, albeit not explicitly discussed to the same extent as the above issue of final causes. 
Like his assessment of final causes, Burnet’s views on occult qualities are resolutely negative and 
decidedly Cartesian. When in the Examination Keill sarcastically slights Burnet’s somewhat clumsy 
avoidance of the term “attraction” in the Theory – “because that word was not Philosophical, (being 
exploded and ridiculed by those who call themselves new Philosophers)” – he is unapologetic, insisting 
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that Keill “tell us how this Attraction differs from an Occult Quality: Whether it is a Mechanical 
Principle or no: And if not, from what Principle it arises. When he hath told us this, we shall be better 
able to judge of it”.105 Keill is equally unapologetic about his use of occult qualities. “We shall not be 
ashamed to use, with the Peripareticks, the Terms Quality, Faculty, Attraction, and the like”, he writes 
in his Introduction, “[a]nd if the true Causes are hid from us, why may we not call them occult 
Qualities?”.106 And in his reply to Burnet, he questions, as he did in the Examination, whether the 
theoretical entities posited by the “new Philosophers” are in any way superior to those of the 
Schoolmen,  
[f]or loose and general Harangues about Effluviums, Particles, subtle Matter, Modes and Motions, 
signify very little more to explain Nature, than the Qualities and Attractions of the old Philosophers, 
(whom the Theorist upon this account so often derides) 'tis indeed but another sort of Cant, and affords 
as little satisfaction to the mind.107 
Beyond this, there is little explicit discussion of the question of occult qualities versus 
mechanistic causes. But the issue underlies one of the subjects that Keill and Burnet do discuss and 
debate at great length, namely, the shape of the earth, which, as is well known, was being widely 
debated at this time. We have seen above Keill’s argument that Burnet’s prolate figure of the earth 
would not facilitate the flow of rivers because the cause Burnet assigns for the earth taking this form, 
that is, the pressure exerted by the atmosphere on the equator causing the fluid of the chaos to move 
toward the poles, would continue to act and prevent rivers flowing toward the equator. Here, of 
course, he was supposing that Burnet’s prolate figure of the earth and the cause he assigned for it 
were true, and showing that, given this cause, rivers could not flow from the poles to the equator. 
After advancing this argument, he turns to the issue of the shape of the earth itself. Here, he argues 
that the earth is spheroidal, but is an oblate rather than a prolate spheroid. The centrifugal force of 
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the earth’s diurnal motion does indeed cause the earth’s matter to recede from its axis, but the 
atmosphere moves with the earth and therefore does not present any impediment. Even if the 
atmosphere did exert such pressure, it would surely exert the same pressure at the poles as at the 
equator, and so the fluid would not move toward the poles and create a prolate figure. He then 
proceeds to give rigorous mathematical demonstrations of the earth’s oblate figure and discusses 
experiments conducted using pendulums which show the force of gravity to be less at the equator as 
well as various other kinds of empirical evidence for this view.108 
In his reply, Burnet emphasises that he did not make any claims about the shape of the present 
earth, only the antediluvian, and since we do not know precisely what effects the Deluge had on the 
shape of the earth, the shape of the present earth does not necessarily imply anything about that of 
the antediluvian earth. He nevertheless acknowledges that the shape of the earth had been the 
subject of much controversy, and it was a controversy to which he had clearly given a great deal of 
consideration and on which he knew much of the current literature, for he goes on to discuss the issue 
at some length, citing various contemporary authors and suggesting several new ways of measuring 
the circumference at the equator and poles. His aim here, unsurprisingly, is to cast doubt on Keill’s 
arguments for an oblate figure and to argue for the contrary position.109 
What is interesting about Burnet’s discussion for our purposes is that at the heart of his belief 
in the prolate figure of the earth is his adherence to the Cartesian theory of vortices. And underpinning 
this belief in vortices is his Cartesian rejection of occult qualities. In the third English edition of the 
Theory, which was published the year before Keill’s Examination, Burnet adds to the above argument 
about the pressure of the atmosphere with the observation that the antediluvian earth must have 
adopted the same shape as the vortex that contained it and so was of a prolate figure.110 In the 
Reflections, he expands on this observation and brings it to bear on his earlier argument, suggesting 
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that, since the vortex of the earth is “streighter, or of a shorter diameter” at the equator than at the 
poles, the fluid of the chaos which recedes from its axis due to the centrifugal force would have less 
room to dilate and would therefore be pushed toward the poles.111 Anticipating the reply from those 
who believe in an oblate figure of the earth that there is no such thing as vortices, Burnet insists, as 
other vortex theorists did when arguing against Newtonians, that those who deny vortices must 
provide some other physical cause of planetary motion.112 
In responding to this point, Keill rebukes Burnet for not keeping abreast of recent 
developments in natural philosophy: 
I thought that this Defender had been better acquainted with the history of Philosophy for these twelve 
years past, than it seems he is. One would think that he had done nothing but por'd upon the Theory 
all this time, since he is not acquainted with what is known to every body that pretends to Philosophy 
now a days.113 
There are, Keill insists, “other causes” than vortices which explain planetary motion. With these causes 
we are able to explain why the planets move in elliptical orbits, why they are fastest at perihelion and 
slowest at aphelion, the precession of the equinoxes, the apogee and nodes of the moon, and 
numerous other phenomena, “none of which could ever be made out by the Vortices”.114 By “other 
causes”, of course, Keill means Newton’s laws of motion and universal gravitation, and so he was 
ultimately talking past Burnet, who, had he responded, would have insisted that these laws rely on 
the notion of attraction which is an occult quality and therefore do not give us an account of what 
actually causes celestial bodies to move, for as he emphasises at the end of the Reflections, physical 
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causes “must be Mechanical: There being no other Modes, or Powers of Matter… but what are 
Mechanical. And to explain Effects by such Causes is properly Natural Science”.115 
 I want now to turn my attention back to the question of why Keill’s attack constituted such a 
decisive refutation of Burnet’s theory, for Burnet’s response to Keill and Keill’s subsequent reply to 
Burnet played an important role here. Crucially, Burnet’s attempt to answer Keill’s objections only 
served to expose further (a) the weaknesses of his theory, (b) his inferior knowledge of and ability in 
natural philosophy, and (c) the extent to which the essentially Cartesian principles on which both his 
theory and defence against Keill were based had become superseded by a new system of philosophy 
with which he lacked the requisite background and training to engage effectively. The above debate 
concerning the shape of the earth is an interesting case in point. Although Burnet knew the current 
literature on the topic, Keill knew it better and a far better grasp of it, enabling him to defeat Burnet’s 
arguments for a prolate figure with ease and to dismiss his suggestions of new ways to determine the 
shape of the earth in a manner that made Burnet’s philosophy appear decidedly amateurish.116 
 Elsewhere, too, Burnet’s attempts to answer Keill’s objections were quite weak and rather 
than vindicating his Theory served merely to further expose both its flaws and its author’s want of 
philosophical learning. They also furnished Keill with ample opportunity to compose several more of 
the same kinds of mathematical and experimental demonstrations that he had used to such 
devastating effect in the Examination. To Keill’s argument that a sphere whose centre of gravity is the 
same as its centre of magnitude will retain any given position when placed in a fluid of the same 
specific gravity, for example, Burnet countered with the somewhat precarious assumption that this 
will only be the case if the sphere and the fluid are at rest. If, however, the sphere and the fluid 
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medium in which it is moving are turning on their axes as is the case with the earth in the sun’s vortex, 
then the sphere being equally balanced, its axis will be parallel to the axis of the fluid.117 
To test Burnet’s assumption, Keill offers the following thought experiment and diagram (Fig. 
3). ABC, he explains, represents an arch of the ecliptic. DEF represents any circle in the earth which is 
in the same plane as the arch ABC. H is the point where the fluid falls perpendicularly on the circle 
DEF. Take any two arches GE and ID which are parallel to and at equal distances from the arch ABC. 
The particles which move from G to E and I to D fall obliquely on E and D. Part of the force on E will be 
spent moving the circle forward and part of it turning the circle around an axis perpendicular to the 
plane ABC from H to E to F. The total force of the particles relative to the force used in turning the 
circle around the axis is as the square of the radius to the rectangle contained between the sine of the 
arch HE and its cosine. Likewise, part of the force on D will be spent moving the circle forward and 
part of it turning the circle around an axis perpendicular to the plane ABC from H to D to L. Here too 
the total force of the particles relative to the force used in turning the circle is as the square of the 
radius to the rectangle contained between the sine of the arch HD and its cosine. Because HE and HD 
are equal, the force of the particles which turn the circle around its axis are equal, and because they 
are contrary forces, they cancel one another out. The same is true of any two points which are equal 
distances from the arch of the ecliptic in any circle which is parallel to the ecliptic. Thus, the sphere 
will not turn on any one diameter more than any other due to the motion of the fluid but will be free 
to turn on any of its diameters.118 
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In many cases, Keill does not merely nullify Burnet’s responses as in the foregoing example 
but actually uses them to strengthen his case against the theory. An interesting example here is his 
response to Burnet’s reply to his point about the inability of the sun to raise vapours through fissures 
in the crust and supply the earth with rivers and volatise the waters of the abyss such that they exerted 
pressure on the crust. In response to this, Burnet appealed to the earth’s “Pores” as another possible 
conduit for the sun’s heat.119 In his reply, Keill constructs a geometrical demonstration which was 
exactly analogous to the one above concerning the fissures but which in his view was far more 
damaging to the theory (Fig. 4). Consider, he proposes, that one of these pores is one inch in diameter 
and the crust is one mile thick. AB represents the opening of this pore, AC the depth of the crust, CND 
the face of the abyss, EGHF the diameter of the sun, and GH the diameter of the section of the sun 
which can shine on the point N halfway between C and D. The ratio of AC to CN is 120,000/1, and 
hence the angle CAN is less than two seconds and the angles ANB and GNH less than four seconds. 
The diameter of the sun EF subtends thirty minutes, so EF relative to GH is thirty minutes to four 
seconds, or 450/1. The circumference of a circle is directly proportional to the square of its diameter, 
so the amount of the sun’s disc that shines on the sea to that which shines on the abyss is 450²/1 or 
202,500/1. But the sun would shine on the abyss less than one ten-thousandth of the time it shines 
                                                          
119 Burnet (1699a), 31-3. 
324 
 
on the sea. Hence, the heat of the sun on the abyss would be less than one ten-millionth of its heat 
on the sea, and the vapours raised from it would be proportionably less.120 
 
Fig. 4 
Burnet’s answers to Keill, then, merely revealed his inferior philosophical knowledge and 
ability and ultimately weakened his theory further. “Has not the Theorist now mended his cause 
mightily”, asked Keill rhetorically in conclusion to the foregoing calculation, “by this answer of his 
Defenders, which has made the argument against him much stronger than it was before?”.121 At 
various points in the Reflections, Burnet seems to be sensible of this weakness and tries to play to his 
strengths by invoking the testimony of the ancients, of which he did possess both considerable 
knowledge and remarkable skill in interpreting. Unfortunately, rather than having its intended effect, 
this merely gifted Keill an opportunity, firstly, to showcase his own considerable knowledge and skill 
in this area, and secondly, to discredit a source of evidence on which Burnet had drawn extensively 
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not only in the Theory itself but also in his replies to Warren and even more extensively in the 
Archaeologiae but which Keill had not addressed in his Examination. 
Burnet’s most extensive appeal to the ancients appears in his discussion of the primitive 
earth’s axis. Just prior to his above argument about the motion of the earth and the vortex of the sun, 
Burnet stressed that, notwithstanding its physical causes, this former position of the earth is a matter 
of historical fact. If Keill “would look a little into Antiquity…, [i]t may be that would awaken him into 
new thoughts, and a more favourable opinion of the Theory as to this particular”.122 He then refers 
Keill to the relevant passages of the Theory and Archaeologiae and also the third English edition of the 
Theory to which he had added further examples of ancient authors whose writings he believed 
supported his view.123 
In his reply, Keill follows Warren and others in noting that these ancient philosophers lived 
too long after the Deluge to be considered authoritative and that they had said many false and absurd 
things. In addition to this, he conducts a rigorous examination of Burnet’s sources which in his view 
showed conclusively that, even if we were to take these philosophers seriously, what they actually 
said does not in fact support Burnet’s theory. Diogenes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Leucippus had 
spoken of a depression of the earth to the south, by which they presumably meant that the northern 
hemisphere became more inclined toward the sun than the southern. But this clearly does not 
describe the present earth, on which both poles are equally inclined to the sun. Elsewhere, these 
philosophers’ writings seemed to imply the very opposite of Burnet’s theory. Leucippus, for example, 
had claimed that the sun had previously risen higher toward the north pole, which would indicate that 
the axis was formerly more rather than less inclined to the ecliptic. Plato’s notion of a regular and 
uniform motion of the heavens during the reign of Saturn, on which Burnet had drawn extensively in 
the Archaeologiae, did not support his view either, for if the axis was perpendicular to the plane of 
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the ecliptic, we would observe the same apparent irregularities in the motion of the planets. And as 
to the poets, they had indeed spoken of a “perpetual spring” in their various accounts of the Golden 
Age, but they had used this phrase in various other contexts when bestowing praise on a given place. 
Virgil, for instance, from whom Burnet had quoted extensively, had used precisely the same terms 
when praising Italy and expressing his preference for that country above all others. So it signified 
nothing whatsoever about the primitive earth’s axis.124 
If it was Burnet’s extensive appeal to the ancients on the issue of the primitive earth’s axis 
that gave Keill the opportunity to showcase his knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity, it was his 
rather brief appeal to them on the subject of the chaos that allowed him to demonstrate his equally 
impressive command of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Keill had argued that, given the composition of 
the earth, the chaos could not have been a perfectly fluid mass as Burnet had supposed but likely 
contained large bodies of solid matter.125 In response, Burnet appealed, as he did on this subject in 
the Theory and Archaeologiae, to the ancients, both pagan and Judeo-Christian, urging that the chaos 
“hath been always describ'd and suppos'd a mass of fluid matter all over”.126 In reply to this, Keill 
introduced translations of several ancient Jewish sources as well as a number of Church Fathers, all of 
whom understood the chaos described in Genesis as the earth simply being “Void and Uncultivated, 
without Ornaments and Inhabitants”. Certainly there was nothing in these writings to suggest that it 
was a fluid mass.127 As to pagan writers, they could be discounted, since they evidently took their 
doctrine of the chaos from Scripture but “corrupted [it] with their own fancies”.128 
  Another thing that Keill had not done in the Examination but took the opportunity to do in 
his reply to Burnet was attack the Archaeologiae. Keill’s sole focus here was on Burnet’s account of 
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the Mosaic history of the Creation. His main purpose was to undermine Burnet’s claim that it was 
necessary for Moses to give a false account of the Creation because they lacked the capacity to 
understand a philosophical account. Burnet’s idea of a philosophical account was hardly difficult to 
understand. Indeed, it was so contrary to the true laws of nature, that the less one knew of philosophy, 
the easier it was to grasp, and, ultimately, to believe. Certainly Moses could have taught the Jews that 
the chaos was a fluid mass which separated into an inner orb and a fluid abyss, that the fluid separated 
into water and oil, and that solid matter descended and mixed with the oil to form a solid crust. 
What deep reach of thought is requir'd for the understanding of this? How many, and what are the 
Laws of nature and motion that the Jews must know before they can comprehend it? in my mind the 
less they knew of those things, the fitter they would be to understand the Theory; at least, I am sure 
they would be more easily perswaded to believe it. We see now that this way of reasoning as 
the Theorist has apply'd it, is of no force against the Mosaick History, for his refin'd Theory if it had been 
true, might have been as easily comprehended by the Jews, as the plain and simple Cosmogonia of 
Moses.129 
Burnet’s exegesis also failed to stand up to scrutiny. On this topic, Keill is often characterised 
by historians as a literalist.130 This is misleading. Keill actually had no problem at all with adopting a 
non-literal interpretation of Scripture where necessary. And his principles for doing so were essentially 
very similar to Burnet’s. That is, he agreed that we should depart from the literal sense of Scripture 
(a) where the Sacred Writers use parables to teach moral lessons, (b) where they refer to sensory 
appearances such as the motion of the sun, and (c) where their writings imply something contradictory 
or absurd. His issue was not with the principles themselves, but with Burnet’s application of them. 
Crucially, the mosaic narrative fulfilled none of the above criteria. It was clearly not a parable, for when 
they write parables, the Sacred Writers make very clear (a) the parabolic nature of their teachings and 
(b) the moral lessons for which a given parable is contrived. Moses, on the other hand, makes very 
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clear that his narrative is intended as a history of the Creation. Neither does the narrative pertain to 
sensory appearances, since no one witnessed the Creation. Indeed, we would know nothing of it were 
it not for Moses’s narration, and so unlike the motion of the sun it cannot have been contrived to 
cohere with our sensory experiences. And most importantly, the Mosaic account implied nothing 
contradictory or absurd, for Moses ascribes the entire Creation to the action of God, who can form 
the earth or any part thereof in any way he chooses.131 
One final important issue in the debate between Keill and Burnet that needs to be addressed 
before we move on to discuss the effect Keill had on the controversy and on eighteenth-century 
thinking about the earth is the subject of miracles. As we have seen above, Keill maintained that the 
Creation and Deluge were miraculous. Burnet, who as we have seen had argued repeatedly against 
such an interpretation, unsurprisingly objected to this. For him, there were two main issues with Keill’s 
appeal to miracles. Firstly, Keill had not given any explanation as to the nature of these miracles: “he 
does not tell us wherein this Miracle consisted”.132 Such an explanation, he saw as important. In his 
Theory, where he had appealed to miracles in explaining the protection of the Ark during the Deluge 
and the causes of the Conflagration, he had given an account of “wherein these miracles consisted”, 
that is, in the ministry of angels. Appeals to miracles without such an explanation were in his view 
simply attempts to evade the difficulty of uncovering the true causes of an event. “Some Men”, he 
writes toward the end of the Reflections, “when they are at a loss in the progress of their work, call in 
a Miracle to relieve them in their distress”.133 Keill was guilty of doing just this. Secondly, when 
defending a miraculous interpretation of the Deluge, Keill had not answered the philosophical 
arguments he had advanced against this interpretation in the Theory. This he must do, especially if he 
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supposes that God created or transmuted other elements into water, both of which were problematic 
from a philosophical point of view.134 
 In his response, Keill dismisses Burnet’s first point out of hand. “The truth is”, he declares, “I 
never thought it my business to explain miracles”.135 He nevertheless offers some possible 
descriptions of what the miracle that produced the Deluge may have consisted in. God may have 
raised subterraneous waters and sustained them on the surface of the earth. He may have created 
new water, transmuted other elements into water, or brought water from elsewhere in the 
universe.136 Ultimately, though, it was not incumbent upon him to determine which of these or any 
other processes God used to bring about the Deluge. It was enough to show that it could not be 
brought about via natural causes and so was necessarily miraculous. As to the second point, Keill 
informs us that he did not consider Burnet arguments against a miraculous interpretation of the 
Deluge because “when I wrote the Examination, I thought them so weak and precarious that it would 
not be worth while to take notice of them”.137 Here again, Burnet’s Cartesianism – and Keill’s disdain 
for it – comes to the surface. Burnet’s argument against the creation of new matter, Keill observes, 
was based on “a notoriously false notion of the Cartesian Philosophy, viz. That matter and space are 
the same”.138 Since this principle had been discredited, it was no impediment to the creation of new 
water. As to the transmutation of other elements into water, this was unproblematic even on 
Cartesian principles, for if physical bodies differ only “in their modifications, motions and figures”, 
then there is no reason why any substance cannot be transformed into any other. And if, according to 
the Cartesian principle of a plenum, there are no vacuities, then not only the air but the subtle matter 
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which supposedly fills all space may be transformed into water and will produce as much of it as if the 
same amount of completely solid matter were so transformed.139 
 Keill closes his debate with Burnet in much the same way as he opened it, that is, with yet 
another attack on Cartesianism. When praising Burnet, Whiston noted that “he employ'd his utmost 
skill in the best System of Philosophy then known in the World”.140 Keill offers a rather more negative 
take on things. In his view, “the best System of Philosophy then known in the World” was actually 
rather poor, and Burnet lacked the requisite skill to apprehend this. The blame for Burnet’s misdeeds, 
however, is placed firmly on the Cartesian system rather than on Burnet himself. Burnet simply lacked 
the training necessary to make an informed judgement about this system and was therefore taken in 
by it and led to believe that he, like Descartes, could give an account of the origin of the world. “I 
acknowledge him to be an ingenious Writer”, writes Keill of Burnet in his closing statement, 
and if he had taken a right method and had made a considerable progress in those Sciences, that are 
Introductory to the study of nature, I doubt not but that he would have made a very acute Philosopher. 
It was his unhappiness to begin at first with the Cartesian Philosophy, and not having a 
sufficient stock of Geometrical and Mechanical principles to examine it rightly, he too rashly believed 
it, and thought that there was but little skill required in those Sciences to become a Philosopher, and 
therefore in imitation of Mons. Des Cartes, he would undertake to shew how the World was made, a 
task too great even for a Mathematician.141 
6.5. Burnet, Whiston, Keill, and theories of the earth in eighteenth-century England 
Thirteen years before the publication of Keill’s Examination, in what was the first attack on Burnet to 
appear in print in England, Herbert Croft wrote: 
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I shall now address my self unto the learned Men of the Universities; and desire to know what Lethargy 
hath possessed them all, that not one of them appears in Writing to confute the Fables of this Man: For 
I have diligently enquired and cannot hear of any one yet come forth in Print. If they answer me that 
they are so vain and extravagant in themselves, that they need no other Confutation; I consent unto 
them that it is true. But if they prevail so far in the World, as to get Reception and Applause, the next 
step may be, for ought I know, to be approved and believed. This hath engaged, me, tho now in the 
Eighty Second Year of my Age, to put some stop to this Current, and to awaken some younger, abler 
and fitter Person to undertake this Man.142 
Croft died in 1691. Had he lived to see Keill’s attack, he undoubtedly would have been pleased by it. 
A young, fit, able “man of the university” had finally produced a thorough confutation of the Theorist’s 
“Fables”. Certainly this was how many viewed the Examination at the time. As George Smalridge, a 
tutor at Christ Church where Keill was soon to follow Gregory, wrote in 1698: 
Mr. Keil, whom I am well acquainted with, is a plain, rough, honest, thorough Scholar, and his book 
answers that character. I am not master enough of Mathematics to understand him always; but, where 
I do, I am convinced he is in the right; and those who are better skilled are satisfied he has 
demonstratively confuted all the material things in Dr. Burnet’s Theory.143 
 The view that Keill successfully refuted both Burnet and Whiston appears to have been 
widespread. It is found throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth and appears 
in some of the most famous works in the history of earth science. Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de 
Buffon, for example, in his voluminous Natural history refers to “Mr. Keill, who has geometrically 
demonstrated the errors of Mr. Burnet, in a treatise called ‘Examination of the Theory of the Earth’”. 
“This Mr. Keill”, he continues, “has also refuted Whiston’s system”.144 And as late 1830, when 
discussing Whiston in his Principles of geology, Charles Lyell states that “[h]is book, as well as Burnet's, 
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was attacked and refuted by Keill”.145 So widespread was the view that Keill had defeated the theorists 
that even in Heathcote’s biography of Burnet, which appeared in the 1759 edition of the Theory itself, 
Keill is said “to have confuted solidly the Theory, on true mathematical Principles” and “to have shewn 
the Insufficiency of both these Theories [i.e. Burnet’s and Whiston’s]”.146 
 Why, then, did these theories, despite such widespread belief that they had been discredited 
scientifically, continue to be so popular during the eighteenth century? By the 1750s, Burnet’s Theory 
was in its eighth edition and Whiston’s New theory in its sixth. Heathcote poses precisely this question 
in the aforementioned biography. “The reader may be ready to wonder”, he writes of Burnet’s work, 
“that a Book fundamentally wrong should run through so many Editions, and be so much read; and he 
may express the same Surprize… in regard to Mr. Whiston’s New Theory of the Earth, which is a Work 
of the same Nature, and has been equally well received”. His answer to this query is that both works 
are to be read not for instruction but for entertainment; not as true accounts of Scripture and earth 
history, but as works of fiction, philosophical romances. “[N]o Man”, he observes, 
reads Homer’s Iliad for History, any more than he reads Milton’s Paradise Lost for Divinity…. Such Works 
are read purely to entertain and amuse the Fancy; and it is not the Story, but the Imagery, that is 
principally sought after. Why may not Burnet’s and Whiston’s Theories be read with the same View? 
They are not, it may be said, strictly true in the philosophic Part, and so in that Light are not to be 
depended on: yet they present to the Imagination new and amazing Scenes; and therefore will always 
furnish out the highest Entertainment to a Reader, who is capable of being pleased as well as 
instructed.147 
 Al Coppola traces the romantic reading of Burnet to the essayist Joseph Addison whom Burnet 
taught at the Charterhouse and who as well as writing a Latin ode to Burnet which appeared in all 
eighteenth-century editions of the Theory promoted the work in the Spectator, a daily paper published 
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by Addison and Richard Steele, another former pupil of Burnet, from 1711 to 1712. “[L]ong after 
Burnet’s book was discredited scientifically”, observes Coppola, Addison praises the work purely for 
its aesthetic value, its utility in cultivating the imagination. “[I]n Addison’s hands”, he argues,  
we have moved a great deal beyond the question of whether Burnet’s is literally true or not; rather, the 
book becomes the occasion for enjoying ‘the highest pleasure’, ‘sublime thoughts’… Addison and his 
readers have learned to dislodge Burnet’s cosmology from the minute particulars of its natural 
philosophy or its theological commitments, and instead prize it as a means for producing edifying 
thoughts about nature.148 
But this ability to distinguish between the philosophical and theological implications of Burnet’s 
Theory and its aesthetic value is already present in many earlier criticisms of the work. “I conceive he 
[Burnet] had done far better”, wrote Croft in 1685, “if he had published it under the Title of a Romance 
only: for several Persons would then have read it as a pretty invention to pass away their idle time, 
and perchance have taken much delight in it”.149 And at the end of the Examination, Keill, having 
exposed Burnet’s philosophical shortcomings, conjectured that 
[p]erhaps many of his Readers will be sorry to be undeceived, for as I believe, never any Book was fuller 
of Errors and Mistakes in Philosophy, so none ever abounded with more beautiful Scenes and surprising 
Images of Nature; but I write only to those who might perhaps expect to find a true Philosophy in it. 
They who read it as an Ingenious Romance will still be pleased with their Entertainment. 
Ultimately, then, once its philosophical value was no longer in question, Burnet’s Theory came to be 
read, as many critics believed it should, for its aesthetic value. And being, as Heathcote noted, “a Work 
of the same Nature”, Whiston’s New theory, notwithstanding both its far greater complexity and its 
authors vastly inferior prose style, became seen in the same light. 
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 There is also evidence that Burnet’s, Whiston’s, and other late-seventeenth-century theories 
of the earth along with the various responses to them were read during the eighteenth century for 
their pedagogical value. William Poole notes that “[i]n the English universities, the whole Burnet-
Woodward-Whiston canon ‘with the answers to them &c.’ was being recommended to students for 
impartial comparison in the early decades of the eighteenth century”.150 Here Poole cites an early-
eighteenth-century guide for students at Oxford drawn up by Thomas Haywood, a fellow of St. John’s 
College.151 A further example which shows that this practice extended to Cambridge and continued 
into the latter part of the century is the Master of Magdalene College Daniel Waterland’s Advice to a 
young student. With a method of study for the first four years. First published in 1730 and revised and 
reprinted until 1761, all editions and reprints of this text set “Burnet’s Theory, with Keill’s Remarks” 
and “Whiston’s Theory, with Keill’s Remarks” as required reading for the third of four years study, the 
rationale being, as Waterland put it, that “[t]he two Theorists, with Keill upon them, may now be 
useful: There is a great deal of curious Learning and Philosophy in them, which a Student may very 
much improve himself by”.152 
 Although true of Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories, the extent to which the “theory of the 
earth” genre as a whole became discredited scientifically and appreciated purely for its aesthetic value 
rather than its philosophical and theological content, and Keill’s role in bringing this situation about, 
has been greatly overstated. Coppola, for example, claims that the new romantic reading of Burnet 
popularised by Addison “suggests the endpoint of the trajectory of late seventeenth-century 
cosmology [i.e. theories of the earth], where physicotheology gives way to the cultivation of exquisite 
states of affective pleasure”.153 With regard to Keill’s influence, David Kubrin claims that after Keill’s 
attack on Burnet and Whiston “it was generally concluded in England that world-making was 
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unphilosophical as well as impious”.154 By attacking Burnet and Whiston, Kubrin argues, Keill showed 
theorising about the earth to be (a) an essentially Cartesian enterprise and (b) incompatible with 
Newtonianism. “Represented in this way as inconsistent with Newtonian principles”, Kubrin observes, 
“world-making had little chance of retaining any following or exercising any persuasion. The prestige 
of Newtonianism was too great, and the shortcomings of Cartesianism too much on peoples’ [sic] 
minds in the eighteenth century for this form of theorizing to be convincing”.155 
 The foregoing arguments, however, conflict very strongly with the historical record. As Roy 
Porter has amply shown, theories of the earth very much in the mould of Burnet’s and Whiston’s 
continued to be published – and widely read – throughout the eighteenth century.156 By mid-century, 
authors on the continent and in Scotland had begun to disconnect earth science from both sacred 
history and human history more generally. In the latter part of the century, some in England did the 
same. Oliver Goldsmith, for example, derided the theories of the previous century as inherently 
hubristic and overambitious and rejected attempts to connect earth and human history.157 Most 
English writers in the eighteenth century, however – William Stukeley, Alexander Catcott, William 
Worthington, and John Whitehurst for example – despite paying greater attention to field evidence 
than earlier theorists, persisted in producing theories of the Creation and Deluge very much in the 
vein of the late-seventeenth-century cosmogonies.158 Even local natural histories like William 
Borlase’s studies of Cornwall and the Scilly Isles continued to attribute geological phenomena to the 
biblical Flood.159 Neither is it the case that Newtonians eschewed such theorising as Kubrin suggests. 
Stukeley, as is well known, was a close associate and biographer of Newton.160 As Porter notes, 
Whitehurst’s theory was based explicitly on the Newtonian principle of an oblate earth, drew heavily 
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on Newtonian physics and chemistry in explaining the formation of the earth from a fluid chaos, and 
used Newton’s theory of the tides to explain the formation of primitive land masses.161 Another 
interesting theory from the late eighteenth century is a manuscript written around 1773 by the 
Newtonian astronomer Thomas Wright entitled A new theory of the earth founded upon, and more 
fully explaining the universal phenomenon, of earthquakes; effects of ye magnet; and doctrine of tides 
in which the Creation and Deluge are explained in similarly Newtonian terms.162 
 Keill’s attack on Burnet and Whiston, then, was successful insofar as it refuted their theories 
in the eyes of both contemporaries and later thinkers. But it did not deter people from theorising 
about the earth along essentially the same lines during the following century. Nor did it show such 
theorising to be incompatible with Newtonian principles. Ultimately, although eighteenth-century 
English theorists accepted that Keill had shown the mechanisms posited by Burnet and Whiston to 
explain the Creation and Deluge to be inadequate, they typically rejected his further inference that 
these events could not be explained in terms of natural causes at all. Some did so explicitly. Patrick 
Cockburn, for example, in his 1750 work An inquiry into the truth and certainty of the Mosaic Deluge, 
appealed to Keill in arguing against Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories but lamented the fact that he had 
concluded from the falsity of these theories that the Deluge must be explained wholly miraculously 
and had not inquired into the natural causes of the event himself, something which, given his 
remarkable philosophical ability, he was well qualified to do. As he emphasised in his discussion of the 
draining of the waters of the Deluge after recounting Keill’s confutation of Whiston on this point: 
His [Keill’s] design in the Examination and Remarks on the two noted Theories was to shew that their 
principles were wrong, and that they reasoned wrong from their own principles. But had he set himself 
to account for the increase and decrease of the waters of the Deluge by the true principles of Natural 
Philosophy, without assuming any fanciful Hypotheses, (the way that others have taken) I make no 
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doubt but that he might have shewn the natural causes of the reduction of the waters far better than I 
can pretend to do.163 
Those who appealed to miracles as well as natural causes in their accounts of the Creation and Deluge, 
moreover, did not accept Keill’s maxim that, insofar as these events were miraculous, they were 
unexplainable. As Catcott stressed in the second edition of his Treatise on the Deluge, published in 
1768: 
When an extraordinary effect is performed, to tell a person – that GOD did it – and there rest, without 
explaining the end, the means, and the manner of doing it, is losing great part of the evidence of the 
miracle, and the intent for which it was performed; and is generally spoken as a cover for our ignorance, 
or rather our pride, which is piqued at a difficulty we cannot solve.164 
This of course strongly echoes Burnet. Eighteenth-century theorists, like their seventeenth-century 
counterparts, wanted to know “wherein the miracles consisted”. 
6.6. Conclusion 
What set Keill’s attack on Burnet apart from the numerous other attacks that appeared during the 
1690s, then, was his sharper focus and experimental and mathematical approach, an approach that 
he had adopted ultimately from his close study of Newton’s Principia, promoted in his Oxford lectures, 
and employed to devastating effect against the theorists. This is essentially why his two books became 
seen as having decisively refuted both Burnet’s and Whiston’s theories. What they did not do, 
however, is deter philosophers – including Newtonians – from theorising about the earth along 
essentially the same lines during the eighteenth century. Keill’s motivation, as well as a desire to court 
favour among his patrons at Oxford, was a strongly held antipathy with the Cartesian philosophy, of 
which he viewed the practice of theorising about the earth as an especially pernicious manifestation, 
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even Whiston’s Newtonian version of it. What is perhaps most interesting about Keill’s debate with 
Burnet is that it embodies several of the disagreements between Newtonians and Cartesians that were 
prevalent in the late seventeenth century: the shape of the earth, the existence of vortices, the 
rejection of final causes, the use of occult qualities. Keill’s two books and Burnet’s pamphlet provide 
a fascinating epitome of these important debates in late-seventeenth-century natural philosophy. In 
England of course the advent of Newtonianism that coincided with the debate over Burnet’s theory 
meant that, on these issues, the dice were very much loaded in Keill’s favour, and this surely 
contributed to the judgement among the reading public that Keill’s refutation of Burnet had been a 
success. Nevertheless, the Theory continued to be immensely popular. No longer did anyone “expect 
















Following his debate with Keill, Burnet wrote nothing more on his theory. We can only conjecture as 
to why not. It is possible that he had come to see, as virtually everyone else had, that his theory had 
been refuted, though this is doubtful given his resolute confidence that he had discovered the true 
history of the earth. It was this confidence as well as his theory’s heterodox implications that likely 
rendered him out of favour with the Latitudinarians – aside from Tillotson – and ultimately damaged 
his chances of further advancement in the Church, for as well as the various Latitudinarian principles 
to which Burnet subscribed, the Latitudinarians also stressed diffidence and humility in matters of 
Scripture, philosophy, and theology. This anti-dogmatic probabilism the Latitudinarians termed “moral 
certainty”, and Burnet had stated explicitly that “we must in equity give more than a moral certitude 
to this Theory”.1 
 It was this confidence in his theory that ultimately led him to be equally confident about his 
controversial interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis. Crucially, he believed that he had 
discovered important truths about the earth and its history, and these truths were incompatible with 
the literal sense of these chapters. Additionally, these truths he had discovered had uncovered the 
true, literal and philosophical sense of other passages of Scripture such as St Peter’s Second Epistle, 
chapter 3 and Psalms 24.2 and 136.6, and he was equally confident about his literal interpretation of 
these passages. These, too, were incompatible with a literal interpretation of Genesis 1-3. Both the 
theory itself and its implications for Scripture, then, had “more than moral certitude”, and the literal 
interpretation of these passages had to be abandoned, just as it had with those passages that refer to 
the motion of the sun. 
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 It is interesting to compare this picture of Burnet with that portrayed in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century by Charles Lyell, Archibald Geikie, and Andrew Dickson White. As I discussed 
in the introduction, they portrayed Burnet as someone whose theory of the earth was designed to 
support orthodox Christianity. Burnet and others like him are juxtaposed against those like Galileo and 
Giordano Bruno who suffered for their science at the hands of the religious establishment. Yet what 
emerges from the above analysis is that Burnet is actually much closer to these latter thinkers. 
Certainly this was how he saw himself. Indeed, given his frequent comparison of his theory with the 
heliocentric system, it is no exaggeration to say he considered himself very much to be the next 
Galileo. He thought he had discovered the true, philosophical history of the earth, of its formation, 
and of its past and future development. This, like the heliocentric system, contradicted the literal 
sense of certain passages of Scripture. The overwhelming evidence for the heliocentric system had led 
the literal sense of those passages of Scripture which it contradicted to be abandoned by all but a few. 
So, too, the evidence for his theory implied that the literal sense of the early chapters of Genesis 
should be abandoned likewise. That this had not been appreciated by his contemporaries and that it 
had cost him his ecclesiastical career made Burnet, in his eyes, a martyr for the “new science” just like 
Galileo and Bruno. 
 This is not to say of course that the story of Burnet and his theory embodies a straightforward 
conflict between science and religion of the kind White portrays. As countless subsequent historians 
of science and religion have amply shown, the historical relationship between these two worldviews 
is highly complex, and this is very much the case with Burnet’s theory. Although he wished to discard 
a literal interpretation of certain passages of Scripture which conflicted with his theory, his 
motivations for doing so were ultimately religious. He believed that opposition between reason and 
philosophy on the one hand and faith on the other was ultimately far more damaging to the latter 
than to the former. Truths about the world which contradict the literal sense of Scripture will in time 
be exposed, and so dogmatically pitting Scripture against reason and philosophy will ultimately 
discredit religion. Yet he is not trying to rescue orthodox seventeenth-century Christianity here, but 
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rather a rational, progressive form of it which is grounded in the fundamental tenets of the Christian 
faith and flexible as to inessential doctrines such as particular interpretations of specific passages of 
Scripture. It is these fundamental tenets, and in particular his rational conception of God’s wisdom 
and goodness, as much as a desire to cohere with philosophy, that motivate his denial of the literal 
sense of Genesis 1-3. These passages, if understood in their literal sense, conflict with this conception 
of God as much as with true philosophy, and so their literal sense must be abandoned. 
 The above considerations on the earth, philosophy, theology, and Scripture ultimately led 
Burnet to publish one of the most controversial texts of the late seventeenth century. This, as we have 
seen, gave rise to significant interest in and debate about the history of the earth. Eighteenth-century 
English theorists, undeterred by Keill’s refutation of Burnet and Whiston, continued to theorise about 
the earth along essentially the same lines as Burnet. Even those on the continent like Buffon and in 
Scotland like James Hutton – whose work borrowed Burnet’s title – who discarded the biblical 
timeframe and disregarded the Deluge paid attention to Burnet.2 Their evaluation of his theory was 
of course negative. They were moving away from biblical time and toward our modern notion of 
geological time, whereas Burnet believed the earth was merely six thousand years old. He did not, 
however, believe that it was created in six days, and he believed that it had formed and developed 
primarily as a result of natural processes. And this was an important first step away from a literal 
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Appendix: A Remark on a Passage in Dr. Burnets Telluris Theoria Sacra pag. 108 Edit. Lat. 
Classified Papers of the Royal Society, Cl.P/8i/51 
 
The Learned Author of this Treatise in ye aforementioned Page argues from ye zones observed in ye 
Planet Jupiter & ye spots in Mars & Venus, compared wth those in ye Moon, yt all ye Planets were 
formed like his primitive Earth wth a solid nucleus in ye center, an Abyss of waters over that, & a shell 
again covering yt Abyss of waters, ye breaking of wch on our Earth was ye cause of ye universal Deluge 
and ye intermixture of Land & seas, whereas his primitive earths have no seas in their surfaces. 
 The spots seen in ye Moon Venus and Mars with ye zones of Jupiter he will have proceed from 
a like breaking of their shells & mixture of ye Earth with ye waters. 
 But ye shell of Saturne he will have broak only towards ye Poles & so to have fall’n in as to 
leave a solid Arch standing over his equator wch formes ye present wonderfull appearance of his Ring. 
 Tis a Pleasant Conjecture & were it probable would almost force us to believe his Theory, but 
I fear out ingenious Author has pitcht upon it too hastily & yt when it is seriously considered it will 
rather wholy overthrow it. 
 For this Ring of Saturn (tho it be above half as broad as ye body of ye Planet) is yet so flat and 
thin yt tis not visible when ye Earth falls into its extended Plane, now tis highly probable and extreamly 
difficult to concieve that so thick a shell should breake off equally every where from this Rimm or Ring 
& leave it so very thin as we find it and perfectly flat without any inequalitys or eminencys to be 
discovered or seen by reflection of ye suns light, as his body is and ye Ring it selfe when the Earth is 
either above or beneath its Plane. 
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 But admit ye Ring of Saturne to have been formed as he would have it by ye falling in of ye 
shell, ye question then is what became of the shell and ye Abysse yt sustained it. I see not how he will 
dispose of it except he supposes yt ye present globe of that Plane was formed out of its ruines & that 
I shall shew is improbable by reason the shell considered alone conteined matter enough to make a 
Globe seven times & ye whole globe eleven times as bigg. 
 Mons Huygens in his Systema Saturnia page 47 gives us the true figure of this Planet wch I 
have here coppyed from him wherein he makes IH ye Diameter of his central Ball 4 such parts as the 
greatest Diameter of his Ring AB is 9 & it least or inward Diameter CD 6 
6
10
 wch proportions as often 
as I have viewed this Planet with long and good Telescopes I have ever found as exact as they could 
be determined by observation or judgment. 
 The breadth of ye Ring AC = DB is therefore 2 
4
10
 such parts as the Diameter of ye ball IH is 4. 
& this must be ye least thickness of ye shell before it fell in, for if we allow what our Author imagines 
(contrary to ye inviolable demonstration of two eminent mathematicians) yt all ye Planets were ovals 
or spheroids having their longest Diameters from Pole to Pole as he gives them in his oval figures or 
at least their Hemispheres were bigger than they would be should we concieve their Bodys perfect 
spheres described on ye Diameters of their Æquator. 
 I favour our Author therefore in supposeing ye body of Saturn perfectly spherical & yet more 
in not demanding any central ball on wch ye ruines of ye shell falling might increase ye bulk of ye 
planet. 
 Now Globes or Spheres are in proportion to each other as ye Cubes of ye Diameters by 18.e.12. 
 If therefore from ye Cube of ye longest Diameter of ye Ring ye Cube of its less be subtracted, 
ye remainder is ye solid content of ye shell before it fell in. 
 The Cube of HI = 4. The Diameter of ye Planet is 64. 
344 
 
 of AB = 9 The greatest Diam. of ye Ring is 729. 
 of CD = 6 
6
10




Which Cubes since they are proportional to ye spheres of ye same Diameters may be taken for ye 
contents of ye spheres themselves, and then ye Differences of ye Cubes of ye greatest & least 
Diameters of ye ring gives ye content of ye perfectly spherical shell GEF = 441 
1
2
 which contains 64 ye 
Cube of ye Diameter of ye present ball of Saturne almost almost 7 times so yt it is impossible ye body 
of ye Planet should be made up of ye Ruines of ye shell if they imployed as much space after as they 
did before their fall since they would made one almost 7 times as big as ye present is. 
 The Cube root of 441 
1
2
 is 7 
615
1000
 equall to ye Diameter Pd in the figure whereby it is pretended 
that ye ball made up of the Ruins of ye shell is so far from being contained within ye ring that it extends 
nearly halfe its breadth. 
 The outward space included betwixt ye Diameter of ye sphere Pd & sphere described on AB 
ye greatest diameter of ye Ring is equall to ye inward content of ye shell; if this space was filled wth a 
liquid such as he concieves filld ye Abysse of our Earth & ye other Planets before their Shells broke; a 
2d question will be askt what is become of it? why did it not mix with ye broken pieces of ye shell (as 
he imagines it did in our Earth & ye other Planets) & compose one nearly entire globe as it does in 
them of ye same bigness wth their first balls? how comes its bulk to be sunk into a globe that is but ye 
eleventh part of ye content of ye first. the water of our Earth cannot be so comprest how shall we 
concieve the liquid that sustained ye shell of Saturn could? Solid Arches of our Earth when they fall 
employ as much space as they did standing how can we imagine yt ye shell of Saturne breaking should 
sink into a ball of but a seventh part of its entire content. 
 It seems therefore much more probable yt ye Planet Saturne was formed at first in that shape 
wee see him with his Ring distinct from his body rather than in yt of ye Author or any other and no 
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less ye other Planets wth their land intermixt with seas much after the manner we now find them. tho 
since ye Creation there have happened changes in some few places by subterraneal Eruptions, 
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